EURISPES

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Summary Document
Italy Report 2004

The 16th
ITALY REPORT

<u>Avenues for research into italian society</u>

ON REPRESENTATION
ON FREEDOM
ON THE ECONOMY
ON KNOWLEDGE
ON COMPETITIVENESS
ON COSTUME

Methodological notes

The sample survey was carried out on a stratified sample based on the distribution of the population by gender, age group (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-64; 65 and over) and geographical area (North-West, North-East, Centre, South and the Islands) as shown by the data of the latest ISTAT Census.
The survey was carried out through the face-to-face administration of a semi-structured questionnaire.
A total of 1,120 questionnaires were filled in and analysed, investigating various thematic areas.
The survey took place in the period from 4 December 2003 to 4 January 2004.

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

By *Gian Maria Fara*, President of Eurispes

General Considerations | A country in search of an author

The hardest thing is always coming back to discover what is already known. E. Canetti

A lost and distrustful Italy

The Italy we see, free of ideological conditioning and political sympathies, is a lost, distrustful Italy in search of an identity.
There are many causes behind the sense of bewilderment, mistrust, and uncertainty that runs through the country.
The current situation is the result of the intertwining of recent and long-term processes that call into question various and concomitant economic, political, social, and psychological factors.
In last year's report, we highlighted the difficulties and failures caused by the rise of the dangerous culture of manicheism. We were convinced that an excessive radicalization of political confrontation would have damaged the prestige of Parliament and the institutions and weakened, at the same time, both the action of the government majority and that of the opposition, producing a slowdown in the process of legitimising bipolarism necessary for the consolidation of the democracy of alternation. However, the political forces have not been able to overcome the partisan spirit that has characterised their paths in recent years, affirming, in the face of public opinion, a vocation for conflict that is difficult to overcome even within the two camps themselves. The difficulties in holding the different souls of the government majority correspond to the division and lack of an alternative project by the opposition.
The conflict extended from the parliamentary halls to the various issues that, from time to time, would require more responsible attitudes to protect general interests.
The overall image of politics and institutions has suffered, and the need to reassert the primacy of politics is at a standstill.

The grimilde syndrome

The government's promised reform initiatives have thus far concentrated on a small number of specific problems, leaving little room for the country's overall expectations and needs.
The impossibility of a bipartisan agreement on institutional reforms and the rejection of the consultation method make it difficult to initiate a modernization process, for which both the active participation of the opposition and the collaboration and involvement of the social partners are necessary.
At the same time, the opposition demonstrates that it has not managed to rid itself of the 'culture of demonization" that leads it to focus its action on the person of the Prime Minister—the leader of a majority legitimately expressed by the electorate—instead of directing it, in the ways and forms demanded by a proper democratic approach, towards the issues and problems that really matter to the vast majority of Italians.
As a result, politics offers a self-portrayal of rancour, brawls, and resentments, with a smallmindedness and a blind-eye view on the various issues, more interested in pleasing herself in front of the mirror, like Snow White's stepmother, than in taking care of the interests and problems, now serious, caused by the difficult economic situation that threatens, along with the prospects for growth, even the classes that have always enjoyed a certain stability and security.

The desire and ability to analyse and investigate the real issues that affect Italians have disappeared. Politics relies on entertainment and third - or fourth - rate talk shows on public and private television, while, after the signing of the 'Pact with the Italians', issues of a certain importance are discussed, instead of in Parliament, at *Porta a Porta* or on *Telecamere,* where the narcissism of politicians finds its full realisation.
What is affirmed is a politics of enunciation and representation that finds no correspondence in the reality of facts. The product of this drift is the *politician-transformer*, focused on slogans and catchy expressions but empty of politically appreciable content.
"*Mirror, mirror of my worries, who is the fairest of them all?*"

Poor galilei!

It would be simpler and more convenient to rely on the flattery and comforts of consolatory sociology or tame statistics instead of claiming to describe reality without complacency or pretence, especially when all around us consciences tend to slide down the slope of soporific conformism.
However, those who chose to devote themselves to social research, knowing how tiring and often thankless the task was, took into account the discomfort for themselves and others of having to say, when necessary, even unpleasant things.
Power, in all latitudes and even in democracy, does not appreciate those who question, challenge, or reveal its limitations, contradictions, or shortcomings. But the role of the intellectual demands this. And on the other hand, faced with the host of celebrators who are always available, someone has to take it upon himself to speak out, also for the benefit of power itself, which, as often happens, ends up paying directly for the piousness of the useless idiots it uses.
Sociology has the task of interpreting and describing social facts, but in recent years its traditional role has been charged with a new and heavy responsibility: that of having to engage in an action of unveiling and denouncing in the face of the desire to conceal, to disguise, to deny even obvious truths.
The terms of the heated controversy that has pitted Eurispes against the National Statistics Institute over the past year are well known. We have been accused of being, from time to time, 'ghost hunters', 'dangerous alarmists', and "interested pessimists'. Today we see our analyses confirmed by incontrovertible scientific facts and the daily experience of millions of Italian families and shared by the highest authorities in the field of economics, in peace with those 'authoritative commentators' always ready to put their pen to the service of well-paid causes. However, it matters little to us that we were right, not least because satisfaction is, unfortunately, overshadowed by the loss of authority of an important piece of those institutions to which we all refer and to which we would all very much like to see represented and protected.
However, the institution's rejection of the assistance that regular citizens offered in a spirit of service to the pursuit of truth may be the most striking and yet underappreciated aspect by many observers. A refusal that confirms the feudal nature that still characterises large strata of politics, government, and public administration, which believe that there should only be one interpretation of facts and reality: the official one. They have even gone so far as to theorise that only that which is public or comes from institutions can be scientific, nullifying with a few jokes the hard struggle waged over the centuries by science against the established power to affirm what could not be affirmed. Poor Galilei!
The afterthought is clear: the management of public affairs belongs exclusively to the representatives of the institutions, and citizens, even in the face of the most irrefutable of demonstrations, are not entitled to criticism or dissent on pain of excommunication.
As Voltaire said, it is dangerous to be right when the government is wrong!
There is in all of this the bitter taste of the symptoms of an intolerance of resistance to standardisation, of a closure to confrontation and discussion, of a gradual erosion of spaces of freedom.
At the same time, there are those who describe, with an accommodating approach, Italians as being by now withdrawn into the management of their own private affairs, indifferent to general issues, and far removed from politics and the economy. On the contrary, there are an increasing number of signs of unease and malaise coming from the social body, suggesting strong attention and participation in the

evolution of the political and economic situation, especially when this directly affects the quality of life and the very future of millions of families.
So, no matter how hard one tries to disguise the evidence or impose a more reassuring virtual one, the fact remains that representation cannot long replace a reality that nonetheless emerges and declares itself with all its force.

A new social darwinism

The government of 'capitalist rationality', with its puny ideological background that still confuses liberal culture with liberalism, is unable to interpret the true needs of Italian society, closed as it is in the protection of corporate interests, when not particular, and prisoner of an accountant's view of politics and state administration.
It will be said that the difficult inheritance handed down from the past imposes rigour and sacrifices, but the problem, which now emerges forcefully, is that some are only granted rights and others only duties.
The waning of that aspiration for fairness, social justice, and protection of the weakest, which had ensured Italy's growth and affirmation over the previous fifty years, is exacerbating the unease in ever more striking ways.
The progressive dismantling of welfare, the vertical drop in the quality of services—from health to transport—the transformation of the labour market that imposes a new social Darwinism and the monadialization of subjects, and the difficulty for young people to imagine a decent future are all signs of the loss of that spirit of solidarity needed to move the country forward.
And while all this is happening, the spectre of poverty is widening to occupy territories that only a few years ago were unknown to it: the middle classes are forced, for the first time in decades, to defend themselves against the danger of a pressing proletarianization. Social mobility is blocked on the bottom-up path, while a highway has opened up on the top-down one. The mechanism for distributing wealth now concentrated at the top of the social hierarchy seems to have jammed.
The 'three-thirds society' that we feared a few years ago has become a reality: *one-third super-wealthy, one-third poor, and one-third at risk of poverty*.
Silently, in recent years, there has been a breakdown of the social pact that, despite tensions and difficulties, guaranteed stability and growth. The result is that of a system within which it appears increasingly difficult to recognise and identify oneself, where it is increasingly difficult to feel part of a whole, and where identity processes are becoming weaker every day because they are homologated by the consumer society or bureaucratic because they are traced back to role, function, status, or belonging.
Through this process, neo-corporative drifts that were thought to have been archived are reborn and gain new vigour.
Conflict returns to the scene with all its disruptive power, and, in the absence of a real system of social regulation, needs are sacrificed to interests, and a sense of the deep malaise that now grips ever larger parts of society is lost.
Admittedly, the radicalization of the positions of certain categories of workers appears to be disrespectful of the general interest, yet it is a sure indicator of the insecurity now rooted in the various social strata.
In the controversy that followed the railway workers' strikes in Milan, for example, the workers were accused of violating the self-regulation rules for strikes in public services.
Few, however, remarked on the fact—even more serious in our opinion—that a contract signed two years ago was still unimplemented. Perhaps people forget that institutions have more duties than can be demanded of individuals.
When the institutions are the first to fail to respect pacts, the overall image of the administration cannot help but lose credibility and prestige. *Pacta sunt servanda,* and this should be the principle from which not even, or rather above all, the institutions can escape, on pain of calling into question the fundamental rules on which social living is organised.

If this were to become the new model of relations with which public administrations deal with citizens and workers, we must take into account the opening of a new season of claims and protests that are difficult to govern.
This is all the more likely when one considers how, especially in large urban concentrations, the salaries of public and private employees have become completely insufficient to guarantee an acceptable quality of life and, in many cases, even to ensure a dignified survival.
Suffice it to say that in 2001–2003, the loss of purchasing power in wages was 19.7% for white-collar workers, 16% for blue-collar workers, 15.4% for executives, and 13.3% for middle managers.
Confirming a widespread feeling of disappointment and concern among the population, our surveys on the Italians' attitude towards the Berlusconi government's economic policy also concur: two out of three Italians consider it to be mismatched with the country's needs, bankrupt, and full of broken promises.
But the most worrying signal for the government should come from the fact that the most negative judgements come from the youngest segments of the population, from women, and from the North-West regions and the Islands. All segments of the electorate in which the centre-right had reaped strong support
The current government majority, but especially the Right, should remember that it owes its success not only to the votes of the uptowners but also, or perhaps above all, to those of the urban proletariat and underclass in the metropolitan suburbs.
The opposition parties, on the other hand, linger in the search for magic formulas and improbable alchemies in the hope of succeeding in bringing together radically opposed conceptions instead of working to define an acceptable alternative government programme.
Italians have the feeling that they have gotten themselves into a labyrinth from which they no longer know how to get out, not least because, at the moment, there seems to be no Ariadne's thread available.
This is now the general belief, and, absurdly, in what should have been a season of accomplished democracy, it appears difficult even to identify credible hypotheses for a replacement.
All gods have now fallen, and of the new ones, there is no trace.

Promises and results

And while the poor performance of the economy, the lack of GDP growth, the fall in industrial production and consumption, and the loss of household purchasing power impoverish Italians, it seems increasingly difficult to discern the traces of the commitments contained in the 'Pact with the Italians' signed by the current Head of Government with the electorate.
The law on conflict of interest, which seemed to be one of the priorities of the majority and the government, is like the phoenix; everyone is talking about it but no one knows where it is, and the less young, who retain a good memory of the past, go back in their minds to the early years of the Republic, when the then Minister of Agriculture, Antonio Segni, passed the law on land reform that expropriated part of the
of the same minister's agricultural property. The area expropriated from the Segni family in Pian di Sorres, between Sassari and Porto Torres, was about 100 hectares (one million square metres). The amount of the expropriation represented about one-fifth of the family's agricultural property.
Other times and other gentlemen!
The modernization of the public administration is still a dream; much-needed public works have not been started; the reform of the justice system continues to be a terrain of contention and confrontation; the reduction of the tax levy is a chimaera; the revitalization of the Mezzogiorno is an idea.
The feeling of being in the middle of a quagmire persists, and Italians are attempting to separate the most diverse electoral systems (municipalities, provinces, regions, Chamber of Deputies, and Senate) from a desire for stability that the political forces have never fully understood while waiting to learn something certain about the reform of the institutions and the federalist perspective.
Bipolarity, on the other hand, has not succeeded in producing greater homogeneity within the different camps, and the current government majority is now being blamed for the same mistakes and the same

wearisome divisions that were blamed on the current opposition at the time. On the contrary, it seems that the divisions and contrasts are even more radical within the same alignments than between them.
The continued fibrillation jeopardises the very stability of the majority and the possibility for the opposition to develop a credible alternative government programme.
Things look no better for the various institutions through which the country is supposed to be governed. The reduction in the number of ministries, envisaged by a law passed by the previous centre-left government a few days before the end of the legislature, proved to be more than ineffective; it was even harmful.
Again, the tendency to deal with complexity through often superficial simplification mechanisms has led to the creation of ungovernable monsters.
In some cases, four or even five of the old dicasteries have been merged into one, with intricate and complex problems of reorganisation, use of human resources, and redefinition of internal procedures and competences. The result is that the bureaucratic machine of the central administration has had to call into question, within a tight timeframe, the balances painstakingly achieved through the numerous adjustments imposed by the reform processes of past years.
In essence, what should have represented a streamlining capable of ensuring greater incisiveness in the administration's action has become a real obstacle, a hindrance that has slowed down the very action of government, creating, at the same time, unease, loss of identity, and disorientation within the bureaucratic apparatus.
At this juncture, the 'enterprise culture', of which the government feels itself to be the bearer, played to the disadvantage of its champions. Indeed, the idea of reducing the number of departments was espoused in the belief that, as happens in a large enterprise, the result would be to reduce the number of spending centres and keep spending under control. Often, however, business culture and government culture fail to marry, and, in any case, governing a country is quite different from running a company, as experience is amply demonstrating.

The loyalty prize

No less damage has been caused by the introduction of the spoil system mechanism, which is completely foreign to the Italian administrative tradition and is practised in completely different and differently graded forms in countries such as the United States, where it is customary for every change of government to correspond to a change of top and senior management in the administration, while the apparatus continues to perform its traditional servant function. In short, one wanted to graft on a system that belongs to other cultures and other traditions when one should have been working towards a different model, such as the French one, for example, in which the 'service to the state" function of the bureaucratic apparatus is exalted and which the various governments make use of. Perhaps, rather than the spoil system, our Public Administration would have needed a thorough retraining and the creation of a school for senior management, like the French Ena. Instead, the feeling was given of wanting, at all costs, to occupy every possible chair, with the result of actually challenging those state managers who would have done their duty regardless of the colour of the government.
It was thought that loyalty could compensate for lacking skills and intelligence, and it was deprived of skills and experience in management and administration, contributing to the ungovernability of the system and giving citizens an image of approximation if not amateurism.
On another level, the certainties and hopes placed in the guarantee role entrusted to the various authorities have disappeared.
The commitment of the Communication Authority, whose prospects are still unclear after many years, is poor and ineffective; the Antitrust Authority, attentive and punctual but often unheeded, is adequate; and Consob's balance sheet is a failure, as it fails to protect savers and listed companies that fully comply with their duties. The Energy Authority, on the other hand, plays a role that is unknown to most people, whereas Stefano Rodotà's Authority for the Protection of Privacy, a rare bird in the desert, plays a positive and satisfactory role because it has been able to keep up with the advancement of society and technological advancements.

Overall, we are seeing a progressive loss of the role of the state and a further alienation of citizens from central institutions as a result of both the obvious difficulty in governing and the ongoing delegitimization work done by well-identified sectors of the same majority that claim to be both in government and in opposition.

A country awaiting trial

If politics fails to restore the confidence of Italians and alleviate their anxieties and fears, justice contributes to their disorientation.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Italians placed their expectations of change and the restoration of a legality that had been disregarded for too long in the judiciary. The idea of entrusting the judiciary with the custody and defence of values, which should instead be shared and lived by all on a cultural and behavioural level, proved not to work. Sinning with pride, some sectors of the judiciary thought they could take on a role that was not theirs to take on: that of moralising the public life of the country through the courts.
The undeclared temptation to replace politics; the defence, which has often appeared corporatist, of prerogatives and on some occasions of privileges; the excessive prominence of certain magistrates; the enormous distance between the number of prosecutions initiated and those concluded with the conviction of the accused; the incredible length of proceedings; the spectacularisation of justice; the substantial selfreferentiality of the judicial order, which sometimes leads to confusing independence and autonomy with licence; the extremely high number of miscarriages of justice that have led almost five million citizens to be unjustly imprisoned in the last fifty years; and finally, the representation of a judicial order that is politically connoted, in one direction or another, which puts citizens in the unfortunate position of having to worry, in the event of a trial, about the orientation of the accusers or judges and therefore about their actual impartiality.
Not to mention the numerous conflicting sentences, the different penalties imposed for identical offences, and the contradiction between first, second, and third instance sentences. To all this must be added the disappointment caused by the discovery of magistrates in the pay of private companies, whom, to tell the truth, the judiciary itself has been able to clean up.
Over the years, all this has contributed to undermining the image of justice and the credibility of the judiciary itself, which citizens would like to see at a distance from political events and as a safe guardian of impartiality and guarantees.
It is precisely this overexposure and the fact that it has fuelled excessive expectations in public opinion that have caused a feeling of disillusionment and mistrust, as well as the attenuation of that aspiration to legality that accompanied the start of the Clean Hands season.
The daily chronicle rattles off its rosary of cases of corruption and embezzlement; citizens are convinced that illegality is even more widespread than in past years; and, silently, the four mafias (mafia, camorra, 'ndrangheta, and sacra corona unita) produce a volume of business that, according to our estimates, has now reached a size of 9.5% of Italy's gross domestic product.
Today, citizens' opinion of the level of corruption in Italian public life is rather negative. 46.5% of Italians believe that corruption has remained unchanged since 1992, and one in four (24.7%) think that it has increased since then.
However, it would be reductive as well as unfair to attribute the resurgence of lawlessness to the difficulties of justice or to the responsibility of magistrates.
Politics has played a decisive role in the resurgence of illegality, especially when it thought that the reconquest of its primacy could pass through the weakening, de-legitimization, and subjugation of the judiciary, or when it showed how legality could be bent and adapted to personal or partisan interests or those of the state itself, as in the case of amnesties that reward cunning and illegality and mortify correctness and respect for the law.
Just as it has failed in its duties by neglecting the strengthening of judicial offices through the hiring of new cadres, the allocation of the necessary financial resources, and the modernization of technological

instruments, with the end result that there are over five million criminal trials pending and over three million civil trials, with at least ten million Italians waiting for justice but unable to obtain it.

The rise and fall of the entrepreneurial myth

Another cause of the bewilderment is to be found in the failure of the promises of the economy and Italy's stuttering capitalism, since the country is now paying for the claim of the full primacy of the economy over politics.

In the early 1990s, the Italian political system was overwhelmed by the intertwining of the results of judicial investigations with the drive of the economic and financial world to get rid of the 'weight' of politics.

The business world was convinced that it could do without that mediating element, politics, which was accused of slowing down the march of the economy's *magnificent and progressive fortunes*. The unhealthy idea that 'capitalist rationality' could guide the country towards growth no longer held back by the ballast, vetoes, and tolls of politics fascinated the Italians.

The new myth was welded with that of a judiciary that would, in parallel, carry out the operations of clearing and cleaning up the institutions.

The economy and finance imposed their own times, rhythms, and interests, which seemed, at least in appearance, to coincide with those of the Italians and the country.

Faced with the sudden collapse of the old system, a new political class was invented within a few months, but it was a class of businessmen, as devoted to their bosses as they were ignorant of the affairs of state.

The results were seen with the first Berlusconi government and the subsequent technical government of Dini, filled with financial experts, accountants, and consultants in various capacities.

The idea that was gaining ground was that Italy should be governed like a company, and this logic found many supporters. In fact, it was no coincidence that in the 1996 elections, won by the Ulivo, the centre-left side fielded a manager with long experience in public companies like Prodi to oppose a private manager like Berlusconi. The difficulty was thus made official.

And even today, amidst ups and downs, it seems that the confrontation and representation of the two camps can only be entrusted to two 'technicians', while the exponents of traditional politics are relegated to the role of supporting players.

Sign of economic strength? Inability of politics?

The impression is that the economy has no desire to return the sceptre won also through the action of the judiciary and that politics has not yet overcome the guilt complex linked to the causes of the decline of the 'First Republic'.

Be that as it may, the myth of entrepreneurship in government has gradually crumbled to its lowest level of acceptance in recent months.

Italians seem to have understood that it is one thing to lead, perhaps successfully, a company; it is quite another to lead a complicated country like Italy, with its history, traditions, cultures, and peculiarities, but also its delays, vices, weaknesses, and needs.

A country that is going through one of the most difficult times in its history, marked by progressive industrial decline and a general loss of competitiveness in several sectors of the national economy.

Italy is seeing a sharp drop in orders and turnover in the main sectors of economic activity. The drop in industrial production is generalised and affects both low and high value-added sectors. In fact, during the period 2000–2003, appreciable decreases were recorded in the leather (-15.9 points), electrical machinery (-18.5), means of transport (-17.9), and textiles (-10) sectors.

Economists, entrepreneurs, and opinion leaders agree in emphasising the main factors of the involution process: the recessionary impact on world economies following September 11, the increasingly aggressive role of the Chinese, Indian, and Eastern European economies in general, and the life cycle of certain Italian products that have now reached full maturity.

These are objectively valid explanations linked to the unfolding of the capitalist model in geoeconomic areas that were previously closed to the free play of competition and market dynamics: in these areas,

significant phenomena of productive internationalisation (company delocalization, transfer of western technologies, patents, and know-how, massive entry of multinationals in industry and services) have occurred thanks to the contribution of external financial capital.
But does this fully explain Italy's 41st place in the hierarchy of world competitiveness in 2003, according to the *World Economic Forum*?
The economic slowdown is the result of significant structural processes of a productive, social, and demographic nature.
For the first time in the history of Western societies, traditional production sectors in crisis, or where the life cycle of certain products seems to have come to an end, are not being supplanted by others capable of immediately creating new employment, added value, and outlet markets for their products.
Factors such as the ageing of the population and the gradual loss of the traditional system of social and employment guarantees also have a negative effect on the psychological attitudes of economic actors, reducing their investment capacity and risk appetite.
A young population is inclined to think and build for the future; an older population is bound to the immediate perspective.
In short, the entire society will experience a sense of uncertainty and bewilderment if we continue to think in terms of the short term and immediate profit. The very idea of the future will be called into question.
For their part, those in charge of economic policy mostly produce short-term responses, so that all concerns seem to be resolved in the short-term measures contained in the Budget, renouncing structural interventions and abdicating, in short, what should be the search for evolutionary trajectories and cumulative processes capable of ensuring stability and growth for the system in the long term.
We say that structural and complex problems require structural and complex interventions, the ability to imagine the future of one's own country in the long term, and the ability to project one's own action beyond contingent problems.

Consultation? No, thanks!

We are convinced that what is happening is primarily attributable to imperfect models of economic and political leadership, historical anomalies, and structural and cultural lags in the Italian production system.
Since the economy has taken over from politics, the Italian system has progressively moved away *from the dimension of wholeness to embrace that of the mere sum of the parts*. A model of bureaucratic efficiency has been pursued that is imperfect and inconsistent with the traditional canons of our public administrations, and rules and procedures have been applied that have attempted to de-bureaucratize the labour market (through the excessive flexibilization of contractual and salary formulas) but have in fact, on the one hand, impoverished the value of human resources in terms of skills, abilities, and knowledge, and on the other, the same companies, dazzled by the myth of flexibility, are now rarely able to treasure the experience and professional skills of their employees.
The loss of the model of *global governance of the economy* that had accompanied the first fifty years of republican history significantly weakened the degree of interdependence between the elements and between the subjects of production and distribution.
In particular, faced with the spectrum of exogenous and endogenous stresses (globalisation of the economy, increased levels of competition, technological changes, deconstruction of traditional forms of organisation and production, transformations of labour market rules, and, with reference to human resources, changes in professional expectations and the skills required by the production apparatus) to which the Italian economic system has been subjected, the propensity to provide random and independent responses has grown on the part of entrepreneurial subjects and the actors in charge of steering the economy, responsible for the country's political and economic guidelines.
The contraction of the levels of interaction between the elements of the system has resulted in the loss of the regulatory capacity of the leading institutions of the economy, of the sectors of economic activity,

and of the social partners involved in the production processes, with the increase of entropy and the fall of the organisational levels of the system at all levels.
The ongoing disputes between the Ministry of the Economy and the Bank of Italy serve as evidence that institutional decisionmakers in the current historical-political phase reproduce independent response mechanisms and fragmented reactions when confronted with the systemic crisis, encouraging institutional confrontation rather than the search for technical solutions to the issue.
The rejection of the consultation model, tenaciously pursued by the current government, is perhaps the most significant and deleterious result of a method of conflict resolution between social partners that lacks an organic and systemic vision.

In the name of laissez faire...

A government without a compass seems to aim directly at ideological division, at the exasperation of conflict, whatever the object of contention may be: from pension reform to the Alitalia employee crisis, from the Cirio case to Parmalat, to the tram workers' strike.
Hardly ever do we witness preceptive, regulatory, and organisational moments at a higher level. The result of political and governmental action only succeeds in changing the system to a lower level of efficiency.
A method that only contemplates internal relations of a competitive and conflictual nature inevitably generates a *system of progressive individualization* where a project is absent.
overall development, where *the subject parts grow* more than the *whole, more than* the system; indeed, they tend to gradually engulf the other elements and resources of the system itself.
Among these *party subjects that are growing more than anything else,* we find, for example, the RaiMediaset binomial that perpetuates a duopoly that will eventually devour the market for advertising resources with serious consequences for the other players in the national mass media system, calling into question the very survival of the printed page, a bulwark of democracy and freedom.
Another sector in which a monopolistic spirit has established itself is that of insurance, where there is a complete absence of effective measures to curb the unjustified increases practised annually by companies.
Even the advantage linked to the introduction of the single European currency, surreptitiously secured by the government for *wholesale and retail traders* and *key figures in the distribution sector*, is the result of the application of a logic alien to the method of inter-sectoral and inter-professional interest composition.
In this case, the government, culpably underestimating the consequences of the introduction of the euro, did not produce any effective political and administrative intervention to curb the growth in the prices of basic necessities, or 'regulated' prices, such as transport and other utilities.
And it has done so in the name of a laissez-*faire, laissez-passer* manner and ideologically disguised by the principles of cheap liberalism, which has nothing to do with a serious liberal policy that should instead pursue a harmonious and systemic development of all sectors of the economy and all professional areas engaged in the production process.
And what can we say about the ever-increasing role that *multinationals in the services and advanced tertiary sector* are taking on in *Italy*, those same multinationals that, according to a *global service* logic, range over the most diverse areas of activity (from the auditing and certification of company balance sheets, to the evaluation of the spending policies of territorial and other public bodies, from monitoring the quality of administrative activities to the implementation of vocational training interventions, to the provision of institutional public communication services, from research to legal advice) create a dangerous intertwining of interests, especially between controllers and controlled, that is almost impossible to untangle in both the public and private sectors of the economy.
A *non-systemic model of economic governance* inevitably tends to selectively privilege specific sectors of activity and specific management structures, conferring on a few subjects pilot functions for the entire national system and delegating an absolute and irresponsible supremacy, both in terms of setting prices

and tariffs and in terms of attributing the power to operate in mono-oligopolistic conditions, outside any scheme of market competitiveness.
Generally, in this process, in order to justify the allocation or transfer of functions, financial resources, decision-making powers, and responsibilities, the pretext of the company dimension is assumed, which should ensure that companies, *holding companies*, and modern techno-structures can compete in international markets in a globalised context.
In this sense, the *Parmalat affair* is emblematic: by bypassing all the control systems in force, it was able to drain colossal portions of public savings, resources that could have been better channelled towards suffering productive sectors or in the direction of credible entrepreneurial projects that lacked adequate economic support.
In this case, it would be necessary to open up another front, that of the *interpenetration between banks, finance, and company ownership*. A perverse entanglement that has had distorting effects on the level both of competition between companies and of the financing of truly reliable business plans, and, finally, on the implementation of an effective control of the managing and disbursing entities of public savings with respect to the recipients.
Protecting public savings should also go hand in hand with improving, in the sense of greater fairness, the criteria for granting credit to citizens. Everyone is aware of the increasing difficulty for ordinary citizens to obtain a loan or credit from the Italian banking system. This represents
certainly a factor that, by blocking the injection of financial resources into the production and exchange circuit, slows down the development of the national economy.

Rana rupta et bos

But failure does not only concern the projection of the economy into politics. Above all, our entrepreneurship fails on its own, as the Fiat crisis and the collapse of Cirio and Parmalat demonstrate to varying degrees.
Cragnotti and Tanzi, once celebrated by the media and aided and abetted by the banks, are a metaphor for the misinterpretation of globalisation and the confusion between the real economy and the virtual economy, between the games of 'creative finance' and the hard realities of business problems.
Some, despite their negative experiences, continue to claim that our industrial system, made up of small and medium-sized enterprises, is totally inadequate to compete internationally and that we should therefore have larger and larger companies that are able to assert themselves on the world stage.
The problem is that no matter how great one's ambitions, 'natura non facit saltus': when one pretends to be what one is not, thinking that one can grow disproportionately in a few years, one runs the risk of ending up like the frog in Phaedrus' fable (rana rupta et bos).
Italian companies that operate successfully internationally, even managing to be leaders in their respective sectors, are the result of long entrepreneurial trajectories, patient leadership building, and a strong and solid corporate culture.
The other successful brands that accredit Made in Italy in the world correspond to medium-small companies with high technological and quality content; one only has to think of the actual size of Ferrari, Maserati, Armani, Valentino, or the Parma ham consortium.
It would be necessary, then, to finally take note that the 'philosophy of gigantism', which seems to fascinate so many authoritative exponents of politics and the government, must be archived in order to devote new attention and space to those who truly produce jobs, turnover, and tidy balance sheets. Without forgetting that it was precisely the network of small and medium-sized enterprises that saved the country from the decline of big industry.
A system firmly rooted in the territory that manages to project itself with its own brands even at an international level and that all other countries envy.
Mind you, there is no intention here to pursue the logic, in many respects outdated, of *small is beautiful*, which has become almost a rhetorical figure, a recurring and easily used slogan, especially by a certain political and entrepreneurial class, devoid of ideas and detached from today's trajectories of the globalised economy.

And on the other hand, 'small is beautiful' was always little more than a slogan coined to appease that system of small and medium-sized enterprises that demanded consideration, visibility, and resources in order to grow. It got consideration and praise, hence the slogan, but never got the resources and support that could have made it big.
The state aid and financing from the banks were all for big business: various subsidies, non-repayable funds, and redundancy payments at the point of need. If anyone today had the patience to calculate the amount of funding and aid granted to companies that then closed, leaving thousands of workers on the street, they would realise the enormous damage caused to the country not only in terms of wasted resources but also in terms of environmental disfigurement and lost opportunities.
Those were the years of the great settlements and the chemical kombinats, and Italian history is littered with the economic and social failures of this culture.
The factory was then the only place of social legitimization, and it didn't matter what was being manufactured or whether what was being manufactured had a market and the company a prospect; the important thing was that the workers were there and, with them, the trade unions and parties that could represent them.
No one admits it, but the ideology that underpinned this development model had strong continuity with the fascist ideology of autarchy: we must be self-sufficient with our cars, our steel, and our chemicals. Who can remember Efim, Egam, and so many other acronyms that have now disappeared but that drained, like a bottomless pit, an incredible amount of public resources?
And while other, more alert countries were beginning to invest in new technologies and services and to realise that the future would be owned by the producers of knowledge, by those who invested in research, we were trudging behind the myth of industrial power.
Our true heritage—creativity, territory, culture, and art—remained unused, abandoned to itself. We had to wait for the arrival of the Aga Khan in Sardinia to understand how business tourism could develop.

China is close

Today, a successful industrialist like Vittorio Merloni reminds us that 'the time is ripe to focus on tourism with conviction' and that 'Italian beaches and even more so our artistic heritage constitute a *unique value* that the world envies us'.
Merloni also extols the investment in intangible values such as brand and image that allow Diego della Valle to 'sell his shoes at a price many times higher than industrial costs'.
The future of our economy is not built by feeding protectionist drifts or the irrational fears of the arrival of the Chinese, but by enhancing the quality and image of our production.
Sure, 'China is near," and we are now a market, especially for certain low-cost products. But it is also true that the opening of that country to a market economy with an increasing number of 'quality consumers" offers our companies a historic opportunity for growth.
But if the land, the arts, and the culture are our resources, we must be aware that Italy is a never-ending source of raw materials.
Perhaps the small goldsmith or the small Florentine artisan will never have the strength, on their own, to assert themselves internationally, but many small producers put together will. And in this case, the 'unique value" to which Merloni refers becomes the city of Florence, and on the 'train' of the city's image, all its components can travel and be enhanced.
Which, translated in terms, means that the only serious prospect is to succeed in 'making a system', leveraging the highest value-added expressions of our territory, our art, our culture, and our productions. The territory as a tool for enhancing all its parts Then being big becomes relative; the issue is to be good and to ensure the quality of one's products and services.
It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to qualify the offer of the Italian product through the establishment of territorial economic systems and consortia of enterprises and brands capable of elaborating integrated packages of territorial offers (a mix of culture, art, environment, tourism, local craftsmanship, and agro-food production), in the awareness that there can be an identity relationship between neo-localism and wealth.

In this sense, Rome serves as an example of a complex reality where, as a result of a culture of general trust and inter-institutional cooperation, the calibre of the cultural and tourist offer, when combined with a new industrial culture, has led to the integration and enhancement of the heritage of diversity, giving rise to a true territorial development project and the improvement of all economic, production, and employment indicators.
The latest figures speak for themselves: in the quality of life ranking, Rome has risen from 57th place in 1999 to 8th place today. In 2002, the added value of production grew by 4.3% against 3% nationally; in the same year, employment grew more than twice as fast as in the rest of the Peninsula (3.1% against 1.5%). In 2002, social expenditure increased by 4.7%, and in terms of the budget
In 2004, no spending cuts were made in this area. In 2003, the municipality's investments exceeded EUR 1,700 million.
The Roman experience shows what results can be achieved through a qualitative leap in entrepreneurial culture, a retraining of managerial skills within the small and medium-sized enterprise structure, generational change, and a change in management styles and business risk models.

Ciampi: the last agency of sense

Faced with the country's contingent difficulties and a non-expansionary economic cycle, the President of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, unfortunately often in solitude, urges Italians to develop and strengthen their sense of confidence in the Italian system's capacity for development and regeneration, in the possibility of improving the quality of individual and collective life, and in the ability of territorial systems and local authorities to cope with the recessionary moment.
In the face of the political desert and the fall of institutional responsibility among the political parties, the president now appears as the only credible agency of sense and direction for the country.
The centrality of trust for the economic and social relations of a country, its relevance for the economic and civil growth of a state community, and its role in raising the expectations and opportunities of individuals are not lost on us either.
The *social construction of trust* represents the outcome of a gradual process of forming a precious and intangible asset based on respect for laws, customs, and the given word, both within organisations and institutions and in the relationship between representative institutions and citizens.
For any person, the formation and growth of trust is a complex feeling, the result of a long historical, economic, and political process, the intersection of identity processes, and mutual recognition between the different subjects that make up the national community.
At various times in the history of the republic, the feeling of trust has contributed to the economic, social, and moral advancement of the country. We recall the efforts of post-war reconstruction, the economic boom of the 1960s, the state's reaction to domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, the fight against the Mafia after the 1993 bombings, the Europeanist construction, and the accession to the single currency.
In the current historical and social phase, why is it so difficult to nurture feelings of trust?
Why does the highest institutional office forcefully appeal to this category underlying the original state covenant?
Something happened, evidently. In all likelihood, especially in recent times, the main mechanisms for reproducing trust have broken down; increasingly, ambiguous and opportunistic attitudes have developed in organisations and institutions. Conflicting patterns have become a constant in relations between economic and social actors.
In various areas of society and the economy, selfish behaviour that is scarcely inspired by the common good and the progress of the community as a whole has become rampant.
The persistence of conflicts of interest at all levels, the less-than-excellent quality and efficiency of public services despite high tax pressure, tax evasion that has now reached 132 billion euros in 2003, and the complexity and uncertainty that characterise today's professional and labour systems do not contribute to enhancing the degree of inter-institutional trust, the sense of loyalty and reciprocity between actors, or the level of cohesion between the different souls of society.

Precisely for these reasons, voters must also take responsibility for the choice of their representatives; it seems less and less plausible today to grant blank mandates or unlimited trust credits.
We need to learn how to best select the recipients of our trust, the representatives to whom we entrust our request for meaning and direction, defining the constraints of their mandate and delegation more precisely.
Today, the issue of trust must be strongly linked to an exaltation of the public spirit, to the internalisation of a management style that puts the general interest before the private interest, and to a true policy of fair and solidarity-based distribution of the burdens necessary for the functioning of the state machine.
Neither trust nor results will be achieved if they continue to produce ad personam laws and ad hoc sectorial measures and if they continue to regard state institutions as places where it is forbidden to exercise the right to criticise and to be guarded by loyal and obedient officials.
Neither trust nor results will be achieved if we continue to demonise the role and regulatory presence of the state, pursue with ideological fury the dismantling of welfare and social security functions in the direction of a selective and residual welfare model, preach the qualitative and quantitative downsizing of public intervention, and renounce the presence of state intervention in strategic sectors for the country.
Why, in France, a country that we consider to be a master of democracy, has the state not renounced its guiding and controlling function in certain essential sectors, such as energy and telecommunications?
What needs to be rebuilt is the sense of belonging to the state community, the restoration of the diffusive logic of prosperity according to the principles of the liberal-democratic and solidarity-based culture of the constituent fathers, and the nurturing in the institutions and among the citizens of the propensity to invest and to long-term development projects.
In a functioning state organisation, the implementation of a mechanism of mutual trust between the elements of the system passes through a fair distribution of duties and burdens between the different territorial areas, between the different sectors of the economy, and between the different professional classes without indulging in attitudes that are unsupportive, selfish, and based solely on accounting and efficiency criteria in the management of the state machine.
Within the desired fiduciary model, political actors and decision-makers have an obligation to subordinate subjective preferences in the name of society and to represent even those who do not have a voice or weight to bring to the social bargaining table. In this sense, the political system must identify a set of institutional instruments and regulatory procedures that give equal attention to the future interests of each citizen and not only the present ones.
In the work of social trust-building, special care must be taken to defend the bulwarks of republican democracy, the places of guarantee and institutional representation (Parliament, the Presidency of the Republic, the Constitutional Court, the Bank of Italy), as envisaged by the Constitutional Charter.
We have started the process of destroying our most significant institutions over the past few years, beginning with the Bank of Italy, in order of time, as if in an iconoclastic rage.
We forget that our constituent fathers, in a difficult and tense climate such as that of the post-war years, succeeded with great wisdom and foresight not only in building a balanced system of guarantees, checks, and balances but even in imagining and implementing mechanisms for the self-limitation of political power itself.
They had 'self-limited' in the knowledge that the excessive concentration of powers would not be good for the country. Hence the autonomy of the Superior Council of the Magistracy; hence the autonomy granted to the Bank of Italy through the 'mandate without expiry' of the Governor, who was thus removed from the games of politics, the interests, and possible pressures of financial and economic power. Even the US model, often instrumentally used by bad imitators, provides for the immovability of Supreme Court judges who remain in office for life.
The attacks to which the Bank of Italy has been subjected on a daily basis for a number of years now jeopardise, on the one hand, the credibility and prestige of our monetary institutions at the national level and international relations, on the other hand, fuel the legitimate suspicion that one of the last institutions still free from political control is being conquered and enslaved.
Indeed, it would be worth remembering that it was precisely from the Bank of Italy that men emerged who were able to ensure the resilience of the institutions and the cohesion of the system during extremely delicate passages in the institutional life of our country.

There are no longer any half seasons! If the territory represents a prospect of growth and economic development for our country, it is clear that the environmental and energy questions become priorities. In spite of the downturn in recent years, the environmental issue re-emerges periodically on the occasion of events that are considered exceptional. Particularly hot years, such as 2003, or particularly rainy summers, such as 2002, bring to the attention of Italians environmental issues such as climate change and the risks and catastrophic events associated with drought and the desertification of vast areas of the planet. The frequency of these events, which would lead one to doubt their exceptional nature, has now also become the cause of an increase in clichés about the environment. Phrases such as 'there are no longer any half seasons' have become a constant in climate discourse.
Nonetheless, there is a perception, which in our view is dormant, that the earth's environmental situation is undergoing a less than positive evolution. The very existence of international conventions on climate, desertification, and biodiversity is proof of the environmental suffering of the earth system. At the same time, unfortunately, the incomprehensibility and contradictory nature of political actions generate in the population a sense of resignation that is difficult to transform into awareness of the real extent of the problems.
The environment is still not a priority on the political agenda of governments. In fact, on the one hand, every time there is a flood, there is talk of land disruption, and on the other hand, in order to make up for the deficit in the state coffers, measures such as building amnesties, which are the main cause of disruption, are proposed and implemented.
Add to this the recent government actions that hastily pass laws like the modification of the EIA Commission (Environmental Impact Assessment), which in fact abolishes the existing guarantee structures to protect the territory, in accordance with the European Union, from which the EIA originates, in order to hasten the design of major works.
Climate change can be seen as an emblematic case of how schizophrenic the environment is. At most symbolic levels, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which our nation ratified, called for a less than 6% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over the course of about ten years. Halfway through, greenhouse gas emissions in our country have increased by about 10%. It means that the measures taken so far have been ineffective, that the problem of transport, which is considered to be the biggest contributor to these emissions, has not been addressed, and that the adoption of new technologies is not enough if we do not consider the possibility of structural changes and do not tackle the real problem: what kind of mobility should be favoured within our cities?
Things have not improved in other sectors, such as agriculture. While it is true that Italian agriculture consumes large quantities of water, little or nothing has been done to encourage the introduction of new technologies and cultivation systems that can reduce this consumption for crops that are in line with the availability of the country's water resource, which has been changing negatively over the years.
The problem of water, or, if you like, water supplies, is precisely the one that will have the greatest environmental burden in the near future. In Italy, we consume on average much more per person than in France and Germany. Our aqueducts are unanimously defined as 'sieve', without regional distinctions, and yet no major work is on the horizon in this sector.
Other environmentally relevant issues, such as waste management and disposal, enter and leave the political agenda only on the basis of emergencies; just think of the popular mobilisations and of local politicians when deciding on the location of a landfill or a plant. In these cases, although everyone recognises the need for these facilities, the so-called NIMBY (*not in* my backyard) syndrome is triggered, an American neologism that simply means 'not in my backyard'. The Ronchi Law, which imposed special waste disposal facilities for each region and also limited the trafficking and earnings of the ecomafia, was never implemented, yet that legislation represented a first step towards rationalising the problem.
These situations are obviously not unrelated, as the ecosystem theory also applies in cases where the environment is mistreated. The greenhouse effect changes the climate by causing floods or droughts; excessive waste production requires more energy, which increases the greenhouse effect; and poor conservation pollutes the water table by reducing water resources that are poorly utilised, increasing environmental problems. Finally, our energy system is not able to relate to the environment; indeed, dependence on fossil fuels makes the situation even worse.

