Afghanistan wake-up call for US, EU and Italy
A month has passed since the Taliban took control of Kabul, sending Afghanistan back twenty years. There has been widespread bewilderment among NATO allies over the timing and strategy with which the US managed the troop withdrawal and opened the door for the Islamist militiamen to return. Academics, experts, and Western political leaders have tried to explain, without reaching an unambiguous conclusion, the responsibilities of the Joe Biden-led administration in an operation that showed a lack of tactics and will have a long-term impact on the course of American foreign policy. Not to mention the human cost. The death of thirteen Marines during the August 26 Kabul airport bombing, claimed by Isis-K terrorists, added to the hefty bill of a twenty-year mission: 2448 American soldiers and 3936 contractors died, $2.26 trillion spent, according to Brown University estimates.
An (external) crisis of distrust
The precipitous withdrawal of the American contingent from Afghanistan has triggered a crisis of distrust between the United States and NATO allies. Among the European countries that are members of the Alliance, starting with France and Germany, there are those who have complained about the lack of prior coordination between allies to organise the evacuation and ensure an orderly exit from the country. The images of the G7 in Cornwall in June, when the EU and the United States were in harmony on the main foreign policy dossiers, from relations with China to the containment of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, already seem distant. The Biden administration’s decision to speed up the exit from Afghanistan has helped to spread among the Old Continent’s allies the perception of a return to the “America First” policy, the flag and slogan of Donald Trump’s presidency, which has so often been the cause of misunderstandings between the two blocs over the past four years. A friction certified by the extraordinary G7 meeting on Afghanistan on August 24, which ended in a deadlock. Apart from the coordination of the evacuation, the meeting between Western leaders failed to draw up a common road map for the “after”, from the management of refugee flows to the fight against a probable resurgence of jihadist terrorism in Central Asia.
Quite different is the impact that the images from Kabul have had on Biden’s popularity and leadership in the United States. Despite a temporary drop in support, experts and pollsters agree in predicting a marginal role of the Afghan events in defining the future course of the presidency. A Pew Research Center survey carried out between August 23 and 29, with the evacuation almost over, shows that 54% of American adults are in favour of withdrawal from Afghanistan, compared to 42% against. There are other obstacles that may hinder Biden’s path to the 2024 goal. Among others, the vaccination campaign and the fight against the Delta variant of the Coronavirus; the containment of inflation and the revival of growth; the migrant emergency at the southern border with Mexico.
Kabul today, Taipei tomorrow?
In addition to a rearrangement of internal NATO relations, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan raises several questions about the future course of American strategy in Asia. If the Afghan army, trained and forged for twenty years with American and European taxpayers’ money, was left to its fate and proved incapable of withstanding the Taliban, what would happen to Taiwan’s armed forces if the US withdrew part of its fleet from the Indo-Pacific? A question that divides scholars of international politics and has already fuelled a Chinese Communist Party media propaganda campaign under the motto: “America has abandoned Kabul, it is ready to abandon Taipei”. Although these are two very different strategic scenarios, it is difficult to deny an impact of the American withdrawal from Kabul on relations with Pacific allies, Taiwan in the lead. As Ispi’s Lorenzo Lamperti has noted, the huge economic effort of the United States to militarily support the island threatened by a possible invasion by China does not necessarily imply an intervention in its defence. In fact, there is no such constraint in the Taiwan Relations Act, which merely enshrines a US commitment to provide the island with the necessary military means. Other analysts, such as the director of the think tank Cnas (Center for a New American Security) Richard Fontaine, argue instead that pulling out of Afghanistan will allow the US to concentrate more resources on containing China in the Indo-Pacific.
The European Stalemate
If the backlash of the Afghan chaos on the credibility of American foreign policy is unquestionable, the test awaiting EU foreign policy is no less so. Just as the Covid-19 pandemic has forced Brussels to make a strategic turn on the economic policy front, shelving austerity recipes albeit temporarily, so the drama in Afghanistan today constitutes a crucial test for the Union’s solidarity and cohesion. The extraordinary Internal Affairs Council of August 31 indicated a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand the rules of engagement for aid policy: lacking official recognition of the Islamic Emirate to which no European country has so far opened its doors, member states will have to send money and supplies exclusively to UN agencies to help the local population. On the other, the most intricate knot: reception policies. Once again, crossed vetoes, especially from the Central and Eastern European member states, have forced a downward compromise that could be summed up with the slogan: “Let’s help them close to home”. The agreement envisages giving priority to supporting the neighbouring countries that will be most exposed to the flow of Afghan refugees in the coming months, from Pakistan to Tajikistan, from Iran to Uzbekistan. A solution to create a first line of attack on the migratory wave that does not, however, define a common strategy to receive political refugees fleeing the regime in Europe.
Autonomous, how?
The unfortunate conclusion of the mission in Afghanistan has also reopened the debate on the repositioning of Europe within NATO as well as the need to pursue the goal of “strategic autonomy” and a common European defence. A genuine flagship of the EU Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, the call for greater autonomy that has been relaunched by European chancelleries over the past two years has been greeted with scepticism across the board by American politicians. Beyond the rhetoric, the practical application of a concept widely abused by European political leaders is what makes the difference. If autonomy means a greater economic contribution to NATO, it is hard to imagine resistance from the United States: exactly like the Trump administration, Joe Biden’s White House has never failed to remind its European allies of their commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP to support the Alliance’s coffers. The numbers don’t lie: according to Nato data, only ten Nato countries will have reached the target in 2020. The case of EU autonomy interpreted as “equidistance” or even “independence” from the American ally is different. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised on his first trip to Europe last March, the US believes that EU alone is not able to stand up to the military and economic pressure of Russia and China.
What does it mean for Italy’s national interest?
Italy has paid a high price in the Afghan war: 53 soldiers killed, 700 wounded, and a total expenditure of 8.7 billion euro for the “Enduring Freedom” and “Resolute Support” missions. Having lowered the flag on June 8 in Herat, where a substantial part of the military’s 900 troops were stationed in the field, the Italians remained in Afghanistan, making a crucial contribution to the evacuation of civilians from Kabul: in the second half of August, more than 5,000 people left the country for Rome. There are now two main challenges facing the government led by Mario Draghi. The first: Italy’s commitment alongside the United States in Central Asia has not ended. From the spring of 2022, Italy will in fact be leading the NATO mission in Iraq, where around 1,100 military personnel are currently stationed between the bases in Erbil and Baghdad. An even more onerous task in light of the end of the mission in Afghanistan and the gradual relaxation of the American presence in Iraq (by the end of 2021, the United States will end military operations in “combat” mode). The second challenge is instead diplomatic and concerns the Italian presidency of the G20. The circumstances make the international forum the most suitable stage for finding a common course of action on the future of Afghanistan. Draghi has already stated that he considers a dialogue with the most influential players in the region, including two “systemic rivals” such as China and Russia, as well as Turkey and Pakistan, to be indispensable. The extraordinary G20 will then be an important test of the “pragmatic Atlanticism” that has so far characterised the Prime Minister. The domestic difficulties of French President Emmanuel Macron and outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel, both grappling with tricky electoral appointments, open a window of opportunity for Draghi to take the helm of European foreign policy. The road is narrow and not devoid of risk. But it is also the only viable one.