For energy, too, the question must be asked as to what the actual strategic priorities and choices are. The issue cannot end with the construction of new oil, coal, or gas power plants. The priority would be to reduce external dependence as well as environmental damage, and then the country's energy choices should be directed towards renewable sources, a sector in which, despite its potential, we are not among the leaders. It is clear that our delay is not entirely due to the Chernobyl tragedy and our renunciation of nuclear power; too many years have now passed since that tragic event. Back in 1986, Italy was already lagging behind in this sector. In this sense, it is wrong to say that the recent blackout is the fault of the nuclear referendum, since almost 20 years have passed since that popular consultation.

Brains on the run

Another problem involving environmental energy and innovation policies is the state of research. Here, too, one must ask whether research is a priority for governments, and the answer is similar to the previous ones: it is not or we have not noticed it. The brain drain, the struggles around public research institutes with their consequent allotment and malfunctioning, the poor competitiveness of universities, and the unhealthy state of education in general are the logical consequences of Italy's strong dependence on innovations from abroad. We import knowledge as we import energy, with costs subtracted from possible and sustainable development.

Over the last ten years, universities and public research institutes have undergone unfinished reform processes, a continuous work in progress that has impoverished the competences and reduced the few certainties of the system. By now, we are not talking about reform but reform of reform. Is this situation, which has led to the almost total abandonment of basic research, compatible with the international competition that Italy is called upon to sustain, especially in the European field?

You want to be an american...

Due to the lack of a reliable point of arrival and a project to which to entrust the nation's perspective in recent years, the Italians' journey from 1993 has not yet come to an end.

A journey that at times someone has tried to steer towards goals and models that culturally, politically, and historically do not belong to the Italian people.

Silvio, my dear! My dear George! It almost sounds like the title of a new *off-Broadway vaudeville* show destined for the local *Teatrotenda* circuits.

In the years of a more *pro-war* government than ever before, there have been fantasies of a boot resembling the *Brave New World* across the Atlantic.

However, on balance, *Silvio's Men*'s search for the *Promise Land bears* little resemblance to the *Pilgrim Fathers*' strenuous and successful journey.

The Italy of 2000 is nothing like the *New England* of the 1600s. Today's Italians *on the road* look rather like the negative, aimless heroes of Kerouac's novels. And the journey undertaken has rather become the landing place of an Eliotian *Waste Land.* But the most tragic risk is that of being indelibly branded (at least until the new elections) with the scarlet letter of Hawthorne's heroine. Only the A is no longer that of adultery, but that of absence.

Absence of men, absence of ideas, absence of programmes.

In search of an identity

Teetering between the Scylla of non-decision-making and the Charybdis of wrong and conflicting decisions, we have accumulated a gap vis-à-vis the other countries that can only be bridged at the cost of further enormous sacrifices, but above all through the identification of a model of decision-making that finally frees us from the idea that everything can be compatible with its opposite.

What can come to our rescue is a new culture of decision-making and choice. Conscious decisions and choices to be pursued with determination and courage, remembering that courage only becomes a virtue when it is assisted by perseverance and the constant and patient pursuit of slow challenges.
It is true what our Head of State says when he states that one should not indulge in pessimism, even though often, as someone said, pessimists are nothing but well-informed optimists.
However, optimism alone, especially if it is not supported by coherent choices and initiatives, cannot produce the added value needed for a recovery that must be economic, social, psychological, and moral at the same time.
We must succeed in combining the *appetition*, the will to recover from affliction, which Spinoza considered indispensable for overcoming illness, with the utilisation of the unexpressed power that our country possesses and that is not adequately harnessed.
Choosing also means defining one's identity, deciding what one wants to be, drawing the contours of one's future, and imagining a possible future.
A strong identity that helps one to find oneself, to give oneself rules and to respect them, but above all to rediscover the very sense of one's role, of being in the world, consistent with one's culture, one's history, and one's memory.

CHAPTER 1 ON REPRESENTATION

Essay | In search of representation

"Representation vanishes": if deputies and senators cannot reflect, discuss, and possibly amend government measures and projects, what is their function reduced to?

This question is linked to one of the Republic's most serious problems: the inability of the political system, in this transitional phase, to reconcile the efficiency of government action with the needs of representation, since only the proper functioning of the latter prevents democracy from sliding towards a plebiscitary form, in which Parliament would be left with residual or ornamental functions. But no democracy is truly such if deputies and senators cannot influence the government's choices by controlling and modifying them.

A dangerous tendency is emerging to consider constitutional procedures, through which laws are formed, a waste of time. And to shorten them. By invoking out of hand the special legitimacy that, in the majority system, governments derive directly from the electorate, there is, in the background of this claim, a terrible confusion between the functions of government and those of parliament. A confusion alien to European and Western mores. We must ask ourselves what has happened.

"Ten agitated and confused years": the political system of the Republic suffered its first setback in 1991, when an overwhelming majority of voters abolished multiple preference voting in the choice of deputies. It was the first concrete sign of the crisis of the parties in public opinion. And it came in the middle of a year destined to upset the world balance, so long locked in by the *Cold War*.

According to widespread opinion, it was responsible for taking away voters' rights and transferring them into the hands of political bureaucracies, now seen as a sort of caste incapable of grasping social changes and citizens' aspirations. The proportional electoral law, which allowed for the election of parliamentarians on the basis of the votes received by each list but gave the parties complete discretion over the make-up and length of government alliances, ultimately came under attack from the Italians.

Then *the 'justicialist hangover':* in 1993, another referendum introduced the majority system in general elections. The Italians decided while the old governing parties agonised under the combined blows of the public debt explosion and judicial investigations into corruption.

The corruption, which the Carabinieri in Milan called *Tangentopoli*, was mainly linked to the hidden financing of political parties and to the costs of politics, which had grown out of all proportion. But public opinion interpreted it as mass theft, in which a large part of the country's ruling class was involved.

On the other hand, the Maastricht agreements of 1992 implied a strict budgetary policy for Italy, aimed at containing public spending within the parameters required for entry into the Euro club. The season of 'tear and blood' financial laws began: selling (and in some cases selling off) state-owned enterprises and thus increasing the tax burden. While in the meantime, the Mafia gangs' attack on the state marked, like a mysterious clock, the end of politics.

There is still debate about the causes that exhausted the so-called *First Republic*. It is difficult to single out just one. But the justicialist hangover, in turn, could not have infected the country so extensively if the ruling class of the parties had, as a whole, had a clear vision of the epoch-making events that were changing the world and their inevitable repercussions on the Italian political balance.

And the figure of the so-called *'unknown deputy'* emerges*:* ten years later, the reality looks completely different. In no European country do parties have as much power as the Italian parties do today. What is more, they have become even more closed organisations than in the past; indeed, there are those who regret the old congresses in which membership cards were counted but ideas were also compared. Instead, congresses are hardly ever held anymore, replaced by gatherings of activists called to ratify decisions already taken. Deputies and senators are almost entirely chosen by the leaders, as nowadays a quarter of the deputies are elected in blocked lists in front of which citizens are only allowed to indicate

the symbol they prefer. Thus, they often cannot even remember the name of the deputy who is supposed to represent them in Parliament.
Now it cannot be ruled out that the system of blocked lists will be extended to all elected representatives, leaving citizens the choice of side but depriving them of the right to designate the people who are to represent them. The idea is what is known as transversal: it is supported by members of the majority and the opposition. The voter is halved. The parties gain a power they had never known in the past. In recent years, the almost permanent clash between the majority and opposition has produced an excessive radicalization of the political struggle. A war of sides that has overshadowed the real question facing Italian society for too long now. What kind of democracy can replace the *old one* that can no longer return? The debates on the reform of the second part of the Constitution are recurrent. They open with clamour and close without noise. But they always leave in the shade the problem of representation—in a word, the actual power of citizens and the value of their delegation—the heart of any democratic system that does not want to be a caricature.
Is Italy a *polyarchy*? The entire system offers no significant counterweights to political power. Despite being the deciders of many fates, the industrial system's crisis weakens the banks themselves.
But then what is *'the power of the new parties'?* A detached observer could easily see that in no European country is power so largely concentrated in the halls of politics without significant external counterweights. And yet one cannot speak of a *restoration*.
It is inevitable at this point to examine the transformation of Italian parties since everything now revolves around them. Where, then, does the concept of representation end? Everyone (parliamentarians, political reporters, Chamber of Deputies, and Senate officials) knows that the functions of deputies and senators are now reduced to raising their hands or pressing the electronic voting button to give legal form to decisions in which they take no part. The crisis in Parliament was one of the symptoms of the illness of the First Republic: continuing to deepen the gulf between voters and their representation will certify the death of the Second (but perhaps it has already happened, to general indifference).
"Efficiency: when a word can become dangerous": a bipolar political system such as the one that has emerged in Italy works if citizens are given two rights: the choice between the parties and the choice of parliamentarians. Dispossessed of these rights, they are dragged, without realising it, towards an illiberal form of democracy. Liberalism (so much confusion now surrounds this topic in Italy) consists of a set of guarantees, engendered by a country's culture and protected by laws, that prevent the prevarication of one power by balancing it with others. If the role of Parliament vanishes, only that of the leader or the small power groups that form around him remains.
Leaders are indispensable to politics as well as to every other human activity. But it is necessary to set insurmountable limits on the things they can do. Because of the complexity of problems in modern societies, it is advised against entrusting their solution to a single person. There is also the illusion that by entrusting them exclusively to a leader, public affairs will be handled more efficiently. 'Efficiency' is a word that has taken on a magical and ambiguous meaning at the same time. Efficiency is not in itself a value but a method of working. It is useful if linked to a project or a vision; otherwise, it becomes the road to a precipice taken in haste. Yet our Constitution is one of the most modern and richest in references to the great values of modern democracies. But it was written with the assumption that the proportional electoral system would prevent any attempt to drift towards plebiscitary forms based on the excessive personalization of politics. Unfortunately, the change in the electoral system has in fact substantially changed the Constitution.

Fact Sheet 1 | The unbearable lightness of the Italian parliament

The transformation in a majoritarian sense of the system for legislative assemblies and the regulatory changes, introduced precisely to adapt the political-parliamentary set-up to the logic of majoritarianism, go in the direction of guaranteeing a relatively more homogeneous parliamentary majority capable of supporting government action, even in the presence of healthy party-institutional dialectics. In this perspective, some summary data on the last legislative session shows some positive dynamics: the normative acts affecting primary sources (laws, legislative decrees, decree-laws, and delegation regulations) are (as of December 31, 2002) 380 (against 1.651 in the 13th Legislature), with a monthly average of regulatory production of 20 acts compared to the average of 27.2 reported in the previous legislature. Indeed, over 80% of the laws passed (151 out of a total of 186) derive from government initiatives, recourse to intersectoral legislation, which responds to the need to stabilise policies that have a general long-term purpose, such as major delegations and programmatic laws, or an annual cycle, such as the budget law, the community law, and the simplification law.
Up to December 31, 2002, the Italian Parliament had passed 186 laws, which means a monthly average of legislative production of 9.8, compared to 14.9 in the 13th Legislature, 11.9 in the 12th, 13.2 in the 11th, and 18.6 in the 10th. This is, in any case, an average that is bound to increase, given that 57 more laws were passed in the period between January 1 and June 15, 2003 alone. The clear preponderance of the laws passed (151) came from the government's initiative and largely concerned laws converting decree-laws, which accounted for 42.5% of the total number of laws passed compared to 19.2% in the 13th Legislature. This is a significant figure, even if it is not definitive (as of June 15, 2003, the percentage incidence of conversion laws had fallen to 38.7%): it should be borne in mind, in fact, that decree-laws represent, in the initial phase of the Legislature, the main, if not the only, instrument for legislating. On the other hand, there are 34 (18.3% of the total) parliamentary initiative laws and one (0.5%) mixed initiative law (i.e., government and parliamentary and/or regional and/or popular and/or CNEl initiative).
A first step in the direction of reorganising ordinary legislative activity was to start by identifying benchmarks that would make it possible to classify approved measures on the basis of their degree of complexity and their relevance in terms of political direction. From this point of view, within the sphere of legislative production with non-binding initiatives, it is possible to distinguish between *institutional laws*, which in the current Legislature account for 13.7% of unbound legislation, while in the previous (13th) Legislature they accounted for 7.3% of the total, a sign of a renewed interest on the part of the Chambers, elected with a majority system, in the definition of general rules of an institutional nature; *measure and regulatory maintenance laws*, whose progressive decrease in percentage terms appears significant, having gone from 76.2% in the 10th Legislature to 62.7% in the current Legislature) *sectoral laws, which, at* 21.6% in the 14th Legislature, are still fundamental, confirming the national Parliament's predisposition towards the regulation and implementation of sectoral policies; *intersectoral laws*, which still represent a minority share of unbound legislative production: only 1.9% so far in the 14th Legislature, compared to 2.6% in the previous and 6% in the 12th Legislature. Among the most significant data to emerge from the attempt to reorganise national legislative production is the emergence of the instrument of delegation as an important moment of regulatory rationalisation. However, while in the previous Legislature (13th), the volume of legislative decrees issued was absolutely conspicuous (as many as 378), in the current Legislature (14th), the trend towards an overall decrease in legislative production can be seen in the decrease of ordinary laws, also by the decrease in the number of legislative decrees issued. Until December 31, 2002, the number of legislative decrees issued was, in fact, 54 (14.2% of the entire legislative production, compared to 22.9% in the previous Legislature); therefore, the monthly average of legislative decrees published, even in the implementation of delegations contained in laws passed in previous Legislatures, is decidedly lower than that achieved in the 13th legislature: 2.8 compared to 6.2.
It is important to keep in mind that different legislative decrees may be necessary to implement each enabling provision. In this respect, in the 13th Legislature, there were no less than 443 enabling provisions, 208 of which were not implemented. However, it should be noted that the deadline for exercising a small number of delegations is still pending; in this specific case, there are 34 unexercised

delegations whose deadlines are still pending. With regard to the current legislature, the figures are not particularly significant since, for almost all the delegation provisions, the deadlines for adopting the implementing legislative decrees have not yet expired.
The conspicuous number of proxies relating to community obligations has an inevitable reflection on the volume of delegated legislation; in fact, 50% of the legislative decrees (27 legislative decrees) adopted in total since the beginning of the 14th Legislature concern the implementation of community laws. It should be noted that this figure is strongly affected by the fact that in the first year of the legislature, there was an acceleration in the implementation process of community laws approved in the previous legislature as the terms of the relevant delegated powers expired. As a result, 21 legislative decrees for the implementation of community legislation issued since the beginning of the legislature were adopted to implement community laws No. 25 of 1999, No. 526 of 1999, and No. 422 of 2000, all approved in the 13th legislature. Of the remaining six legislative decrees, only five are attributable to authorizations provided for by the 2001 Community Law and one to Law No. 180 of 2002.
In the first year and a half of the 14th Legislature, the number of decree-laws issued was 76, compared to 204 in the previous Legislature. However, the figures in absolute terms are not misleading: in the current Legislature, the decrees-laws approved represent 20% of the entire legislative production (compared to 12.4% in the 13th Legislature) and record a monthly average of 4 acts, with a slight increase compared to the monthly average of 3.4 in the previous Legislature. In most cases (81.6%), these are decrees converted with amendments by Parliament, which expanded their content with amendments made during the approval of the conversion law.
The instrument of delegitimization proved to be the most widely used instrument for simplifying the regulation of specific matters. In this respect, during the 14th Legislature, 12 measures (laws or acts with the force of law) were approved that provide for the authorization of delegitimization, and 64 delegitimization regulations were published. As for the latter, although much fewer in absolute terms than in the previous Legislature (163), they have a heavier impact on the entire legislative output: 16.8% as against 9.8%.
Finally, with regard to the programme to simplify administrative procedures, the three annual simplification laws approved in the 13th Legislature (Law 59/1997, Law 50/1999, and Law 340/2000) provide for the issuance of delegation regulations to simplify numerous administrative procedures (206 in total).
As of December 31, 2002, 62 regulations had been published under these laws, and a total of 104 procedures had been simplified. Some of these were simplified by the single texts issued in implementation of Law 50/1999.
In particular, as regards the reorganisation of legislation through the issuance of single texts, it should be noted that in the first year and a half of the 14th Legislature, five such measures were issued, one of which (the single text on criminal records) was issued in 2002 and published in 2003.

Fact Sheet 2 | Welfare and federalism: an impossible team

The construction of the federal structure of Italy is still a long way from being completed. While waiting for great reform in the federal sense of the state, administrators, politicians, citizens, and businesses continue to come to terms with the current forms of power and central and peripheral government.
The transition that many define as from a welfare state to a welfare community is, therefore, an obligatory step for many European countries, for which the transformation of social policies sees the municipality play a fundamental role, both in the relationship and confrontation with other state institutions and as the referent and guarantor of citizens and their representative organisations.
Today, the municipal level represents the most favourable terrain for experimenting with a new system in terms of certain and enforceable services and opportunities within a framework of equity and accessibility with respect to available resources (without overestimating the objective of financial sustainability with respect to the costs of accessibility and quality), which responds flexibly and

creatively to changing times, enhancing the spontaneous unfolding of every positive social dynamic that appears on the scene of our communities.
The data referring to current and capital expenditure was analysed according to the functional criteria adopted in the final accounts for 2001 of the municipal administrations, broken down by geographical areas: north-west, north-east, centre, and south. For the municipal administrations as a whole, the largest item concerns *general administration*, which accounts for 33.73% of the total expenditure of Italian municipalities. Almost 15,700 million euros, or 21.82%, are spent *on land and environment management*, from waste disposal to the care of green areas, including water services and urban planning. The resources allocated to the functions of *road and transport* (12.76%), *interventions in the social field* (9.74%), and *public education* (8.48%) are more contained.
The functions *of local police*, *culture and cultural heritage*, *sports and recreation*, *productive services*, *economic development*, *tourism*, and *justice* receive resources totaling 13.48% of the total.
A comparative analysis of the final budgets of the municipalities reveals significant differences in expenditure planning activities in the territory. The North-West, compared to the other geographical areas, is characterised by a higher level of current and capital expenditure related to *the* items *social welfare* (13.02%), *public education* (10.55%), *culture and cultural heritage* (4.63%), and *productive services* (4.07%). In the North-East, more resources are allocated to the *general administration* function (47.55%). In the centre, expenditure on *roads and transport* (17.46%), *local police* (4.08%), and *economic development* (2.41%) is more significant.
For the functions concerning *territory and environment* (31.42%), *tourism* (1.23%), and *justice* (0.92%), the local municipal authorities of Southern Italy prevail. In the political and institutional debate, there emerges the clear concern of regional governors and mayors that the fiscal *devolution* processes may, with a view to an overall recovery of state coffers, sacrifice part of the central transfers to local and peripheral authorities.
Eurispes, in an attempt to trace a prospective situation on the possible consequences that a reduction in transfers would have on the budgets of municipal administrations, has tried to quantify, starting from an analysis of the financial framework of municipal administrations relative to the year 2001, the extent to which this reduction (provided for by financial law no. 448/2001) could affect the level of tax pressure during the three-year period 2002–2004.
In 2001, transfers totaling EUR 12,675.3 million were allocated to municipalities.
The Eurispes also highlighted, for the municipalities, the values of state transfers in 2001, consisting exclusively of the items for which the cut is envisaged: a share of 7.608.8 million relative to the ordinary fund, not including the sums disbursed directly by the Ministry of the Treasury to the municipalities of the Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli Venezia Giulia Regions as they are subject to special legislation; a share of 839.3 million relative to the equalisation fund for imbalances in local taxation; a share of 1,914.6 million relative to the consolidated fund.
The starting hypothesis is that over the three-year period considered, the cut in current transfers of up to 3% will force municipalities to increase 'their' level of tax burden. An analysis of the data shows that it would be the southern regions, which enjoy less financial and tax autonomy, that would suffer the greatest setback from 2002 to 2004.
In the first place, the Calabrian municipal administrations, presenting the highest degree of state dependence (51.8%) and a low degree of tax autonomy (25.7%), would need the highest percentage increase in their own tax revenues (9%) to balance the reduction in central government transfers, quantifiable at over 31 million euros. Next in the national ranking are Basilicata (8.5%), Campania, and Sicily, whose percentage increase for both is 7.9%.
On the other hand, a smaller reduction in transfers is hypothesised in those northern regions with greater levels of autonomy: Liguria, whose 'loss' is around 16.25 million euros and where an increase in tax revenues of 2% is expected; Emilia Romagna; and Veneto, with both an increase in taxation of 2.4% and a reduction in transfers quantifiable at 34.65 and 38.40 million euros, respectively.
For the second year running, Eurispes attempted to measure the level of implementation of federalism by local authorities through the LIF estimator, Level of Federal Commitment.
Five indicators were considered in the analysis of the final accounts of the municipal administrations for the two-year period 2000–2001: tax autonomy, financial autonomy, tax dependency, structural

rigidity, and the incidence of personnel expenses. Two measures were used: one static, aimed at determining the degree of autonomy achieved, and the other dynamic, which focuses attention on the greater or lesser speed with which territorial municipal authorities take possession of the new opportunities and thus the speed of growth of federalism.
In order to determine the ranking of the level of federal commitment of municipalities, a scoring system was set up on the basis of certain indices derived, as mentioned above, from the elaboration of the budgets of the municipal administrations of each region.
According to an analysis of the data, the municipal administrations of Trentino Alto Adige maintain their position as Italy's most autonomous local authorities by scoring 381.9 points in the Eurispes ranking. Following this are the municipalities of Veneto (375.3), Emilia Romagna (373.1), Liguria (373.0), and Lombardy (371.1). It should also be noted that there are six regions that, compared to the ranking for the previous year, have gained positions: Emilia Romagna and Umbria at the top, whose municipal administrations have risen by three positions in the general autonomy ranking, placing themselves in 3rd place (6th place in 2003) and 7th place (10th place in 2003), respectively. This is followed by the municipal authorities of Veneto and Piedmont, which, in 2nd and 6th place, move up two rungs compared to the previous period. At the bottom of the ranking are the municipal administrations of Campania (299.6), Calabria (286.1), Basilicata (279.1), and, lastly, Sicily (246.9), penalised mainly by a tax dependency that averages close to 50%. A datum on which it is necessary to reflect, considering that the financial assistance regime on current revenue represents just 12.4% for Piedmont and 13.9% for Lombardy.
Additionally, Trentino-Alto Adige receives the highest ranking in the LIF general ranking of municipal administrations, which provides an analysis of the municipalities' level of commitment to achieving complete autonomy over the course of the two-year period 2000–2001. Following this are Umbria (405.2), Sardinia (407.6), and Valle d'Aosta (428.8). Significantly, as many as four southern regions placed in the top 11: Basilicata (5th place, 403.2 points), Apulia (6th place, 400.8 points), Campania (9th place, 394.1 points), and Calabria (11th place, 393.3 points). A result for Southern Italy that, despite continuing to rely mainly on transfers and contributions from the state, testifies to a growing interest and commitment on the part of municipalities to achieve more adequate levels of autonomy An obstacle course whose full implementation will necessarily have to pass through a tightening of local taxation so that municipal authorities can 'balance' their budgets to continue to guarantee and/or improve the level of services to citizens. Certainly, the increase in taxation will be felt more in those municipalities where there is a low level of social and economic welfare. But such corrective manoeuvres are an obligatory step for all municipal administrations on their way to full autonomy.

Fact Sheet 3 | The level of openness of the regional political system

The record for the most open political system in Italy goes to Trentino Alto Adige, as with a score of 244.8, it is the Italian region that shows the most attention to young people and women in internal decision-making processes.
The main objective of the study was to provide some useful indications about the level of openness of the regional political system through the observation of the following indicators: political and electoral participation, youth presence, and female presence in regional administrations.
Therefore, an ad hoc 'indicator' was created that was able to project, as accurately as possible, recent developments in the phenomenon and the dimensions it has taken on in the contexts examined in the light of recent political-electoral competitions.
Following Trentino Alto Adige, and with values that do not fall below the 200-point threshold, we find Piedmont (240.8 points), Umbria (238.0 points), Lombardy (232.6 points), Emilia Romagna (224.9 points), Veneto (221.6 points), and Tuscany (206.9 points).
An overall and comparative analysis of the results recorded in the various Italian territorial contexts also reveals, in all its clarity, the gap existing between the regional realities of the North and those of the other areas of the country, the South in particular. In fact, at the bottom of the league table, with the

exception of Liguria (132.4 points), are almost all the regions of the South, penalised not only by the low degree of participation of their residents in public life but also by a proven closed attitude towards the female universe.

The black jersey definitely belongs to Calabria (106.9 points), whose best performance does not go beyond the penultimate place reached in the ranking concerning the degree of political-electoral participation.

The only non-painful note for the southern regions comes from Sicily, which, although it reserves few 'seats' for women, turns out to be the youngest regional administration in Italy.

Emilia Romagna, on the other hand, is the region that obtains the best ranking in the ranking that takes into account the level of adhesion shown by the regional population towards the instruments and/or mechanisms of political verification, i.e., electoral competitions. The average turnout of the people of Emilia-Romagna, compared to the last electoral rounds, is, in fact, 83.1%, a full eight points higher than the national average (75%). In second place we find Umbria, where as many as eight out of ten residents (80.6%) demonstrate that they take an 'active' part in electoral consultations; they are followed by Lombardy (79.9%), Veneto (78.6%), Tuscany (78.5%), and Trentino Alto Adige (78.4%), by far the region with the highest index of political permeability.

The most 'distracted' prove to be the Sicilians in primis, who are by far the most disinterested in politics compared to the average Italian: the level of political-electoral participation recorded in this region is 64.5%, compared to a national average of 75%. Residents of Calabria and Molise also appear rather detached; as in Sicily, the average index of political and electoral participation in these areas does not even reach 70% (66.6% and 68.6%, respectively). Instead, Sicily holds the record for the youngest administration in Italy. With an incidence of 20.8%, compared to a national average of 11.8%, Sicily has the highest number of junior administrators: as many as 21 out of 101 under-40s hold an institutional office within the regional political scene in this area. In second place is Piedmont, with a youth presence within the regional administration as a whole equal to 19.2% of the total. Lombardy is in third place with 17.7%, Valle d'Aosta is fourth with 14%, Veneto is fifth with 13.7% of young people, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna are sixth with 12.7%, and Puglia is seventh with 12.5% of junior administrators. All the other regions present values below the national average, with percentages ranging from 11.1 in Campania to 3.8 in Calabria, an administration that, on balance, is politically more closed, or, if you like, less closed, to young people.

Breaking down the data by regional body, the ranking, at least limited to the first positions, does not undergo any particular variations. Sicily, in fact, also tops the list with regard to the youngest regional executive in Italy: as many as six out of twelve (50%) junior administrators have been called upon to be part of the current Junta. The gap that separates it from the second in the ranking, the Lombardy Council, which counts among its ranks four 'juniors' out of a total of 17 administrators, is also quite substantial. Following them are Liguria, Puglia, and Campania, with a combined youth presence of 22.2% in the regional executive body. At the bottom of the list are seven regions with a total absence of junior administrators in the regional council: Umbria, Trentino Alto Adige, Sardinia, Marche, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Calabria, and Abruzzo.

The youngest regional council in Italy is that of Piedmont, where 21.7% of junior administrators are members. The oldest is that of the Calabria Region, once again the negative record holder (4.7% of young people in it). Top positions again for Sicily (16.9%) and Lombardy (16.5%), respectively the second and third youngest regional councils in Italy.

A further classification of the level of openness of the regional political system towards the youth universe was obtained in consideration of the political orientation of the individual administrations. More attention, then, from centre-right or centre-left regional governments?

Overall, at the regional level, it is the centre-right coalitions that are more open to young people: 11.6% of the degree of openness of centre-right governments compared to 10.3% of centre-left ones. The gap widens considerably if we look at the percentage of young people in the executive: 13.4% of the weight of junior administrators in centre-right governments, compared to 6.3% on the opposite side.

The analysis by gender, on the other hand, assigns the title of the 'pinkest' administration in Italy to the Trentino region.

Alto Adige (22.4% share of female administrators), which, by virtue of this result and the good placings achieved in the other rankings, is currently at the top of the general classification describing the level of openness of the regional political system.
In terms of the percentage of women working in regional administrations, Umbria (20.5%) and Tuscany (16.9%%) are in second and third place, respectively, behind Emilia Romagna (14%) Veneto (13.7%) Piedmont (12.3%), and Marche (12.2%). At the tail end, Calabria and Abruzzo give way to Puglia, with not a single woman in the Council or the regional Junta. In the last position, we also find Sicily, whose political system, although it has a high percentage of young people within it, does not show itself to be particularly sensitive to women, who are taken into consideration in only 2% of cases.
There has been a change in the two highest rungs of the ranking of the 'pinkest' council in Italy: Umbria leads the way with a 44.4% female presence in the regional executive, followed by the 'highly decorated' Trentino Alto Adige with 37.5%. There is no female presence in the councils of the regions: Sardinia, Molise, Calabria, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Abruzzo, Basilicata, and Apulia. The latter, in particular, seems to favour a male-only policy, as it takes the black jersey, and this time alone, also in terms of female presence in the assembly body.
At the top of the list of the 'pinkest' regional councils in Italy, Trentino Alto Adige once again takes the lead, with two women for every ten regional councillors; second and third place go to Veneto and Emilia Romagna, with, respectively, 14.8% and 14% of the total number of female councillors in the regional assembly.
More women overall, finally, especially in the centre-left regional governments: the administrations led by this coalition have, in fact, a female presence within them that is twice as high as that found in centre-right administrations (13.6% *vs.* 6.2%). This trend is also confirmed in the Regional Councils (12.3% female presence in centre-left administrations, 6.4% in centre-right administrations), while the gap widens in the Councils: the ratio between centre-right and centre-left governments is one to four with respect to the number of women holding some office in the regional executives (5.7% the quota of 'female' administrators in centre-right Councils, against 19.7% in centre-left ones).

Fact Sheet 4 | Youth political and election participation

In analysing the relationship of young people with politics, many studies have often emphasised the eclipse of politics that characterises the new generation. From this perspective, youth abstentionism would be a clear sign of generalised political apathy. Refuge in the private sphere, marked individualism, and disinterest in issues of collective scope and interest would therefore characterise the new youth culture. However, in Italy, it is Mani Pulite, the movement triggered by the Milanese magistracy investigating the illicit profits of political personnel, that radicalises the crisis of the political system. Abstentionism went from 6.6% in 1976 to 12.8% in 1992 and 13.9% in 1994.
So much so that among young people, in particular those aged between 15 and 29, only 49.9% expressed an electoral preference. This figure, for the year 2000, marks a sharp decrease compared to 1996, when the percentage of young people expressing an electoral preference was 57%. One in two young people, therefore, do not identify with any party formation. This is an important fact, since it makes it possible to trace in youth abstentionism not only or not simply the proof of the political apathy that characterises the new generations indiscriminately, but rather the fruit of the failure to recognise their own demands in party representation.
There is no official data on youth abstentionism; it is therefore not possible to have an exact measure of the non-participation of young people at the ballot box. However, it is possible to assume that the differences in non-participation in voting between the Chamber and the Senate can largely be attributed to the voting behaviour of young people aged 18 to 24. A comparison of the different legislative elections shows that, since 1992, youth abstentionism has been gradually increasing: it tended to be around 7% in 1992, around 10% in 1994, around 18% in 1996, and 35% in 2001. The weight of the share of the youth electorate, which in the last elections did not go to the polls, voted blank, or cancelled their vote, is so considerable that it has prompted several observers to speak of a 'party of abstainers'. And the data of an Eurispes and Telefono Azzurro survey on adolescents, contained in the *4th Report on the Condition*

of Childhood and Adolescence, confirm the generalised disaffection towards organised forms of political participation: 86.7% of adolescents have never made a contribution to a party, and 86.1% have never done free work for a party organisation. The break with the subjects traditionally responsible for representing collective demands therefore seems to be clear.
What is in crisis, however, is trust in organised structures and not interest in politics. It can be observed, in fact, that the majority of those interviewed state that they inform themselves and discuss political facts often or sometimes: 61.3% talk about politics with friends, 59.5% listen to a political debate on TV, and 55.6% find out about politics from newspapers. Listening to a rally appears to be less frequent, attended sometimes by 30.2% of respondents and often by 6%.
If, for the majority of teenagers, defilement from organised structures translates into a withdrawal into the private sphere of the political dimension, for some it is accompanied by the proposal of alternative forms of participation. 38.1% of teenagers take part in demonstrations, and 10.8% of them often do so. The political dimension, experienced in the privacy of one's daily relationships or in the public space of the square, is thus present, despite the generalised rejection of party affiliation.
There is no shortage, however, of those who show complete disinterest in politics: around 40 percent of the sample never read about politics in the newspapers, 37.5 percent have never listened to a political debate on TV, and more than one in three say they never talk about politics with their friends.
The percentage of children who talk about politics with friends increases progressively as the age of the respondents increases. Discussion with peers on political topics is less common among 12-year-olds, among whom just 42% say they often or sometimes talk about politics with friends, while
acquires significant importance among older children. In fact, among 18- and 19-year-olds, 79.8% and 77.5% of the interviewees, respectively, exchange and share opinions among peers on political issues. It is also worth highlighting how more mature teenagers feel a greater need to discuss politics with their friends: if the percentage of those who often talk about politics with their peers is 11.8% among 12-year-olds, it reaches 22.8% among 15-year-olds, and it exceeds 30% among those aged 17 and over,
Although interest in politics does not always 'translate' into active participation, the dimension of political engagement is more widespread among adolescents, who often discuss politics with friends. It can be observed, in fact, that two-thirds (66.5%) of the respondents who often discuss politics participate in marches, 24.6% of them frequently, compared to 28.7% of those who never discuss politics with their peers. Of these, just 5.6% often attend a demonstration.
Even party activism, which is extremely rare among teenagers, is more popular among those who often talk politics with friends. However, the percentage of those who say they have never done free activity for a party remains very high: 79.2%, a value that reaches 94.4% among those who never discuss politics with their peers.
A European survey of 4,272 young people between the ages of 20 and 23 about their relationship with politics offers additional interesting insights. The survey, which was carried out within the framework of the European research programme *The Integration of Young People into Working Life and the Future of Democratic Culture in Southern Europe* (1997–2000), investigated the opinions and behaviours related to the political dimension of young people in France, Spain, and Italy. The Italian sample consisted of 1,946 young people. When asked about their perception of the political world, 89% of them (as opposed to 78% of Spaniards and French) disagreed with the idea that "politics is a dirty thing", manifesting a potential for trust that contradicts the widespread opinion of a general disqualification of politics by the new generations. The overwhelming majority of the Italian sample (87%) also believes that their political participation can have a significant influence on political decisions and rejects the idea that it is better to deal with their personal problems.
The research confirms young Europeans' distance from traditional political participation, based on party and trade union affiliation: just 18% of young Italians say they are more or less regularly active in a political party or trade union, and 42% would never join a political party.
This distancing does not, however, translate into an abandonment of political commitment. 38% of Italian young people carry out more or less regular activities in an association, and alternative forms of political participation, in Italy as in France and Spain, arouse a very strong appeal. The overwhelming majority of those interviewed, in fact, manifested a participatory potential of undoubted relevance: 92% of the Italian sample took part or would take part in a strike (the percentage is 87% in France and 95%

in Spain) and 95% in a demonstration (against 92% of French youngsters and 97% of Spanish youngsters).

Fact Sheet 5 | (Survey) Citizens' trust in institutions

To investigate the degree of citizens' trust in the various institutions, Eurispes asked a series of questions on the subject to a sample of 1,500 Italians stratified by gender, geographical area of origin, and age.
The first question, on general trust in institutions, aims to record any change in citizens' perceptions over the past two years.
The results indicate that for more than half of the respondents (51.5%), trust in the institutions has remained unchanged; for a significant 38%, it has decreased; and for 8.9%, it has increased.
The percentage of people whose trust in institutions has increased over the past two years is higher among men than among women (12% vs. 6%); on the contrary, those whose trust has decreased are more numerous among women than among men (41.3% vs. 34.5%). Female respondents therefore appear more distrustful and disappointed by the current situation than male respondents.
The perception of trust in the institutions is also related to the age of the sample: the percentage of those who say they trust the institutions more than in the past increases as they get older, while the percentage of those who say they trust them less gradually rises as they get older. Only 4% of those aged between 18 and 24 described their trust as having increased, compared with 11.7% of those aged 64 and over; correspondingly, 41% of the youngest respondents described their trust as having decreased, compared with 35.8% of the oldest respondents.
In the younger age groups, there is therefore a greater dissatisfaction with recent events and, probably, with many of the state institutions.
It is mainly university graduates who say they trust the institutions less than two years ago: as many as 49.4%, almost half.
In order to examine more specifically the current degree of citizens' trust in the various central and local powers, the sample was asked to give their opinion on the European Union, the Italian State, the Region, the Province, and the Municipality.
For all the institutions taken into consideration, the majority of the subjects show trust; however, the percentage of those not trusting is also very high, so that the sample tends to split.
The European Union turns out to be the institution in which the highest percentage of respondents place their trust: 58.5% say they trust it very much or fairly, 36.1% little or not at all. The reference to Europe and to an institution outside our country, towards which feelings of discontent and distrust are extremely widespread, most likely determines this result. In Italy, in fact, there is a tendency to often look to Europe with the conviction that more efficiency and less corruption can generally be found there.
It is no coincidence that it is precisely the Italian State that registers a higher degree of distrust (44.1%), since it is largely identified with the government and politicians, whose image is frequently challenged, but also with bureaucracy and inefficiency, the inability to change things and make improvements.
In intermediate positions are the local authorities, among which the province is the institution that enjoys the lowest level of trust; in relation to the municipality, the percentage of those who say they are not at all trusting is higher than average (14.5%), but there are also those who say they are very trusting (11.9%).
The data on trust in central and local institutions were compared with those obtained in 2003 by asking a representative sample of Italians the same question. The percentage of respondents declaring themselves trustworthy was higher in 2004 than in 2003, indicating an increase in trust in the five institutions examined here.
With regard to the Italian state, women show less trust in it than men, as do younger respondents (1824 years) than more mature ones. Those with a title
Moreover, higher educational qualifications are more trusting overall than those with lower qualifications; the lowest percentages of respondents who trust the state are in the South and the Islands.

Therefore, the part of the population that is most critical and disillusioned with the state seems to be the new generations; having grown up in a social atmosphere that encourages detachment and distrust of this institution, they trust in Europe but not in the Italian state.
Citizens' trust in local authorities is mainly related to the territorial area of origin of the sample and only marginally to the other variables.
Respondents say they are confident in their region, province, and municipality, with a particularly high percentage in the North (especially in the North-West) and a much lower percentage in the South and on the Islands; the Centre is in an intermediate position here.
In the north of the country, greater trust is thus observed in local institutions than in central ones.
Questions concerning trust in the main public institutions, i.e., the institutions representing the three powers of the state—the government (executive power), parliament (legislative power), and the judiciary (judicial power)—and the Presidency of the Republic, show extremely
different institutions.
A very large majority of the sample (80%) trusts the Presidency of the Republic in spite of the decreased trust in the Italian state mentioned above. Such a positive result is, however, a decidedly isolated figure. Although there was a much less clear consensus, the judiciary gained the trust of the majority of respondents (52.4%).
Nevertheless, the situation regarding the government and parliament is quite different, as the majority of those interviewed have little or no trust in these two institutions. Only 36.5% of the sample said they trusted Parliament, while 56.9% said they had no trust in it, while even lower was the percentage of those who trusted the government (33.6%), and as many as 63.5% said they had little or no trust at all.
Government and parliament presumably achieve the most negative results because they are most directly associated with politics and politicians, whose image has been decidedly negative in recent years.
On the other hand, the judiciary is more divisive among the sample because, on the one hand, it appears to many to be less corrupt than politics and less influenced by personal interests, on the other hand, it suffers from the serious inefficiency of the Italian justice system, which leads many citizens to despair in their chances of obtaining justice. The Presidency of the Republic, which gains the trust of such a large part of those interviewed, is probably identified in the figure of the current President, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who enjoys widespread sympathy and esteem and appears to many to be super partes and not implicated in party interests and games.
Trust in the judiciary increased compared to the survey conducted in 2003, while the percentages for the parliament and the government remained essentially stable.
Placing the answers on trust in the government in relation to the different structural variables of the sample, it can be observed that, as previously found, men say they trust the government more frequently than women, as do adults and the elderly compared to the very young (18–24 years old). The detachment and disaffection of the younger generations towards the political world and the current government are thus confirmed.
Mistrust of the government is more widespread among those with a low level of education (no qualifications and an elementary school leaving certificate) and among university graduates.
On the other hand, differences between subjects of different geographical origins prove to be insignificant. Moreover, similar trends are evident with regard to trust in parliament, as women say they trust parliament less often than men, and young people between 18 and 24 say they trust parliament less often than other age groups.
On the other hand, there is a difference related to educational qualification, the percentage of respondents who trust the parliament gradually increases as their level of education rises, reaching 20.8% for those with up to a primary school leaving certificate, 36.7% for those with a secondary school leaving certificate, 40.8% for high school graduates, and 48.3% for university graduates.
Indeed, it can be assumed that more educated people are more accustomed to recognising the value of parliament, at least as a fundamental organ of democracy, and shy away more often than others from aprioristic criticism and qualunquism.
Currently, 56.9% of the men interviewed stated that they trusted the judiciary, compared to 48.2% of the women. The level of education also confirms itself as a fundamental variable, as the percentage of people expressing a great deal or a fair amount of trust grows exponentially as the level of education

rises, while only 38.6% among those with no schooling or an elementary school leaving certificate, 49.7% among those with a middle school leaving certificate, 56.2% among high school graduates, and 69.6% among university graduates.
In terms of geographical area of origin, the lowest share of respondents confident in the judiciary is in the Islands (the only territorial area where distrust prevails).
The data indicate that trust in the Presidency of the Republic is more widespread among males and those living in the north of the country (less so in the islands and the south).
Here, too, respondents say they are more confident as their educational qualifications increase (34.7% of those without a degree or with an elementary school diploma have 'a lot of confidence' in the Presidency of the Republic, compared to 44.3% of university graduates).
The level of citizens' trust in other types of institutions was then investigated. The highest percentage of trusting respondents is to be found in voluntary associations (89.9%), which are considered by the vast majority of the sample to be of great social benefit and an expression of altruism and commitment without personal interest or profit motive.
The forces of law and order also receive great approval. The majority of the sample (55.1%) has the greatest trust in the Carabinieri (84.2% say they are fairly or completely confident); almost half (49.2%) have the greatest trust in the police (81.2% trust them). The percentage of respondents who trust the Guardia di Finanza (72.3%) and the Church and other religious institutions (68.3%) is also high.
The majority of the sample (50.7%: 16.5% are very trusting and 34.2% are fairly trusting) trusts the school, but there are also a lot of people (49.3%) who say they don't. These data highlight strongly contrasting positions: citizens are divided on schools, which have long been the focus of contestation and controversy, even though they are aware of the crucial role they play in society. On the other hand, the institutions in which the majority of respondents do not trust are trade unions (32.1% trusting, 67.9% not trusting), employers' associations (31.2% vs. 68.8%), the public administration (28.7% vs. 71.3%), and, lastly, parties (13.6% vs. 86.4%).
In the case of parties, moreover, distrust is deeper and is linked to the now widespread conviction that their members only and indiscriminately pursue personal interests, forgetting the good of citizens, and that they very often act dishonestly. As many as 48.6% of the sample, or almost half, say they have no trust in parties; 37.8% have little trust; 10.9% quite a lot; and 2.7% have the most.
The degree of trust in the carabinieri and police appears to be strongly correlated with the age of the respondents; as age increases, the percentage of subjects who say they trust them rises significantly. Only 28.5% of 18- to 24-year-olds have a lot of trust in the carabinieri, compared to 47.3% of 25- to 44-year-olds, 62.1% of 45- to 64-year-olds and 70.8% of older people.
Trust in the school does not appear to be related to the gender or age of the respondents.
On the other hand, analysing the cross-references with the sample's educational qualification, it emerges that among those with a low educational qualification (up to the lower secondary school leaving certificate), there are more people who say they have a lot of confidence in the school than among the others. Paradoxically, it is therefore precisely those who have studied less who have complete confidence in the Italian school, perhaps also because those who have attended school more are also aware of its current limitations and weaknesses.
As far as trade unions are concerned, only the age of the respondents was significantly correlated with the degree of trust expressed: among the very young (18–24 years old), the percentage of subjects trusting trade unions was higher than among others. Only 18.5% of those aged between 18 and 24 said they had no trust in trade unions, compared to 30.7% of those aged between 25 and 44, 37.4% of those aged between 45 and 54, and 31.3% of those aged 65 and over. Younger people, therefore, seem to maintain a relationship of greater trust and identification with trade unions.
Respondents aged 65 and over say more frequently than others that they trust parties. The intersection between the answers and the age of the sample also shows that among 18- to 24-year-olds, the percentage of people who have no trust in parties is lower than average: 37.7%, compared to 52.5% of respondents aged 25 to 44, 49.7% of those aged 45 to 64, and 45.5% of those over 64. Although the younger respondents, as pointed out above, were very often not trusting of the Italian government and state, they were less extreme than the more mature respondents with regard to political parties.

With regard to the public administration, trust is more widespread among young people than among mature and elderly people; respondents with no educational qualification or an elementary school leaving certificate are also slightly more distrustful than those with a higher level of education.
The most interesting differences, however, are those noted in relation to the geographical area to which the sample belongs. In the North-West and the North-East, the proportion of people who say they trust the public administration is higher than elsewhere; on the contrary, on the islands and in the South, more people say they do not trust the PA at all (31.4% and 26.3%, respectively).
The gender of the respondents proves to be a significant variable with regard to trust in the church and other religious institutions. In fact, men say more often than women that they have little or no trust in them; among women, on the contrary, the percentage of those who have a great deal of trust in religious institutions is significantly higher than among men (42.4% versus 29.2%). Since religious and practising women are usually more numerous than men, the result does not appear surprising.
Trust in the Church is also correlated with the age of the subjects. Indeed, it is gradually more widespread as age increases, in particular, 20.5% of 18–24-year-olds, 28.2% of 25–44-year-olds, 39.4% of 45–64-year-olds, and 51.8% of 65-year-olds and over have the greatest trust in religious institutions. An inverse trend is seen for educational qualifications: a higher educational qualification corresponds to a lower percentage of respondents trusting the church and other religious institutions.
The geographical area to which the interviewees belong is a particularly significant variable. In the south of the country and the islands, there are particularly many people who say they trust religious institutions, while there are fewer in the north-east and, above all, in the north-west.
In order to ascertain whether and to what extent the difficult historical and political moment our country is going through affects the propensity of citizens to exercise their right to vote, the sample was asked two specific questions. In fact, it seems of great interest to investigate not only the conception that citizens have of the instrument of voting but also to detect whether the wavering trust in the state and in institutions such as the government, parliament, and above all, the parties particularly motivates Italians to use the electoral medium to change things or, on the contrary, determines a state of mistrust and apathy that translates into disinterest and indistinct discouragement.
The vast majority of the sample (84.1%) states that they always vote in elections, 9.4% sometimes, 2.7% almost never, and 2.5% never. Those who say they exercise their right to vote sometimes probably also choose when to do so in relation to the different types of votes and the importance they attach to them.
The habit of always voting is clearly in the majority, although the share of those who do otherwise is noteworthy.
The percentage of those who always vote increased by two percentage points compared to 2003. The situation over the past year has therefore not weakened citizens' motivation to vote.
Respondents who always vote in elections are slightly more numerous among men (85.6%) than among women (82.6%); among the latter, however, the percentage of those who vote sometimes is higher (11.1%) versus 7.6%, perhaps due to a lesser involvement or confidence in the possibility of improving the country's situation by means of the electoral instrument.
Women, as highlighted above, are generally less trusting than men in the Italian state, local authorities, government, and parliament, which can be related to a lower motivation to vote in elections.
The differences found in relation to age group are partly attributable to the fact that among the youngest subjects (18–24 years), there are many who have not yet had the opportunity to vote. In this age group, in fact, the percentage of those who always vote in elections is lower than average (78.1%); the highest percentage is instead, albeit by a small margin, of those aged between 25 and 44 (85.7%).
An analysis of the intersection between the answers given to this question and the geographical area to which the sample belongs does not show any substantial differences; however, it can be seen that the highest percentage of respondents who choose to always vote is in the North-East (85.4%), while the percentages for the Islands (82.2%) and the Centre (82.4%) are slightly lower than average. It is precisely in the centre that we find the highest proportion of people who never vote (4.1%).
The propensity to exercise the right to vote appears to be related to the level of education in the sample. The higher the educational qualification, the more widespread is the habit of always voting, with 89.7% of university graduates and 86.8% of high school graduates, compared to 79.6% of those with a middle school diploma and 81.5% of those with a primary school diploma or no diploma.

Respondents were also asked to express an opinion on abstentionism. According to the majority of the sample (53.7%), abstentionism is an expression of indifference towards politics; for 27.1%, it is an expression of protest; and for 12.7%, it is normal electoral behaviour.
It is mainly younger respondents (18–24 years old) who define abstentionism as the result of a lack of interest in politics (66.9%, compared to 53.7% on average).
The 45–64-year-olds, on the other hand, emphasise the protest aspect more often than the others (34.4% against 27.1% of the average).
The different territorial areas of the country are not characterised by strongly contrasting conceptions of abstentionism. However, the data indicate that respondents from the North-West define abstentionism as a form of indifference to politics in a higher percentage than average (59.6%) and an expression of protest in a lower percentage than average (21.8%).
However, among residents in the South, those who see abstentionism as normal electoral behaviour are more numerous than elsewhere (19.7%) and fewer than those who see it as an expression of a lack of interest in politics (44.8%).
The educational qualification proves to be a rather significant variable in this case; in fact, it is possible to distinguish two main trends: respondents with a medium-high educational qualification most often attribute abstentionism to indifference towards politics (61.2% of high school graduates and 62.1% of university graduates), while those with a low educational qualification define it more often than the others as an expression of protest (33.1% of those with a middle school diploma and 30.7% of those with an elementary school diploma or no diploma).
The percentage of people (more than 15%) who say they do not vote regularly should not be underestimated; this is a minority but extremely significant and should be taken into account as a wakeup call. It is no coincidence that many consider abstentionism to be normal electoral behaviour or an expression of protest. If distrust increasingly translated into a lack of motivation to vote, the rift between the people and the institutions would be even more serious and would undermine the fundamental mechanism of democracy.
Considering also that, at the present time, the different parties no longer clearly represent the different social and economic positions of citizens, it is easy to understand a further detachment and disinterest of the population towards politics in general and the electoral moment in particular.

Fact Sheet 6 | Rome asks Brussels: "how much do we count in Europe?

The EU currently has fifteen member countries. It originally consisted of six countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), to which three countries were added in 1973 (Denmark, Ireland, and Great Britain), Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and three countries in 1995.
(Austria, Finland, and Sweden). Ten new countries will join in May 2004: Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Two more countries, Bulgaria and Romania, are scheduled to join in 2007–2008.
In March 1999, the European Council agreed on Agenda 2000, which is the framework for EU policies for the period 2000–2006. The structural funds and the cohesion fund are part of the community's structural policy. The aim of this policy is to reduce the differences in development levels between regions and between EU Member States. The Structural Funds provide the basis for financing development programmes in the 15 Member States, while the Cohesion Fund serves to promote the development of those Member States whose GDP is 90 percent below the Community average and which are implementing an economic convergence programme. Agenda 2000 created a number of changes to the structural funds, the most important of which are the reduction of the priority objectives from 6 to 3 and the parallel creation of transitional support funds for those regions that fell under former Objectives 1, 2, and 5b.
Within the framework of the Structural Funds, Objective 1 represents the most important chapter; it is aimed at promoting the growth and structural adjustment of regions lagging behind in development. In

particular, the Italian regions concerned are currently Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Apulia, Sardinia, and Sicily. Objective 2 aims to promote the economic and social conversion of areas in crisis in the industrial and service sectors, rural and urban areas in difficulty, and depressed areas dependent on fishing. Some areas in the centre and north fall under Objective 2. Objective 3 is aimed at promoting the adaptation and modernization of education, training, and employment policies and systems in regions not covered by Objective 1.

For the period 2000–2006, the amounts allocated to the European Community's regional policy (Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund) were EUR 213 billion. Of this, 195 billion is allocated to the structural

Funds and 18 billion to the Cohesion Fund. Most of the structural funds are allocated to Objective 1 (69.7% or EUR 135.9 billion), and the remainder is allocated to Objective 2 (11.5% or EUR 22.4 billion) and Objective 3 (12.3% or EUR 24.05 billion).

Agenda 2000 provided for the allocation of structural funds to each member state. Italy is the second country with the largest share of structural funds after Spain.

Eurispes also examined the European Commission report published in September 2003 entitled 'Allocation of 2002 EU Operational Expenditure by Member State'.

An important chapter of the budget is operational expenditure, defined in the Financial Regulation as that expenditure contained in Part B of the budget. This includes agricultural expenditure, expenditure on structural operations, and expenditure on internal policies, while administrative expenditure is excluded.

The total operational expenditure allocated in 2002 was EUR 72,734.3 million, i.e., 91% of the total operational expenditure executed. A remark should be made about this figure. By convention, expenditure on external actions, reserves, and pre-recruitment aid cannot be allocated to Member States. If these expenses are therefore excluded from the general statement, it appears that the operational expenditure allocated in 2002 represents 98.8% of the allocable operational expenditure executed.

For both agriculture and structural operations, the expenditures implemented were almost completely allocated. In contrast, the allocated expenditure in the area of internal policies corresponds to 90.5% of the executed expenditure. This seems to depend, in particular, on the portion of payments in this area benefiting non-EU countries.

Agriculture accounts for the majority of operational expenditure in the budget (54.4%), with structural operations coming in second (29.4%).

Analysing the operational expenditure allocated to Italy, it can be seen that there are differences between the various titles. In the agricultural sector (Title 1), the expenditure allocated to Italy in 2002 amounted to €5,695.1 million, which corresponds to 13.1% of the EU total. The greatest change occurred in the area of structural operations, where funds allocated went from €2,707.2 million in 2001 (12.1% of the EU total) to €1,818.9 million (7.8% of the EU total). It is the Objective 1 regions (the so-called Mezzogiorno) that benefit most from the structural funds. The decrease in funding in this area appears to be due to the sharp decline in payments linked to pre-2000 programming. This decline, according to the European Commission, is partially offset by a sharp increase in payments related to the programmes of the current programming period. Funding in the area of internal policies (Title 3) remained fairly stable, from €524.2 million in 2001 (11% of the EU total) to €599.1 million (10.1% of the EU total).

The European Structural Funds under Objective 1, which were made available in 2000, were fully utilised by Italy during 2002.

Under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Italy enjoys a sufficient amount of funding. The most important sector is plant products, where funding increased from EUR 4,144.1 million in 2001 to EUR 4,494.3 million in 2002. In 2002, the share of funding to Italy for plant products accounted for 16.2% of the total funding to the 15 EU member states. The products that, on average, received the most funding were olive oil, fruit and vegetables, vines, and tobacco. A less leading sector is animal products, where Italy received EUR 544.9 in 2002 (5.4% of the funding allocated to the 15 countries). Although funding for rural development is lower than for plant products, Italy receives 15% of the payments allocated to member countries.

As far as structural operations (Title 2) are concerned, support for regions that are lagging behind is implemented through the financing of four EU funds: EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and

Guarantee Fund), FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), and ESF (European Social Fund). The most important is the ERDF, which was established in 1975. This fund finances the construction of infrastructure, productive investments in favour of companies to facilitate employment, and local development projects. The European Social Fund, the second most important, was established in 1958 and has the purpose of promoting the professional integration of the unemployed and socially disadvantaged people, especially through training actions. The EAGGF finances both rural development and support actions for farmers in regions in difficulty (guidance) and common market organisations and rural development interventions in different areas of the community (guarantee). The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance was established more recently (1993) with the aim of adapting and modernising equipment in the sector.

In order to assess the role and importance of Italy in Europe compared to the other EU Member States, it is interesting to look at the comparative data on operational expenditure and resources for the various countries. Data on the allocation of operational expenditure in 2002 were analysed and broken down by sector and by member state. Italy is the fourth country with the highest funding of expenditure for the agricultural sector (13.1% of the total), after France (22.5%), Germany (15.7%), and Spain (13.7%). In the area of structural operations, the second most important expenditure heading, Italy is the fifth country with the highest amount of allocated expenditure (7.8% of the total), after Spain (38%), Germany (14.7%), Portugal (12.9%), and Greece (7.9%). In the area of internal policies, Italy is also the fifth country with the highest amount of allocated expenditure (10.1% of the total), after Germany (22%), Belgium (13.4%), France (12%), and Great Britain (11.7%). It is interesting to note that some important budget items, such as 'research and technological development' or 'training, youth, culture, etc.', Italy remains in fifth place in terms of the amount of funding allocated.

In 2002, resource payments concerned so-called traditional resources (agricultural taxes, sugar taxes, customs duties, etc.), value-added tax, gross national product and gross national income, and the correction of budgetary imbalances. With regard to the first heading, that of traditional resources, Italy benefited in 2002 from 868.1 million euros, or 9.4% of the total of traditional resources. In this sector, Italy is the sixth country with the highest amount of resource payments, after Great Britain (22.4% of total payments), Germany (21.3%), the Netherlands (10.4%), France (10.4%), and Belgium (9.6%).

With regard to value-added tax, Italy was the fourth country with the highest financing (12.1% of the total), after Germany (21.3%), Great Britain (20.3%), and France (17.9%). The same situation can be observed with respect to gross national product and gross national income payments. Germany accounted for the highest proportion of payments in this industry (22.9% of the total), ahead of Great Britain (18.5%), France (16.7%), and Italy (13.9%).

Summarising the data on the operational expenditure from which each Member State has benefited in recent years, one thing is clear: Italy had a decrease of €462.1 million between 2001 and 2002, despite the fact that total operational expenditure increased from €68,741.3 million to €72,734.3 million. As we've seen, the decline in payments for pre-2000 programming explains the majority of this decrease, which is due to the structural funds' contraction. In the period between 1996 and 2002, the year in which total operational expenditure was highest was 2000 (€73,141.3 million). In that year, Italy was among the countries with the highest operational expenditure (€10,770.9 million, or 14.7% of the total), after France (16.7%) and Spain (14.9%). In all other years, Italy was always the fourth-largest country, after France, Spain, and Germany. Since 1998, the country with the highest amount of funding for operational expenditure has been Spain, followed by France.

The Eurispes also looked at data on total EU expenditure by member state from 1996 to 2002. Total expenditure includes agriculture (Title 1), structural operations (Title 2), internal policies (Title 3), external action (Title 4), administrative expenditure (Title 5), pre-recruitment aid (Title 6), and reserves (Title 7). As in the case of operational expenditure, the countries receiving the most funding were France and Spain (Spain came first in 1998, 2001, and 2002). Italy was the fourth-largest country in terms of total expenditure, after Germany.

Fact Sheet 7 | Consumer associations in Italy

In Italy, the development of consumer associations took place during the 1980s, also thanks to regional laws that recognised the importance of citizens and their rights in the economic and social fields. The various regional laws thus had the task of promoting consumer protection and recognising the presence and representativeness of consumer protection associations.

Some of the most important consumer associations are members of the National Council of Consumers and Users. From a historical point of view, the National Consumers' Union was among the first associations to be established with the aim of protecting consumers. Other associations (Lega Consumatori and Altroconsumo) have more than thirty years of activity.

The ACU (Associazione Consumatori Utenti-Onlus) was established in Rome in 1984 under the name Agrisalus. It is currently active in the fields of mass consumer products, telephone and telematic services, network services (transport, water, etc.), e-commerce and misleading advertising, insurance, banking, finance, housing, etc.

ADICONSUM (Associazione Difesa Consumatori e Ambiente, Association for the Defence of Consumers and the Environment) was founded in 1987 and deals with consumer protection in various areas such as complaints about domestic services (water, electricity, and gas), the travel and tourism sector, contracts concluded on and off commercial premises, safety, health, and product quality, relations with banks and insurance companies, energy saving and the environmental sector, real estate and condominium problems, disputes with major telephone operators, the satellite TV and pay TV sector, combating usury, etc.

ADOC (Associazione per la Difesa e l'Orientamento dei Consumatori) was established in 1988 and is one of the founders of the European Consumers' Association. Adoc is involved in the fields of consumer information and assistance, price and tariff monitoring, and the promotion of campaigns to request refunds or the elimination of fees. Adoc campaigns on proper nutrition, food safety, clear labelling of products, and against petty crime.

ADUSBEF (Associazione Difesa Utenti Servizi Bancari, Finanziari, Postali, Assicurativi—Association for the Defence of Banking, Financial, Postal, and Insurance Services Users) was founded in 1987 and deals with all those sectors in which the consumer has a weak position.

The ALTROCONSUMO association, established in 1973, is the only Italian association recognised by the BEUC (European Bureau of Consumer Associations). Altroconsumo carries out over 80 comparative tests on consumer products and numerous surveys on public services, banking, and insurance every year. It also offers advice in the fields of law, tax, product quality, tariffs (telephone, RC auto), and generic drugs.

The CTCU (Centre for the Protection of Consumers and Users) was founded in 1993, and ten associations working for the protection of consumer rights in South Tyrol and individual consumers are members. CITTADINANZATTIVA was founded in 1978 as the Movimento Federativo Democratico with the aim of promoting the civic commitment of individuals, groups, and networks to actively participate in the governance of society. The movement is founded on territorial assemblies of active citizenship, which currently number more than 180 throughout the country.

CODACONS, Coordination of Associations for the Environmental Defence of Users' and Consumers' Rights, was founded in 1986 as an 'Association of Associations'. It is an association aimed at achieving a balanced relationship between the individual use of environmental resources and the sustainable development of society.

CONFCONSUMATORI (General Confederation of Consumers) was founded in 1976 and is responsible for informing, guiding, representing, organising, and defending consumers.

FEDERCONSUMATORI (Federazione Nazionale Consumatori e Utenti, National Federation of Consumers and Users) was founded in 1988 and operates through consumer assistance and advice desks in the main cities. It offers a legal advice service at the territorial level, an information service through the publication of a periodical, and user protection services for disputes on bills or with insurance companies and banks.

The Acli (Italian Workers' Associations) founded the association LEGA CONSUMATORI in 1971. It monitors cost-of-living trends through the 'basket', which summarises household spending in

supermarkets in ten provincial capitals, promotes conciliation and arbitration initiatives in the communications sector, and conducts research and awareness-raising activities on domestic accidents.
A group of citizens and experts who were interested in promoting the protection of consumer and user rights founded the Consumer Movement in 1985.
The MDC (Movimento di Difesa del Cittadino) is an association independent of parties or trade unions that was founded in 1987 with the aim of promoting the protection of citizens' rights.
The UNC (Unione Nazionale Consumatori) is an independent organisation founded in 1955. It educates, informs (through a daily newsletter and scientific publications), and defends consumers and users, carrying out actions to denounce abuses and speculation in various sectors and disseminating analyses and comparative tests of consumer goods to verify the correspondence between what is declared by producers and what is prescribed by law.
The various consumer associations have come together in two large groupings: *Independent Consumers*, formed by Cittadinanzattiva, Confconsumatori, Movimento Consumatori, Movimento Difesa del Cittadino, Unione Nazionale dei Consumatori, and the *Consumers' Entente*, formed by Adoc, Adusbef, Codacons, and Federconsumatori.
The Intesa denounced the price rises that have occurred in recent months and since the birth of the euro. In early August 2003, Consumers' Intesa released data on Italian households' spending in the first seven months of 2003. According to Intesa, each Italian family shelled out an average of EUR 1,381 more for groceries from December 31, 2002, to July 31, 2003, going from
23,480 to EUR 24,861. The 6 percent increase seems to depend mainly on the increase in food prices (+1.9 percent). In September, the estimated price increase for the period August 2003–January 2004 was released. A further increase in household expenditure of EUR 1,436 on average is expected. Consumer associations have frequently denounced the price increases following the launch of the single currency. The actual lire-euro exchange rate was, according to the associations, not 1,936.27 = 1, but 1,000 lire for 1 euro. Table 8 shows the data provided by Adiconsum on the so-called doubling of the euro.
Intesa Consumeri recorded prices for 50 products between December 2001 and June 2003 and compared them to come up with a further estimate of the cost increase. For Adiconsum, the loss of purchasing power is about EUR 1,000 per family for 2003. Purchasing power is estimated on the basis of the difference between the increase in income and the decrease in income due to price increases. A family with two children and two incomes that had an average increase in income of EUR 680, however, had to bear increases in their usual consumption of about EUR 1,800, resulting in a decrease in purchasing power of about EUR 1,220. This inevitably results in a cut in consumption.

Fact Sheet 8 | Associationism and volunteering: how committed are Italians?

But how many volunteers are there, and, above all, who is there today? The 3rd Fivol Report on Organisations Engaged in Social Work (published in 2002) attempts to assess the evolution of the phenomenon over the last ten years, analysing a sample of over 13,089 organisations out of a total of 26,235 surveyed (out of a verified universe of 26,374 active in our country in 2001).
The estimated number of volunteers in the 26,374 organisations is around 950,000. Fifty-eight percent of these contribute on a continuous basis. As far as the remunerated forces at the national level are concerned, the number is just under 35,000 (excluding paid consultants), broken down as follows: 11,850 employees, 10,800 collaborators, and 12,000 persons receiving expense reimbursement.
From the analysis of its data, the Italian Voluntary Work Foundation notes:

- *a more balanced spread over the territory*. Although 57.1% of volunteer groups are located in the North, there is a narrower spread of new organisations in the South (about 5% more than in the northern regions);
- *the phenomenon of active citizenship* The emergence of organisations is always more determined by citizens' initiative (45 out of 100) than by the affiliation capacity of volunteer centres or church promotion.

- *identity in the service*. Compared to the last survey, which showed the dichotomous choice between "confessional" and "non-denominational" inspiration, a third option ("no explicit matrix") has been added. As many as 44 out of 100 organisations attribute this 'neutrality' to themselves. Those describing themselves as 'confessional' fell from 38.8% in 1997 to 28.7% in 2001, reinforcing the hypothesis of a process of secularisation within solidarity groups;
- *the strengthening of the organisational set-up*. The way in which the VOs operate is changing. 92 out of 100 work continuously, mostly with a set weekly opening time (63 out of 100); they are more formalised (96 out of 100 have a statute); they are registered by public deed (6 out of 100 are informal groups); and they have supervisory bodies (9 out of 100 have more than one) to comply with the rules of transparency and good management required by registration in the volunteer register. Only 26.6% of the VOs have their own premises or rented premises; 63 out of 100 are hosted by another body, mostly public, or in the homes of presidents and managers;
- *more fields of intervention and specialisation in voluntary work*. Most of the VOs are in the welfare, social welfare, and health sectors, to which 62 out of 100 associations belong;
- *a change in the internal composition of groups* Organisations made up of volunteers alone are decreasing: from 34% in 1997 to 21% in 2000, due to two interrelated phenomena such as the growth of association- and mutualist-type organisations (an increasing number of VOs with few volunteers and a larger number of members) and a professional presence in organised volunteering with the inclusion of paid workers. Whereas in 1997 the units with specialised staff were 12.3%, in 2000 this percentage rose to 21.2%;
- *smaller nuclei of volunteers* In general, the VOs do not exceed 20 workers. Three out of ten are based on the commitment of no more than five activists, and in the majority of cases (56.4%), there are no more than ten continuous volunteers. The people working in the sector fall, in 38.4% of cases, into the age group of 46 to 65 years. Young people under the age of 30 make up only 8.3% of the total, a figure that could suggest both turnover problems and

generational or intergenerational cohabitation, as well as the tendency of younger forces towards the world of work.

Women represent 50.8% of active volunteers, although they are at the top of management responsibilities in only 3 out of 10 organisations.

Finally, with regard to the type of volunteers, as many as 95.3% are active and continuous. 62.8% work on an occasional basis, while 12.1% fall into the category of conscientious objectors. The number of paid collaborators and full- and part-time employees is just over 20%.

As far as the geographical breakdown is concerned, the regions that participate most actively in voluntary work are: Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Tuscany, Piedmont, Lazio, and Sardinia.

Valle d'Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Emilia Romagna, and Liguria are the regions with the highest number of VOs per 10,000 inhabitants.

The largest increase is recorded in the north-east, and in particular in Veneto and Trentino-Alto Adige.

The 8th Iref Report on Social Associations, published on the occasion of the Institute's 20th anniversary of its research on the subject, provides further valuable information for understanding the phenomenon. The survey was carried out on a representative sample of 1,000 Italian citizens aged 18 and over, stratified with respect to territorial and socio-demographic variables.

The data speak of a reversal in the spread of volunteering compared to the second half of the 1990s. In fact, after a continuous decline that began in 1991 (13.6%), there has been a recovery in the following years.

The return of the square is probably the most significant phenomenon to understand the extent to which civil society is awakening from a long torpor. Iref asked Italians whether, in the twelve months prior to the interview (November 2001–November 2002), they had taken part in one of the following initiatives: strikes, boycotts, social and political demonstrations, roundabouts, marches, or occupations. These were the results: "One fifth of the citizens over the age of 18 (21.8%) stated that they had taken part in at least one of these forms of group demands. The motivations are varied, and not all have anti-government traits. They range from the item 'because I recognise myself in the themes proposed by these initiatives' (35.7%), to 'to express my dissatisfaction with the political class' (22.9%), to 'protesting against the current government majority' (14%).

With respect to the narrowing of the gap between associationism and political participation, the Iref Report shows that, unlike in the 1990s, Italian volunteering is no longer in contradiction with (or a substitute for) political participation. Starting from this observation, the survey illustrates the orientations of Italians by drawing "four Italys": that of extraneousness, that of delegation, that of adhesion, and that of commitment. The first data reveals that our country is painfully split in half: about half the population (47.1%) 'keeps its hands in its pockets', that is, it does not carry out any voluntary activity, does not join the third sector, does not donate. The remaining part of the citizens can be divided into three distinct groups according to their intensity and mode of participation. First of all, of all those who delegate (22.2% of the sample), they do not get directly involved in social issues but are rather willing to give money out of a passive charitable spirit. This is therefore a form of civic responsibility mediated by money and characterised by disengagement. The second group (14.9%) is characterised by an intermediate level of participation. Finally, the last group, 15.8% of the total, is made up of all those Italians who can be considered true social 'militants': they donate, engage in voluntary work, move with agility in the third sector, and are inclined to savings and ethical consumption. The commitment is almost 360 degrees, and the intensity is rather high.

Fact Sheet 9 | Banking foundations: the social use of capital

That of banking foundations is an extremely interesting sector in order to grasp certain relevant processes that run through Italian society. This is not only because of what the world of banking foundations objectively produces, in terms of interventions and the promotion of local development, for those thousands of millions of euros that go towards a social or cultural purpose every year, but also, last but not least, because it stands as an exemplary crossroads between historically heterogeneous worlds: the banking world, central institutions, the third sector, and local authorities.

If it is indeed true that banking foundations succeed in carrying out works that very often the public sector could not carry out and that they manage to support the work of hundreds of private social subjects that, often with difficulty and limited means, are already active in the territories, it is also clear that this synergetic attitude becomes essential to the full expression of an increasingly important social role.

It is precisely around this dynamic of relations that the most important part of the work of foundations is played out: in their being part of a non-profit that is too often anchored to the logic of voluntary improvisation and at the same time being subjects that are integrated into the global financial world, both in terms of origin and tradition and in terms of professionalism and skills; in being disengaged from public institutions but, as recent events have amply demonstrated, at the same time being deeply involved in the country's political events; in acting in the context of local realities with awareness and tradition, but at the same time being supported by a systemic vision that makes it possible, as in the case of the 'Southern Project', to relaunch less well-equipped areas of the country.

Awareness on the part of the various social actors involved and an even greater promotion of this relational vocation, combined with a clear identification of the objectives that are really useful for local development systems, may constitute an element of further maturation of the sector and support for the variegated world of national non-profit organisations.

That said, the numbers of foundations say that there are a total of 89 banking foundations in Italy. The territorial distribution of these bodies is by no means homogeneous, so much so that they are more present in the north-east and in the central area of the country, where around two-thirds of the national institutions are to be found. There are fewer foundations active in the North-West (around 20% of the total) and fewer still in the South (around 13%).

If the data on the distribution of assets are analysed together, the previous indicator takes on further significant elements of explanation: Despite the limited number of organisations present, the North-West has a significant presence of overall assets: over 40% of the total funds administered by foundations belong to organisations in this geographical area; the Centre also stands out for the presence of a conspicuous share of overall assets (about one third), while in the North-East this element appears visibly lower (just over one fifth). The assets available to foundations operating in the south are

decidedly limited, amounting to 4.1% of the total. The distribution of the institutions in the Italian regions highlights the considerable concentration in Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Tuscany. The assets of banking foundations have tended to increase; the culmination of a process that began a decade ago was reached in the financial year 2000, when the invested assets achieved a peak profitability of 5.5%, while in the two following years, the results were financially less positive but still around 5%.
An examination of the structural characteristics of foundations cannot, of course, overlook the fundamental aspect of these bodies: the type and characteristics of disbursements. From the point of view of the type of disbursements, it should first be noted that annual disbursements make up the vast majority of the interventions implemented. They account for over 83% of total disbursements (in 2002) and absorb over 97% of the total amount disbursed. The percentage of interventions exceeding 5,000 euro is slightly higher than those with a budget of less than 5,000 (54.2% against 43.2%, this difference is more pronounced than in 2001, when the difference between the two types of disbursements was almost negligible), however, if we look at the amount disbursed, it is clear that the most generous disbursements absorb the majority of the interventions (81.5% in 2002 and a practically identical share in 2001).
Concerning the dynamics of disbursements, while it is true that more than one out of three interventions concern amounts between EUR 5 and 25 thousand (34.1%), almost 12% concern interventions between EUR 25 and 100 thousand, about 5% concern actions between EUR 100 and 250 thousand, and only about 3% concern even more significant interventions, it is nevertheless true that from the point of view of amounts, it is precisely the latter that absorb more than half of the disbursed assets. The intermediate classes of disbursements include shares of assets disbursed between 11 and 14%, while smaller interventions (up to 25 thousand euros) account for about one tenth of the total amounts. Thus, Acre data show that the average amount of grants was approximately 52,000 euros in 2002, compared to approximately 45,000 euros in the previous year. This is due both to the total amount disbursed (which increased by approximately 11%, i.e., from 971.3 million euros to 1,0767 million euros) and to a different spending policy, which is more attentive to concentrating initiatives on wide-ranging projects and not dispersing resources.
An element of considerable interest in better describing the nature of the interventions implemented is the allocation of disbursements according to the beneficiary. The preponderance of the interventions in 2002, as in the previous year, was made up of private entities other than associations, voluntary organisations, and various associations; this type of entity attracted around 28% of the interventions and almost 21% of the resources (less than the previous year, when this share almost reached 32% of the interventions and exceeded a quarter of the total amounts).
The role of public bodies, both territorial and non-territorial, is undoubtedly important: more than 30% of the interventions go to them, and almost 43% of the budget is allocated to them. There was an increase over 2001 in the number of disbursements destined for private associations, which receive about one out of every four interventions; however, these are more often than not actions of limited scope, not reaching a tenth of the total amounts. Lastly, it is worth noting the considerable increase in actions destined for voluntary organisations: while it is true that the total number of disbursements is not particularly high and is slightly down on 2001, it should be noted that the amount disbursed in 2002 absorbed more than 10% of the total, compared to about 2% in the previous year.
Observation of the sectors benefiting from the interventions allows for further reflection. The sector traditionally most affected by the banking foundations' donations is that of cultural and artistic activities; this area attracts 36.6% of the disbursements and just under 30% of the amounts. This figure is slightly down on 2001, when amounts allocated to this sector exceeded 34% of the total. This certainly benefited the education sector, which collected over 16% of the resources compared to 12.8% in the previous year. The share relating to social assistance remained substantially stable (about one fifth of the interventions and 12.5% of the amounts), while the resources allocated to philanthropic and voluntary organisations and those addressed to entities operating in the health sector appeared to increase slightly. On the other hand, the share of resources earmarked for research was less conspicuous compared to 2001: while in 2001 it absorbed one tenth of the total amounts, the following year, despite the increase in interventions in this field, it drew 8.9% of the amounts.

Specifying further on the type of interventions, it can be seen that the majority of disbursements are earmarked for the construction and renovation of buildings, to which 28.7% of the total amounts flow. The implementation of specific projects benefits from just under a fifth of the resources, while a not inconsiderable 17% is allocated to general administration costs.

Fact Sheet 10 | The discreet charm of the freemasonry

The Glasnost of the Grand Orient of Italy is the largest Masonic communion in Italy as well as the oldest, having been founded in 1805 in Milan. Its first Grand Master was Eugene Beauharnais, viceroy of Italy during the Napoleonic era. The G.o.I. declares that it scrupulously observes the Constitutional Charter of the democratic Italian State and the laws inspired by it.
In official documents, the G.o.I. defines itself as the sole legitimate source of Masonic authority on Italian territory and in relation to foreign Masonic Communions and declares itself in fraternal relations with almost all the regular Masonic Grand Lodges in the world. An exception is the United Grand Lodge of England, which, in 1993, deprived the G.o.I. of recognition following accusations made by the controversial former Grand Master Giuliano di Bernardo, according to whom the worst of the old P2, reorganised around Licio Gelli, always loomed over the Grand Orient of Italy. In addition, di Bernardo went so far as to suggest an involvement of the G.o.I. in the 1993 Mafia bombings in Rome and Florence and to state that members of the Grand Orient practised obscene rites and invoked the satanic representation of the Bafometto, an accusation once levelled at the Templars, whose Grand Master had been burned alive precisely in expiation of that guilt.
Having divested itself of its former anticlericalism, the G.o.I. claims to have fruitful relations not only with the Catholic Church but also with the Waldensian Church, the Jewish world, and the Muslim world. But secularism remains an indispensable prerogative. In 1994, at the height of the Cordova investigation, there were 630 lodges belonging to the G.O.I. and 20,939 affiliates. Today, the number of lodges is 579 (-8% compared to 1994), and the number of brothers is 15,004 (-28.4%).
The figures for the last few years show a growth in applications for membership (+15.8% in 2000 compared to 1999, +8.9% in 2001) and in new members (+14.7% in 2000, +3.4% in 2001). The trend is positive, although the growth rates cannot be described as accelerated. The annual increase in the number of reawakenings (i.e., re-affiliation with the Order after a period of removal) appears to be more substantial: as +53.3% is the percentage change in 2000/1999, and even +112.1% is the increase in 2001 compared to 2000.
The region with the highest density of G.o.I. members is Umbria, with 9.1 members per 10,000 inhabitants, followed by Calabria (7.1) and Tuscany (7). In the North-East regions, the density of members is particularly low, ranging from 0.7 in Veneto to 1.8 in Emilia Romagna. On the other hand, a fair density of affiliates is recorded in Sardinia (4.2) and in Piedmont, Marche, and Liguria, regions where the rate is always above 3 affiliates per 10,000 inhabitants.
If, in the past, the forced transparency imposed by Cordova with his cognitive investigation had resulted in a haemorrhaging of membership, today, Glasnost as a strategic choice of the G.o.I. leadership has had a twofold effect: to recover consensus in the order and to divert suspicions of conspiratorial activity. This would also explain the lowering of the average age of the "knockers" (i.e., those who ask to join Freemasonry), which passed from 43 years of age in 2000 to 42 and a half years in 2001, but also the consistent presence (22%) of the 25–40 year-old band among the ranks of members.
However, the over-40s still constitute the clear majority of members (72%). In particular, the 40–60 age group is widely represented (40%), as is the professional segment of freelancers (as many as 30%), teachers (20%), and entrepreneurs (15%). Graduates represent the overwhelming majority (70%). On the whole, the analysis of the intellectual and professional composition confirms the image of Freemasonry as an association mainly of notables and professionals, which, however, claiming to select its adherents on the basis of their moral and spiritual depth, cannot prejudicially close itself off to the entry of other social strata.

In 1993, at the same time as his resignation as Grand Master of the G.o.I., Giuliano di Bernardo founded The Grand Regular Lodge of Italy, a non-profit association that boasts the recognition of the United Grand Lodge of England. Originally, the G.L.R.I. counted seven regular lodges and about 300 brothers; today it has 110 lodges and about 3,000 affiliates. This figure, added to that of the affiliated with the G.o.i. (15,004) and the G.l.d.i. (about 7,000), for a total of about 25,000 members of the three largest Italian Masonic Communions.
The average age of the G.l.r.i.'s members is 43. Therefore, it is a younger Masonic communion than the G.o.i. (where the average member age is 52.4), as shown by the Grand Master's age, 43-year-old sociologist Fabio Venzi, as well as the presence of a particularly strong student component (20%).
The element that clearly distinguishes the G.l.r.i. from the G.o.i. is the absolute respect for the ban on talking about politics and religion, one of the basic principles for recognition by the GLU of England. It is therefore not possible to identify a political line of the G.L.R.I. on the basis of the available documents and publications.
To this end, G.l.r.i., pursuing the line of Anglo-Saxon charity, undertook initiatives in the field of charity by awarding scholarships and earmarking the 2003 Grand Benevolence Fund to the Telethon Institute for Gene Therapy for the treatment of muscular dystrophy.
To disseminate Masonic thought, the G.l.r.i. uses a website, two magazines, one of which is bilingual (De Hominis Dignitate, the title of an Oratio by Pico della Mirandola), and a publishing house ("Mirandoliana"), whose terminology already echoes Neo-Platonism and Renaissance humanism, hence a conception of man as the author of himself, projected into operativity and self-transcendence.
In essence, Freemasonry would be ascribable to civic activism as the 'third pillar of democracy' (according to Ralph Dahrendorf's expression), i.e., to those forms of social self-organisation that are not an extension of institutions or political parties and which represent a guarantee for an open society and a deterrent against totalitarianism of the opposite matrix.
In Italy, unlike in the Anglo-Saxon context, Freemasonry has traditionally had a political connotation rather than one of civil commitment. The hypertrophy of political and administrative structures, which has had a restraining effect on the development of free associationism, can explain this phenomenon.
In conclusion, whatever the reason for the politicisation of Masonry in our country, according to a substantial proportion of brethren, today the time has come to return to the statute, that is, to the founding principles that prohibit political and religious discussions in lodge work and identify civil commitment as the authentic vocation of Freemasonry.

CHAPTER 2 ON FREEDOM

Essay | A confused democracy

"The effort of liberal-democratic culture can be summed up in the long-successful attempt to make democracy and capitalism the instruments of our freedoms. Tocqueville's lesson comes to our aid once again: democracy can help us overcome the wild instincts within us, but it does not always guarantee us freedom. Freedom, in fact, depends not only on institutions and laws but also on the culture in which we identify ourselves. It is culture that is the true identity card of a society and a nation. It is culture that *steers*, as Machiavelli explained, a country towards its destiny.

Everything is different in the West, in Europe, and especially in Italy, after the end of the fears aroused by Leninism and Stalinism. How much remains of that liberal-democratic culture with which we vanquished our enemies of the past? Freedom,' argued Benedetto Croce, 'has before it not the future but the eternal. What, indeed, is the anti-Semitism that resurfaces among us on a daily basis? And that *will to power* that unfolds in the brazenly overbearing attitudes of certain economic, social, or political groups? Are these questions related to different and separate problems? For us, they encapsulate the symptoms of the same disease. Democracy and freedom are terms dense with duplicity. A sick democracy can also become a prison. Freedom, in turn, can be reduced to the claim of some to impose their own view of nature and history on others. And even their own way of hoping and thinking. It is the liberal-democratic culture that allows us to combine our freedom with that of others and allows democracy to overcome its most recurring disease: that Jacobinism that was once violent, tragic, and grandiose and today manifests itself in grey and anaesthetizing forms.

Many insist on not grasping the connection between the crisis of liberal-democratic culture and the excesses of capitalism, perhaps so as not to burden the authoritarian drift towards which important sectors of capitalism are now travelling with excessive and embarrassing symbols.

Right at the heart of the western system, in its economy, the eclipse of liberal democratic culture and its replacement by a form of subtle despotism are revealed.

Also worrying is the Eurobarometer report made public at the end of the year. It is a strange survey since the very wording of the questions does not seem the most suitable to solicit clear answers capable of offering a reliable picture of the mood and feelings of Europeans. And yet there is one aspect of that document that confirms several clues: Anti-Semitism is also being blown out of proportion by minority currents of the European left, driven to mix, in the same absurd criticism, the policy of the Sharon government with the people of Israel.

Is it the Israeli government's choices that fuel anti-Semitism? Or is it the latter that represents an unbeatable prejudice against any policy Israel adopts? Reflecting on these questions is a necessity for anyone who wants to remove any pretext for racism, even in Italy. Some seem to confuse the events of the Middle East with those of the Jewish people. Ignorance is the main cause of the confusion; many Italians are unaware of Israel's history and the causes of the brutal conflict in Palestine. The choices made by the current Israeli government to defend its citizens may be wrong, dictated by fear and resentment. But why do most of Sharon's critics go as far as to confuse the acts of a government with those of an entire people? One often catches, in the rancorous and irrational ways in which these criticisms are made, the smell of unconfessed racism. The same odour, moreover, can be smelled in some positions of feigned sympathy for the Jewish cause, behind which another form of racism directed against Arabs and Muslim immigrants is often concealed. If one can understand where racism begins, it is more difficult to know where it can lead us. Why not discuss it frankly, especially in Italy?

Our country does not have a long and established culture of freedom behind it. Remember that Giolitti only introduced universal suffrage in 1912. And that women only obtained the right to vote in 1946, with the birth of the so-called First Republic, after twenty years of dictatorship. The Constitutional Charter, in force since 1948, is in some ways a miraculous event. The first part, intended to regulate the

rights and duties of citizens, can be considered an extraordinary *manifesto* of modern liberal-democratic culture.
Parties can no longer govern the present or imagine the future. All passions seem to be extinguished. Imagination, which once seemed to be a virtue of the Italians, is now mainly applied to finance with a voracity that leaves one breathless, from the Cirio case to Parmalat. It is not surprising that the true values of democracy are scarcely felt and defended. And that scepticism is spreading, especially among young people.
How can those young people, who, upon completion of their studies, cannot find a job or find one that is unskilled and insecure, believe these words? The real problem is not the economic situation, which can always improve. But by that sub-culture, widespread in recent years, which tends to identify the necessary flexibility of the labour market with the permanent precariousness of workers, Thus, society seems to be pointing young people down a road that they must travel without dreams, and then youth lose its magic. What idea of freedom can generations be condemned to grow up with, thinking that they will never be able to hold the reins of their own destiny in their hands? What idea of freedom can those pensioners have who feel guilty and threatened, as if their pension were no longer the fruit of their labour but a subsidy that burdens the community and takes resources away from the country? This question is not related to the reform of the social security system that is being discussed these days; reform may be inevitable or unjust, providential or not. Once again, the real problem is that wretched sub-culture that envelops and accompanies the reform debate. There is in this sub-culture the barely concealed idea that everything must be subordinated exclusively to the times and the world of production: those who have left this world because they are old or have not yet entered it because they are young are not a resource of experience or energy but a hindrance. And in this case, freedom and democracy become abstract and distant concepts.
Last year, surveys conducted by our institute showed that price increases were and are travelling at a much faster rate than the inflation ascertained by public observers, which is traceable to the government. An absurd controversy ensued, as some went as far as to theorise that a private institute cannot measure the consumer price of tomatoes or schoolbooks. Instead, the survey conducted by the Eurispes should have prompted an unprejudiced discussion on the profound changes that the uncontrolled price race is bringing about in Italian society.
Other examples could confirm the crisis of liberal-democratic culture in our daily reality. The nonchalant use of criminal prosecution by some prosecutors, even in the absence of serious indications of a crime, and the consequent media pillorying, facilitated by the usual mysterious leaks, to the detriment of citizens who will have to wait years to *prove* their innocence The verb "*prove*, purposely printed by us in italics, is intended to emphasise that its use and misuse overturn one of the fundamental principles of freedom: the principle that it is up to the prosecution to prove the guilt of the suspect and not for the latter to prove his innocence. Is it possible that, while waiting for the usual great reform, we will not at least find the means to discourage virtual trials in newspapers and on television where, in special parlours, innocents and guilty parties issue sentences that precede those of judges? And what about the recurring clash between politics and justice that has divided Italy for years? Many believe that the judiciary, or a part of it, wants to *commandeer* politics, dispossessing voters of their right to choose the majority and the government they prefer. Still others believe that it is politics, more precisely the government, which is cultivating the design of a domesticated justice system that is brazenly subordinated to unmentionable powerful interests. Could such a clash take place in a society that had liberal-democratic culture as its common denominator?
The widespread tendency among parties on both sides to envision electoral law reform as a majoritarian system that gives the majority the power to do and undo anything and casts the opposition in the role of a vindictive and destructive critic makes everything worse. But where?
Meanwhile, anti-Semitism resurfaces in Europe. It returns to the places where it was born with a load of hatred and misfortune. To deny it is a gamble. The poisons it carries can leaven our apathy. The painful experience of the past should have taught us that anti-Semitism thrives when it is protected by the indifference of intellectuals, of the so-called bourgeoisie, and of the trade unions; in a word, when it manages to take cover behind the carelessness of all those people who should be the first to notice how racism is the harbinger of a sunset—the slow decline of our freedoms. Why is the alarm not high enough?

Of course, after every episode of violence (or threats or insults) against Jews, many choruses of condemnation are raised, but widespread apprehension is seldom heard. As if they were execrable events, sure. They happened, however, in an indistinct and distant suburb. And yet they are happening right among us, in our distracted and forgetful cities. A reflection is now called for, since anti-Semitism and racism are not like rotten pustules in a healthy body that can be cut out with a miraculous blow of a scalpel. Instead, they are the symptoms of a serious disease that is growing in the whole body of a community, even when it seems to have infected only one part of it.

Anti-Semitism is a very small minority in Italy, according to the survey our institute conducted, but underestimating it would be a serious mistake.

We are aware that our arguments will arouse opposition in those who do not believe that racism and anti-Semitism are expressions of the crisis of liberal-democratic culture. But where do they originate, then? It is a historical fact that anti-Semitism and racism have developed in culturally weak communities where individualism has lost its positive characteristics and has blossomed into a kind of widespread, rancorous scepticism.

What is the real origin of the anti-Semitism swirling around us? Is it really the war in the Middle East? Doubting it is legitimate

Is it possible that even today we can think of solving the Middle East question by destroying the State of Israel? The Islamic fundamentalist currents want this. It is a stage in their *holy war* against the entire West. This is why attributing the explosion of terrorism to the conflict in the Middle East is a simplistic thesis, a disastrous naivety. Although it is imprudent to underestimate that the suffering of the Palestinians provides a breeding ground for the most desperate and extreme acts, the ideologues of fundamentalism openly advocate a form of new totalitarianism similar to that experienced in Afghanistan by the Taliban. They arbitrarily deform and interpret the 'Koran' and aim to seize power, primarily, in Arab countries ruled by moderate governments.

Terrorism will not disappear after the birth of a Palestinian state that can coexist with the reality of the State of Israel. Meanwhile, the whole of Palestine is a land of sorrow, in which two people mourn their daily deaths. This cannot be the real backdrop of anti-Semitism. Rather, it appears to be a tragic mask, behind which lie unmentionable delusions and the unconscious rejection of the values of freedom. We see in the return of the ghosts of racism a sign of Europe's weakness, while in Italy, fortunately, public opinion is proving to be more mature, alert, selective, and capable of separating judgement on the Jewish people from political judgement on the Israeli government, as confirmed by the in-depth survey carried out by our institute and presented within this report. Europe sometimes seems reduced to a huge, jammed market. It still does not know how to reconcile its welfare state model with the suggestive rapacity of old capitalism, reborn from the ashes of the 19th century. Capillary and aggressive propaganda confines the values of solidarity among the remnants of a past that must be erased. The words of a poet particularly dear to us, Eugenio Montale, come to mind:

"Europe is no longer fighting for supremacy; it is fighting to survive. The fact that never before has there been so much talk about the European spirit is proof of this. A disease is not given a name until it is discovered, and Europe speaks of itself because it doubts that it is lying on its deathbed. But Europe still lives as a flavour rather than a unified synthesis of characters. A revival of Europe is surely linked to a revival of its culture, steeped in liberalism and humanism'.

The Italian scenario is obviously no different, as it is from the crisis of political culture that the *will to power* resurfaces, that unconfessed but in some cases ostentatious racism. We would be pessimistic if we were not helped by Croce's prophecy, which we wish to recall once again: "Freedom has before it not the future but eternity'.

Fact Sheet 11 | The labour market reform: Legislative Decree 276/2003

With the approval of the Biagi law (Law 30/2003) and subsequently with the enactment of the implementing decree 276/2003, the regulatory framework that characterised the labour market in Italy changed completely. With the Biagi reform, in fact, new working methods and, consequently, different types of contracts were introduced. A reform that mainly involves those seeking their first job, the unemployed, and those already working in 'non-standard' forms of employment. These forms of atypical work represent contractual modalities that characterise the labour market in our country today. There are an increasing number of 'atypical' workers, so much so that some working arrangements can no longer be defined as 'atypical" due to their widespread diffusion within Italian society. Only occasional, coordinated, and continuous collaboration can be considered the only true form of atypical work.
Over the past five years, the number of collaborators enrolled in the Inps separate management fund, to which only certain types of atypical workers are obliged to register, has increased significantly: from 1998 to 2002, the number of collaborators regularly registered with the Inps rose by 58%, from 1,388,918 in 1998 to a total of 2,194,803 in 2002. The greatest increase was seen in the enrolment of female collaborators, who grew steadily more than male enrolment over the entire five-year period. The increase in female enrolments in the Inps separate management fund from 1998 to 2002 was a total of 64.8%, compared to an increase in men's enrolments of 52.3%, a percentage value that is significantly lower than that for the female universe.
In 2002, women accounted for 47.7% of fund members, with a higher concentration in the 30 to 39 age group, while in 1998, female members accounted for 45.6% of total membership. A detailed knowledge of the phenomenon of atypical work in all its contractual forms is still difficult due to the fact that these types of work do not enjoy adequate attention from a statistical point of view, and it is impossible to add up all the existing data in order to know how much they affect total Italian employment. In a recent study, the Eurispes attempted to draw a picture of atypical workers, subdivided according to the main types of contracts, providing a trend for the five-year period 1996–2000. From this analysis, it emerged that the contractual forms with the highest number of employees are coordinated and continuous collaborations and part-time work. Since the entry into force of the law that introduced temporary work, this type of contract has experienced significant growth, despite a slowdown in 2002. In 1998, there were 34 companies authorised to provide temporary work; by the end of 2000, there were 52, rising to 69 in 2003, with a total of 2,114 branches distributed throughout the country. Temporary agency work was widely used by Italian companies, especially those in Northern Italy. 73.4% of temporary employment agencies are located in the northern regions, of which 30.5% are in Lombardy alone, while in the centre there are 15.8% of agencies and in the south only 10.7%.
With the entry into force of Legislative Decree 276/2003, temporary work was replaced by the institution of ''labour supply', which, although it has points in common with the old form of temporary work, takes on its own highly innovative characteristics for the Italian labour market. In fact, the legislation regulating temporary work (Law 196/1997) provided for certain constraints both on the supply of temporary workers and on the use of temporary work by companies in order to avoid its improper use. Today, with the decree implementing the Biagi reform, the scope of action of 'employment agencies' has been considerably broadened, and they will be able to carry out work administration, intermediation, personnel search and selection, and support activities.
professional outplacement. In the description of labour supply, i.e., the relationship between the supply agency and the user company, the legislator distinguishes between two types of supply: fixed-term and open-ended.
One of the most innovative points of the legislative decree implementing the Biagi reform is, however, the regulation of 'project work', which will replace 'coordinated and continuous collaboration', commonly referred to as 'co.co.co." In order to significantly limit the improper use of coordinated and continuous collaboration contracts, the legislator introduced a series of restrictions on the stipulations of these contracts. In fact, collaborations are often used to disguise subordinate employment relationships, allowing principals a very large saving in terms of both remuneration and contributions. Unlike 'co.co.co.', project collaborations must always be 'referable to one or more specific projects or

work programmes or phases thereof' that must be determined by the principal and "managed autonomously by the employee depending on the result" (at. 61, c. 1, Legislative Decree 276/2003).
Coordinated and continuous collaboration contracts still in existence will therefore have to be converted into project-based collaborations. With these provisions, the legislator aims to convert all those irregular collaborations into subordinate employment relationships, thus allowing for the regular employment of collaborators who practically perform their work in the same manner as employees.
In fact, these provisions contain fictitious protections. In fact, in the event that a coordinated and continuous collaboration cannot be traced back to a project collaboration, it will maintain its effectiveness until the expiry date provided for in the contract and 'in any case, no later than one year from the date of entry into force' of Legislative Decree 276/2003 (Art. 86, c.1). On the basis of these provisions, therefore, and also taking into account all the categories to which project collaboration will not be applied, there will be a large number of coordinated and continuous collaboration contracts that will remain in place.
Since October 24, 2003, legislative decree 276/2003 has also introduced completely new types of contracts, thus creating situations and labour relations never before considered. Title V of Decree 276/2003 introduces the 'reduced, modulated, and flexible time contract types': intermittent work, split work, and part-time work.
The first two typologies (intermittent work and job-sharing) became established in our legal system for the first time. A brief description of these contractual modalities will serve to clarify the new labour market structure outlined by the Biagi reform. Intermittent work takes the form of an employment contract, either fixed-term or open-ended, 'by which a worker places himself at the disposal of an employer who may use his work performance' in the cases provided for by the decree (Art. 33, c. 1 Legislative Decree 276/2003). Recourse to this working modality, also referred to as '*job on call*', is not always permitted. In fact, the legislator has provided that intermittent work contracts can only be concluded for 'discontinuous or intermittent services' and, on an experimental basis, for 'services rendered by unemployed persons under 25 years of age or by workers over 45 years of age who have been expelled from the production cycle or are registered in the mobility and employment lists' (art. 34, c. 2, Legislative Decree 276/2003). Job sharing, also referred to as *job sharing,"* is a contractual case that allows two workers to share the same job, provided that the work obligation is 'single and identical' (Art. 41, c. 1, Legislative Decree 276/2003). It is an institution already known to the Italian legal system because it was administratively regulated in 1998.

Fact Sheet 12 | The wage market in Italy (trend 2001-2003)

Wages in Italy in the three-year period 2001–2003 have remained at the pole, prices have risen considerably, and consequently purchasing power has fallen drastically, with obvious repercussions on consumption and on the possibilities of sustaining development through the traditional and tried-and-tested method based on increasing domestic demand as the basic factor for relaunching production and development.
The data speak clearly about the phenomenon and its spread across all occupational strata and describe a new scenario with very peculiar features in the economic and social landscape: the value of the professions, and more generally of work, is rapidly decreasing and aligning downwards, with a redistribution of income unfavourable to a growing number of people and families.
Taking up the invitation of Eurispes, interested in measuring the erosion of workers' purchasing power, OD&M Consulting has developed, for this edition of the *Italy Report*, an in-depth study on the pay market in Italy, limited to the period 2001–2003.
This serves the purpose of monitoring the market value of a profession.
The information consists of 852,413 salary profiles that make up OD&M's general database. A 'salary profile' is a system of information related to a person's remuneration: sector and industry, company size and turnover, territorial area, profession and task, category, classification, age, seniority, and gender.

The salary data surveyed refers to the four occupational categories of managers, middle managers, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003.
The picture that emerges when comparing the information obtained through the hundreds of thousands of interviews conducted in 2001, 2002, and 2003 leaves no doubt.
The market value of all private sector professions in Italy appears to be declining in all categories, including the annual total remuneration:

- grew by about 3 percentage points for middle managers (2.7%) and marginally for executives (0.6%);
- recorded a decrease for office workers (-3.7%); remained stationary for the workers.

The described growth rates are therefore not sufficient to counterbalance an inflation that grew by more than 5 points in 2002–03 alone; the value recognised by the market for the professions has decreased.
There are three main reasons for this situation:

- The first concerns an international context characterised by low growth, instability, and conflict.
- The second is about the subpar state of the Italian economy, which is evident from its almost zero growth in gross domestic product and declining levels of competitiveness;
- The third concerns changes in labour policies (dictated to a large extent by the first two phenomena); these policies have produced two transformation processes:
- a profound change in the mix of the working population;
- a safeguarding of the competitive level based on a pronounced reduction of fixed costs and only to a residual extent on investments in research and development.

In order to calculate the loss of purchasing power, Eurispes compared the trend in total wages with the inflation rate recorded for the three-year period 2001–2003 by the official source (Istat) and Eurispes. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the estimates of other associations indicate even higher values (over 10% per year in the last two to three years). According to Istat data, prices grew by 2.8% between 2001 and 2002 and by 2.7% in the following year. According to the Eurispes, the increase was much higher: 8.1% in 2001–2002 and 8% in 2002–2003. Overall, therefore, the inflation rate recorded for the three-year period 2001–2003 was 5.5% according to Istat and 16.1% for the Eurispes.
The combination of the trend in annual salaries and the simultaneous rise in prices recorded by the two research institutes caused a sharp drop in the purchasing power of all professional categories over the three-year period under consideration. It is in fact possible to observe, for example, that the decrease in the annual total remuneration of white-collar workers, equal to -3.7% between 2001 and 2003, added to the inflation rate of the same three-year period, determined for this professional category a decrease in purchasing power, varying from 9.2% (considering an inflation rate of 5.5%) to 19.8% (an inflation rate of 16.1%). Middle managers and executives were less affected by inflation because of a fair increase in annual salaries, but blue-collar workers were particularly hard hit because their purchasing power decreased by a variable amount between 5.5% and 16.1%.
The real extent of price growth in recent years in relation to the introduction of the European single currency was one of the most bitter controversies of 2003.
However, whatever the source considered, the loss of purchasing power appears evident and penalises above all the white-collar categories. In particular, referring to the inflation rates measured by Eurispes, it is possible to observe, in the two-year period 2001–2003, that the loss of purchasing power was 19.7% for office workers, 16% for blue-collar workers, 15.4% for executives, and 13.3% for middle managers.
The combination of the stagnation of the fixed element and the decline of the variable element produced a negative balance, which mainly penalised white-collar workers (-32.1% in two years of the variable element indicates that bonuses and overtime have decreased significantly).
Looking at the average values recorded per category and divided between fixed and variable parts, it can be seen that

- For managers, the fixed portion increased from 2001 to 2003 by 1.3%. In contrast, the variable portion fell by 7.5% over the same period.
- For middle managers, the deviation for the fixed portion is greater (3.3%), while the decrease in the variable portion is very similar (-7.7%);
- For white-collar workers, finally, the situation appears much more critical: the variable element collapses (-32.1%) and the fixed part also decreases (-2.8%).

For the category of executives, a further investigation aimed at measuring the differences recorded according to the company size and origin of the salary profiles surveyed shows partially different dynamics.
The fixed component of managers' salaries has increased in small and medium-sized companies compared to 2001, but the difference in large companies is negligible.
All sizes share a decrease in the variable part (up to -20.1% in small companies).
The distinctive features of the wage market in Italy in 2003 are characterised by the following phenomena:

- a substantial territorial homogeneity: with the exception of southern Italy and metropolitan areas, the Italian territory seems to be aligned around similar wage values;
- the performance of the South, which, while confirming itself as an area with its own remuneration logic, shows the best growth trends in the middle management and executive categories compared to the previous two-year period;
- The differences between the South and the rest of the country are deeper in the lower professional categories: The gap between the South and the North-West varies in fact between -3.7% of executives, -10.1% of office workers, and -9.9% of blue-collar workers.
- The credit and insurance sectors maintained the highest average wages in all categories but also recorded significant declines among both employees and managers (-6.3%);
- Transport is the best-performing sector, while industry and handicrafts show a positive trend only among executives.
- Banks and financial companies, energy, petroleum, and related industries, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications continue to be the strongest pay segments;
- Due to the latter's improving trend, the pay gap between large and medium-sized businesses will continue to close; the gap only seems to be significant in the executive category.

The analysis of salaries by province once again confirms the differences between the South and the North of Italy, the areas to which all the provinces with the best average salaries belong. Among these, the Lombardy provinces stand out (generally above the average values in all categories), especially Milan, which records the absolute highest average remuneration for executives (89,733 euros). The most significant phenomenon, however, appears to be in the provinces of Emilia, with Parma (third among blue-collar workers, immediately after Modena and Sondrio, and fifth among executives), Reggio Emilia (first among white-collar workers), and especially Modena. The province, famous throughout the world as the home of Italy's most famous brand, Ferrari, seems to offer the best salary context overall, recording the highest averages among blue-collar workers, fifth among white-collar workers, and third among executives. Finally, the excellent situation in Bolzano should be highlighted, first among middle managers and second among office workers. Overall, the impression emerges from the scenario provided that far from the large metropolitan areas, there are thriving economic realities capable of guaranteeing salary levels in line with those of the largest Italian cities.
Variable pay, incentive pay, target-based pay, performance or participation bonus, etc. are many of the terms used to indicate the payment of a variable part of remuneration in addition to basic pay.
The creation and implementation of 'strong' incentive instruments, to which a central role in the overall reward system should be acknowledged, appears to be a management challenge that can no longer be postponed if one wants to successfully combine behaviour consistent with challenging goals and high performance with economic recognition, employee satisfaction, and sustainability in the medium and long term.
Total remuneration is the fundamental element of any reward system that also includes promotion, status, career, security, personal satisfaction, and learning opportunities. Total remuneration is broken down into direct remuneration: fixed, variable (incentives, bonuses), and deferred (severance pay); and indirect remuneration: shareholdings and benefits.
In 2002, about one in two (48.9% compared to 51.6% in 2001) executives were granted a car as part of their agreed remuneration package, while almost one in three (28.8%) obtained one of the most topical benefits, namely supplementary pension benefits.
Stock options, whose appeal after the stock market woes of the early years of the century (especially for New Economy companies) is actually significantly declining, are granted to 10.8% of Italian executives.

Among middle managers, the percentage spread of benefits is obviously lower, with a ratio of around 50% compared to executives: 15.3% versus 28.4% for credit cards, 6.5% versus 12.2% for medical check-ups, and 14.1% versus 28.8% for insurance.
The final point of analysis relates to accommodation, a benefit that 5.9% of executives and 2.2% of managers receive.

Fact Sheet 13 | Less poor or less wealth? The accounts do not add up

The likelihood of impoverishment of the lower and middle classes has become even more marked in recent years, and the dividing line between the poor and the non-poor has become increasingly blurred. The loss of a job, redundancy funds, or the onset of a serious illness are causal variables capable of seriously compromising the fragile economic-financial balance of a large proportion of households.
The middle class itself is at risk of extinction; even the classes that thought themselves (or believed themselves) exempt from sudden reversals of fortune may suddenly plummet below the poverty line, despite welfare and welfare safety nets.
Other components, such as the erosion of the purchasing power of wages and pensions due to the resurgence of inflation or the increase in 'regulated' prices (transport fares and other utilities), also add to the uncertainty. These factors have a negative impact on the living conditions and expectations of the population, especially those on fixed incomes.
It is particularly single-income families and those with more than two children that are more likely to become impoverished. The condition of marginality, which characterises an increasing number of families and individuals, must be taken as an alarm bell for the future in order to prevent the worsening of an already evident social malaise. No category can claim to be completely safe from the risk of poverty, and, often, employment status is not a sufficient guarantee of decent living conditions.
In addition to the percentage of poor households counted by Istat, with all the limitations highlighted, on the basis of Bankitalia data, Eurispes was able to estimate the number of Italian households that are seriously at risk of poverty. The blurred boundary between poverty and non-poverty represents a condition of instability that could occur when just one variable changes.
Using the parameters referring to income brackets, it turns out, in fact, that more than 10% of Italian households are at risk of poverty; in absolute values, this is about 2,400,000 households. If we look at the numerical composition of households, the greatest precariousness is confirmed in the largest nuclei; adding the households composed of 5 or more members already poor (23.4%) to those at risk (18.6%), we arrive at 42% of the corresponding size band (5 or more members), about 626 thousand Italian households. Households of four people are also very exposed to the risk of destitution; precisely 14.7% of more than 4 million households could find themselves below the poverty line as a result of an unfavourable event, such as the loss of a job mentioned above.
Single-person households are in a favourable condition in percentage terms, at 9 percent, but looking at the absolute figure, we note that the risk affects as many as 503,000 families, this family type being one of the most widespread; in fact, in our country, more than 5.5 million people live alone.
According to ISTAT data, a picture emerges of an Italian society that is gradually reaching a level of widespread wellbeing, where, therefore, social policies have achieved their objectives and economic development affects a larger segment of the population. This is not the case, and it is essential to highlight a series of considerations that draw a very different reality from the statistics, as indicated at the beginning.
First of all, Eurispes recalls that the relative poverty 'line' is calculated annually with respect to the average per capita household consumption expenditure; this means that the relative poverty line shifts from year to year as a result of both the change in consumer prices and the trend in real terms of household consumption expenditure. Based on these parameters, ISTAT sets the poverty line for a two-person household at EUR 823.45 and counts 2,456,000 destitute households.
As previously stated, the standard poverty line (823.45 euros) takes into account both inflation (the price index increased by 2.5% compared to 2001) and consumer spending, which decreased in real terms in

2002 despite higher average monthly expenditures per family (16 euros more, or an increase of 0.7%) due to 2.5% inflation-related declines in consumption. Put simply, Italian households spent more but bought less as the value of their money fell as a result of higher prices.
On the contrary, if only inflation had been taken into account, the poverty line would have been EUR 844.04 per month, which is about EUR 21 higher than the established poverty line.
As a result, the number of poor households would have been 2,654,000, a good 198,000 more than those estimated, which, however, were not counted because the benchmark was different. This means that there was no decrease in the number of poor people, but a decrease in the value of the poverty line caused by a worsening in the average standard of living of the population.
Still using the concept of revalued poverty, the incidence of poverty in the population is 11.9%, only 0.1% lower than in 2001.
Another noteworthy element is the intensity of poverty, an indicator measuring how much, on average, poor households spend below the poverty line, which was 21.4% in 2002, an increase of 0.3% on the previous year. This value indicates that although the number of poor households has decreased, their condition has worsened.
It is worth mentioning here the evolution of Italian household consumption over the last three years. In 2002, average household expenditure on foodstuffs increased and stood at EUR 425 per month, compared to EUR 404 in 2000. Expenditure on non-food items is also positive, but a detailed look at the data shows that the increase is in those goods and services that are indispensable: housing (+1.4%) and health and sanitary services (+0.1%). On the contrary, spending on other goods suffered a general contraction: clothing and footwear (-0.2%), furnishings and household services (-0.5%), transport (-0.3%), and leisure (-0.2%).

Fact Sheet 14 | Family support policies

Italy devotes just 0.9 percent of its national wealth to family policies. All the other EU-15 countries spend much more on the family, starting with Portugal and the Netherlands, which devote 1.2% of their GDP to family policies.
They are followed (in ascending order) by: Ireland 1.9%, Greece 2.1%, the UK 2.4%, Belgium 2.6%, Austria 2.9%, France and Germany 3%, Luxembourg and Finland 3.4%, Sweden 3.5%, and Denmark 3.8%. Italy is therefore well below the EU average of 2.3%. Only Spain is worse off than us, with 0.4% of GDP.
It is difficult for Italian families to conceive children (the average fertility rate for an Italian woman is 1.2, the lowest in Europe) because of economic obstacles and the latitude of family support policies. France, on the other hand, spends 3% of its GDP on family policy, or 80 billion euros, and can afford the highest fertility rate, with 1.9 children per woman.
One of the main instruments to support the family is fiscal in nature. In fact, the Italian tax system provides various measures of Irpef deductions for dependent family members, depending on the taxpayer's income and the number of children. Family members are considered dependent if their total income is less than EUR 2,850.41. However, it is worth pointing out that the instrument of tax deductions for family burdens leaves uncovered the households that most need economic support: those in which both spouses are unemployed. Therefore, the introduction of measures to support households that are not eligible for tax relief appears to be a priority.
Monetary allowances, currently in place to support families, appear to be totally inadequate for child maintenance: the arrival of the first child leads on average to a decrease in disposable income of between 18% and 45% and to additional expenditure of between EUR 500 and 800 per month, varying according to age and location.
As far as indirect subsidies are concerned, the inadequacy of the tax deductions in force in our country is evident in comparison with France and Germany: for a family with two dependent children and a total income of 30,000 euros, the expected tax saving is just over 500 euros in Italy, three thousand euros in France, and six thousand euros in Germany.

From this point of view, an important novelty has been provided for in the 2004 Financial Law, which, in Article 16, establishes an instrument to guarantee a minimum income to the weaker segments of the population: the Redito di Ultima Istanza (Rui), which will be granted by the local administrations through a co-financing by the state. The amount of the envisaged allowance is not indicated. It is certain, however, that the resources earmarked for this measure should be substantial to ensure coverage for all families living in poverty. According to the latest available data, there are in fact about 2.5 million households living in relative poverty (11% of the total), two-thirds of which are concentrated in southern Italy.

Poverty is significantly more widespread among households with one or more job seekers: it affects 9.4% of households with no one unemployed, 21.1% of households with one job seeker, and more than a third (37.3%) of households with two or more job seekers. Household size is also a discriminating variable: poverty affects 23.4% of households with at least five members, against an average of 11%.

It is plausible to think that where the conditions linked to geographical location, employment status, and family size add up negatively, the probability of finding oneself in a situation of economic deprivation takes on dramatic contours. Suffice it to observe that while in the northern regions, poverty affects 11.6% of households with five or more members, in the south, with the same family size, the percentage rises dramatically, reaching 32.4%.

In terms of support for children and working mothers, our country is characterised by a significant lack of early childhood services.

It is possible to observe how private services cover, at a national level, more than one fifth of the total supply: 604 nurseries out of 3,008 are in fact private. In some regions and autonomous provinces, the incidence of the private sector on the total number of crèches is particularly significant, as in the autonomous province of Bolzano (43.7%) and in Veneto (52.2%), Campania (52.9%), and Calabria (45%).

The presence of private nurseries can only partially make up for the lack of facilities supported by public resources. In fact, the high cost of private services prevents them from being considered a viable alternative. In addition, the percentage of applications for public and private crèches that remain uncollected is very high, even in territories characterised by a greater presence of private services.

In fact, one third of Italian children are on the waiting list to enter a nursery school; 32% of applications are on hold. The greatest shortages are to be found in Trentino Alto Adige, where the percentage is close to 60%; in Liguria (55.8%); and in Valle d'Aosta, which, with 51.7% of unsuccessful applications, closes the group of regions where the percentage of children waiting to go to a nursery school exceeds the percentage of successful applications. The nursery school coverage rate is also below average in Veneto (where the percentage of accepted applications is 58.5%), Friuli Venezia Giulia (62.2%), Lazio (63.5%), Tuscany (65.1%), and Sardinia (66.3%).

The structural shortage of public childcare facilities has prompted many countries to create innovative services and diversify forms of care. In Germany, where crèches are scarce and in some Länder are not even envisaged as a public institution, the *Tagesmutter* (day mother) is widespread, who, in addition to looking after her own children, also looks after those of others (up to a maximum of three). This is a completely private service that nevertheless offers flexibility in terms of hours and reasonable costs: EUR 1.5 per hour for 40 hours per week or EUR 1.7 for 20 hours per week; the price of meals varies between EUR 4 and EUR 7. Some countries financially support the use of day mothers for low-income families.

It is therefore a priority to adopt a new and more generous family policy based on the development of instruments of an economic nature parallel to and alternative to family allowances and tax deductions. Child allowances, childbirth allowances, and forms of guaranteed minimum income, partly provided for in the DPEF, are necessary instruments to guarantee support for child maintenance costs for families not covered by the main instruments used in our country.

Fact Sheet 15 | Older and older: the lonely and/or dependent elderly emergency

Demographic and social ageing is an incontrovertible reality in western countries that now deserves the utmost attention and is destined to have far-reaching and growing repercussions on the balance and organisation of our society.
Worldwide, there are many deaths related to climate change; in 2000 alone, there were 150,000, a large part of which can be attributed to heat as well as floods.
In Italy, in fact, the heat wave of the summer of 2003 claimed victims from north to south, and our Istituto Superiore di Sanità has set up a special surveillance network. A study on the city of Rome showed (for the summer of 2003) 23 excess deaths among those aged 65 to 74, 254 among those aged 75 to 84, and 461 among those over 85, especially those living in the most deprived areas of the metropolis.
More than 10 million people over the age of 65 live in Italy, almost one in five, and it is estimated that within three to four decades there will be about one in every three inhabitants.
But the figure does not present itself homogeneously across the country, observing indications and trends relating to the individual regions. The Biennial Report to Parliament on the Condition of the Elderly 1998-1999 by the Department for Social Affairs of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers shows how:

- The highest percentage values for the population aged over 65 in 1999 were recorded in Liguria (24.4%), Umbria (22%), and Emilia-Romagna (21.9%). Along with Tuscany and Friuli Venezia Giulia, these regions will continue to have the highest proportion of elderly people in the near future.
- The lowest percentages of over-65s in 1999 were to be found in Campania (13.4%), Apulia (14.8%), and Sardinia (14.9%), but these regions too will experience very strong ageing in the future. In 2024, the lowest percentage will continue to be recorded in Campania, but with values around 20 percent, which could reach 30 percent in 2049;
- The region that is likely to experience the greatest increase in the proportion of elderly inhabitants is Sardinia, which will go from a percentage of over-65s of 15% in 1999 to 42.4% in 2049. This is due to the fact that this region is undergoing a very sharp reduction in fertility, which, as previously mentioned, is one of the determining factors in the ageing of the population.
- In the near future, that is, for the first 25 years considered, see in Lombardy, Latium, Campania, Veneto, Apulia, and Sicily an increase of more than 10 thousand elderly per year. The most important case is Lombardy, in which, over the next 25 years, an increase of about 730,000 senior citizens is expected, i.e., an annual flow of about 29,000 'new' senior citizens;
- In relative terms, the highest rates of increase above the national average will be recorded in Sardinia (1.9% per year), Campania and Apulia (1.7%), Lazio and Lombardy (1.6%), Trentino Alto Adige (1.5%), and Veneto (1.4%);
- from about 2030 onwards in Liguria, Piedmont, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, and also in Friuli

In Venezia Giulia, the number of elderly people will decrease (in absolute terms) because the 'over65' levers born in the 1970s and 1980s will reach old age. However, the percentage of those over 65 years of age out of the total regional population will increase since there are far fewer of them than those over that age. Therefore, the weight of the latter in the total population will increase.
The progressive ageing of the population has led to a radical rethinking of healthcare strategies, with the identification of new and more appropriate care models aimed both at improving the quality of life of the over-65s and at a more rational use of resources.
The ageing of the population has led to the emergence of two main problems that the Italian welfare system is urgently called upon to tackle: on the one hand, the number of the 'great elderly' who live alone or for whom the family support network has been weakened has grown; on the other, the number of elderly people exposed to the risk of losing their physical or mental self-sufficiency is increasing.
What implications do these have for the types and quality of care?
A survey of socio-assistance facilities for the elderly distinguishes two types of institutionalised care for the elderly: nursing homes for the elderly, which are aimed at the predominantly self-sufficient elderly,

and socio-medical residences for the elderly, which have a greater health value and are aimed mainly at the non-self-sufficient elderly or disabled people.
As of December 31, 1999, care residences housed 98,065 elderly persons and socio-medical residences 107,159, representing respectively 44.1% and 48.2% of the total number of elderly persons housed.
It appears that the socio-medical residences for the elderly are characterised by a more intense utilisation and a more frequent turnover of guests than the care residences: the percentage of beds occupied as of December 31, 1999, reached 96% in the former case and 88.3% in the latter; the turnover index (average number of persons admitted per year per bed) was 0.3 for the care residences and 0.5 for the socio-medical residences for the elderly.
However, in our country, the care and assistance of dependents have always been mainly entrusted to the family network.
Through the use of family members or largely unreported private care work, families are primarily responsible for bearing the costs of care.
Moreover, there are no reliable estimates of total household expenditures.
In the general shortage of responses, strong support for families today comes from non-EU domestic workers. Already, 136,679 are insured with the INPS, while 341,121 are in the process of applying for regularisation. But this support is not enough and does not always guarantee the necessary quality and caring skills, and it also entails high costs for families, which are only partly compensated by the accompaniment allowance.
According to a 1999 survey, there are over 2.6 million disabled people, and the elderly makes up 73.2 percent (1.9 million people). According to this analysis, 1.5 million people can be considered severely disabled; families with at least one severely disabled person make up 1,400,000, or 6.6%, of Italian families.
Often, however, the family has financial and logistical difficulties caring for the elderly person in need of care at home. It is, therefore, necessary to support them in this task.
Against an estimated need of around EUR 15 billion per year, Italy currently spends around EUR 6.5 billion on social assistance.
All Western countries have had the problem of adequately funding a care sector that only 30 years ago was insignificant in size but that now, with the lengthening of average life expectancy, is steadily increasing.
Today, in northern Italy, almost 10% of the population is over 75 years old (slightly less in the south), and we know that disability in this population group reaches 30% (National Health Plan 2003–2005).

Fact Sheet 16 | The welfare manoeuvre: an unnecessary reform

According to the government, it was 'decided to reform the pension system with the aim of guaranteeing the pensions of everyone, both those who are already retired today and those who will be retired tomorrow. The reform will not change anything for those who are already retired. So today's pensioners have nothing to fear'.
The message is clear: keep quiet if you can; you have nothing to worry about. Until 2008, nothing happens; the reform is just a slow clockwork device. The reassuring tones represent the effect of the 1994 experience: it is better not to let the opponents of the reform do all the talking but to give a constructive and reassuring message instead.
The reform would take place in two stages. Between now and 2008, the measures envisaged by the social security proxy, which has been at a standstill in Parliament for two years, would come into force: the mobilisation of severance pay and incentives to extend working life.
In summary, until 2008, those who have already acquired the right to retire will be able to do so under the same rules as today.
In 2008 alone, 40 years of paid contributions will be required to retire before reaching the age of 65 (for men) or 60 (for women), whereas today 35 years are required.

According to the government, this is a small extension of working life that will make a great contribution to everyone's well-being, also because it must be taken into account "that the longer life span and advances in medicine, and more generally the well-being that all Italians have built up, have greatly improved our lives. Fifty years ago, the average lifespan was 65. Today it is 80, and we can all see how a 65-year-old person is still in the prime of life'.

The message leaves out some topics that are certainly not of secondary importance but are uncomfortable and difficult, such as de-contribution for new hires or the allocation of severance pay.

Some of the reasons against the reform can be found not so much in the political and trade union opposition fronts as within the Ministry of Welfare itself.

Given that the first decade expires in 2005, the urgency of this intervention is unclear.

In addition, the amount of expenditure on pensions is assessed gross of taxation; therefore, a share of no less than 25 billion euros must be subtracted from the expenditure on pensions, which remains in the state coffers in the form of IRPEF. This, in the pay-as-you-go system, means that a corresponding amount of the pension contribution, instead of being allocated to the pensioners in the form of a pension, goes to increase the IRPEF.

The retirement age of Italian workers is within the European average, and no less than half of the seniority pensions (which lower the average age) derive from the decrees of the Minister of Labour himself, who, accepting the demands of companies, grants mobility 'accompanying retirement'.

In Law 421/1992 (by which the legislature delegated the government to adopt measures 'for the reorganisation of the social security system'), Article 3(1)(n) included among the guiding principles and criteria the raising of the contribution requirement for the right to a retirement pension from 35 to 36 years.

Alberto Brambilla's study, presented at the CNE, disproves one of the clichés about Italian welfare and basically states that it is not true that Italy spends more on pensions than the European average. In order to arrive at this result, Brambilla makes a very simple operation, which the trade unions have been calling for practically forever and which was started with Law 88 of 1989 without coming to fruition: the separation of spending on welfare from spending on assistance. Because the official data is in circulation,

which indicate an expenditure on pensions (obtained by adding invalidity, old age, and survivors) equal to 17.2% of the gross domestic product and equal to 70.6% of total social protection benefits, are not true.

In the official data, provided by the Ministry of the Treasury and published in the 'General Report on the Economic Situation of the Country', Brambilla points out that 'budget items are calculated under the heading "pension" that are more welfare than social security'.

These are: expenditure items accounted for in the old-age function that do not have the characteristics of a pension; severance pay and equivalent allowances; disability pensions of a social security nature received by persons above retirement age; survivors' pensions; and early retirement and early retirement pensions. In addition, some inaccuracies were highlighted: a questionable placement of some expenditures, e.g., integrated minimum pensions and some survivors' pensions; a failure to account for expenditure on imputed contributions; the underestimation of some social protection expenditure items (local government welfare expenditure, public housing expenditure).

Depreciating the expenditure figure for 'pensions and annuities paid by the General Government' of the improper budget items, better classified as welfare expenditure, 'pure pension expenditure' falls to 247.424 billion Euros, with an incidence of 47.3% on total social protection expenditure and 11.5% on GDP. Adding the share paid by the private sector to public pension expenditure, the total cost of pensions amounts to EUR 250,038 billion, accounting for 47.8% of the total and 11.6% of GDP. Expenditure on pensions and annuities, reclassified in this way, would have an incidence of more than three percentage points less on GDP compared to the figure in the General Report, while the overall expenditure on Ivs (invalidity, old age, survivors) goes from 17.2% to 12.6 of GDP and from 70.6% to 51.69 of social protection expenditure.

In 2000, the old-age dependency ratio in Italy (26.6%) was higher than the EU average value (24.4%), and a further worsening of the imbalance in the ratio of the over-65s to the working population seems

to be in prospect. As regards the incidence of welfare spending on GDP, on the other hand, the initial value (14.2%), after peaking in 2030 (15.9%), is expected to fall to a lower rate in 2050, equal to 13.9%. Comparison with some European countries on employment rates shows a clear disadvantage for Italy, which has lower values than other European countries, similar only to Belgium. In both age groups considered, 50–64 years and 55–64 years, Italy has very low employment rates; the comparison with Sweden shows Italian percentages almost halved. Also, with regard to the average retirement age, both old age and retirement age, there is a discrepancy between the national figure and that of other countries: Italians retire much younger. But how many workers will be affected by the pension squeeze? What are the effects on social security accounts? The figures that have been circulating on the number of workers affected by the reform seem to be the result of a cabal. They range from ten million workers (almost all private employees insured with the INS) to a few hundred. As Tito Boeri pointed out in one of his speeches, a considerable part of this uncertainty falls on the INPS's choice not to make public its own elaborations on the data in its archives. This makes all kinds of inferences possible.
It is well known, in fact, that the announcement of reforms tightening access to old-age pensions tends to stimulate strong exits from work before the measure is implemented.
For instance, a significant increase in the flow into retirement anticipated the freeze on old-age pensions in 1993, 1995, and 1997, so that the effects of the freeze were almost entirely nullified.
According to data released by Boeri, around 250,000 workers accrue rights every year.
Of these, about 60% (around 150,000) decide to retire, while the remaining 40% (around 100,000) continue working.
Thus, there are about 700,000 workers who could be pushed out of the labour force precisely because of the prospects of a tightening of regulations in 2008. By estimating that the effect of the announcement anticipates retirement by an average of four years (which is obtained by dividing the stock with the annual flows of eligible and non-eligible workers), one can calculate an increase in the debt of the social security coffers of about 22 billion euros (in 2003 values).
Moreover, according to the same estimates, the workers who would suffer the consequences of the reform 'without being able to do anything" would be about 220,000, of whom 60% (about 130,000) would have received a pension. These workers in 2008 will have an average contribution seniority of between 36 and 58 years of age, so they will be deprived of access to seniority for, on average, four years.
The 'victims' of the measure will be those workers over 57 (but under 65) who will accrue 35 years of contributions in 2008 and those who, having already accrued 35 years of contributions, will turn 57 in 2008.
This effect would drag on from 2008 to 2014, when the first generations, who have a hybrid pension (based for eighteen years on the earnings method and for the remainder on the contributions method), would accrue the requirements for seniority. From then on, there would be no appreciable effect of postponing the retirement age on the pension debt.
Therefore, the tightening of regulations would affect about 800,000 workers overall (with peaks of about half a million per year), resulting in an estimated reduction in pension debt of about EUR 25 billion at 2003 values.
Thus, too high a 'wall' erected in 2008 risks triggering a stampede in the immediately preceding years, which could jeopardise the savings to be achieved by tightening seniority conditions.
A more gradual intervention, spreading the raising of the minimum contribution requirements over several years, would cause fewer leaks but would also have much more limited effects on the dynamics of social security expenditure because it would intervene when the first effects of the Dini reform begin to be realised.
The real problem is therefore the postponement of the reform until 2008, which has no economic justification: each year of postponement has high costs. The decision to wait until 2008 is justifiable only in terms of gaining political consensus.
Moreover, it is by no means certain that the postponement to 2008 will reduce opposition to the reform. This will be particularly fierce in the run-up to 2008 (e.g., during the 2005 audit or the 2006 election campaign).

The 'Tremonti reform', in conclusion, would create new inequalities, concentrating the adjustment on a small number of generations (those from 1953 to 1957) and possibly rewarding previous generations (with incentives).
In addition, inequalities in treatment would increase because we would no longer have just two but four different regimes ('simple' retributive, retributive with bonus, retributive with seniority hardening, and contributory).
And the complexity of the system could only increase.

Fact Sheet 17 | Night work: choice or necessity?

According to the European Directive 93/104 of 1993 'concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time," night work is defined as 'work performed for at least seven hours between midnight and 5 a.m., where night work is work performed consecutively between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m., between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., and between midnight and 7 a.m.; a night worker is defined as anyone who performs during night time, on a non-occasional basis, at least a portion of his working time (da daily, weekly, monthly, or annual) (...) specified by collective agreement'.
The recent Legislative Decree No. 66 of April 8, 2003 ('Implementation of Directives 93/104/EC and 2000/34/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time') with regard to night work specifies further aspects by providing that

- The night work shift may not exceed 8 hours on average over 24 hours unless a different reference period is agreed upon by the parties.
- The competent public health facilities may also determine ineligibility for night work;
- Collective agreements lay down the requirements of workers who may be excluded from the obligation to perform night work.
- Within 120 days, a decree of the Ministers of Labour and/or the Civil Service must be issued identifying particularly stressful work for which the limit of eight hours per shift may never be exceeded.

Currently, due to the increasing competitiveness of markets, there is a de-delaying and desynchronization of working time, which leads companies to try to produce in shorter times through the extension of work throughout the day, at night, on Saturdays, and Sundays.
An analysis of the data shows that night work is the least used form of work in Europe. In fact, it appears that the most frequent working hours are Saturday work (27.9%), evening work (19.5%), and shift work (17.6%).
Despite the fact that night work is currently the least used form of atypical working time, an analysis of it is nevertheless interesting, as it can be a response to the needs expressed by companies and workers.
On the one hand, night work allows companies to solve technical and economic problems. In industry and services, it makes it possible to ensure maximum profit and competitiveness through the continuous use of equipment.
On the other hand, it leaves the worker free to dispose of his time differently during the day. In fact, a survey conducted in the 1990s showed that a proportion of Londoners prefer to work at night in order to have more free time during the day. This was stated by a quarter of the respondents (30% of men and 24% of women).
It is also noted that night workers are most prevalent in the UK (21.3%), Portugal (20.2%), and Iceland (19.2%). The country with the lowest percentage is Spain (9.8%). Italy is in an intermediate position in the European ranking, with 2,514 thousand workers, or 11.6% of the total employed.
Looking at data from another survey in which workers are divided into two categories: those who always work at night (whom we will call 'regulars' for simplicity's sake) and those who work sometimes at night ('occasional'), the following picture emerges:
The country with the highest percentage of 'habituals' is the United Kingdom (12.5%), followed by the Netherlands (9.6%), Austria (9.2%), Finland (9.1%), and Portugal (8.1%); the countries using this type of work the least are Switzerland (1.8%) and Belgium (2.1%).

Italy also has a low percentage of 'regulars'. These, in fact, represent 5.1% of the total number of employed persons, which is below the European average (7.0%).
In general, there is a greater presence of 'occasionalists' in Europe. These are, in fact, more common than 'regulars' in Belgium, Iceland, Portugal, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Greece, France, Spain, and Italy.
In all European countries, the number of men employed at night is higher than that of women. The highest percentages of men working at night are found in the UK (27.3%), Iceland (26.5%), and Portugal (24.7%); the female component has higher percentages in Portugal (14.8%), the UK (14%), Finland (13.5%), Norway (13.1%), and Austria (12.7%).
Even when considering the classification between 'regular' and 'occasional' night workers, there is still a higher proportion of men. The only exceptions are Switzerland (where the proportion of 'regular' female night workers exceeds that of men) and Great Britain (where the proportion of 'occasional' female night workers is higher than that of men).
Referring exclusively to the male component, it is noted that men 'habitually' work at night mainly in Great Britain (15.4%), the Netherlands (11.2%), and Austria (11.1%). A smaller percentage was found in Belgium (2.5%) and Switzerland (1.7%).
Looking at the data for women only, it can be seen that 'habitual' night work is more frequent in the United Kingdom (8.9%), Finland (8.1%), the Netherlands (7.4%), and Austria (6.9%); it is, on the other hand, uncommon in Belgium (1.4%) and Switzerland (2.0%).
A comparative analysis of the male data shows that they work 'occasionally' at night, mainly in Iceland (19.3%) and Belgium (17%). With regard to women, on the other hand, these are employed 'occasionally," mainly in Belgium (10.7%), Portugal (8.8%), and Norway (8.8%).
In conclusion, it is possible to state that night time is more prevalent among both men and women in Great Britain.
There are 2,514 night workers in Italy, of whom 1,099 are 'regular' and 1,415 are "occasional." Occasional' night work is more common than 'regular' night work; in fact, those employed 'occasionally' at night account for 6.5% of the total number of employed, while those involved 'habitually' account for 5.1%.
As emerged from the European analysis, there is also a lower presence of this type of workforce in Italy. In fact, as can be seen from the statistics, the most frequently used flexible hours are Saturday work (35.6%) and shift work (21.8%). Night workers in Italy are also predominantly male. In fact, analysing the data according to the gender variable, it can be observed that males make up 14.1% of the total number of employees, while women make up 7.3%. Of the total number of night workers (2,514,000), however, women make up 24% and men 76%.
Looking at the data according to the classification between 'occasional' and 'regular' night workers, it can be seen that, among both men and women, the proportion of 'occasional' night workers is higher.
From recent estimates by Eurispes, it is possible to draw a profile of the age and geographical location of the night worker.
As far as age is concerned, the majority of night workers are in the 26–45 age bracket. In fact, 31.5% are between 26 and 35 years old, and 31.9% are between 36 and 45 years old.
Interestingly, there is a lower presence of young people and older people. As far as the figure for young people is concerned, it is possible that the restrictions under current legislation have succeeded in discouraging the employment of minors on the shifts between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Analysing the data in relation to geographical area, it can be seen that night work is predominantly used in the north (42.4%), while the central regions have the lowest percentage (25.1%).
Today, companies in both the industrial and service sectors are carrying out a revolution in working hours by extending working hours to the whole day and week in an attempt to respond more promptly to market demands. For this reason, it is interesting to see what weight this reorganisation has had within the different employment areas.
Eurispes estimates show that those working at night are above all industrial and manufacturing workers (metalworkers, cement workers, agri-food workers, bakers, confectioners, etc., 23.5%), waste disposal service personnel and cleaners (15.7%), and personnel employed in the transport, logistics, and road

transport sectors (transporters of goods and raw materials, state railway personnel, air transport, etc., 13.7%).
In conclusion, it is possible to say that those working at night are mainly those aged between 26 and 45, predominantly employed in the North, and working in industry and manufacturing. Over the last ten years, the number of 'regular' night workers has increased by around 1%. In 1992, these represented 4.3% of the employed, while in 2002 they represented 5.1%. As far as 'occasional' night workers are concerned, it can be seen that although their percentage has increased by 1.6%, the highest peak was in 1996, when they made up 8% of the employed.
Looking at the evolution of night work by gender, an increase in 'regular' male and female workers can be noted, by 0.8% and 0.9%, respectively.
On the other hand, for both men and women, there was an increase in 1996 of 1% and 0.5%, respectively, and a decrease in 2002 for both sexes. Women working at night in Italy make up only 7.3% of the total number of employed people, a lower percentage than in other European countries. In England, for example, women make up 14% of the total employed.
About 63% of people who work at night experience sleep disorders. In such individuals, sleep duration may be limited to 4-6 hours, in contrast to the average duration per healthy person, which is 7-9 hours. This loss of sleep results in reduced energy and responsiveness.
In the short term, the reversal of the sleep-wake rhythm causes disturbances like jet lag (sleep disturbances, irritability, and dyspepsia). In the long term, it can cause an increased incidence of gastrointestinal disorders (31.3 % of night workers suffer from gastroduodenitis, 12.2 % from duodenal ulcers) and of the neuropsychic system (64.4 % suffer from anxiety and/or depressive syndromes).
Latent health problems, which had not found a way to vent under the negative stimuli of night work, end up manifesting themselves.

Fact Sheet 18 | The organised crime’s holding

The turnover of the Italian 'four domes', forecast by the Eurispes for 2004, amounts to almost 100 billion euros. An 'outlaw' turnover equal to 9.5% of the gross domestic product estimated, for the year in question, at around 1,052 billion euros.
The most lucrative sector remains drug trafficking, which allegedly brings in EUR 59,022 million in revenue. In recent years, there has been a qualitative leap in this particular illicit activity: the 'domes' aim to optimise efforts and risks towards a greater and more prudent management of international drug flows.
Among the largest proceeds are those linked to public works contracts and enterprises (17,520 million euros), extortion and usury (13,520), prostitution (5,104), and arms trafficking (4,774). The Cosa Nostra (18,224), the Camorra (16,459), and the Sacra Corona Unita (1,999) were the next largest drug trafficking organisations in 2004, trailing the 'Ndrangheta (22,340 million euros). On the business front (rigged public contracts and co-participation in enterprises in general), it is Cosa Nostra that has the *leadership* with a 'turnover' of 6,468 million euros, followed by Camorra (5,878), 'Ndrangheta (4,703), and Sacra Corona Unita (471). Usury is also a strongly present phenomenon, albeit submerged. In this illegal activity, it is the Camorra that holds first place, with a turnover estimated for 2004 at 4,703 million euros, a rapidly expanding market on which the Anti-Mafia Commission had sounded the alarm in its 2003 report. With regard to prostitution, the Calabrian criminal organisation regained first place with a turnover of 2,352 million euros, followed by the Sacra Corona Unita (1,764), Camorra (587), and Cosa Nostra (401).
As far as arms trafficking is concerned, the 'Ndrangheta also continues to top the list with 2,352 million euros, the estimated turnover for 2004, an activity that seems to mainly involve the Calabrian dome, given that several lengths behind it are the Camorra with 824 million euros and *ex aequo* Cosa Nostra and Sacra Corona Unita with around 800 million euros.

Eurispes has traced, through the analysis and processing of the main statistical-documentary references, the 'numbers of the war' between the main criminal associations that control and manage the market of illegality in Italy.
There were 666 cases of mafia, camorra, or ‘Ndrangheta murders in the five-year period 1999–2003. The level of violence reached in some regional areas of the country, particularly during the numerous bloody feuds that broke out between rival cosche, is clearly expressed in the number of murders recorded. In Campania alone, the region most represented in the judicial classification of homicides, there are 311 killings, equal to 46.7% of the overall national figure.
During the same period, in Calabria, whose homicides account for 21.6% of the national total, there were 144 homicides linked to ‘Ndrangheta motives. This was followed by Apulia (108) and Sicily (89). At the provincial level, the area with the highest number of Mafia-related murders is the Neapolitan one: no less than 234 deaths in just five years. This is followed by another province of Campania, Caserta, where 57 Camorra-related deaths were recorded in the period under review, testifying to the ferocity that characterises the criminal organisation rooted in this area of southern Italy: Foggia (46), Reggio Calabria (43), and Bari (38).
The Eurispes research paid particular attention to the world of the 'Ndrangheta, which, compared to other criminal organisations, seems to have a renewed ability to attract young recruits into its circle. In particular, in the district of Reggio Calabria, one of the areas historically most at risk, an increasing involvement of minors in particularly serious crimes is noted.
With regard to the distribution of crimes in the Calabrian territory, data from the various police forces show that, for all crimes considered, 1,752 complaints were made in 2001 alone:
263 for extortion, 1,335 for production, possession, and trafficking of drugs, 81 for criminal association (of which 32 for mafia-type association), 50 charges for exploitation and aiding and abetting prostitution, and 23 for smuggling. In particular, analysing the level of territorial distribution of crimes in Calabria, the province of Cosenza, with 647 cases, is the area with the highest number of complaints for crimes similar to mafia-type associations. This is followed by Reggio Calabria (494 complaints) and Catanzaro (394 complaints). The provinces of Vibo Valentia and Crotone close the ranking, with 110 and 107 reports, respectively, for crimes similar to mafia associations.
In Reggio Calabria, between 2001 and 2002, more than 800 people were reported to the judicial authorities by the State Police, the Carabinieri, and the Guardia di Finanza for mafia-type associations. This was followed by the provinces of Cosenza (241), Crotone (155), and Catanzaro, where, despite their limited territorial extension, 137 persons were reported under Article 416bis. The province of Vibo Valentia, on the other hand, does not record any charges for mafia-type associations.
Seizures and confiscations of assets by the Camorra have a decidedly different weight compared to other criminal organisations throughout the country. The loss of assets by the Camorra is even almost four times higher than that recorded for the second criminal organisation in the asset confiscation ranking, i.e., the Mafia. The 'Ndrangheta, with approximately EUR 185 million in confiscated and seized assets, ranks third, followed by other minor criminal groups and the Sacra Corona Unita.
Eurispes, in an attempt to contribute to a further in-depth study of the phenomenon and to develop scientific guidelines within which to move for the analysis of its main dynamics in the Calabrian territory, has carried out a study in which, starting from the monitoring and evaluation of certain parameters of social unease, the degree of fragility and permeability of a territory with respect to the tentacles of the 'Ndrangheta was highlighted. The main objective of the study was therefore to provide some useful indications on the risk of mafia penetration to which the five provincial territories of Calabria are exposed.
To this end, an ad hoc estimator was created, the IPM (Indice di Penetrazione Mafiosa—Mafia Penetration Index), capable of suggesting, as far as possible, the recent developments of the phenomenon and the dimensions it is assuming and, even more interestingly, that it may assume in the contexts examined.
In order to determine a ranking of the level of mafia penetration of criminal organisations in the Calabrian provinces, a scoring system has been set up on the basis of certain indices (which will be illustrated below) that arise, as stated, from the objective and, for the most part, quantitative evaluation of certain socio-economic variables that characterise a territorial area (unemployment rate, degree of

trust in the institutions, crimes committed and assimilated to mafia associations, cases of municipal administrations that have fallen due to mafia infiltration, as well as intimidating acts against local administrators). An analysis of the data shows that it is the province of Reggio Calabria that registers the highest risk of mafia infiltration, obtaining an overall score of 47.3 by virtue of the fact that it tops the provincial rankings on several occasions: in relation to the highest unemployment rate (29% as of 2002), the highest number of cases of municipalities dissolved due to mafia infiltration (17 from 1991 to 2003), and intimidating acts against local administrators (72 from 2000 to 2002). This is followed by Catanzaro, which has the lowest level of trust in the institutions (45.8%) and the highest number of crimes committed that can be likened to mafia associations; Vibo Valentia, where mistrust in the institutions is accompanied by an employment situation that is anything but rosy (27% unemployment rate); and Cosenza, in whose area, despite the high number of mafia events detected (87.1 crimes that can be likened to mafia associations per 100.000 inhabitants), a substantial climate of trust in the institutions at various levels seems to reign (60.5%). At the tail end, we find Crotone, whose mafia penetration index is almost half of that found for the province of Reggio Calabria (25.0 *vs.* 47.3). Crotone is, in short, the Calabrian territory that, at present, seems to be able to resist the tentacles of the 'Ndrangheta more incisively.
Faced with such a diversified and unpredictable threat, therefore, defence structures must necessarily modulate their counteraction actions, possibly at the same speed as offensive ones.

Fact Sheet 19 | The map of terror

In this analysis, Eurispes (as is its methodological custom) has not pursued the improbable aims of completeness and exhaustiveness. The list and analyses that follow, therefore, albeit with the rigour of verifying documentary sources and with due anti-dogmatic caution for the individual evaluations expressed, have only aimed at an absolute perfect result of indicative sampling. However, it is sufficiently illustrative of the complex geo-spatial dimension of the phenomenon, as can be deduced from the list of the main organisations active on the world chessboard and the main attacks that took place in 2003.
Al-Qaeda, also known as Qa'idat al-Jihad, was founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s with the aim of uniting in a single formation the Arabs who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Originally, it carried out intense activity in favour of the Afghan resistance through logistical and financial support, recruitment, and training of Islamic groups of Sunni extremists. Subsequently, it set itself the political-military goal of establishing a kind of pan-Islamic caliphate on a global scale. Among the tactical means of implementing this design is the alliance with Islamic extremist groups strategically interested in overthrowing non-Islamic governments and physically expelling from all Muslim countries (especially Saudi Arabia) any Westerners and, in any case, anyone who is not Muslim. Under the label of a self-styled *World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders*, since February 1998, it has preached the *duty for* every Muslim to kill American citizens and their allies, civilian or military, wherever they may be. The operational convergence with members of the *Egyptian Islamic Jihad* dates back to June 2001.
Jemaah Islamica: Under this name (abbreviated: JI), is grouped a South-East Asian terrorist network, in obvious connection with Al-Qaeda, which began to weave its plots in the late 1990s. The declared goal was the creation of an ideal pan-Islamic state that would encompass Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, along with the southern parts of the Philippines and Thailand.
Harakat ul-Mujahidin: This formation (abbreviated HUM), also known under the name of the *Holy Warrior Movement*, is a militant Islamic group active mainly in Pakistan in the Kashmir region. In mid-February 2000, the undisputed leader of the movement, Fazlur Rehman Khalil (from whose previous formation of the same name the present one derives), proposed himself as Emir of HUM after ousting the popularity of his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri. With a new strategic approach, Khalil assumed the role of Secretary General and adhered to Osama bin Laden's line, in turn launching a *fatwa* against the joint interests of the US and its allies in the West. He was actively involved in terrorist

training in special school camps located in eastern Afghanistan until they were dismantled or destroyed by air strikes by Coalition forces in the autumn of 2001.

Al-Jihad, otherwise known as *Egyptian Islamic Jihad*, is an extremist group that exists and has been active since the late 1970s. Since June 2001, it has been acting jointly with Al-Qaeda, although it is believed to be able to carry out its own independent initiatives. Its main aims include the overthrow of the current Egyptian government (to replace it with an Islamic State) and the preparation of attacks against US and Israeli interests (including allies) in Egypt and abroad.

Hamas *originated* in 1987 from a Palestinian segment of the *Muslim Brotherhood.* Many of its adherents have systematically resorted to political violence, not excluding acts of outright terrorism, with the strategic objective of establishing an *Islamic Palestinian state* in place of Israel. Loosely structured, it makes use of elements operating underground and others in the open (active in mosques and social service centres) to carry out propaganda activities, recruit followers, raise funds, and organise various activities. The hubs of greatest operational intensity are in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. At the same time, it is engaged in non-violent political activities such as electoral support for aspiring candidates for positions in the West Bank Chamber of Commerce.

HIZBALLAH: Otherwise known as the *Party of God* or *Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine*, this organisation was founded in 1982 in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon. As a grouping of radical extremists based in Lebanon, it drew ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the elder Ayatollah Khomeini. Its highest governing body is a kind of advisory committee (*Majlis al-Shura*) under the leadership of the Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. The group's main task is the liberation of Jerusalem, together with the final elimination of Israel, with a view to establishing an Islamic order in Lebanon. Although it has had a well-defined role in the Lebanese political system since 1992, the Hizballah movement remains a close ally of Iran (if not its docile satellite), even if some of its initiatives have not met with Tehran's approval. Although it does not share the more secular orientation of Syria's regime, it has always established a close tactical alliance with this country, supporting its political and territorial objectives.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad: The group (abbreviated: PIJ) originated in the 1970s among Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. Currently, the *Shiqaqi* faction led by Ramadan Shallah in Damascus is very active in this formation. Its strategic objective is the creation of a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through a holy war. It also conducts a determined opposition against moderate Arab governments, which are considered to be subservient to Western-style secularism.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, ***a*** Marxist-Leninist formation (abbreviated: PFLP), was founded in 1967 by George Habash (a PLO member) at the time of the split from the *Arab Nationalist Movement*. The PFLP sees the Palestinian struggle as a form of resistance and opposition against the illegal occupation of its territories by Israel, against which it preaches opposition to any form of negotiation.

Palestinian Liberation Front: Derived from a leadership split of the *Popular Front for Palestinian Liberation* in the 1970s, it later splintered again into a number of pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Lebanese factions of Arafat. The pro-PLO faction headed by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas) is still based in Baghdad.

Eta, the historic organisation of Basque terrorists, was created in 1959 with the intention of founding an independent homeland, hinged on firm Marxist principles, in the northern Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarre, together with the south-western French departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule. A series of successful actions by the Spanish counter-terrorist forces dealt very significant blows to the entire organisation, undermining its operational capabilities. In 2002 alone, as many as 123 Eta members were arrested by the Spanish police, while several dozen more were brought to justice by the French authorities. Finally, last August, a Spanish magistrate banned Eta's political wing, Batasuna, by special order.

Fact Sheet 20 | (Survey) The Italians' opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East issue

In Italy, there are areas, more or less extensive, of possible incubation of prejudice against the Jewish people. Specifically, it is possible to detect the presence of feelings and attitudes of prejudice when: 11.1% of those interviewed declare themselves to be very (4.1%) or fairly in agreement (7%) with the statement: "The Holocaust of the Jews really happened, but it did not produce as many victims as is usually claimed"; and, in particular, when 34.1% of the respondents agree fairly (24.9%) or very much (9.2%) with the statement: "Jews covertly control economic and financial power, as well as the media," while 47.9% of the sample agree little (25%) or not at all (22.9%) with this thesis; in addition, 17.9% preferred or did not wish to express a position on this. The area in which an anti-Semitic attitude is most strongly affirmed is very narrow: 2.7% very much (1.4%) or fairly agree (1.3%) with the expression "The Holocaust of the Jews never happened".

This was revealed by the sample survey entitled 'Italians' opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East issue', which Eurispes conducted on 1,500 Italian citizens, stratified by gender, age group, and geographic area, in order to ascertain the presence of anti-Jewish sentiments in Italy and to collect the opinions of Italian citizens on Israeli government policy and the Middle East conflict.

With this social research action, Eurispes aimed to ascertain the opinions of Italians on: a) the current policy of Sharon's government in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; b) the possible presence of prejudice or anti-Semitic attitudes towards the Jewish people; c) the main factors of destabilisation in the Middle East area; and d) the role of the Italian contingent in the Iraqi conflict.

But Italians do not deny the Holocaust. 92.3% of those interviewed stated that they agreed a little (8.8%) or not at all (83.5%) with the statement, "The Holocaust of the Jews never happened." A very small percentage of deniers, 2.7% of the sample, also stated that they agree a lot (1.4%) or quite a lot (1.3%) with the thesis that denies the Holocaust; 5% of the sample did not know or did not answer. Moreover, Italians do not hold revisionist views on the Holocaust tragedy. In fact, 80.7% of the interviewees say they agree a little (16.6%) or not at all (64.1%) with the statement: "The Holocaust of the Jews really happened, but it did not produce as many victims as is usually claimed", 11.1% agree a lot or quite a lot with the previous statement, and 8.2% do not know or do not want to express a position.

At the same time, the profound hiatus between the expression of critical positions towards Israeli government policy, which is significantly higher, and the presence of an area of possible incubation of prejudice and suspicion towards the Jewish people is highlighted.

Almost all respondents (91.4%) do not question the State of Israel's right to exist. More specifically, only 2.8% of the sample believes that the State of Israel does not have the right to exist, while 91.4 percent of the respondents are in favour of the existence of the State of Israel (26% of the sample, however, condition the existence of the State of Israel on the recognition of a Palestinian state). 5.8% of respondents do not express or cannot express an opinion on this issue.

Regarding Sharon's conduct on the Palestinian issue, almost 3 out of 4 Italians (74.5%) agree with the statement that 'Sharon's government is wrong, but so are the Palestinian suicide bombers'.

In particular, 74.5 percent agreed very much or fairly much with the statement that 'The Sharon government is wrong, but the Palestinian suicide bombers are also wrong', while 14.4 percent of the sample were
little or not at all agree with this view. 11.1% of the respondents preferred not to express (or did not know how to express) an opinion on this.

Italians are also highly critical of the Sharon government's attitude towards the Palestinian issue. So much so that the area of dissent with regard to Sharon's policy is more extensive when 53.7% of the respondents declare themselves not at all or not very much in agreement with the statement: "Sharon's government makes the right choices because it has to defend itself from Palestinian kamikaze attacks" (only 30.9% declare themselves very or fairly in agreement with this statement). It is worth noting that more than 15% of the sample did not or could not express an opinion on the proposed item.

53.8% say they agree little or not at all with the statement that "Sharon's government, with regard to the Palestinians, is following the only possible political line, since the very survival of the State of Israel is at stake" (only 26.7 of the respondents agree very much or fairly with the previous statement).

Almost one in five Italians (19.5%) were unwilling or unable to express their agreement or disagreement with the proposed item.
77.8 percent oppose the construction of the Separation Wall between Israelis and Palestinians; only 10.8 percent are in favour of the project, while 11.4 percent of respondents were unwilling or unable to express an opinion on it.
The area of dissent is less extensive but nonetheless indicates particularly critical evaluations when: 35.9 percent agree fairly or very much with the statement: 'Sharon's government is carrying out a real genocide and behaves with the Palestinians as the Nazis behaved with the Jews' (in this case, the majority of respondents, 48.2 percent, disagree with the previous statement, while 15.9 percent of respondents do not know or do not wish to express an evaluation on this).
36.9 percent (more than one in three citizens) agree fairly or very much with the statement 'the blame for the kamikaze attacks lies with Sharon's imperialist and aggressive policy (45.9 percent, however, disagree with this thesis, while the remaining 17.3 percent do not know or do not wish to make a judgement)'.
In conclusion, in light of the results of the sample survey, Eurispes highlights the need to raise and keep vigilance and prevention devices high for any episode of racism or strong racial prejudice, develop all kinds of cultural initiatives capable of nurturing mutual trust between peoples and religions, and finally qualify the skills and responsibilities of the journalistic and social research functions in relation to such complex issues of particular historical and cultural value.

CHAPTER 3 ON THE ECONOMY

Essay | Missed opportunities

Agriculture. Just a few figures are enough to give an idea of the changes that have taken place in Italian agriculture: in the 1951 population census, there were over 8 million active farmers; today there are barely more than a million; in the 1950 agricultural census, the Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA) covered over 24 million hectares; today (the 2001 census) it covers less than 18 million. But, with all this, agricultural income still remains far behind the per capita income achieved by other sectors, since on average, the person working in the fields derives from his labour an income that is less than half that achieved in other sectors.

Industry. The industrial crisis has been in our country, but also in France and the United States, aggravated by financial crises and provoked by unscrupulous and deceptive behaviour on the part of new and old industrial patrons (the Cirio and Parmalat cases), not dissimilar to those that occurred in the aftermath of the 1929 crisis. The last great change in Italy occurred at the turn of the third millennium and called into question the country's economic structure as configured in the previous fifty years. Competition made itself felt in the slowdown of orders, in the difficulty of placing their own models, and in the lowering of prices that reduced not only profits but also the incomes of workers, often members of the entrepreneur's family, pieceworkers, or home workers.

The need to make industrial sites more attractive and to promote new investments and new settlements passes through a very precise path: to reduce as much as possible and simplify the procedures for obtaining permits, licences, authorizations, and anything else required by laws and regulations to start, expand, or modify an industrial activity.

The tertiary sector. The large services sector, which now encompasses the vast majority of activities in our country, providing work for two-thirds of the active population and being responsible for almost three-quarters of the gross domestic product, although constantly growing, both in absolute values and in percentage terms, has been characterised by difficulties in recent years. The most obvious shortcomings in services are to be found in those managed in public form, from vocational training to schools, from research to universities, from healthcare to urban transport, from waterworks to employment agencies, from waste collection and disposal to the control of environmental standards. The most serious deficiency among those that afflict the service sector, both public and private at the same time, is, however, undoubtedly the lack of competition, which makes the services offered both poor and expensive.

One can only express astonishment at the total inertia of the current government, which professes to be liberal and liberalist, and which in the two years of its existence has not taken, nor seems willing to take, any initiatives in defence of the consumer or towards the strengthening and spread of competition.

The crisis of recent years. The last year has undoubtedly been the worst in Italy's economic history. The stagnation of production and income measured at current prices has been matched by a resurgence of inflation, which, already present in 2002, has further depressed the purchasing capacity of less affluent households, having hit especially non-replaceable basic consumer goods. The income squeeze also reduced savings as a consequence, but the weakness of domestic demand, compounded by the decline in international demand, plunged investments to their lowest level in fifteen years, despite the extremely low interest rates.

The ghost employed by Istat. Who are those 600,000 more employed people than in 2002, according to the Istat interviewers? The answer is not difficult. It is in fact sufficient to look at the data on the regularisations of immigrants in the last year and consider the ways in which Istat constructs its survey universe. The number of immigrants regularised last year should be no less than six hundred thousand, since at the beginning of October the prefectures had managed to process ninety percent of the almost 700,000 applications submitted by non-EU citizens. More convincing than the absolute figures, which are difficult to compare because they come from sources that use different methods and pursue different goals, are the

Comparisons between the percentage compositions of the aggregates show that the regularisation of non EU workers primarily affects Northern Italy (50%), followed by the Centre (30%), and only to a lesser extent in the South (20%). The increase in employment, according to ISTAT's quarterly survey, primarily affects the North (60% of the increase), secondarily the Centre (25%), and only marginally the South (15%), with an almost perfect parallelism with the distribution of those regularised by the Bossi-Fini.

The impoverishment of households. The most serious aspect of the crisis of the last two years, an aspect that was fully manifested in mid-2002 and that also expressed all its effects in 2003 (certainly in the first three quarters), is the change in the real disposable income of households, which, after the contractions of '97 and '98 (due to the Prodi government's squeeze to enter the euro), had shown signs of recovery in 2000 and most of 2001 itself.

The real disposable income of households fell sharply as early as 2002 but deepened in the course of 2003 to values that, for households with only income from employment and pensions, were certainly more than 15% over the two years. This fall in disposable income was due to two concomitant causes: the modest growth in GDP on the one hand and the sharp rise in the prices of everyday consumer products for low- and middle-income households on the other.

Eurispes did a good job of highlighting the latter effect, which escaped official statistics and displayed worrying peaks, such as those for consumer foodstuffs, with peaks of a 30% annual increase for baskets of consumer foodstuffs.

The tram drivers' contract. The main cause of the anger (unfair and cruel to users) of the vast majority of the tram drivers' strike adherents is not inexplicable and lies in the growing gap between an immovable pay packet and an increasing cost of living, which has reduced their standard of living, like that of many other employees, in the space of a few years.

Bringing home between 800 and two thousand euros at the end of the month, depending on functions, workloads, and seniority, they can be considered representative of salaried employment in Italy. Well, with an income of, let us say, 1,200 euros net, albeit increased by another 800 to 1,000 euros from another salary, a family of four is forced to spend well over half its income on food and household expenses.

Of course, the family whose only source of income is the railway worker's wage will be even worse. An increase in the prices of basic goods and services, i.e., those that are incompressible, of the order of 30 percent over two years means a reduction in the purchasing power of the family of a minimum of 15 percent to a maximum of 20 or 25 percent, depending on the number of mouths to feed and how many salaries flow into the family.

Who protects savers? The recent insolvencies of two major Italian companies raise the question: who monitors on behalf of and to protect savers?

In our financial model, unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, where there are very strong rules and particularly active supervisory authorities, the supervision of companies is 'naturally' entrusted to the banks, which have every interest in protecting their loans. How, then, was it possible for two cases as serious as those of Cirio and Parmalat to occur?

There can be only two explanations: on the one hand, the banks responsible did not carry out any or very few checks, or, having carried them out and measured the size of the chasms, were unable to appreciate their danger; on the other hand, since the indebtedness was divided among numerous banks, none of them was able to make a rapid diagnosis that would stop the haemorrhaging in time.

Government inertia. The increase in pensions to one million lire (EUR 516) had no effect on the economy because, due to the flaws in its implementation mechanism, it affected a very small number of people. For at least three reasons, the reduction in central taxation had no impact on consumer demand and could not have done so: a) it had a negligible impact on income taxes, primarily affecting businesses and assets (abolition of inheritance taxes); b) the increase in local taxation more than offset it; and c) it did not reach appreciable proportions on the macro level. The tax burden fell in Italy from 1997 to 2002 by almost 3 percentage points of GDP (2.8%), from 44.5% to 41.7%, but the Berlusconi effect on the contraction of the

Taxation can be estimated at no more than 0.8 percentage points over two years, with an annual rate of reduction (-0.4%) lower than in previous years.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the Berlusconi government's tax policy has not only had no discernible impact on the crisis and the reduction in households' disposable income, but it even appears to have exacerbated the decline in consumer demand.
The Maastricht parameters. The budgetary policy pursued so far in recent years has had nothing but negative effects on the economy, and the desire to pursue the Maastricht parameters has certainly contributed to this. An expansionary and anti-recessionary policy in fact requires, as is well known, an increase in the deficit, or, as they say, a courageous policy of deficit spending.
The decision made in Brussels not to open condemnation proceedings against France and Germany, guilty of transgressing the Maastricht rules, should make one meditate on the absurdity of overly strict rules and push the Community to give itself new rules with regard to the deficits of individual states by introducing something similar to the British golden rule, under which it is possible to exceed the budget constraint, but only for investment expenditure, i.e., that expenditure that, since it does not create lasting constraints and rights over time (as is the case for salaries and pensions, for example), does not create current expenditure flows and is therefore typically cyclical.
Fiscal Policy. To understand the value of the differing assessments of budgetary policy, it is necessary to break down the public finance balance into its two main components: the primary balance and the overall debt. If we follow the trend in overall debt in its annual dimension, we see the great effort made from 1996 to 2000, the year in which it came close to zero (0.4% of GDP). In 2001, a year of general elections, the deficit increased again and exceeded 2% of GDP. In 2002, the first year in which the government of the new Minister for the Economy made itself felt, the deficit, albeit by a very small margin (it remained above 2%), contracted again, thus moving in the direction of the Maastricht parameters. But in 2003, the deficit increased again, approaching 3% (the final figures are still lacking, but the estimates put the debt at a figure close to 2.8%), and it does not appear that, according to the forecasts in the same Finance Bill, it will fall below 2.5% in 2004.
Therefore, Minister Tremonti has no reason to affirm the effectiveness of his action with regard to the Maastricht parameters.
Investments. Faced with a fall in demand, one possible manoeuvre to revive the economy, in addition to tax cuts and budgetary policy, is to support and relaunch investment, which is a non-negligible part of overall demand.
In this field, too, there has been a great deal of inertia on the part of the government, which is all the more objectionable given that the European Union is making considerable resources available. If we look at the data from the Bank of Italy's Governor's Report to the Annual General Meeting, we can clearly see that the capital expenditure of all public administrations, which includes public investments, did not change in 2002 compared to the previous year, while the budget data even show a contraction from 2.5% to 1.8% of GDP in gross fixed investment expenditure.
Economy without guidance. While it is true that the crisis that has been sweeping the world for more than two years and that has not spared Italy is a slowdown in growth due to a lack of demand, in our country, the weakness of demand is fed by both the foreign and domestic components.
Faced with such a situation, what appears most serious is that in none of the sectors to which one can attribute responsibility for the crisis (from which one is emerging with great difficulty) has there been a decisive and conscious intervention by the government. One has the impression that, beyond a series of fiscal expedients, the government is disinterested in managing the economy. Already in October, faced with the crisis coming at us from outside and in the absence of government initiatives to support consumption and investment, Eurispes had recalled Dante's verse (immediately taken up by numerous political exponents, including those in the government area): already eight hundred years ago, Italy resembled "a ship without a helmsman in a great storm'.
Forgotten Mezzogiorno. In the past years, the enlarged public expenditure, thus including not only the allocations of the state but also those of public bodies, regions, and territorial authorities, has been directed more to the north than to the south. The difference is so great that each citizen in the centre-north was the recipient of 13,111 euros per year, compared to 9,101 for those living in the south. In

percentage terms, Italian public administrations disburse on average 45% more per resident in the centre and north than they spend per resident in the south.
However, despite the Mezzogiorno's improved readiness to receive public spending, it stubbornly continues to prefer the North. This is demonstrated by those expenditures that have no plausible reason to be directed more towards the regions of the centre and north. The government's promise to allocate a specific (and hopefully additional) allocation of 0.6% to the South will not console the southerners much. In fact, 0.6 percent of public resources are less than EUR 10 billion; the difference between what the public administration disburses today and what it disburses today favours the North by more than EUR 100 billion!
The pension trap. The government's proposal to increase the pay packet by 32% for workers who, by giving up their pensions, will prolong their employment, seems fraudulent and ineffective. In practise, the proposed rule provides for an exchange between the worker and the social security institution. The latter, for a few years, will renounce collecting contributions, but in return will reduce the pension for all the years to come. The exchange is not fair because, as the legislation stands at present and as can be deduced by looking at the financial situation of the Italian social security system, it is well known that contributions only cover part of the pension expenditure; it clearly follows, even without carrying out complicated actuarial calculations, that it is the worker who loses out in the exchange. The situation is then particularly punitive for women, who, as is well known, have longer life expectancies.
On the basis of these considerations, one can safely conclude that, when and if the rule is implemented, those who decide to continue working would find it more convenient to forego the exchange proposed by the government, which can be summarised by the phrase 'more salary today, less pension tomorrow'.
Why the Minister for the Economy displeases everyone. The 2004 Finance Bill, which will accompany us throughout the rest of the year, seems to have displeased everyone except perhaps Minister Tremonti. Even in these preparatory aspects, the document comes off badly. The first and most macroscopic contradiction to be found in it is that relating to the data that will have to guarantee peace in industrial relations, that is, the setting of a programmed inflation that does not deviate too much from that which we will experience tomorrow when we go shopping. Now planned inflation is stuck at 1.7%, while real inflation is already touching, according to ISTAT, 3% and is almost certainly, as authoritative study institutes state, much higher.
Drawing up the finance bill without taking into account such a strident discrepancy between reality and project, which can be the source of long, painful claims that can inflame the social climate, explains ad abundantiam the irritation of the workers' unions and employers' representatives.
There is also a lack of a clear distinction between short-term measures and those that will take effect in the years to come.
A great opportunity for development: the territory. For some decades now, our country has shown an urgent need for infrastructure interventions. Nevertheless, almost miraculously, Italy retains all its charm and attractions. Setting up a far-reaching action that leads to a recovery of the historical, archaeological, architectural, artistic, and natural emergencies in which the territory is rich and that also lays the foundations for a strengthening of anti-seismic defences and seriously begins to address the problem of hydrogeological protection seems to us to be one of the commitments that must be tackled as a priority in the coming years by the state administrations and local self-government bodies.

Fact Sheet 21 | (Survey) The Italians' opinion on the government's economic policy and economic trends

The Berlusconi government's economic policy is proving to be 'bankrupt and full of broken promises' and 'does not correspond to the country's needs'. Word of Italians. In fact, 65.7% of the citizens of the Belpaese express themselves in this way with regard to the economic policy of the current executive, highlighting mainly a feeling of disappointment in the electorate.

This was revealed by a sample survey entitled 'Italians' opinion on economic trends and the government's economic policy', which has just been completed and which Eurispes conducted on 1,500 Italian citizens, stratified by gender, age group, and geographical area.

Almost half of the sample (44.6%) answered that the points envisaged in the election programme have not been realised and that the government's economic policy is a failure. Moreover, about one in five respondents (21.1%) considers the current policy to not correspond to the country's needs.

Positive opinions are also recorded among the interviewees, albeit in a smaller percentage: 17.8% say that the political approach of the executive is appropriate and that the effects will be tangible in the long term; 7.4% say that they are fully satisfied with the choices made by the government, which respond exactly to the country's needs. Of particular note is the large percentage of people who do not express a position (9.1%).

The most critical judgements refer to all aspects of economic and financial policy within the competence of the executive. 32.7 percent of the interviewees say they do not trust the government at all in the matter of the consolidation of public accounts, and 29.9 percent are of the same opinion regarding the implementation of a fair pension reform. With regard to other issues, such as unemployment, the degree of trust among respondents, while remaining very low, shifts to a more moderate level of scepticism. The ability to manage inflationary processes is also judged negatively, but the high percentage of respondents expressing moderate confidence (41.7%) is noteworthy.

Women are more likely than men to express criticism of the Berlusconi government's economic policy, with 47.6% of respondents believing it to be a failure and 21.2% believing it to be inadequate. Overall, therefore, 68.8% of women and 62.3% of men express a negative opinion. Among men, slightly more than one in five (20.5%) judge the government's economic policy to be appropriate and believe that the effects will be seen in the long term, compared to 15.3% of women. Finally, the government's economic policy is considered appropriate with respect to the country's current needs by 8.9% of men and 6% of women.

The age variable does not significantly influence Italians' judgements of the Berlusconi government's actions in the economic sphere. However, it can be seen that there is a greater propensity among younger people, who represent the largest component, to consider the economic policy of the current executive as a failure and full of broken promises. In fact, young people belonging to the 18 to 24 age group judge the government's economic policy to be 'bankrupt' in 47.7% and 'not corresponding to the country's needs' in 19.9%, for a total of 67.6%. Those in the upper age group, 25–44, also gave negative answers overall: 69.1% judged the current government's economic policy as 'bankrupt' and 'not corresponding to the country's needs'. In particular, 47.0% judged it 'bankrupt' and 22.1% 'not corresponding'.

The breakdown of responses by geographic area shows that critical judgements of the Berlusconi government's economic policy are clearly in the majority throughout the country. In the North-West and the Islands, more than two out of three citizens believe that the government's economic policy does not correspond to the country's needs or is even a failure (with response percentages of 67.7% and 69.8%, respectively). Slightly lower were the negative judgements expressed by citizens living in the South (65.6%), the Centre (64.8%), and the North-East (63.2%). Among the interviewees from all geographical areas, the opinion that the Berlusconi government's economic policy is a failure and full of broken promises prevails, expressed by a percentage varying from 43.2% (North-East) to 48.5% (Islands).

According to their qualifications, university graduates were the respondents who expressed the most severe judgement on the Berlusconi government's economic policy: 73.0% judged it 'bankrupt' and 'not corresponding to the country's needs'. Disaggregating the data, 50.6%, again of graduates, judged it to be 'bankrupt' and 22.4% 'not corresponding'.

Graduates assess the government's economic policy positively more frequently than others, in many cases emphasising that the effects will be seen in the long term. Among those with a low level of education (no qualification or elementary school leaving certificate), there are more people who do not respond (14.2%), perhaps because they do not feel able to make an economic assessment.

The socio-professional categories that judge the current government's economic policy positively at a higher percentage than average are pensioners and the self-employed. Pensioners also say more often than others that the positive effects will manifest themselves in the long term.
On the other hand, the most critical subjects are blue-collar workers and the unemployed; both categories define this policy as a failure and full of broken promises at a high percentage (56.7% of blue-collar workers and 49.2% of the unemployed).
Managers, executives, and entrepreneurs, on the other hand, tend to be divided on the issue: the percentage of those who complain about an ineffective economic policy and broken promises is high, but the percentage of those who consider this policy appropriate and hope that it will bring positive effects over time is also noteworthy.
As far as favourable judgements are concerned, the highest degree of trust (15.9%) is placed in the ability to keep up the country's image in the international context; the judgement on the strategies activated to fight international and domestic terrorism is also very positive (11.2% and 11.1%, respectively, have a lot of trust). The actions taken to fight organised crime (8.6% say they have a lot of confidence) and to guarantee unity and cohesion in the country (7.5% say they have a lot of confidence and 35.7% say they have enough confidence) are also fairly appreciated.
Aggregating, on the one hand, the opinions expressing a great deal of trust or enough trust (42.3%) and, on the other, those expressing little or no trust, it is possible to observe that the lowest degree of trust in the government is expressed by the interviewees in relation to its ability to fight organised crime (those not trusting are 53.1%). The sample expressed greater optimism in relation to the government's ability to fight unemployment (46.7%) and inflation (46.5%).
The phenomenon of unemployment mainly worries citizens residing in the areas where the problem is most felt. In the South (where the highest unemployment rates are recorded), more than 30% of those interviewed have no confidence in the executive's abilities, compared to 25.2% nationally. On the contrary, the level of trust increases in the North, as the North-East and the North-West record a high percentage of citizens who say they have a lot of confidence in the government's ability to fight unemployment, equal to 6.9% and 6.3%, respectively.
Scepticism as to whether the government will be able to carry out a fair pension reform is widespread across all socio-professional types; it ranges from 73.7% of executives, managers, and entrepreneurs to 62.3% of the non-employed, from 53.3% of blue-collar workers to 51.7% of teachers and office workers. On the contrary, pensioners and students seem to be more trusting; among the latter, there is the highest percentage of the 'trusting' (48.9% compared to 44.3% of the non-confident).
Thus, those who declare their dissatisfaction with the way the executive is changing the pension system constitute the labour force of our country (employed and non-employed), while those who express less critical judgements have not yet entered the labour market (the students) or are already in the social security circuit (the pensioners).
Dissatisfaction and scepticism are rampant among citizens, which is why it is increasingly difficult to urge a system that seems to be at a standstill.
The Eurispes survey also aims to find out what Italians think about their current financial situation. The inter-temporal comparison of the country's economic situation shows a growing pessimism on the part of Italian citizens. If in 2003 the majority of those interviewed perceived a slight worsening of the Italian economy (32.5%), in 2004, the situation worsens further: in fact, 48.2% of those interviewed perceive a net worsening. Consequently, the percentages of those who perceive a positive economic trend decrease in 2004, only 0.6% perceived a clear improvement and 6.8% a slight improvement.
Finally, the percentage of those who consider the country's economic situation to be stable was halved in 2004 compared to 2003 (14.4% against 27.8%).
Cross-judgements by territorial area show a more favourable outlook among residents in Central Italy; in fact, 1% of citizens residing in this territorial area perceive a marked improvement against a national average of 0.6%. The greatest pessimism is manifested by residents in the South; in both the South and the Islands, the percentages of those expressing a strong deterioration are very high (50.9% and 54.4%, respectively). The North-East is in an intermediate position: none of those interviewed believe that there has been a marked improvement in the country's economic situation, while many responses focus on substantial stability (16.3%) and a slight worsening (32.1%).

Respondents were then asked to give their opinion on the country's economic outlook over the next 12 months. In 2003, the majority expressed themselves for a continuation (43%), 26.8% for a further worsening, and 23.1% for an improvement, but in the past year, the situation has changed dramatically. The share of those forecasting a stable trend for the economy fell sharply (29.1%), while both the optimists (27.1%) and, especially, the pessimists (36.4%) increased. In relation to forecasts for the future, students strongly advocate an improvement in the economy, probably because they also assess the general outlook in relation to their own personal situation: they are young and look with confidence at the world opening up before them.

In the next 12 months, the country's economy will also improve for a rather high percentage of self-employed workers (freelancers, traders, etc.) and, surprisingly, pensioners (29.6%), among whom, however, pessimists are also very numerous (38%). A smaller percentage of optimists is recorded among blue-collar workers (21.3%) and the non-employed (13.1%). These last two categories are the same ones that foresee a worsening of the current situation to a greater extent than the others: almost half of the sample is in favour of a worsening; it is therefore the weaker categories that foresee even harder times in the months to come.

Fact Sheet 22 | An economy without leadership

The most serious aspect of the crisis of the last two years—an aspect that manifested itself in full in the course of 2002 and that continues to show its effects in 2003 (certainly in the first three quarters)—is the change in the real disposable income of households, which after the contractions of '97 and '98 (due to the Prodi squeeze to enter the euro) had shown signs of recovery in 2000 and most of 2001 itself. The real disposable income of households fell sharply in 2002 (-3.8%) as a result of two concomitant causes: the modest growth in GDP on the one hand and the sharp rise in the prices of the usual consumer products of low- and middle-income households on the other. The latter effect in particular, which escaped official statistics, was well highlighted by Eurispes with specific surveys and showed worrying peaks, as in the case of widely consumed foodstuffs.

The two combined effects (modest GDP growth and price increases) reduced consumers' real disposable income in 2002. On the other hand, the periodic surveys on consumer confidence by Banca d'Italia, Isae, and Eurispes revealed a sharp decline in expectations in 2002 and 2003, which indirectly supports the Eurispes analysis on the decline in real household income. Household income has contracted considerably over the last two years. First of all, because there is a slight increase in the resident population, which necessitates dividing today's consumption among more people—or, as they used to say, individuals. Secondly, because that figure (-3.08%) is calculated on GDP at factor cost, i.e., on the flow of labour, capital, and business wages, and does not take into account the yields on fixed-income securities, which, as is well known, have collapsed and are a no small cause of the reduction in savers' income as the old (high-yield) securities mature. If we estimate that at least one third of Italian debt is owned by households, the loss of income they have suffered over the past seven years is no less than EUR 17 billion, or an average of almost EUR 1,000 per family, or, again on average, almost 2 percent of the typical family's income. Lastly, alongside the reduction in income, we must also consider the reduction in assets, which for the Mib thirty stocks alone amounted to more than 600 billion euros from 2000 to 2003 due to the loss in value recorded by the shares of the largest thirty companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. If all stocks were held by private individuals, the drop in the value of equity assets would be 30,000 euros per household! Of the same order of magnitude, although a precise estimate is lacking, should be the loss in value of the bond assets held by the public, most of which are in the portfolios of households. In the face of a substantial drop in household demand, the premonitory signs of which had already appeared in 2002 and in respect of which Eurispes itself, with its price surveys, had pointed out the negative impact on the economy and the not inconsiderable size, one would have expected a series of initiatives aimed at supporting incomes, particularly of the least well-off families or those at risk of poverty. The data taken into consideration show the trend in Italian industry turnover over the last year: one can clearly see the drop in demand for all sectors (except for energy, due not to the increase in production sold but to the rise in oil prices). A large part of the fall in turnover stems from the negative trend in foreign demand, but, as can be seen from the data, there is an equally conspicuous drop in domestic orders. There are two measures taken by the current government that could have had an invigorating effect on consumption: the first was the increase in minimum pensions, and the other was the contraction of taxation. Neither had any stimulating effect. The increase in pensions to one million lire per month (EUR 516) had no economic effect because, due to flaws in its implementation mechanism, it affected a very small number of people.

The contraction of central taxation did not and could not have an effect on consumer demand for three reasons: a) It only marginally affected income taxes, mainly affecting the

companies and assets (the elimination of inheritance taxes); b) the increase in local taxation more than offset it; c) it did not have a significant impact on the macroeconomic level. The tax burden decreased in Italy from 1997 to 2002 by almost 3 percentage points of GDP (2.8), going from 44.5 to 41.7, but the Berlusconi effect on the contraction of taxation can be estimated at no more than 0.8 percentage points in two years with a lower rate of reduction (-0.4%) than in previous years. If in relation to GDP we can speak of a contraction in taxation, the same cannot be said if we consider absolute values, which are perhaps more significant because they are certified by the General Accounting Office, while the percentage values on GDP presuppose a trust, which we do not feel able to share, in the calculation, by official statistics, of the latter value, the measurement of which is almost never free of criticism (such as, for example, the value to be attributed to the deflator). In overall terms, tax and parafiscal revenue increased by 1.7% in 2002 compared to the previous year. This result is the sum of contrasting trends in the various tax components. Indirect taxes (+4%) and actual social security contributions (+3.7%) increased between 2001 and 2002, while income and wealth taxes decreased. In particular, VAT, ICI, and Irap contributed to the growth in indirect taxes. Among direct taxes, Irpef (+1.6%) and taxes on capital income (+3.6%) grew, while Irpeg (9.3%), the tax on capital gains, and the tax on the revaluation of business capital (-33.7%) decreased more than significantly. To the increase in absolute terms of ordinary taxation, and in particular that which affects the consumer (VAT, ICI, IRPEF, and social security contributions), must also be added, because it also collects means of payment, the value of extraordinary revenues deriving from the tax amnesty.

The figures show the development of the overall debt in its annual dimension. One can clearly see the great effort made in the years from 1996 to 2000, when it was very close to zero (-0.4% of GDP). In 2001, a year of general elections, the deficit grew again and exceeded -2% of GDP. In 2002, the first year in which the government of the new Minister for the Economy made itself felt, the deficit, albeit very slightly (it remained above 2%), contracted again in the direction of Maastricht. The figures for 2003 (the first quarter) show a further deterioration.

However, if we go and analyse what movements underlie this result, we discover some interesting facts. Consider first of all the primary balance, i.e., the balance between all income and expenditure excluding debt servicing. As is well known, for many years this balance has been positive, i.e., annual revenues constantly exceed expenditures; in fact, the cause of Italy's debt is the weight of debt accumulated in the past, which is constantly renewed and on which interest must be paid.

Well, in 2002, the primary balance, even if it only slightly decreased, showed a downward trend even in the first months of 2003. This may mean that either expenditure increased compared to the previous year or revenue contracted, or the two things occurred simultaneously. In conclusion, there was no restrictive budgetary policy aimed at containing the deficit, and the small success in the direction of the Maastricht parameters cannot be attributed to the numerous expedients (such as, for example, the bizarre placement of real estate securitizations in the budget) implemented by the Minister for the Economy.

Much more banally, the reduction of the deficit, achieved despite the worsening of the primary balance, is a gift from the recession and stems from the contraction of interest rates, which has been going on for almost a five-year period and has in recent months reached the lowest values in fifty years. The low level of interest rates reduces the debt service burden year after year as new issues replace old ones that have reached maturity.

That is why even when the primary balance shrinks, the annual debt is reduced.

Nor is it true that the worsening of the primary balance is due to an increase in the capital expenditure required for the large amount of public investment that the country desperately needs.

The analysis also shows the development of the current balance, i.e., that which measures the difference between current income and current expenditure. As can be seen, this balance, which was also greater than zero, also shows a downward trend, which means that the reduction in capital expenditure also played a role in the contraction of the deficit, with a contraction so great as to
nullify the increase in capital receipts, an increase due to the proceeds of securitization of public real estate.
Faced with a fall in demand, the third possible manoeuvre to relaunch the economy, in addition to tax cuts and budgetary policy, is to support and relaunch investment, which is a non-negligible part of overall demand.
Investment, like other macroeconomic quantities, has not shown a satisfactory trend in recent years.
The automobile and intangible goods industries have experienced a steady decline in growth rates since 1999. Investment in construction, after a surge in 2000, showed declines until the end of 2002. For all items taken together, the figures for the first few months of 2003 show no signs of recovery but rather further declines.
The most significant indicator is that of investment in machinery and equipment, which signals the willingness of companies to renew and expand their facilities. Well, this sector, earlier than the others, i.e., already in 2001, showed a sharp drop compared to the previous year, giving a signal that should have sounded an alarm bell and pushed towards a policy that would go beyond petty budgetary expedients.
Finally, the government's inattention is demonstrated by the fact that in the construction sector, which experienced a very modest increase of 0.3% between 2001 and 2002, i.e., very close to zero, the "construction for housing" sector, which is dominated in its entirety by the private market, recorded a small but noticeable increase of close to one percentage point (+0.9%), while the "other construction" sector, which includes public works commissioned by any entity, showed a slight but nevertheless significant drop compared to the previous year (-0.3%).

Fact Sheet 23 | Shadow economy and unemployment: a two-way relationship?

In the 2002–2003 period, the Italian GDP bordered on stagnation; consumption and orders recorded values slightly above zero; *exports* fell by a total of 2.8%; labour factor productivity did not increase; and according to the World Economic Forum's findings, the industrial system lost two further positions on the international competitiveness scale (going from 39th to 41st). In spite of this, the ISTAT figures show a positive employment balance for 2002.
315,000 (434,000 in 2001) and by 213,000 in 2003, with an employment rate growth higher than the increase in population and labour force: 1.5% (1.9% in 2001) compared to 0.2% and 0.9% (year 2002).
The positive employment trend not only appears to be largely in contrast with the general economic situation but also to be in contrast with the recent widespread company policy of personnel reduction, and it does not even seem to be attributable, as has been emphasised by many, to the proliferation of 'atypical' forms of work or to the so-called feminization of employment. It is more likely attributable to the regularisation of previous 'abnormal' employment positions, primarily those of immigrants.
Only those who declare themselves to be inactive (housewives, students, pensioners), non-regular foreign workers, and multiple jobs (i.e., jobs in addition to the primary one and not reported) are considered to be engaging in non-regular work.
Following this methodology, the latest surveys show that, in the period 1992–2000, the number of regular employees declined slightly, from 20,319,400 to 19,922,600 (-1.9%), reaching a low of 19,265,600 in 1995; in the same period, the non-regular component went from
3,089,000 in 1992 to 3,378,000 in 2000 (+9.4%) and to an estimated 3,529,000 in 2002 (+12.4%). The increase is mainly attributable to the presence of foreigners (597,000), whose weight on the total workforce rose from 12.6% in 1992 to 16.9% in 2000. The number of undeclared multiple employment positions rose from 746,000 in 1992 to 833,000 in 2000 (+11.7%). Again, non-regular employees went from 2,459,000 in 1992 to 2,797,400 in 2000 (13.7%), while for the self-employed, there was a decrease

from 630,100 to 580,800 (-7.6%). Considering that in the period from 1992 to 2000 the agricultural sector was the only one to have recorded a marked decrease in the number of nonregular employees (industry in the strict sense remained more or less stable), basically because the sector's incidence on the total national economy was decreasing more and more, the increase in the number of nonregular employees in the national economy was even more marked, while there was substantial stability in the number of self-employed. In particular, the number of irregularly employed persons involved in service sector activities is increasing.
In terms of percentage incidence, it is no coincidence that the irregularity rate in the agricultural sector was 32.4% in 2000 compared to 25.5% in 1992. Industry in the strict sense, therefore, does not use irregular staff to any great extent: 5.8% (5.7% in 1992). In the construction sector (15.5% from 14.2% in 1992) and particularly in the services sector, as mentioned, the phenomenon is much more widespread (18.3% compared to 15.6%), mainly due to the contribution of the hotel sector, public establishments (32%), and transport (29%). In other words, the concentration of undeclared work, as is to be expected, is greater in sectors where small and medium-sized production units can survive.
In the territorial sphere, it is well known that the incidence of irregular work shows significant differences, with an increasing trend from north to south. According to recent surveys, in 2001, the rate of irregularity in the South stood at 23%, compared to 10.8% in the North-West, 11.3% in the North-East, and 15.4% in the Centre. For the North-West and North-East, the incidence is slightly decreasing, respectively.
11.3 and 11.2% in 1995, and 11.1 and 10.9% in 1999. In the centre, there was an increase from 14.2% in 1995 but a decrease from 15.2% in 1999. In the southern regions, on the other hand, the average rate continues to rise, steadily exceeding 20% in almost every single region. Calabria and Campania have the highest levels (29.5% and 25.3%, respectively). Again with reference to the South of Italy, according to a study conducted in 2001, 'irregular' workers are said to number more than one and a half million, a figure that helps to explain (much more than any widespread company *downsizing* could) the reasons why, from 1993 to 1999, 352,000 regular jobs were officially lost in conjunction with the establishment of no less than 77,346 companies. The estimates of undeclared workers drawn up by Eurispes, also based on the *currency demand* approach but corroborated with the results of sample surveys carried out by various public bodies in the performance of their institutional duties (Guardia di Finanza, special commissions or *task forces* set up at the Ministry of Labour, Inps, Inail, and Asl), are more limited than the IMF data; nevertheless, they go well beyond the ISTAT findings. The latter, in fact, do not refer to the full complexity of undeclared work, especially considering the seasonality, precariousness, and discontinuity of many non-regular occupations. It is estimated, in fact, that there are over five and a half million people distributed among the various sectors in the forms of continuous undeclared work, double work, and occasional hidden work, involving a multiplicity of subjects: young people looking for their first job, the unemployed, those on temporary lay-offs, workers in mobility, non-EU nationals who do not have legal status, but also students, pensioners, housewives, employees, and the self-employed with regular work.
First of all, in terms of work units, we must consider those who carry out activities in the black economy alongside others, part-time or full-time, that are part of an institutionalised and regularised context: from the accountant of a private company who does tax returns for his neighbours to the Asl nurse who privately gives injections or other small interventions to the patients. These *multiple* workers could number at least 1,200,000 (350,000 more than the ISTAT estimate). Also escaping official counting are those who, despite already having an income and/or pension (invalidity and old age pensioners, for example), carry out an undetected, even full-time, activity in the black economy: about 500,000 people. Finally, in a country obsessed with the search for a permanent job, even continuous self-employment may not be 'felt' as an occupation; it therefore tends not to be reported (or only in part) to the surveyors of households and enterprises. This practise is confirmed by the fact that the share of the self-employed among those in the black economy is very small and far lower than expected due to the widespread customs of the domestic economic system: around 450,000.
In summary, to the 3,500,000 undeclared workers calculated by ISTAT should be added those who, as mentioned above, hide that they have some kind of work activity. The sum of all components brings the total to 5,650,000 workers, equal to just under a fifth of the current working population. This value,

although lower than the IMF estimates, is presumably more representative of reality considering that more than a quarter of Italian GDP systematically escapes official statistical quantification.
In Italy, the vast aggregate of the undeclared tends to configure itself as a shock absorber and an element of flexibility in the economic system, but also as a chain that constrains its competitiveness and future prospects, with negative effects on regular employment. Considering that, as shown, the undeclared economy presents, at the same time, a complexity that is difficult to disentangle with connotations of conjunctural, cyclical, voluntary, and structural origin, sometimes in opposition to each other, it is unthinkable to 'attack' such a complex problem if not by acting simultaneously on several fronts, through an employment, industrial, infrastructural, social, and community policy.

Fact Sheet 24 | Income distribution and geographical scales: a measure of well-being

A comparison with the EU shows that Italy is characterised by a greater variety and dispersion of territorial development models than the main European countries. This difference is not only attributable to the traditional dualism between the Centre-North and the South, nor to the affirmation of the economic realities of the North-East compared to those of the North-West. It is the micro dimension—the presence of aggregations of businesses and people in the territory with unique and specific perspectives and behaviours—that highlights fundamental elements of Italy's economic and social structure.
The variety of local development models on which the Italian economy is based and the differentiation of income distribution (and of economic performance in general) are evident in comparison with the main EU countries.
Interesting data also emerges simply by using the territorial scale produced by Eurostat, defined as NUTs2 (for Italy equivalent to regions): the per capita product of the richest Italian region (Trentino Alto Adige) is 2.16 times that of the poorest region (Calabria); the gap is smaller in France (2.0) and the United Kingdom (1.85), while it is greater in Germany (2.93), where the gap accumulated by the eastern regions still has to be made up.
Experiencing different and varying territorial performance and thus significant gaps in output and per capita income is not in itself a symptom of a lower degree of development. For example, some European countries with less developed economies (from a production point of view) show less wide territorial gaps than Italy: the ratio between richest and poorest areas is 2.01 in Poland, 1.86 in Romania, and very close to the Italian value in Hungary.
The persistence of territorial gaps in the distribution of GDP and income in Italy, while testifying to the slowness of development diffusion processes, should not condemn the variety of endogenous development models and paths in the Italian system. In fact, this variety represents an asset as well as a source of opportunities.
According to some elaborations, disposable income in real terms increased in all major European countries, with the exception of Italy. Italy has also shown, in the period 1972–2000, a progressive decrease in the weight of employee income on the gross domestic product at market prices, going from 50.6% in 1972 to 40.6% in 2000, while in the other European countries, albeit with some fluctuations, it has remained more or less constant. The growth of real disposable income in the period 1992–2000 was, in fact, 15.2% in France, 10.3% in Germany, 19.1% in Spain, 11% in the euro area, and 23.5% in Great Britain, while in Italy the increase was only 2%.
In order to get a snapshot of the situation at the national level, we need to start by analysing economic trends within the major territorial divisions (North-East, North-West, Centre, and South). According to the most recent regional accounting information, GDP growth (at constant 1995 prices) in the South was estimated at 0.7% in 2002, compared to 0.4% for the country as a whole. A moderate decline affected the economy of the North-West, which recorded a GDP change rate of -0.1%. Economic activity in the North-East showed substantial stagnation (+0.2%); above the national average, however, was the result for the Centre (+0.9%). Also in per capita terms, the dynamics of the Centre-South were more favourable than in the northern regions: the percentage rate of change was 1% in the Centre and 0.9% in the South,

while the North-West and North-East recorded negative variations, equal to -0.4 and -0.3 percentage points, respectively.
One positive fact is that the GDP of southern Italy grew by half a percentage point more than that of Italy, both in 2001 (2.2 vs. 1.6) and in 2002 (1 and perhaps more vs. 0.5), in two different years: the first one of still appreciable growth, the second one of stagnation of the economy.
A further unequivocally positive figure is that of employment, which is growing at a rate of two percentage points per year in the southern areas, bringing the unemployment rate down to 18% (youth unemployment fell from 57.3% in October 1997 to 48.9% in October 2002).
Thus, in 2001-2002, we are faced with a novelty in recent Italian economic development: in a context of modest overall growth, the Mezzogiorno is developing more than other areas of the country.
In the face of an awakening in the Italian Mezzogiorno for the two-year period 2001–2002, analysing the data on Italian household budgets (1995–2000) leads to regional estimates of disposable household income, net of taxes and contributions, which confirm, for the period 1995–2000, what was highlighted in last year's Eurispes report on the existence of an Italy *divided into three.* In all the regions of the North, family income exceeds the national average; in all those of the South, there are values much lower than the average; and the centre (with the exception of Tuscany) is slightly above the national average. The region with the highest family income is Emilia Romagna, with an index equal to 126 (the Italian total being 100); it is followed by Tuscany (118), Lombardy (117), Trentino and Friuli (115), and the other central-northern regions. The regions with the lowest household income are Sicily (68), Basilicata (69), and Calabria (69).
Considering the correlation between GDP and income, an analysis of welfare and its regional distribution can be made on the basis of 2002 data (using regional GDP per capita and its trend).
According to an analysis of these data, the North-West and North-East regions' per capita GDP in 2002 was noticeably higher than the national average, with the Central regions coming in second and the Southern regions coming in well below the average. In particular, the value in the North-Western regions is
21.8% higher than the Italian average; in the North-Eastern regions, the advantage is slightly lower, at 20.6%; the regions in the Central division are, on the other hand, just over 9% above the national average, while the South registers an average value of 31.8% below the national average.
In 2002, Calabria was the region with the lowest GDP per capita and, on average, the lowest percentage of income-earning households. Other regions with a per capita GDP well below the national average included Sicily, Campania, and Apulia. Again in 2002, the regions with a per capita GDP well above the average were Trentino Alto Adige, Valle D'Aosta, Emilia Romagna, and Lombardy; among the central regions, only Umbria recorded a value lower than the national average (-6.2%).
Emilia Romagna (with an index of 162), Tuscany (136), Trentino and Friuli (127), and Veneto (124) are the regions with the highest family wealth. Lombardy (107), which is just above the average level, is below Lazio (91) in terms of wealth. The regions with the lowest index value are still Basilicata and Calabria (62) and Sicily (62) and Campania (64).
Analysing per capita wealth, the situation improves further for Emilia Romagna, which with an index of 184 still ranks as the wealthiest region, followed by the other northern regions, such as Liguria (133) and Lombardy (117); the southern regions, on the other hand, show a retreat in their position due to their high average family size (and a low percentage of members who are wealthy).
Estimates of the well-being of a community, in addition to income trends, can be derived from an analysis of consumption. The drop in national consumption in 2002 (-0.2%) is attributable to both the resident and non-resident components. Investment in intangible goods was the liveliest component, with an increase of 1.3%.
Over the last three years, consumption by resident households has continued to decline. These were close to 3% in 2000, while in 2002 they were less than half a percentage point. The increase in domestic consumption (0.7 percent) is mainly related to residents' purchases abroad (17.7 percent), which returned to growth again.
The automobile industry crisis had an impact on consumer durables spending (-2.8% in real terms in 2002). In addition, there was a physiological downsizing of mobile phone purchases. On the whole, other durable goods showed moderately negative growth rates, with a further reallocation of expenditure

towards more technological and innovative goods (DVDs, satellite components, digital cameras, etc.). Purchases of non-durable goods recorded a slight negative sign (-0.3%), mainly due to the conspicuous deterioration in the climate of confidence that is historically correlated with this type of expenditure. The only sector that showed a positive annual result, albeit less lively than in the past, was expenditure on services (0.7%). This result can be attributed, in part, to the particular nature of this type of consumption, which makes it inflexible and endowed with carry-over effects. One thinks of services related to health, housing, or mobility.

A survey conducted in November 2003 shows that about half of those interviewed continue to consider prices to have risen 'a lot' in the last 12 months (49%); 42% of the sample consider them to have risen 'quite a lot', while those who consider them to have risen or fallen 'a little' decrease to 4% (from 8% and 5%, respectively, in October 2003). On the other hand, favourable signs are emerging regarding inflationary expectations for the next 12 months; substantial stability is expected.

The climate of confidence also deteriorated practically throughout the two-year period 2002–2003, not only due to the changing international scenario (fears related to terrorism, instability in the Middle East, the Iraq crisis), but also domestically (the Fiat crisis). In February 2002, the consumer confidence index was 124.2, net of seasonal and erratic factors. In November 2003, the index stood at 104, which is about average for the euro area countries as a whole.

As a percentage of GDP, Italy's public spending on education compared to other EU countries is 4.5%, similar to that of the United Kingdom and slightly higher than Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, which reach 4.3%, while it remains decidedly lower than that of Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal. On the other hand, the percentage of graduates between the ages of 24 and 64 remains rather low (43%) when compared to that of the other OECD countries, in most of which it is well above 50%. Within the country, the difference between regions is felt above all with regard to vocational training courses, 66.4% of which are concentrated in the North, 12.2% in the Centre, and 21.4% in Southern Italy; the percentage of participants follows more or less the same trend, with the largest number of pupils in the North (70%), and the remainder divided between the Centre and the South, with a slight prevalence of the latter.

The percentage of employed persons in relation to the labour force is still higher in the northern regions and in particular in the north-east, where the number of new enterprises grew in the second quarter of 2003 (0.87%, or 8,184 more enterprises) at a higher rate than in the other areas of the peninsula, while in the north-west there is a consistent increase in sole proprietorships (0.83% growth compared to the national average of 0.68%), and in the south, capital companies continue to grow (1.67%), but self-employed workers are falling at a sustained rate.

Worker migration is not decreasing, and the outflow continues from the south to the regions of northern Italy. In 2002, it was once again the North-East that absorbed 34,000 of the 150–200,000 high school and university graduates who leave the regions of Southern Italy every year for work. The largest dropouts are in Sicily, Apulia, and Campania, at the tail end of the scale in terms of per capita wealth. The need for security, well-being, and greater economic stability are the reasons that most frequently drive people, especially young people, to leave their areas of origin; suffice it to say that in the first four months of 2003, with the exception of Sardinia, in the South and the Islands, the age group with the greatest capacity to buy a house was identified as being people over 56, especially in Campania and Sicily, compared with 36–45 in the North and 36–55 in the Centre, with exceptions to the picture in Emilia Romagna and Veneto, where the age drops further (25–55) thanks also to a high per capita income, and in Tuscany, a region where the prevailing age group of buyers is between 46 and 55.

Fact Sheet 25 | The evolution of Italian household consumption

Eurispes has observed the evolution of household consumption expenditure from 1970 to 2002, analysing how its composition has undergone profound changes over time due to changes in lifestyles, the introduction of innovative products on the market, the increase in per capita income, and demographic trends. It also examines the contraction of consumption in recent years due to the

recessionary trend in the economy, difficult labour market conditions, the introduction of the single currency, the negative performance of the stock markets, and uncertainty scenarios worldwide. Finally, the consumer scenario of 2002–2003 and future prospects are discussed, which outline a stalled economy with consumption growth of only 0.42% in 2003 and a slow recovery in 2004.
The lack of international economic recovery has also affected the Italian economy.
The weak expansion of resident households' demand for consumer goods during 2002 was even more pronounced in 2003; in fact, by the 3rd quarter of 2003, it had reached only 159,215 million euro lire, whereas in the same quarter of 2002, it had reached 155,377 million euro lire, an increase of 0.42% over 2002. The contraction in consumption is even more evident if we analyse its evolution with respect to the GDP over the last few quarters: the weight of household consumption expenditure on the GDP appears to have fallen by about half a percentage point, from 60.8% in the second quarter of 2003 to values of less than 60.4% in the third quarter of 2003.
Increased uncertainty about the global economic outlook continued to influence consumer choices, which became more cautious and insecure, and led to a further decline in consumer confidence in 2003, followed by a slight upturn in recent months. All this led to a downturn in the propensity to consume, due both to the high inflation perceived in the last two years and to the decline in households' disposable income, which is to be found in the contraction of capital income resulting from the poor performance of the stock markets inspired by the financial crashes of some companies on the international scene.
2003, with its apathetic economy, has passed, but what will happen in 2004?
Currently, forecasts by leading economic research institutes indicate a recovery of economic growth in 2004 averaging 1.8%, which is expected to consolidate in 2005.
Analyses on the imminent future of the international economy remain linked to several factors, such as the ability of the US economy to regain some of the lost dynamism and the need for improved competitiveness and productivity of European companies made difficult by the appreciation of the euro.
In addition to these factors, further factors must be taken into account: inflation, oil price trends, developments in the still unfinished war in Iraq, the ability to control terrorist attacks, and reforms initiated not only in our country. All this can further worsen consumer confidence, which is now at its lowest level since 1997. Only if all these tensions on prices, sales, and consumption are eased will it be possible to speak of an economic recovery.
From the analysis of the data, it is possible to analyse the trend in consumption expenditure of Italian households from 1970 to 2002, the values of which are at constant prices.
Household consumption showed an upward trend until 2000, except during the periods of economic crisis that hit Italy (1974, 1975, 1992, and 1993), followed first by a slowdown in growth and then by a downward trend. In 2002, household expenditure stood at
627,465 million, while in 2000 and 2001 it amounted to 622,628 and 628,367 million, respectively.
From 1970 to 2002, the composition of expenditures underwent profound changes.
The slowdown affected all the main categories of goods; however, while for the first four consumption categories the change over the last five years has been fairly moderate, the change for communications and TV, Hi-Fi, etc. has been particularly strong, with strong upward and downward fluctuations due to the high rate of obsolescence that characterises these products.
The average monthly expenditure per family in 2002, according to the survey conducted on a sample of about 27 thousand Italian families, was 2,194 euros, 16 euros more than in 2001 (0.7%), even though in real terms there was a 1.8% decrease in expenditure. In disaggregated terms, different dynamics are evident: in the North, a decrease in average monthly expenditure of 2.2% is observed, going from 2,451 euros per month in 2001 to 2,396 in 2002, while a more sustained growth can be noted in the Centre, equal to 7.6%. In the South, the increase is more modest at 1.7%.
In 2002, average household expenditure on food and drink was EUR 425 per month; the largest share was spent on meat (4.5 percent); an increase was also recorded for fruit and vegetables, milk, cheese, and eggs, although the largest expenditure was still on housing.
A contraction in expenditure is observed in the North, mainly due to a decrease in expenditure on non-food goods and services (from EUR 2,044 in 2001 to EUR 1,985 in 2002) and a visible contraction of food goods in some regions.

In the Mezzogiorno, food expenditure rose from EUR 415 per month in 2001 to EUR 435 per month in 2002, and non-food expenditure also increased.
On the other hand, in the Centre, there was a substantial increase, due both to higher expenditure on foodstuffs (from EUR 414 in 2001 to EUR 443 in 2002) and an increase in non-food items, from EUR 1,769 in 2001 to EUR 1,905 in 2002.

Fact Sheet 26 | Sell, sell, sell!

The management of state real estate is the responsibility of the State Property Agency of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which in recent years has not particularly excelled in the performance of its institutional activities.
The census of state property, which will involve both the central and territorial structures of the Agency until mid-2005, has two objectives: the first, immediate, is to carry out an organic reconnaissance and functional updating of the physical data concerning all the property belonging to the state heritage. The second, according to the agency, is to constitute the knowledge base on which to develop the activities for the valorisation of the heritage itself. In practise, what to sell and at what price In November 2003, the work of the Tender Commission was completed for the evaluation of the bids relating to the census services for state property administered by the Agency. At the end of its work, the Commission drew up a final ranking list of the nine lots, which constitute the geographical areas into which the national territory in which state property is located is divided.
The question remains as to the principle on which, however, the sale of overruns was initiated before the census took place; perhaps the answer is that this too is an innovative procedure.
Faced with a substantial inability to manage the state's state property in a constructive manner, the agency's top management found nothing better than to create a joint-stock company under the name 'Demanio Servizi S.p.A."
This other flower of bureaucratic engineering is based in the same building as the 'mother' agency and could set up branch offices both in Italy and abroad.
The company, established with a majority shareholding by the Agenzia del Demanio (90% plus the Scuola Superiore dell'Economia e delle Finanze with 6% and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance with 4%), has as its object the performance of activities related to the provision of instrumental services in support of the exercise of the public functions assigned to the Agency, as well as the promotion, development, and implementation of said activities.
The activities indicated raise further doubts as to the operational choices made. For example, it is stipulated that the company is to carry out 'technical-economic reconnaissance, rationalisation, and optimisation of real estate assets, including the optimal management of the cost structure related to their operation'.
The company's activities include strategic analyses, studies, valuations, sales and purchases of real estate and movable assets, as well as operational and management support for valuation programmes. In view of what has just been described, it is foreseeable that these services will be contracted out to third parties through private negotiations, bypassing the transparency rules associated with the holding of tenders.
Two new companies have been operational since last year: Patrimonio dello Stato Spa and Infrastrutture Spa. Patrimonio dello Stato Spa has the task of valuing, managing, and disposing of available, non-transferable, and state property.
The shares of this company can be transferred to other companies in which the Ministry directly holds the entire share capital.
Infrastrutture Spa, headquartered in Rome with possible offices in Naples and Milan, with an initial capital of EUR 1 million, through loans granted by banks and other intermediaries, should: finance infrastructure and major public works in any form; grant loans under
any form aimed at investments for economic development. It also grants guarantees for the same purposes.

In conclusion, Patrimonio Spa and Infrastrutture Spa will be able to generate some efficiency gains (appropriate imputation of the cost of using public capital) and some greater economy of management (power of the company structures regulated by the civil code, which has contributed to the reorganisation of public service companies), which can be achieved even in the absence of the two companies.
The government provides that state-owned asset, including those of historical and artistic value, are expressly included among those transferable from state ownership to that of Patrimonio Spa. A simple decree of the Minister of the Economy is sufficient.
In turn, the assets in question can be transferred from this company to Infrastrutture Spa. The difference between the two businesses is that, in contrast to the former, which is currently under the Treasury's ownership and must remain so, Infrastrutture Spa may in the future sell shares, even majority shares, to private individuals.
The Minister of the Economy values the state's assets at just under EUR 500 billion and envisages a valuation of the same, through the two companies mentioned above, at a market value of EUR 2 trillion. According to a Patrimonio Spa estimate, the market value of the Italian local authorities' real estate portfolio is roughly three times that of the central state.
According to the draught balance sheet as of December 31, 2002, prepared by the Treasury following company accounting standards, at the central government level, the value of residential properties was EUR 4.9 billion, that of non-residential units was EUR 33.7 billion, and that of land was EUR 5.6 billion. For the assets of municipalities, provinces, and regions, the amount could therefore be tripled.
Although the Patrimonio Spa document cannot be based on the Agenzia del Demanio census, preliminary estimates indicate that the state owns about one-third of the assets of public bodies in its portfolio, including land and buildings.
A third includes assets for whose valorisation a long preparatory activity is necessary, assets for which it may take ten or twenty years of valorisation before they can be brought to the market.
Together with the items infrastructure, the *fair value of* which is estimated at EUR 285 billion, natural resources (EUR 140 billion), frequencies, and military equipment, public real estate is included in the fixed assets chapter of the new draught balance sheet.
The ratio of assets to liabilities at the end of last year was 0.7 at the level of central government (966 billion lire assets and 1,382 billion lire liabilities) and 1.22 at the level of general government (1,738 billion lire assets versus 1,428 billion lire liabilities).
The Patrimonio Spa-created real estate fund should debut on the market at the beginning of 2004 for a sum close to EUR 1 billion. The state should contribute $300–400 million in real estate assets, while private individuals have been invited to do the same.

Fact Sheet 27 | The Italian healthcare system: between federalism, commemorations and new emergencies

In Italy, the last part of 2003 could also have been, with the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the most important event in Italian healthcare, the Health Reform, an opportunity to reflect on our National Health Service, launched by Law 833 of December 21, 1978. Few people realised this, and many deliberately glossed over it, because the risk could have been that of starting yet another 'blanks' clash between the poles without giving rise to a calm debate with which, data in hand, to draw a balance sheet on our health welfare system. So much so that some people improperly spoke of a Fourth Reform—after those of 1992 (legislative decree 502) and 1999 (law 229) amending the 'real' Health Reform of 1978—when the Council of Ministers (in the very days of the 'silver wedding anniversary') approved on December 19, 2003, the outline of a bill bearing 'Fundamental Principles on the National Health Service', which deals, among other things, with the issue of clinical governance of health care companies through the figure of a super manager clinical coordinator doctor.
The temptation to take stock of Law 833 is strong, even if the object of evaluation has changed: on the one hand, the 'old' National Health Service in a centralist Italy; on the other, the new regional health

services in a federalist Italy. But drawing up these balances is an improbable and binding task because this should be preliminary to proposing solutions among health policy experts in the two Italian poles.
However, balance sheets aside, how are the Italians? In the year 2000, there were 560,121 deaths, 280,714 of which were male and 279,407 females, an average drop of 1.25% per year. However, it should be emphasised that male mortality is still much higher than female mortality: the mortality quotient in 2000 was 56.5 per 100,000 for men and 34.7 per 100,000 for women. An examination of the data at the territorial level shows a higher mortality rate in the northern and central regions than in the southern regions.
More than 70% of overall mortality is due to diseases of the circulatory system and cancer. In particular, the most frequent causes of death remain those related to diseases of the circulatory system (240,430 deaths in 2000). The mortality rates per 100,000 inhabitants, referring to the year 2000, for this cause were 416.2 for the total population, 383.0 for males, and 447.6 for females. In second place among the causes of death were cancers (160,053 deaths in the year 2000, about 28% of the total number of deaths), with death rates per 100,000 inhabitants of 327.5 for males and 229.5 for females.
During the five-year period from 1996 to 2000, the mortality rate for cancer rose from 272.8 to 277.1 per 100,000 inhabitants, i.e., -1.4% among men and -1.5% among women since the beginning of the 1990s. Third place among deaths is taken by diseases of the respiratory system (37,782 deaths), the quotient of which was 65.4 per 100,000 in 2000 for the total population, 78.2 for males and 53.4 for females. For causes of violent death, a slight decrease in the mortality rate was observed between 1999 and 2000, with a decrease from 46.9 to 45.2 per 100,000.
Finally, with regard to deaths in the first year of life, summarised by the so-called infant mortality rate, the time analysis shows substantially decreasing trends (with the infant mortality rate going from 6.2 in 1996 to 4.5 per thousand in 2000). Specifically, in the year 2000, a total of 2,431 deaths were recorded in this age group; among these, 13 cases were attributable to infectious and parasitic diseases, 37 cases to diseases of the respiratory system, 750 cases to congenital malformations, and as many as 1,328 to morbid conditions of perinatal origin.
The recent amendment to Title V of the Italian Constitution assigned legislative autonomy in health matters to the Regions, while Legislative Decree 56/2000 (the so-called fiscal federalism reform) introduced the principle of co-participation of ordinary statute Regions in the revenues of the main taxes (including the health service) and made the Regions responsible for any overruns in the management of health expenditure by the ASLs through the use of own resources derived from the co-participation in the revenue from VAT, Irpef, and the Regional Tax on Productive Activities (IRAP). Direct state transfers paid in the form of the National Health Fund have been maintained only with reference to the regions with special statutes: Sardinia and Sicily.
The Regional Irpef Surtax increased from 0.9% to 1.4% as a result of Legislative Decree 56/2000, which also provided for the simultaneous elimination of the National Health Fund and its replacement by regional co-participation in 25.7% of VAT revenue. The National Health Fund has thus been replaced by 21 Regional Health Funds and has been accompanied by an equalising mechanism of a solidaristic nature, which acts in favour of the regions that would be financially non-self-sufficient on the basis of their fiscal capacity. The equalising solidarity mechanism serves to guarantee the right of every citizen, whether Calabrian or Piedmontese, Tuscan or Apulian, to the Essential Levels of Care (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA). The equalisation fund will cover these guarantees until 2013.
The abolition of both current and capital state transfers, including the National Health Fund, has meant that the financing of health care in ordinary regions has come to be based entirely on regional finance. However, public intervention in healthcare and the relative tax system designed to finance it represent only part of the financing of healthcare consumption that does not derive from state transfers. In the period between 1995 and 2000, the share of private expenditure rose from 23.46% to 27.40% of the entire resources. Moreover, what emerges even more clearly is the total change in the weight of public funding sources.
With the agreement of August 8, 2001, the Essential Levels of Care (LEA) were defined. It should be emphasised that, in redefining the levels of care, particular attention was paid to the possibility of optimising the use of resources, especially in the area of hospital care. Estimates by organisations operating in the health sector have at one time indicated that the economic and financial consequences

of inappropriate use of the hospital with inappropriate admissions in ordinary instead of day hospital regimes amount to approximately EUR 1 billion. The recent release of preliminary data from the so-called 'LEA Monitoring Table', albeit still of an experimental nature, has caused a stir. The data for 2001 reveal a 'hole' of 8 billion euros (an expenditure of 79.58 billion compared to a health fund of 71.27 billion euros). The greatest responsibility, as an expenditure generator, was attributed to hospitals, which absorbed more than 48% of the resources with respect to the ceiling of 45% indicated by the LEA agreements, the lowest (43.8%) in Emilia Romagna and the highest (53.81) in Valle d'Aosta, with an average per capita cost of 661.42 euros.
In 2002, public expenditure on social protection in Italy exceeded 293 billion euros, absorbing 23.4% of GDP. The trend over the last four years shows an increasing use of resources (from EUR 249.2 billion in 1999 to the current EUR 293.3 billion). The sector that weighs most heavily on the public budget is social security (an 'umbrella' within which there are very heterogeneous measures); less capital is committed to health and assistance.
In absolute values, there is a monetary increase in all the expenditure items considered, but if we refer to percentage values, there is a decreasing but still preponderant weight of the social security sector (which rose from 71.1% in 1999 to 67.7% in 2002). On the contrary, state budgets show an increase in healthcare expenditure (by almost three percentage points) and in the share allocated to assistance (from 6.4% in 1999 to 7.2% in 2002). Compared to other European countries, the incidence of social expenditure on GDP is 25.3%, more than two points below the average of the 15 EC countries (27.6%). Below the Italian figure are Portugal (22.9%), Luxembourg (21.9%), Spain (20%), and Ireland (14.7%). Above the Italian figure, which, it should be remembered, relates only to public benefits, are Sweden (32.9%), France (30.3%), Germany (29.6%), Austria (28.6%), Belgium (28.2%), the Netherlands (28.1%), the UK (26.9%), and Finland (26.7%).

Fact Sheet 28 | Microcredit and the criteria for granting credit

Microcredit is a system of financing informal activities carried out by people who do not have the possibility of obtaining credit from official institutions because they are not able to offer financial guarantees. The term informal refers to the fact that the activities are characterised by precarious, nonformalized, often family-based working relationships.
The objective of microcredit institutions is to contribute to the development of economic and social opportunities for those in disadvantaged circumstances and, more generally, to the promotion of local activities and the fight against poverty.
The different microcredit methodologies can be grouped into two broad categories: group lending (peer lending) and individual lending (individual lending). The earliest type of microlending is individual lending, which is a system that commercial banks have adopted. The financing provided by this credit method is generally higher than that of the other systems, and for this reason, it requires effective guarantees and frequent contact with the customers using the service.
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 95% of the world's credit is disbursed to the richest 20% of the population. In contrast, the poorest 20 percent of the world's population (about 1 billion people) produce 1 percent of the world's savings and receive only 0.2 percent of the world's credit disbursed. This means that four-fifths of the savings of poor people are used to provide credit to richer people. Moreover, according to UN estimates, the poorest one billion people live on less than one dollar a day.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has estimated that only two percent of the world's 500 million microenterprises benefit from credit. These small enterprises would mostly be the recipients of microcredit programmes.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 52/194 of December 18, 1997, entitled 'Role of Microcredit in Poverty Eradication." The goal enshrined in the resolution is to succeed in eradicating extreme poverty and reducing overall poverty in the world through the actions of individual states and international cooperation.

Microcredit experiences in Europe have been founded on the principles of ethical finance, which, in general, indicate giving priority to people rather than capital, to ideas rather than wealth, and to fair remuneration rather than speculation.
More specifically, ethical finance considers the social and environmental consequences of investments rather than the economic ones. Credit is understood as a right of the people, and the primary objectives become the protection of the common good and the redistribution of wealth. Transparency of activities, efficiency, and sobriety constitute the characteristics of responsibility and ethical finance. Furthermore, the participation of savers (as well as shareholders) in the enterprise's choices is facilitated.
Recipients of funding are social and international cooperatives working in the non-profit sector, fair trade, organic farming, renewable energy, human rights advocacy, and the promotion of responsible tourism.
In Italy, the microcredit experience is also part of ethical finance. During the 1970s, MAG (Mutue Auto Gestione) cooperatives were set up in our country with the aim of collecting members' savings for use in social economy and international cooperation projects. The MAGs provided credit on the basis of the social and environmental impact of the projects rather than on the verification of the beneficiaries' asset guarantees. In particular, the Mags intervene by supporting projects for the employment of people with disabilities or disadvantaged conditions, ecological projects for the separate collection and recycling of waste, the production and distribution of organic products, and
environmental purification, natural medicine, and cultural projects for the development of art, creativity, and the free expression of people.
The Mags developed mainly during the 1980s and carried out their activities in the territory where they were established. Mag Verona (1977) was the first Mag, and Mag-2 Milan (1980), Autogest Udine, Mag-3 Padua (1983), Mag-4 Piedmont (1987), Mag-6 Reggio Emilia (1988), Ctm-Mag (1989), Mag-7 Genoa (1991), and Mag Venice (1992) were the following Mags.
In Italy, the bodies and institutions currently dealing with microfinance, microcredit, and ethical finance are the Banca Popolare Etica, the Choros Foundation, the Etimos Consortium, the Ethical Finance Association, Mag-2 Finance, Mag-4 Piedmont, Mag-6 Emilia Romagna, and Sefea Scarl (Società Europea Finanza Etica ed Alternativa).
In 1995, the cooperative 'Verso la Banca Etica' was established, which was transformed into Banca Popolare Etica in 1998 after the minimum share capital (12.5 billion lire) was reached. In 1999, the Banca Popolare Etica started its activities first in Padua and then in Brescia, Milan, Rome, and Vicenza. The idea is to offer a meeting point for people who want to manage their savings and socio-economic activities in a conscious and responsible manner, conducted according to the principles of sustainable development. According to these principles, economic growth and wealth distribution must be based on values of corporate social and environmental responsibility, solidarity, transparency, and the protection of collective interests. The sectors to which the Ethical Bank provides funding are social cooperation; environment; international cooperation; culture; and civil society.
The social cooperation sector is concerned with the provision of socio-health and educational services, combating the social and economic exclusion of disadvantaged people, social inclusion projects, the employment of disadvantaged people, and the protection of people living in difficult situations.
Projects with an environmental focus refer to the protection of the natural heritage and the development of environmentally friendly activities (environmentally friendly waste disposal services, environmentally friendly transport services, production and distribution systems that have a positive impact on the environment, experimentation with and use of alternative energy sources, and the development of organic farming).
The international cooperation sector covers development cooperation, microcredit services (social and economic development of the poorest areas, promotion of the informal economy and micro-enterprises), support for fair trade, international voluntary work, and reception, assistance, and support activities for immigrants.
Projects addressed to culture and civil society concern the quality of life, the promotion of sport for all (with special attention to disadvantaged groups), the management and protection of the artistic and cultural heritage, the development of artistic and cultural activities, socio-cultural animation in the poorest areas, the creation of employment in areas of social deprivation, support for families willing to

adopt or foster children, the provision of housing for disadvantaged people, and the promotion of social tourism.

Fact Sheet 29 | North calling South: economy and work in Emilia Romagna and Calabria

2003 saw a slowdown in the trend towards reducing the North-South gap, in the sense that the South of Italy grew slightly more than the rest of the country, and even this small but significant difference seems to have narrowed over the course of this year, so much so that we can speak of a 'slowed development'. It is therefore not wrong to claim that business in the South is not a strong player and that it can only develop in a logic of overall support that also takes into account the inhomogeneity present in the territory between areas of backwardness and decay together with more competitive and modern contexts. Even the credit system, substantially located in the north, shows that it does not have faith in the possibilities of the southern system and continues to concentrate lending in the more developed areas, while in the south it essentially operates a policy of collecting savings.

In 2006, the enlargement of the European horizon will also force the southern regions to deal more and more with the issues of development and cohesion, since at that point the Mezzogiorno will no longer be just a 'point of weakness' within a framework of strong and rich countries but will have to reckon with new regions lagging far behind in their development, with new needs, new poverty, and new imbalances.

In order to better understand the dualism that grips the growth and socio-economic development of our country, it is not necessarily necessary to undertake complex analyses that take into account an indefinite mass of indicators capable of reproducing a synthesis scenario for the entire territory, but it is sufficient to refer to the conditions in which the populations occupying the 'most' and 'least' developed areas of the country, namely Emilia Romagna and Calabria, respectively, find themselves.

Underscoring an important gap between the two regions are the data on the gross domestic product (GDP) and the relative variation between 2000 and 2002. As many as four provinces in Emilia Romagna are among the top ten for per capita GDP, while three provinces in Calabria are among the last (Crotone is the Italian tail-end, although it has gone from an index number of 47.2 to an index number of 56.9 in 7 years). It is also important to point out that Calabria's GDP has increased considerably over the last six years: the growth rate was 30.8%, reaching over 23,514 million euros, a positive figure that is significantly higher than the trend recorded at the national level (25.4%).

Significant and surprising differences in values are also recorded in view of the characteristics and numbers of the entrepreneurial fabric in the two areas. If we pause to analyse the trend of businesses present in the two regions over the last five years (from 1997 to 2002), even though the gap, in terms of numerical consistency, is more than notable (there were more than 410,000 active businesses in Emilia Romagna on December 31, 2002, and just over 146,000 in Calabria), it is interesting to note how a comparison of the two percentage variations over this period shows a

+18.6% in favour of the southernmost region of peninsular Italy, an indication of the tenacity and desire for redemption of Calabrian entrepreneurs. The figure for Emilia Romagna in percentage terms is slightly above 2%.

In addition, the balance of enterprises (registered vs. closed) in the two years under consideration reveals a *trend* that is reversed over the five-year period: while in 1997 in Calabria this value was 17,625 and in Emilia Romagna there was a positive balance of 87,984 enterprises, in 2002 the positive balance in the Emilia-Romagna area was just 942 enterprises, compared to a remarkable 5,798 in the Calabrian area.

The different level of competitiveness of the Italian economic system, or rather the Emilia Romagna/Calabria dichotomy, can be clearly seen if we examine the level of 'openness' of production.

fabric of the two regions If we pause to analyse the export *trends* in the two regions considered,

In the last five years (from 1998 to 2002, as 2003 still gives us partial data), it is easy to see that both regions have seen an increase in the value of 'outgoing' goods, with Calabria going from 2.4 billion euros to 2.9 (+18.2%) and Emilia Romagna from 257 billion euros to 315 (+22.5%).

Another particularly significant metric is always linked to the trade balance and refers to the *trend of* goods imported by businesses in the two regions. As for the export quota, the differences in absolute terms between Calabria and Emilia Romagna are decidedly accentuated: in 2002 alone, the former imported goods for just 473 million euros (with a negative *trend* compared to the previous year of over -7%), while the latter imported almost 19 billion euros with an increase of 6%.
Both regions, moreover, show a tendency to reduce imports during 2003 in anticipation of an economic recovery at a national level that is still a long way off. Driving the entrepreneurial system towards new import levels are, to date, the provinces of Ferrara, with +15.2%, for Emilia Romagna, and Vibo Valentia, with +51.6%, for Calabria.
Another important indicator for the purposes of an in-depth analysis of the gap between the two regional systems is the trend of expenditure in the *information technology* sector. Compared to the other Italian territorial realities, both certainly do not shine in terms of IT investments; in fact, Emilia Romagna ranks (together with Tuscany) eighth in the national ranking with a contribution of 2.7%, while Calabria is only ahead of the two islands with 0.4% (table 12). However, the *digital divide* between the 'two Italys" is particularly evident: there is a clear divide between the North and the South of the country in terms of technological investments, since, while the top ten positions (we are always referring to IT investment expenditure) include no less than eight regions in the North, the last ten positions are all occupied by regions in the Centre-South.
Needless to say, we must stress again the huge gap between the 'two Italys" on the employment and labour fronts. A comparison of employment and unemployment flows in Calabria and Emilia Romagna shows a positive *trend* for both regions. The 2002 figures compared to those of 2001 show an increase in *employment of* 13 thousand in Calabria and 28 thousand in Emilia Romagna. Unemployment also fell more substantially in Calabria (-4.5%), although the *gap* between the two areas still remains at high levels. The positive change in employment in Emilia Romagna is determined exclusively by employees, who increase by 43 thousand units (+0.03%), while the self-employed fall by a good 15 thousand units (-0.03%). There was also a greater incidence of employed persons in Calabria, which increased by 11 thousand against a growth of only 2 thousand in the self-employed. Looking at the breakdown of employed persons by branch of economic activity, the services and trade sector is confirmed as the leading sector for the Calabrian economy, whose percentage of employed persons out of the overall total is almost 70%. The industry sector, on the other hand, remains very weak, accounting for only 6.3%. In Emilia Romagna, too, it is the third sector that dominates; industry nevertheless remains higher than the national average (28% of people in Emilia Romagna are employed in the second sector). Overall, in both Calabria and Emilia Romagna, more than 50% of employment is concentrated in the tertiary sector (commerce and services); the incidence of employees in the agricultural sector remains higher than the national average in both Calabria (12.9%) and Emilia Romagna (5.6%). A further comparison of the data shows that unemployment in Calabria has decreased more consistently than the national figure and that of Emilia Romagna. However, it should be emphasised that unemployment levels in Emilia Romagna were already very low, reaching 3.3% in 2002 against 9% for the country. It is interesting to note that in Calabria, the greatest difficulties are encountered by female graduates, while male graduates account for 4% of the unemployed as a whole. Analysing the youth unemployment rates, it can be seen that Calabria is, after Campania (59.5%), the region with the highest rate (58.2%); Emilia Romagna, on the other hand, after Trentino Alto Adige (5%) and Veneto (7.6%), has the lowest rate (9%).

Fact Sheet 30 | The presence of corruption in the Italian public life

From the beginning of the 'Mani Pulite' operation in 2002, there were 3,175 indictments for corruption, 405 guilty verdicts, 828 convictions by plea bargaining, 429 acquittals, 386 prescriptions, and 1,320 assignments to other offices. Twelve years after Tangentopoli, Eurispes felt it was important to ascertain citizens' opinions on corruption in Italian public life by administering a survey questionnaire to a representative sample of the Italian population.

The survey data show that citizens' opinions of the level of corruption in Italian public life are rather negative. In fact, 46.5% of the sample believe that corruption has remained unchanged since 1992; furthermore, about one in four citizens think that there has even been a worsening of the phenomenon; specifically, 13.7% think that corruption has increased a great deal and 11% think that there has been an increase, albeit slight, in the phenomenon since 1992. However, there is no shortage of more positive opinions: 20.7% of those interviewed believe that corruption in public life has decreased significantly over the period considered, and 3.3% believe that it has decreased slightly.

The analysis of the answers according to geographical area of reference reveals how, going down the boot, negative judgements increase. The percentage of citizens who believe that corruption has increased significantly since 1992 rises from 10.1% in the North-East and 11.9% in the North-West to 13.9% in the Centre and 16.5% in the South, reaching 18.9% in the Islands. Amongst those interviewed in the Centre and the South, the proportion of those who believe that there has been a slight increase in corruption compared to 1992 is higher (11.9% and 11.6%, respectively), whereas the opinions concerning the stability of the phenomenon are more numerous amongst citizens resident in the North-East and the North-West (49.6% and 47%).

On the whole, therefore, the percentage of citizens who are sceptical about a decrease in corruption in Italian public life and who therefore believe that nothing has changed or, worse, that there has been an increase in unlawful behaviour compared to the Clean Hands era is extremely high throughout the country: this percentage share is 69.1% among citizens in the North-West and reaches a peak among respondents living in the South (72%) and the Islands (74%).

The next question sought to collect citizens' opinions on the areas or systems most affected by corruption. According to the opinion of the sample, it is managers, officials, and employees of the public administration, central and local, who are the main actors of unlawful behaviour, indicated as the professional area most affected by corruption in 13.8% of cases. In second place in this negative ranking is the government, indicated by 12% of those interviewed, followed by entrepreneurs (10.2%), the judiciary (10%), local administrators (9.5%), and the public health service (9%). Parliament ranks seventh, as indicated by 5.2% of citizens, as the sector where corruption is most prevalent. Banks and credit institutions collect 2.5% of the answers, followed by the police (2.2%), trade unions (2%), and court officials (1.9%). In the opinion of citizens, corruption involves to a lesser extent the legal profession (1.7%), tax and levy collection staff (1.5%), urban and municipal police (1%) and the journalism sector (at the bottom of the list, with just 0.5% of responses). Finally, it should be noted that a fairly significant percentage of the sample (13.2%) was unable or unwilling to provide any information.

How much have corruption-related incidents personally impacted citizens in the past year? 1.3% of the sample replied that they had been victims of corruption or attempted corruption, or that a member of their family had been. The vast majority of the respondents (97.3%) answered in the negative, while 1.4% did not want to give any indication or said they were not informed of any bribery incidents involving their family members.

According to the answers of the interviewees, corruption would be more widespread in the Islands, where 3% of citizens claimed to have been directly or indirectly victims of episodes of corruption or attempted corruption, such as bribes or requests for money to speed up a procedure, while it would affect citizens residing in the North-East to a lesser extent (0.7%). It should be pointed out, however, that the higher percentage of affirmative responses found in the Islands could also be attributed to the lower percentage of non-responses relating to this geographical area (0.6% against an average of 1.4%).

Finally, the questionnaire aimed to collect citizens' opinions on the Clean Hands experience. The data show the degree of citizens' agreement on a number of statements concerning corruption and the Clean Hands experience. The first states that 'Tangentopoli' never ended and the system of corruption continues to operate at full capacity. This is evidently a pessimistic view, with which, unfortunately, a clear majority of the sample agrees: 70.4%. Specifically, as many as 32.5% of those interviewed declared themselves to be 'very much in agreement', 37.9% 'fairly much in agreement', while just 17% said they were not very much in agreement with this statement, and an even smaller percentage (6.6%) expressed total disagreement.

If the first item also implied a negative judgement on the actual capacity of Operation Clean Hands to undermine the corruption system, the statement "Corruption has always existed and will always exist, and nothing can be done to eliminate it" expresses instead a total scepticism on the morality of public life; from this point of view, corruption would be an ineliminable evil to be resigned to living with. Well, 56.9% of those interviewed say that they very much or fairly agree with this statement; of these, 31.8% express total agreement. The percentage of those who, on the contrary, agree a little amounts to 21.5%, while the share of the sample expressing complete disagreement does not reach 17%.

The other two items allow for a comparison of two very different assessments of Clean Hands: an encounter cut short by the political system's veto and a political operation intended to target only a portion of the parties involved in the corruption system. The answers provided by the sample show that citizens are more inclined to believe that Di Pietro and the Clean Hands pool did not have the chance to finish their work because politics would have blocked them earlier. 61.2% of those interviewed agreed very much or fairly with this statement, compared to 47.4% who said they agreed fairly much or very much with the opinion that the Clean Hands judges operated in a one-way direction, investigating only some parties and neglecting others. Specifically, it is possible to observe that 29.3% and 31.9% of the sample, respectively, very much and fairly agreed with the judgement on Clean Hands as an operation truncated by the political system; these percentages fall to 21.3% (very much agree) and 26.1% (fairly agree) in relation to the judgement on Clean Hands as a one-way operation aimed at investigating only part of the political system.

The claim that the Clean Hands judges operated in a one-way direction, investigating only certain parties and neglecting the others, finds the highest percentage of non-answers, 14.2% overall. However, it is possible to highlight how opinions expressing agreement with this statement prevail among citizens. This is what emerges by cumulating, on the one hand, the answers expressing very much or fairly much agreement with this item and, on the other, those expressing little or no agreement. Specifically, the idea that Mani Pulite was in some way a political operation finds agreement among 40.6% of citizens with no more than an elementary school leaving certificate, 49.1% of those with a middle school leaving certificate, and 52% of those with a high school diploma. Among these citizens, disagreement with this opinion never reaches 40%.

An exception are citizens with at least a university degree, among whom those who say they agree little or not at all with the idea that the Mani Pulite pool operated one way: 55.2% against 39.6% of those who, on the contrary, express much or quite a lot of agreement.

CHAPTER 4 ON KNOWLEDGE

Essay | Images of knowledge

Knowledge as a multidimensional problem imposes the specificity of individual knowledges and, at the same time, demands the need to recompose particular knowledges in a general vision of the subject. From physics to biology, from philosophy to psychology, from anthropology to the social sciences, all disciplines are questioned because each has produced its own expertise, but, as many warn, the risk is that of a dangerous fragmentation that prevents the construction of a design, assuming that a design is possible.

One has to take into account that the attempt to gather 'ultimate' knowledge around knowledge can lead to provisional results strongly marked by doubt and uncertainty.

However positively this condition of uncertainty may be considered, there remains a background of restlessness, a need for knowledge that has the force of a foundation, that colour-impregnated string that unequivocally marks the exact line on the materials that are to be worked.

A myth is not just any story; it is a 'sacred' story, and, for this reason, it is a true and exemplary story. Retracing one of these often labyrinthine stories also means attempting a true immersion in the collective imagination and thus initiating an archaeological investigation of major cultural themes. Who is Sisyphus? It might seem like a banal question to which an equally banal and obvious answer is offered: Sisyphus is the hero of an endless and infinitely repeated punishment. What remains of him is his condemnation: eternally dragging a boulder to the top of a mountain to see it eternally fall back down, from where the hero must pick it up to repeat the futile effort. This is what remains of Sisyphus, but little is said about him and his guilt—the very guilt that will bring him memorable condemnation. What remains of this ancient story, and why is it embedded so vividly in our collective heritage? In the end, Sisyphus, beyond all his vicissitudes, is the only hero condemned to an extraordinary effort that finds no fulfilment. His name is evoked whenever men feel that their efforts are ineffective and hopelessly doomed to defeat. But failure does not produce a paralysing defeat but only another effort, a new attempt that, in its stubbornness, signals the desire not to let adversity bring it down. And it is good, then, to remember what the Zen masters say: 'Life is to fall seven times and get back up eight'.

There is always a big difference between amateurs and masters. While the former builds their game by staying within the schemes and following the rules to the letter, the masters move creatively along the register of infinite possibilities. However, one must warn against any easy illusions and eliminate any misunderstandings. Of course, the Universal Game in itself aspires to perfection and perhaps announces and configures it, but it is not unfamiliar with the arrogance and impudence of wanting to put things in order, thus devoting itself to pure repetition. Perhaps its truest charm lies precisely in its infinite ordering possibility and in the power, it possesses to prefigure the harmony of the world, and in this it also shows its illusory nature. Mask and deception, vertigo and fear, rule and transgression are only some of the characters of the game, but they are sufficient to warn against that baloney that makes games the enchanted world of children. Whoever really wants to play must know from the outset what is at stake, which certainly cannot be the ridiculous one of wanting to 'fool the time'. Perhaps for this reason, the game, in its highest form, once belonged to the mystical brotherhoods.

Who remembers the sacred origin of so many games anymore? The shamanic ascents of the tree of cuccagna, the clash between good and evil in ritual fights, the dramatic contest between light and darkness, the contest in tournaments for power over the sun—an infantile humanity has appropriated the games and has lost the memory of this possible way to salvation. The resurgence of a strong interest in the problems posed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment should, however, be noted, and certainly fewer polemics regarding this decisive philosophical season should be reconsidered. One cannot, in fact, completely forget the great dream of the Enlightenment philosophers who saw in reason and scientific thought the unfolding of human power, of which Bacon had already outlined the programme (Scientia est potentia).

The encyclopaedic eye forcefully asserts a will to dominion that subjugates nature and its knowledge. And again, the decisive change in the age of technology, i.e., the present time and world, of reason from order of the cosmos to instrument should be emphasised. The fulminating judgements expressed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno [1978] in the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* should certainly be reconsidered, but we must also avoid throwing everything away.

In order to grasp with some approximation the disruptive force of the 'crisis of the fundamentals', which matures in the first thirty years of our century, it is useful to hint at some more remote premises that remain rather in the background and are only occasionally recalled. One alludes to the conflict between classical 'reason' and

"modern 'reason'. The crisis of the foundations, provoked by the development of the sciences in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, seems to enter this problematic area and bring the germs of that conflict to maturity, clearly highlighting the irreducibility of classical 'reason' to modern 'reason'.

It is well known that one of the characteristic features of classical reason is the problem of 'foundation'. Any knowledge is true if it is certain, and it is certain if it has an indisputable foundation. Truth and foundation, therefore, are identified. You cannot have one without the other. Aspiration to truth and aspiration to certainty characterise classical reason. This conception of reason gave rise to the problem of the justification of such a foundation, i.e., how objective certainty can be inherent in the agreement between the subject's judgements and the effected connections, which it is claimed to achieve in knowledge. The problem does not concern general principles, from that of non-contradiction to that of identity and sufficient reason, but rather their foundational function of knowledge in its actual exercise.

Now, with the development of the sciences in the last century and in our own, the problematic character and then the untenability of the demand for the absolute foundation of our knowledge, in the classical as well as in the Kantian version, have gradually become clear. Indeed, the birth of non-Euclidean geometries and the formation of a non-Newtonian physics, which contains those geometries as an essential part; the birth of quantum mechanics, which questions the universal, unilinear and deterministic character of the principle of causality; the discovery of contradictions in the foundations of mathematics, these and similar revolutionary results of scientific development not only appeared irreconcilable with those foundational premises, but made clear the fragility of any claim to certainty as a guarantee of truth for any scientific proposition, and, on a more general level, the non-propagability of the problem of the absolute foundation of our knowledge. Einstein soon highlighted the incompatibility of actual scientific progress with the rigidity of Kant's a priori assumptions, and Russell demonstrated how and why mathematics could no longer represent the last safe haven of certainty in knowledge.

Classical reason, therefore, was characterised by the incessant search that revolved around the problem of its foundation: knowledge only became true if it was able to draw on certainty and, consequently, if it could show its indisputable foundation. Now, it is precisely the question of foundation that constitutes the burning core of all reflection and argumentation: how, if at all, is it possible to give birth to knowledge that represents 'a permanent centre of gravity'?

As long as reason remained under God's wing, i.e., drew its very existence from participation in divine rationality, the matter appeared resolved as the regress to infinity found a safe and ultimate shelter in the presence of an unfailingly ordering and guaranteeing God.

The moment modern reason 'emancipates' itself from divine protection, it is called upon to account for its own activity, its own processes, and its results.

Today, reason takes on a purely organisational dimension and manifests itself in all its power through the establishment of an operational knowledge that will know its ultimate triumph in the age of technology.

The ancient world had no doubt that there was a truth to be known and a knowledge that could account for that truth. But neither did it have any doubt that such a truth was difficult to understand and tragically foreign to most.

Fact Sheet 31 | Research policies in Italy

The development of research in Italy is a topic that has fascinated the country over the years, from the post-war period to the present. That Italy should provide itself with a structure capable of independently producing research and development is a necessity that we could now define as historical. Nonetheless, research policies in Italy have hardly ever found, except in a few sectors, a space that would place our country in a position commensurate with being part of the group of the world's top ten most industrialised countries.

This situation has led to various consequences, both on a purely scientific level and on a social and economic level. On the scientific level, Italy has lagged behind in sectors that are fundamental for development, such as energy, which has not allowed the liberation of dependence on foreign countries in strategic sectors. The nuclear industry itself, if we exclude construction work, has not had a development in Italy that would allow self-sufficiency, at least in this field. From an economic point of view, we have been forced to 'import' patents, creating a situation of dependence that has not allowed our industry to develop technologies that can be sold outside the national market. From a social point of view, an entire generation of probable researchers has developed in Italy, employed in improper functions or, even more strikingly, forced into 'exile' in order to be able to perform their function.

It is no coincidence that our country ranks, not only within the European Union but also within the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, at the bottom in the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP.

These often dormant contradictions become public when we hear from time to time about Italian researchers and scientists who choose to work abroad, increasing the phenomenon commonly referred to as the 'brain drain'.

This phenomenon is also quite variable in its numerical values. In fact, the official statistics mainly take into account those researchers who, in some way, often precariously, worked in Italy, while they do not take into account those who moved abroad after graduation without ever having worked at home.

Even from the point of view of research personnel, our country is lagging far behind, which cannot be blamed solely on the brain drain. In fact, if one were to consider the total number of Italian researchers abroad and add them to those present in Italy, one would still be a long way from the figures for other countries.

With reference only to graduates working full-time in the sector, in fact, from 1987 to 2001 in Italy, there was a loss of 3,854 employees, a phenomenon that is even more serious if 1990 is taken as the reference year. In this case, the loss of employees is even greater: 11,174.

The year 2000 then visibly showed this trend. In a comparison with some European countries such as France and Germany and with a non-European industrial country such as Japan, Italy shows all its weaknesses in the sector, considering that these are countries with which we have to compete in international markets.

It is also evident that while in Italy from 1991 to 2000 the percentage of researchers fell by 0.4, in France it rose by 1.4, and in Germany by 0.4, not to mention Japan, where this percentage rose between 1991 and 2001 by 1.1.

Of course, these factors cannot be separated from the expenditure that our country has allocated to research over the years. Already in 1987, compared to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to remain in the European sphere, this expenditure was the lowest ever. If we take 1990 as our starting point, moreover, we see that R&D expenditure has remained constant in Italy with little significant change, while in France and Germany the figures show unthinkable increases for our research system. It is true that in the UK, spending has remained more or less constant over the years, but at levels that are significantly higher than in Italy.

A separate discussion must be made about public funding. Even in this sector, which is supposed to include basic research, we hold the unflattering position of last in our class among the EU's major industrialised countries, especially when compared to the average of the 15 accession countries. A consoling note might, on a careless reading, come from the figures for Spain. But if we analyse the data carefully, the progress of this nation, which (it should be remembered) has only recently emerged from decades of dictatorship, is evident. Compared to the European average, Italy (from 1987 to 2001) has

always been below that average, despite the increases of the last two years. The spending cuts of the last two Budgets, however, suggest that in 2002 and 2003 we will be even further behind European levels.
Obviously, this situation is reflected in the organisation of the centres where the research is carried out. The data published on the website of the CNR (National Research Council) clearly show the situation from the point of view of both personnel and resources available for public research.
Another interesting fact concerns the prevarication of research, especially public research.
It is an established fact that many research activities, also due to the hiring freeze introduced by the latest Finance Laws, are carried out by precarious personnel who enter research as research fellows, research fellows, or personnel employed on a temporary basis.
This is not to say that a period of precariousness is not useful, in the research sector as in other sectors. Nevertheless, it must be noted that certain programmes, defined as strategic, cannot, in the long run, be based on precarious personnel who are very often replaced by other personnel.
The training period is necessary to create researchers, especially in view of the almost total lack of training at the university. However, the training must be followed by the research continuity phase, which can last for years, without considering that it is not possible to establish a priori that two years are sufficient to enter into a complex research activity, such as climate change research or the research carried out by Italy in Antarctica.
The political decision is the real crux of the matter regarding the state of research in Italy. The real problem, as has been highlighted repeatedly at the highest institutional level, is that of priority. The impression, in fact, is that there has not existed, and still does not exist, a Scientific Research priority in Italy, or that there are no political intentions to tackle this problem.
The average age at which our graduates enter the world of research—both public and private—is rising, which serves to highlight this ailment. And this despite the fact that there are fewer graduates in our country compared to other industrialised countries.

Fact Sheet 32 | The Italian school system

The number of pupils enrolled in the 2003-2004 school year was 7,687,672, concentrated mainly in secondary and primary schools and less numerous in nursery schools, confirming an ever-decreasing birth rate. For kindergarten and grade I and II secondary schools, Campania has the largest student population, while Lombardy has the highest number of students in primary schools.
In secondary school, pupils are mainly concentrated in technical schools (919,799), vocational schools (559,846), and scientific high schools (502,896). They are followed, in terms of the number of pupils attending, by classical high schools, teacher training colleges and schools, and, last of all, art schools and art colleges.
As regards teaching staff, the number of teachers with open-ended contracts in the 2001-2002 school year in most Italian regions increased compared to 1999-2000. The largest increase was in Lombardy (5.7%) and Piedmont (4.7%); there was instead a slight decrease in Umbria, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata, and Calabria.
The percentage of expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in our country represents an intermediate value compared to other European states; in 1999, with 4.4%, Italy was in 7th place along with Spain and the United Kingdom. The ratio of education expenditure to total public expenditure sees Italy in last place, with a value of 9.4% in 1999, lower than the previous year, and Germany in second place with 9.7%. As well as being in last place, Italy is also the country where there was the largest negative variation in the ratio between 1999 and 1998.
Faced with this reality, what is the opinion of parents about Italian schools? Through the opinions expressed by a sample of 1,500 parents with at least one child attending in the 2002-2003 school year, the last class of secondary school, Eurispes proceeded to reconstruct the picture relating to the overall functioning of the Italian school system.
On the Moratti Reform, the greatest consensus is recorded on the introduction of the study of a foreign language and the use of computers in the first year of primary school: the overwhelming majority of the

sample, 85%, judged it 'positively' or 'very positively'. School-work alternation, as an alternative way of obtaining diplomas and qualifications from the age of 15, as part of the 12-year right or obligation to education or training for all, also enjoys very broad approval. 62.2% of parents rated it "positively" and 11.9% "very positively", for a total of 74.1% of the sample's positive evaluations. Alongside alternance school/work, two other measures received a positive or very positive assessment from around 3 out of 4 parents: the reintroduction of the conduct mark and the possibility for regions to introduce subjects linked to local realities into school curricula, with a slightly higher percentage of very positive judgements for the first of the two measures (15.6% against 11.3%). Thus, the parents interviewed seem to believe that discipline should, to all intents and purposes, be subject to assessment on a par with the other subjects. 19.8% of the sample took a contrary view.

On the other hand, as regards the possibility of access to state schools from the age of five and a half, it is possible to observe how the gap between positive and negative judgements has considerably narrowed. In this case too, a positive or very positive assessment of the measure prevails, expressed by 53.6% of the sample, but compared to the measures analysed so far, there is a considerable increase in the "negative" judgements (33.5%) and a slight increase in the "very negative" ones (8.3%).

The possibility of obtaining diplomas and qualifications by alternating periods of study and work, starting at the age of 15, shows a greater homogeneity of opinion. They prevail, in fact, among the

Parents of all political orientations made positive judgements, with percentages varying from 55.3% (among politically left-oriented parents) to 87.3% (centre-right).

Faced with the specific question on the need for a closer link between school and the world of work, the majority of the sample (54.2%) stated that they considered a closer link between school and work very opportune, 36.8% quite opportune; only a minority of parents did not share this opinion: 5.1% answered a little, 2.2% not at all. It therefore seems to be the opinion of almost all parents that the school system needs a change in this direction, and more than half of the sample considers this objective to be of great importance.

The various initiatives aimed at promoting such a link between school and the world of work were also examined in detail in order to understand which, according to parents, would be most useful and which would be least useful. The measure considered useful by the highest percentage of respondents is the strengthening of information and career guidance initiatives aimed at students (very useful for 54.5% of the sample, quite useful for 36.3%, and little or not at all for 6.3%).

However, parents are aware of some key points. For example, if we restrict the distribution of the data to the two modes 'positive and negative', the state of school buildings emerges as the most problematic aspect, with 58.2% of the sample rating it negative and 38.5% positive.

The IT equipment also ranks among the problematic elements, although less markedly than the state of school buildings: 48.8% of the sample expressed a negative opinion and 46.4% a positive one.

The interviewees positively assess the teachers' skills (64.5% of the sample) and some specific areas of the curriculum, such as the integration of foreign pupils, support for people with disabilities, and, to a lesser extent, preventive interventions against deviance. With regard to the comparison between state schools and public schools, those interviewed do not agree with the statement that teachers in public schools are less well prepared. 31.9% disagree completely, 26.4% agree a little with this opinion, 20.9% say they agree a little, and 11.3% agree a lot. Neither does the statement that the reliability of public schools is due to the absence of strikes and occupations meet with approval. 38.2% do not agree at all, 21.3% agree a little, 20.2% quite a lot, and only 11.9% agree very much.

Respondents were positive about the quality of public school facilities. 18% answered 'a lot',

30.4% said quite a lot', 22% said a little, and 19.7% said not at all'.

The need for more funding for state schools is felt mainly in the left and centre-left political camps, where the 'very much agree' mode is close to 80% and very low percentages are in 'not at all'.

Concerning the specific limitations of Italian schools, the respondents do not seem to have very clear ideas; in fact, 33% do not know or do not answer.

According to 25.4% of respondents, a lack of funding is the main barrier to effective school services, and the variety of subjects is the second. 11.8% believe that this prevents them from developing specific skills. The frequent alternation of teachers with frequent substitutions is indicated in third place in the

ranking of the most burning problems (7.3%) because it interrupts teaching continuity, creating considerable inconvenience for students and delays in the completion of the programme.
Next, 6.2 percent of parents blame the main problems in Italian schools on excessive unionisation and 5.5 percent on too many strikes and occupations.
The sample of parents was asked whether, in their opinion, the identity and professionalism of teachers should be enhanced. A very large majority of the respondents (89%) were in favour; only 7.5% were against.

Fact Sheet 33 | The higher-education system: public and private universities

When discussing the level of education in our country, one often hears that there are still few university graduates in Italy. In reality, this is only true if we consider the population as a whole: in fact, just 10% of those aged between 25 and 64 have a university degree, while 21% have a primary school leaving certificate or no degree at all. However, if we consider only young people (25–34 years of age), graduates are much more numerous (12.2%), and the share of people with a primary school leaving certificate or no qualification is very low (4.4%).
What is still scarcely widespread in Italy is the short academic degree: according to some data, 17 out of 100 young people have a long university degree, while only 2 out of 100 have a university degree. We are among the top countries in terms of obtaining a long university degree and among the last in relation to short ones. The more deeply ingrained tradition of short-cycle degrees (two or three years) abroad helps to explain this situation, at least in part.
With the new system, the educational offer has grown from a territorial point of view: in 2002–2003, 198 municipalities were home to university headmasters and at least one course of study. As for the universities' ability to offer students differentiated forms of study capable of accommodating varied needs, e.g., by enrolling part-time students, the system shows that it is not quite ready. According to some data, in fact, only 38% of the universities have made provision for the enrolment of part-time students, and only 37% have set up organisational arrangements for the teaching of these students. Over 59% of universities have not even made provision for this mode. On the other hand, however, universities are looking to the world of work. The data show that 81% of the universities made provision in the 2001-2002 academic year for a quota of non-academic contract teaching aimed at ensuring the contribution of specific professional skills.
In the distinction between state and non-state universities, some interesting differences emerge.
In the academic year 2002-03, out-of-course, repeat, and conditional enrolments, i.e., those for whom, at the time of the survey, it had not yet been decided which year their enrolment or transfer would be accepted, accounted for 27.3% of the total number of enrolments in non-state universities (109,351) and 36.9% of those enrolled in state universities (1,656,067).
In a ranking of universities based on the irregularity of the careers of its enrolled students in the last academic year, we could put the University of Urbino in first place among the non-state universities, with 38.8% of out-of-school, repeat, or under-subscribed students out of the total number of enrolled students. The gold medal for the highest percentage of students with irregular careers among state universities goes to the University of Camerino (55.1% out of the total number of enrolled students).
In order to take a snapshot of the trend in demand for education up to 2002, indicators of participation and success in university education were taken into account, i.e., the ratio of mature to 19-year-olds, of matriculated to mature, of matriculated to 19-year-olds, of graduates to the moving average of matriculated 5, 6, and 7 years previously, and of graduates to the average of the population aged 25-26-27.
As far as the number of 'mature' boys out of the total number of 19-year-olds is concerned, the percentage has increased over the years. And the ratio of enrolled to 'mature' students also increased in 2002, despite the declining population of 19-year-olds in the period, after a decline that stopped in 2000. The relationship between the increase in enrolments in the 2001–02 academic year and the experimental introduction of the new three-year degree courses will or will not be confirmed over time. In that

academic year, the new degree courses coexisted with the traditional degree courses, and yet, out of 100 first-time enrolees in the university system, about 91 were enrolled in the bachelor's degree courses established under the new system. Of the remainder, five enrolled in courses of
single-cycle degree course and only 4 to a university course under the previous system (2.3 to a long degree course and 1.7 to a diploma course or direct school for special purposes).
As for the trend in enrolments by faculty group from the academic year 1998–99 to the academic year 2001–02, the number of enrolments in the Faculty of Law decreased and preferences for the Faculty of Engineering increased. Literature and Philosophy topped the list of preferences in 2001–02, with an increase in relative weight in relation to the total number of enrolled students: from 15.3% in 2000–01 to 17% in 2001–02. Medicine and Surgery are also on the rise, surpassing Education Sciences in preferences. It must be borne in mind, however, that for the Faculty of Medicine and Surgery, the increase is attributable only to enrolments in the degree courses of the health professions, which grew by 66%, while the number of enrolments in the traditional degree courses of Medicine and Dentistry decreased.
If, on the other hand, we take into consideration the enrolments by type of university (state and nonstate) in the academic years 2001-02 and 2002-03, we record that out of the 440 study courses activated in 2001 in the non-state universities, there were 105,839 enrolments, 21,566 of which were 'freshmen' (data updated to 31.01.02). In the following academic year (in which it should be noted that the degree courses of the non-state universities become 466), there are 3,512 more enrolled students, i.e., 109,351, 22,849 of whom are new matriculations (data as of 31.01.03).
State universities also recorded an increase in enrolments in the 2002-03 academic year: enrolments in the 5,309 degree courses started in the 2001-02 academic year totalled 1,596,282, and in the following academic year, against an offer of 5,987 degree courses, they became 1,656,067, 324,311 of whom enrolled for the first time at the university.
The indicator constructed from the ratio of university graduates to graduates and the moving average of the population aged 25, 26, and 27 reached a value of 21% in 2001, compared to 11.3% in 2001.
It should be noted that these late enrolments, which increased in percentage terms from 25% in 2000-01 to 28% in 2001-02, almost always take place in faculties offering vocational courses. This suggests that these are students who are probably already working and intend to improve their vocational training. In fact, among the highest percentages of students enrolling at least six or more years after graduating from high school are those enrolled in Education Sciences (17.9%); in this case, the phenomenon can be attributed to the desire for further training of primary school teachers who are already tenured. However, traditional faculties such as Law also show a high percentage of enrolments at least six years after graduation (12.8%).
According to the results of another survey in 2002, 'full-time students' were less than half of the total (46%), outnumbered by student-workers with very different needs (54%). Specifically, almost one in two students has a casual or stable job, while 9 out of 100 university students are full-time workers.
In addition, the start of the new courses has led to another important trend reversal: the rate of growth in male enrolment has exceeded that of women. For the first time in a number of years, men are registering a greater increase in enrolment than women (12.7% versus 11.6%) compared to the previous academic year. The new short academic education would seem to exert a greater attraction on men, therefore, who are more oriented than women towards a rapid conclusion of the training phase and a more immediate transition to the world of work.
In absolute terms, however, the propensity of women to continue their studies beyond high school remains greater, in fact, more girls than boys matriculate at university. Of the total of 319,624 enrolled in the 2001-2002 academic year, 55.1% were female, with maximum percentage values in Sardinia (60.9% women out of the total number of enrolled students) and minimum values in Tuscany (52.6%). The female presence varies greatly as the disciplinary group considered varies: 82.3% of those enrolled in the Faculty of Education are women, compared to 30% of female enrolees in the Faculty of Agriculture. Gender is related to the average age of the students enrolled (23.4 years, over half a year more since 1994): the average age of female students is lower than that of their male colleagues by almost a year. In addition, the gender differences observed in enrolment are also reflected in the graduation rate. The percentage of female graduates stood at 56% in 2001, and female graduates (with

the old system) are on average younger than their male counterparts: Any type of faculty, women graduate on average at around 27.6 years of age, compared to 28.1 years for men. In particular, the youngest female graduates are found in the Faculty of Statistics, with an age of 26.3 compared to 27.4 for men; but also in the Faculty of Economics, women cross the finish line at 26.9 compared to 27.3 for men.

The data show that in non-state universities, the presence of women is around 63%, compared to 55.1% of the total number of women enrolled in state universities.

In the comparative analysis of the academic years 2000–01 and 2001–02, the data show that Italian university students have little inclination to move away from home: in 2000–01, in fact, the percentage of students attending university in the region where they resided was 80.3%, and the year before it was 81%. Emilia Romagna (particularly Bologna) and Umbria, or rather the university of Perugia, are at the top of the list of most desirable universities, with a percentage of non-resident matriculated students of 45.6% and 44.6%, respectively, due in part to the abundance of housing in the Casa dello Studente. The most critical locations are those of Basilicata and Calabria, which are unable to retain residents from their respective regions (70% of the matriculated residents in Basilicata enrolled in universities in other regions, in Calabria 41%) and very poorly capture matriculated students from other regions (17.2% and 3.1%, respectively), despite the existence of adequate facilities (three universities in Calabria).

Among the forms of support, the main one appears to be the scholarship, which in the academic year 2001–02 absorbed 95.1% of the expenditure on direct financial assistance for students enrolled in degree and specialisation courses. The number of scholarship students in the 2001–02 academic year was almost 137,000, or 14% of regularly enrolled students. The coverage of eligible students (those entitled to a scholarship) rose from 54.9% in the 1996–97 academic year to 66% in the 2001–02 academic year, after peaking at 79.2% in the 1999–2000 academic year.

If we consider the geographical distribution of these figures, considerable differences emerge in 2001–02, both in the centre and in the north, the degree of coverage was over 75%, while in the south, the degree of coverage was less than 50%. From the provisional data for 2002–03, the situation seems to be improving again: the degree of coverage at the national level reaches 70%.

However, a comparison with Europe shows us far from the average in the distribution of scholarships and accommodation places for the needy and deserving: Accommodation places in Italy are 1.7% of the number of students; in France, 7%; in Germany, 10%; in Denmark, 20%; in Sweden, 17%; only Portugal and Spain have values slightly higher than ours.

The housing situation has improved slightly since 1996: more than 5,158 accommodation places have been built, and, as a result of Law 338/00, the procedures for which are about to be concluded, the construction of another 10,000 new accommodation places is planned.

The university system as a whole then has 9,649 classrooms with a total of 948,880 seats, a number just below the 963,272 students in the 2001-02 academic year. 89.2% of the seats are used by faculties in exclusive use; only the remaining 10.8% are shared between several faculties.

The situation seems to be improving compared to last year, with an overall increase of 4.3% in the number of classrooms and 15% in the number of seats and a slight increase in the number of classrooms for exclusive use compared to those for shared use between several faculties.

Libraries were also monitored, which showed that the university system has 1,338 libraries with a total of over 40 million volumes and

350,000 subscriptions make 83,385 seats available to users.

With regard to the use of libraries by students, the panorama that emerges from the analysis of the situation of the various state universities is characterised by a strong heterogeneity: it ranges from just over 30 seat-hours per year per current student to over 400. At the system level, it is evident that students at some universities can make use of reading places for just over an hour a day, while colleagues at other universities cannot make use of them for more than an hour a week.

As far as 'computer laboratories' (facilities with more than 5 networked workstations) are concerned, the state university system as a whole has 1,577 computer laboratories (slightly increasing

compared to 1,432 available as of December 31, 2001) for a total of 34,920 posts (also a slight increase compared to 32,243 available as of December 31, 2001).

In addition, the ratio of students to teachers is currently around 32, and the ratio of graduates to teachers has become 3.2, almost double that of 1985.
The figures for the 2001 financial year (centralised management) show that the total resources available to the universities amounted to approximately 18,200 billion old lire, of which approximately 80% came from transfers and 20% from own revenues, showing that the development of financial autonomy has contributed to increasing the self-financing capacity of the system.
In fact, if one looks in detail at the composition of one's own revenues, it is evident that a large part (about 57%) derives from contributory revenues (student fees and contributions). The incidence of revenue from contracted activities is also quite significant, amounting to approximately 18% in 2000 and 24% in 2001; it must be borne in mind that these activities are then carried out in many cases directly under decentralised management. On the transfer revenue side, the State contributes 89% with current transfers and 7% with investments, with the remainder coming from other entities, such as the European Union, foreign public bodies, public agencies, and other private entities. The largest share of current transfers is made up of the Ordinary Operating Fund (approximately 93%), corresponding to approximately 11,690 billion lire, or 64.2% of total revenue.
Expenditure figures for the 2001 financial year (centralised management) show that, out of a total of approximately ITL 16,265 billion, approximately 67% is used to cover personnel expenses (of which 93%, net of social security, IRAP, and other charges, is for permanent staff), approximately 12% is for the acquisition and enhancement of durable goods, and approximately 10% is for operating expenses; student aid accounts for approximately 8%. Operating expenditure, amounting to just over 1,600 million lire, is mainly for the purchase of goods and services (32%), and the maintenance and management of facilities (29%); finally, expenditure on utilities and rents, leasing, and institutional activities accounts for 16%, 12%, and 10%, respectively.

Fact Sheet 34 | The use of cultural and museum heritage

Over the decades, our governments have often disregarded the protection and enhancement of cultural heritage, prioritising other sectors in public spending and allocating budget resources to interventions in other activities, many of them questionable.
The last period, however, marks a visible turnaround. The cultural heritage system seems to have emerged from routine and paralysing management and seems to have embarked with increasing strength on the path of utilising what exists as a resource. There is a growing awareness among cultural, economic, and political operators that the artistic heritage represents raw material' on which entrepreneurial processes capable of multiplying economic and social benefits can be triggered.
Thanks to more careful policies on the part of the various culture departments and by virtue of medium- and high-level sponsorships, there has in fact been a growth in the supply and demand for culture. In practise, art consumption is experiencing a more favourable season thanks to the new scenario that is emerging. This transformation from a static culture incapable of promoting a development circuit to a dynamic culture, the driving force behind the revitalization of a territory, only recently outlined a specific profile and a potential *trend.* It appears to be characterised by multiple factors. Firstly, a change of mentality is taking place among technical and political decision-makers, enabling them to interpret the 'mining basin' of culture in terms of economic valorisation and understanding the importance of intersecting with spheres that were once extraneous if not antithetical. Secondly, we are faced with a multiplicity of actors in the sector. The cultural heritage network shows a high power of connectivity: the contribution of exponents from the industrial world, foundations, cooperatives, trade unions, and the scientific community becomes an active presence and harbinger of concrete and unusual prospects. In many cases, multi-voice management of a strategic resource for the entire territory is already underway, albeit with the specificity and safeguards of the technical management of the asset. Thirdly, the classical management of the cultural resource with respect to the target audience appears to be in question. In this case too, the shift is from an undifferentiated and universalistic (and therefore, in many cases, self-

referential) proposal to the assumption of a *marketing* perspective capable of carving out the offer on the basis of the public's needs and soliciting a new demand for culture.
Some figures. After a sharp drop in visitor numbers around the early 1990s, which was attributable to the economic crisis, there was a turnaround as early as 1995, and up to the year 2000, the trend achieved significant results.
There are a total of 4,144 museums in Italy, representing 12% of the total number of museums in Europe. According to Sistan data, which are provisional because they relate to the first half of 2003, there were a total of 16,269,615 visitors to places of culture such as museums, monuments, archaeological sites, and museum circuits, 57% of whom were non-paying visitors.
It is worth remembering that the semester taken into consideration is the semester in which schools carry out traditional school trips and that visitors under the age of 18 or over 65 are entitled to free visits to museums and archaeological sites in the state, regional, and municipal circuits. It can be safely assumed that a large proportion of these visitors are young or elderly.
The gross income for the state coffers as of the indicated date was 38,592,226.91, only 1% more than in the same half of the previous year. In particular, there was a decrease in paying visitors and an increase in free tickets. The overall figure, although provisional, shows a 3% increase in visits compared to the same period in 2002, despite the fact that 11 out of 18 regions saw a decrease in the number of visitors. In spite of the slight overall increase, there are some regions that suffered a very steep decline. Sardinia saw its visitors drop by 15%, Apulia by 12%, Molise by 11%, Liguria by 10%, and Piedmont by 10%. There was a strong increase in visitors to museums and other areas.
archaeological sites in Friuli Venezia Giulia: the increase compared to 2002 was 35%, with almost 500,000 more visits than the previous year. There was also an increase in visitors to Basilicata and Emilia Romagna.
and Campania. The absolute most visited region, however, is Lazio, with approximately 4.8 million tourists, followed by Campania with 3.2 million, and immediately after by Tuscany with 2.7 million.
Reading the data reveals some strange peculiarities, such as the fact that revenue growth is not always synchronous with visitor growth. Friuli, despite a substantial increase in visitors, saw revenue fall by 13%, while Liguria, which had shown a decrease in visitors, instead 'gained' 5% compared to the previous year. Umbria, despite a slight increase in visitors, showed an increase in revenue of 20%. Sistan data show that cultural sites in
Central Italy attracts twice as many visitors.
of museums and archaeological sites in the North and South.
These are the figures for the first half of 2003. The trend analysis of recent years shows a substantial and constant increase in the number of visitors, if we disregard the disastrous year of 2001. In particular, the number of visitors to museums and those to monuments and archaeological sites has steadily decreased, while those to museum circuits have increased. Museum circuits are fictitious aggregations of places of culture that meet the criteria of specially designed cultural routes.
In total, the number of visitors to Italian art in 2002 was just over 31 million, with receipts from the Treasury of just under 86 million euros.
With almost 2.9 million visitors, the archaeological circuit that includes the Colosseum and the Palatine (the Roman Forum) is by far the most popular. Pompeii's excavations come in second with just over two million cultural tourists. This is followed by the Uffizi Gallery, with one and a half million visitors, and the Accademia in Florence, with just over one million.
The analysis of the use of museums and archaeological areas according to the 2002 data shows an aspect to be taken into consideration, namely the progressive increase of visitors in places where admission is free of charge; compared to the increase of seven free cultural institutes, there was an increase of one million 400 thousand visitors compared to 2001. That is to say, the number of free areas increased from 170 to 177, while the number of visitors rose from 5.6 million in 2001 to 7 million in 2002.

Fact Sheet 35 | The circulation of the press: newspapers and periodicals

Italy is a country that does not like to read but prefers to watch TV. However, the figures for 2002 show an increase compared to the previous year, outlining more widespread and homogeneous reading habits among the various segments of the Italian population. In fact, readership of daily and weekly newspapers increased in 2002. The percentage of Italians who, on an average day, leaf through or read a daily newspaper or periodical of any kind rose from 74.7% in 2001 to 78.4% in 2002.

Although the highest concentration of readers is confirmed in certain categories (males, higher socioeconomic status, residents of Northern Italy, age group 14–54), the trend also shows growth in sociodemographic areas that are historically less receptive (individuals over 55 and very young, lower socioeconomic status, island residents). Women's readers are also increasing, particularly in daily newspapers and monthly magazines.

An initial comparison between the data for 2002 and the previous year shows that the reading of newspapers and periodicals shows a generally positive trend, with an increase in readership of almost two million. Analysing consumption trends by type of reading (daily newspapers, weeklies, and monthlies), it is possible to observe a significant drop in the readership of daily newspapers compared to the previous year (-4.4%). The increase was noticeably positive for weeklies, whose readership increased by 5.4%, and for monthlies, which grew by 2.8%. As for the decline in newspaper consumption, it can be seen that men's choices weighed more heavily. In fact, while there was a decrease in readership for both sexes, the drop was much greater for men: among the latter, newspaper readership fell by 5%, compared to the -3.4% recorded for women. Yet it should be noted that men are by far the largest consumers of newspapers, accounting for 60.7% of total consumption. Newspapers therefore lose more readers within their main target group. In contrast, the increase in the consumption of monthlies is almost exclusively attributable to the behaviour of female readers, a category that grows by a good five percentage points compared to the meagre increase of 0.6 percent totalled by men. The positive trend recorded in the consumption of weeklies, on the other hand, was equivalent for both sexes.

To sum up, the general increase in the number of readers in the Italian population from 2001 to 2002 is mainly attributable to the contribution of women, especially as regards the consumption of monthlies, which owe their positive trend almost exclusively to the increase in female readers.

In fact, women's contribution to reading is greater than men's for both the consumption of monthlies (51.6% versus 48.4%) and weeklies (54.5% versus 45.5%: a difference of 9.5 percentage points!).

Although there has been an improvement, the phenomenon is very complex and internally diverse. To realise this, one only has to take a look at the consumption trends of the major national newspapers, which often present contrasting data, alternating between significant increases and equally heavy falls in readership.

Analysing the data concerning the ten most-read daily newspapers in 2002, it can be seen that the increase in the number of readers compared to the previous year affects only a minority of the titles: as many as seven out of ten titles suffer from a drop in the number of readers, reaching negative values that are also quite heavy (*La Stampa*, -15.3%; *Il Sole-24 Ore*, -12.3%; *Il Giornale*, -11.2%). Among the newspapers that instead saw an increase in the number of their readers, the +10.9% obtained by *Resto del Carlino* and the 5.5% increase of *Gazzetta dello Sport* stand out.

The typology of periodical supplements attached to newspapers is in itself interesting in that it could be considered a category 'in between' periodicals and newspapers. In fact, even though they are unquestionably periodicals, it could still be assumed that their consumption is in some way 'dependent' on

by the accompanying newspaper. The supplement to La Stampa, the newspaper that experienced the largest decline in readership (-15.3%), achieved the largest increase in readership from 2001 to 2002. And the positive figures for *Venerdi' di Repubblica* (+9.1%) and *D-Repubblica Donne* (+3.2%) also contrasted with the 1.3% drop in the same period for the newspaper to which the two periodicals are attached. Evidently, the link between the reading of a daily newspaper and that of its periodical supplements is not as close as one might have expected.

As far as the most-read weeklies and monthlies of the year are concerned, in line with the country's economic trend, magazines linked to economic and social sectors that went through moments of crisis

in 2002, such as *Viaggi/Turismo*, *Economia/Finanza*, and *Informatica*, lost readers. The most widely read title was *TV, Sorrisi e Canzoni*, followed by *Famiglia Cristiana, with a* gap of over three million readers. The greatest increase in readership was, on the other hand, achieved by *Chi*, which saw its readership grow by an impressive 11.2 percentage points in 2002.
For the best-selling magazines, the results were all positive. Particularly strong was the growth of *Max (up* 29.8%). There was also a marked increase for the popular science monthly *Focus*, whose readership grew by 9.3%, making it the most widely read monthly, followed by *Quattroruote* and *Starbene*.
Data on readership indicate that fewer than 40% of adult Italians read a daily newspaper, while almost ten million, or 10% of the adult population, say they never read a newspaper at all. Data on newspaper sales in 2002 indicate a 2.8% drop in average circulation, down to 5.9 million copies sold per day (from 6.8 million copies per day in 1990, the year in which the all-time high was reached). It must be considered, however, that the official surveys on circulation and readership do not take into account free newspapers. It should also be borne in mind that in Italy there are on average more than three readers (3.3 to be exact) for every copy of the newspaper sold, demonstrating how the phenomenon of so-called 'collective reading' (at the bar, in the office, etc.) continues to be widespread. The daily newspaper continues to be a predominantly 'male' product. The gap separating men from women is quite clear: among the latter, only 29.5% read newspapers every day, while among men, 49.1% of the population read them on an average day.
In contrast to the daily newspaper, the periodical is a predominantly 'female' type of reading.
The data show that, during 2002, 67.3% of Italians read or leafed through a periodical of any kind in the period following its last issue; this type of reading is more widespread among women than among men (69.8% against 64.6%). The difference in behaviour between the two sexes is much more marked as regards weeklies, which are read by 54.4% of women and only 44.8% of men, while the gap is smaller for monthlies: 48.1% of women against 46.8% of men.
Periodicals have more 'grip' on younger age groups, mainly the very young (14–17 years), which is not the case for newspapers. The highest percentage of magazine readers is found among university graduates (83.4%), closely followed by high school graduates (81.6%). The difference between these two categories of readers is small compared to that found among newspaper readers on an average day. In this sense, therefore, it is possible to say that the possession of a degree rather than a diploma is not a 'discriminating' factor when it comes to reading periodicals. The total readership of weekly newspapers is even slightly higher among graduates than among university graduates (57.7% versus 57.1%).

Fact Sheet 36 | Genetically modified organisms and food safety

The appearance of Genetically Modified Organisms on the market comes at a time of great change and contributes to accentuating a balance already made precarious by changes in the system and in consumption patterns. The result is the accentuation of an attitude of strong distrust and hostility towards GMOs and the entire biotechnology sector that encompasses them, an attitude that is further reinforced both by the inadequacy of information on the subject, the uncertainty of the scientific debate, and the lack of credibility of government information sources, which are considered to be aligned with the industries in promoting biotechnology. It is worth remembering that GMOs represent organisms whose genetic heritage has been suitably modified through the insertion of genetic material from another organism to give them particular characteristics, such as greater resistance to environmental discomforts such as water scarcity, herbicides, parasites, a longer shelf life, nutritional characteristics that are not present in the product, and curative properties.
In terms of production, the hectares of land allocated to GM crops rose from about 44.2 million in 2000 to 58.7 million in 2002, an area equal to one third of China's territory, an increase of about 14.5 million hectares in two years. In the last seven years, the number of countries that have adopted these crops has doubled. 11 nations have joined the first five pioneers, which were the USA, Argentina, Canada, Australia, and Mexico.

On the one hand, the share of GMOs produced by industrialised countries has increased; on the other hand, however, the share of GMOs produced by developing countries in total production has risen substantially, from 16% in 1996 to 24% in 2000 to 27% in 2002.
More than a quarter of the world's area under GMO cultivation is concentrated in countries such as Argentina, China, and South Africa, while other countries, such as India, Honduras, Indonesia, and Colombia, undertook their first GMO cultivations in 2002.
Soya, maize, cotton, and rapeseed account for almost 100% of all GM crops worldwide, with soya growing by more than 10 million hectares in the last two years.
From the data on the distribution of transgenic crops by modified trait, it emerges that research is mainly focusing on the possibility of reducing the costs of GMO production, on the one hand, and increasing the productivity of cultivated fields, on the other. Of the possible modifications that can be realised, only two are actually used: herbicide resistance and self-production of insecticide.
In recent years, the market weight of GM products has grown considerably, becoming predominant for certain types of goods.
The market for GMO crops has become such an important part of the traditional agricultural market that it has changed its structure and the relevance of certain sectors operating within it, such as the seed, agrochemical, and phytopharmaceutical sectors, which are responsible for supplying the raw materials needed for production. At present, the seed market for transgenic crops occupies 10% of the world market, estimated at $30 billion; the future scenario described is one of steady and accelerated growth in seed turnover over the years, from around $8,000 million for the year 2005 to
25,000 million in the year 2025. The agrochemical market also looks set to follow the same trend as the seed market for GMOs.
Italy is a 'consumer' in the biotechnology market, with a turnover (for 1998) of only 6.3% of the world market. The estimates would appear to have been partially
confirmed by the sales performance of biotechnological personal care products in 2001, which reached a level of EUR 1,100 million.
The Cartagena Protocol is the policy document to which all Community legislation and policy on GMOs basically refer. In particular, the Community Regulation on GMOs (EC Regulation 1946/2003), in force since November 25, 2003, concerning the cross-border movement of genetically modified organisms, sanctions a GMO-free Europe. The marketing of products containing GMOs is, in fact, subject to their approval at the community level, according to the procedure indicated in the Regulation. The only exceptions excluded from compulsory labelling and traceability are GMOs not related to human or animal nutrition and those made for pharmaceutical purposes for human use. The Italian regulatory scenario has substantially conformed to the European one, transposing European regulations and directives while maintaining a wide margin of freedom derived from the precautionary principle.
The picture regarding the perception of GMOs by European consumers shows that most consider GM food unnecessary and risky for society. Another important point is the level of trust accorded to the different actors in the field. Among the proposed actors, according to a Eurobarometer survey, 70% of Europeans said they trusted doctors, university researchers, and consumer and patient organisations, while expressing little trust in government sources. Another important aspect of the perception of the problem is the level of knowledge about GMOs. The results of a survey conducted in Italy in March 2002 show that six out of ten Italians know nothing about GMOs. Collective ignorance is perceived by Italian consumers themselves; 86% of those interviewed complain about the lack of an adequate information campaign on the subject, which 90% of those interviewed demand from the industries themselves.
Those who are more informed have a more objective conception of the problem based on their recognition of certain benefits of GMOs. The level of knowledge on the subject ends up conveying different attitudes and perceptions of the problem.

Fact Sheet 37 | Environmental criticalities: areas at risk of desertification

Although few areas in Italy are in a situation of overt desertification, the evolving trend of the climate and the pressure of productive activities, which do not sufficiently take into account the natural limits imposed by environmental characteristics, risk increasing and extending the phenomenon. Sicily's environmental, social, and economic sensitivity serves as a driving force behind the decision to conduct studies on the subject of desertification.

For this reason, a large part of the activities of the Ministry of the Environment and Territory Protection relating to desertification and the implementation of the United Nations Convention, to which Italy is a party, have been carried out in southern Italy and Sicily in particular.

At present, many activities also concern the other southern regions, Apulia, Basilicata, and Sardinia in particular, which are believed to be affected by desertification phenomena.

Nonetheless, since desertification phenomena can also occur due to the economic activities in the area, other regions with climatic situations different from those of Southern Italy (Liguria, Tuscany, and Emilia Romagna) are also gearing up to combat these phenomena, which are due not to the climate but to improper land use.

Climate change is a predisposing factor for desertification phenomena, which have a strong local impact. In the citizen's perception, desertification 'can be seen' in the territory. The emblematic case is that of Licata, a town in the Agrigento area, where a series of environmental, social, and economic analyses have been carried out. In Licata, there is a progressive decrease in the population, hand in hand with the drought phenomena that have been present in the area for years. Agricultural losses are now close to 80% of the harvest, while water availability per inhabitant is 30 litres per day, well below not only the national but also the regional average. In this area, shared solutions have been sought with citizens using the Agenda 21 approach, i.e., environmental analysis, civic forum, and sustainable solutions. The same is being sought in Sardinia and Basilicata, where there are similar areas of environmental criticality.

Currently, the missing link is politics. Scientific studies do not solve the problem; they serve to highlight it. The search for sustainable and shared solutions does not coincide with the automatic implementation of these solutions on the ground. A greater connection, therefore, with the actions of politics would be not only desirable but, for some areas of Italy, no longer procrastinable.

In particular, in our country, desertification mainly affects arid, semi-arid, and sub-humid dry areas, which are particularly present in Southern Italy. It has been estimated that in Southern Italy, an area of 3.7 million hectares is currently or potentially affected, to varying degrees, by obvious forms of soil and water degradation.

Among the processes of chemical degradation, one of the most serious and difficult to solve is the salinization of water and soil.

In many regions, coastal plains, especially in the areas closest to the sea, present considerable problems with regard to the salinity content of soils. The rise in the latter is due to the capillary rise and the use of water rich in salts due to the increasing intrusion of sea water into continental aquifers, which is in turn caused by the massive, often uncontrolled, abstraction of fresh groundwater and incorrect irrigation practises. This implies that the soil is irrigated with increasingly saltier water; the effects are all the more serious the lower the permeability of the substrate, which does not allow for a spontaneous loss of salts to the deeper layers.

Another chemical process, contamination, particularly affects industrial areas, mining areas (especially abandoned ones), and major roads. Recent studies in areas

Abandoned mines in Sardinia have highlighted the serious phenomenon of pollution by heavy metals such as lead, zinc, chromium, cadmium, etc. This contamination, found in the south-western part of Sardinia, where there is the largest mining basin in Italy and the Mediterranean, affects, in vast areas, watercourses, aquifers, lakes, lagoons, soil, and the sea, reaching them through the action of wind and rain.

Soil erosion in Italian territory is mainly due to the action of water, in the form of driving rain and surface runoff, and only subordinately to wind action. High-intensity rainfall events can, in fact, produce an erosive action on the soil surface, especially in areas subject to water deficit, on soils without or with

little vegetation cover, characterised by strong acclivity, and developed on lithological substrates belonging to clayey-sandy sedimentary formations.
Therefore, the Italian areas subject to intense water erosion and desertification processes are generally those in the south and on the islands, where highly erodible lithotypes and soils are widespread due to their composition and morphological structure, and the climatic regime is characterised by strong seasonal contrasts.

Fact Sheet 38 | Agriculture and the preservation of natural resources

Numerous factors, including population growth, changing lifestyles, human-caused contamination, and climate change, which produces arid regions at the equator and flooded areas at the poles, contribute to water scarcity. Twenty-five percent of the world's population is forced to live in arid or semi-arid regions, thus living in poor conditions. The World Health Organisation states in
1,000 m^3 per person per year is the minimum amount of water compatible with the development of a country's agricultural, industrial, and civil activities. Almost all countries in the Mediterranean basin currently have an average availability of about 400 m^3 per person per year. The prospects for future availability are even more worrying if we look at the forecasts to 2025, partly because of the increase in urban population, which makes the antagonism between domestic and industrial uses of water and agricultural uses increasingly acute.
With 980 cubic metres of annual water withdrawal per capita, Italy is the leading water consumer in Europe and the third in the world after the USA and Canada. Despite this, one-third of Italians do not have regular and sufficient access to drinking water. The theoretical annual availability in our country is approximately 155 billion cubic metres, or 2,700 cubic metres per inhabitant. However, due to mismanagement and poor planning of water use, the actual availability per capita is only 920 cubic metres. Most of the water withdrawn is used in agriculture; in 1999, an estimated 20,137 million cubic metres were used for this purpose, compared to 7,986 for industrial use and 7,940 for civil use.
In the face of very high consumption, there are very high losses, mainly due to the poor state of the aqueducts. These infrastructures, which to call dilapidated seems unrealistic, lose on average about 27% of the water fed into the network. This average appears unrealistic when analysing the data concerning aqueducts in southern Italy, where losses are estimated at between 40 and 60%.
On the savings front, things are no better, if it is true that more than a third of the water consumed is not purified, causing serious damage to watercourses and reducing the possibility of reuse, especially for agricultural use, of that water. Yet Italy is one of the richest countries overall in terms of water.
In spite of this, natural losses and the irregular nature of outflows lower the real availability to 51 billion cubic metres per year, also taking into account water accumulated underground and in artificial reservoirs. In addition to these factors, it must be considered that water availability is unevenly distributed over the national territory, with 65% in the North, 15% in the centre, 12% in the south, and 8% in the larger islands.
Moreover, the irrigated surface area in agriculture has stood at around 2.7 million hectares since the mid-1990s. A study shows a worrying disparity between the areas irrigated by the Consorzi di Bonifica—around 830,000 hectares—and those actually irrigated, which turn out to be about twice as much, 1.6 million hectares, revealing a parallel system that escapes any kind of control and management.
In any case, information on the actual water availability of the various sources of supply by the land reclamation consortiums is lacking or even non-existent. The overall estimate, adding together consortium and private withdrawals, leads to an irrigation requirement (in the eight Objective 1 regions alone, i.e., Molise, Basilicata, Abruzzo, Campania, Calabria, Apulia, Sicily, and Sardinia) of 3,200 billion cubic metres.
Soil erosion is a major environmental problem. The loss of arable soils is a serious phenomenon in Europe, affecting all countries to varying degrees. Water erosion affects more than 110 million hectares (12% of Europe's total area), and wind erosion affects more than 40 million hectares (4% of Europe's total area). The situation is particularly delicate in the Mediterranean area, where the erosion process

reaches losses of 20–40 tonnes per hectare in a single rainfall event, with higher peaks for exceptional rainfall events in terms of intensity and duration. The average rate of soil erosion far exceeds the average rate of formation.
Of the six gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol, at least three originate in significant proportions in the agricultural sector and are the subject of specific studies to limit emissions: methane, carbon dioxide, and nitrous oxide. Methane mainly originates from fermentation processes in biomasses and animal breeding; nitrous oxide emissions are linked to nitrogenous fertilisation; and carbon dioxide comes directly from energy uses in agriculture and, above all, from the oxidation of organic matter in soils. The agricultural sector worldwide produces only one-fifth of the amount of gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect. Man produces about 50–70% of methane and nitrous oxide and 5% of CO_2 emissions. Deforestation, the burning of stubble, and other plant residues contribute to these emissions. Soil ploughing is the main cause of CO_2 emissions. Historically, intensive tillage of agricultural land has resulted in substantial organic carbon losses of 30 to 50 percent.
Water and soil resources represent the most important factors of agricultural productivity, and their preservation in both quantitative and qualitative terms is the most valid strategy to ensure continuity and stability in production and, at the same time, the decrease of erosive and emissive processes.
Conservation tillage systems significantly reduce soil erosion, with values ranging from 90% in direct seeding to 60% in reduced tillage compared to conventional tillage. They also improve the quality of surface water by reducing the amount of loose soil sediment in it. A comparison of conservation tillage and conventional tillage revealed that when using direct seeding, surface runoff is 69% lower, herbicide concentration is 70% lower, and the amount of loosened soil sediment is 90% lower than with conventional tillage. These reductions all contribute to improved water quality.
It is clear that mitigation and adaptation strategies can no longer be postponed, and in the definition of these strategies, collaboration with agricultural stakeholders in the identification of interventions appears relevant.
A study activity, initiated perhaps thanks to the international Conventions (see the fact sheet on desertification in Italy in this same Report), is indispensable for understanding the cause-and-effect relationships of the degradation processes underway. The understanding of these processes must necessarily make use of an ecosystem and integrated land management approach since it is not possible to address the various topics—soil, water management, urbanisation processes, demographic trends, to name but a few—from a reductionist perspective.

Fact Sheet 39 | Smoke signals: smoking in Italy

There are approximately 1.1 billion smokers worldwide. Over the years, there has been a slow decline in cigarette consumption in industrialised countries and, on the contrary, a significant increase in developing countries, especially among the illiterate and the poorly educated; 70% of tobacco consumption is now in undeveloped countries. Cigarette consumption also increased in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s. This shift in smoking habits is predicted to generate a surge in the number of tobacco-related deaths.
Sweden, the USA, Canada, and Australia have the lowest percentage of smokers (less than 20%), while Turkey (51%), Serbia (45%), and Greece (35%) hold the record. According to Italian estimates, there are approximately 14 million smokers in our country, or 23.8% of the population: 31.2% of men and 16.9% of women (in 2001).
Tobacco consumption in Italy increased significantly from 1900 until 1985, after which sales fell sharply. Consumption is highest in the centre. The regions where the percentage of smokers is highest are Lazio (27.5%), Campania (26.9%), and Emilia Romagna (25.7%); the one where it is lowest is Molise (20.2%).
With regard to gender differences, it can be observed that while there has been a marked decrease in male smokers, there has been an increase in female smokers in recent decades.

While lung cancer mortality in Italy has fallen by 15% since the 1980s, this decrease only concerns the male population; for women, there has been a 50% increase (in Europe, the increase was 30%). The main cause is the persistence of teenage girls' smoking habits.
The age groups involved in more widespread smoking are those between 25 and 54 years old: 30.3% between 25 and 34 years; 32.5% between 35 and 44 years; and 31.1% between 45 and 54 years. Consumption becomes less widespread after the age of 55, and even more so after the age of 65.
The average number of cigarettes smoked per day by smokers is 14.7, which is very high. The highest average number is found in the 45–54 age group, and the lowest in the 14–19 age group. Men smoke a higher average number of cigarettes per day than women: 16.5 compared with 11.9. Significantly more women than men smoke fewer cigarettes per day (less than 6 or between 6 and 10).
Ex-smokers make up a total of 20.1% of the population over the age of 14: 27.4% of males and 13.3% of females. The proportion of those who have quit smoking obviously increases as the age of the subjects increases. The high proportion of ex-smokers, added to that of smokers, indicates that there are a large number of people who take up smoking, even though a large proportion of them, especially at an older age, decide to quit.
It is estimated that more than 9 million people have quit smoking (more than 6 million men compared to more than 3 million women); the decision matures on average after 22 years of smoking, but there are many who try to quit smoking without success. In this respect, one only has to consider that the world's pharmaceutical companies make EUR 3 billion in profits each year from the sale of products specifically designed to stop smoking. It is therefore clear that awareness of the health risks associated with tobacco is growing in the majority of smokers (especially with maturity); the majority of those who continue to smoke probably do so because they are unable to quit.
Those over 15 years of age who smoke more than 20 cigarettes a day are more numerous among males (13.5%) than among females (4.8%). Heavy smokers make up 10.2% of the overall population and are found particularly frequently in the South and among 45- to 54-year-olds.
The harm of smoking, on the other hand, does not only affect those who smoke but also those who live in contact with smokers, especially in the case of relatives, cohabitants, and workmates. Passive smokers are estimated to number around 15 million (26.5% of the population), over 4 million of whom are children. The number of deaths per year due to passive smoking is estimated to be about 2,800; in addition, passive smoking increases the risk of cancer by about 30% and the risk of death from myocardial ischaemia or heart attack by 20–30%.
Young people are the biggest source of income for the tobacco market. American research, commissioned by the National Cancer Institute (2002), states that worldwide, 14% of young people between the ages of 13 and 15 smoke; many starts as young as 10. In many cases, it only takes a few weeks of occasional smoking to generate addiction and dependence; children develop nicotine addiction particularly quickly. The study also reveals that countries with a low standard of living and greater backwardness have higher rates of smoking among the very young than elsewhere; examples include India, Chile, Russia, and Ukraine.
24.3% of adolescents smoked cigarettes, according to a 2003 survey by Eurispes and Telefono Azzurro in Italy on a sample of 5,710 young people between the ages of 12 and 19 (representative in terms of gender and geographical origin). Smoking turns out to be a habit with a slight male prevalence (25.8% of males against 21.9% of females) and closely correlated with age; in fact, smokers represent 10.9% in the very young age group (12–14 years) and 35.7% in the 15–19 age group. As far as the number of cigarettes smoked is concerned, the results show little consumption: 40.2%, in fact, state that they smoke a cigarette every now and then; in this case, we cannot speak of a real smoking habit.
28.9% of the respondents smoke less than ten cigarettes per day, while 16% smoke between 10 and 15 cigarettes per day. However, there are also heavy smokers: 8.8% of the sample used to consume about one packet of cigarettes a day, while 6.1% said they smoked more than one packet a day. A significant presence of heavy smokers, even among the very young, cannot fail to give cause for concern.
Among regular smokers and heavy users, males prevail, who smoke more than one packet of cigarettes per day in 7.4% of cases. Girls, on the other hand, are more often occasional smokers: 45.8% smoke one cigarette every now and then (compared with 36.9% of their peers), 30.1% smoke less than ten a day, and only 3.3% smoke more than one pack a day.

Thirty percent of the young people surveyed have been smoking for two to three years, 21.8% for about a year, 12.3% started recently, and 12.6% for a few months. 13.1% of the sample, despite their young age, have been smoking for four to five years, and 10.1% even for more than five years.
The gender distribution shows that males, on the whole, started smoking earlier than females. More than 60% of the girls have been smoking for at most one year, although a significant proportion state that they have been smoking for four to five years. In contrast, 32.8% of males have been smoking for at least two to three years (compared with 27% of females) and 12.3% for more than five years (compared with 6.4% of females).
The adolescent sample was also asked to express an opinion on the habit of smoking cigarettes. More than a quarter of the adolescents interviewed (25.9%) believe that smoking is not at all serious; for 30.3%, it is not very serious; for 26.1%, it is quite serious; and for only 16.5%, it is very serious. The majority of the sample is therefore convinced that smoking cigarettes is neither serious nor worthy of condemnation.

Fact Sheet 40 | The phenomenon of drug addiction

A sample of 5,710 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 19 participated in an Eurispes sample survey to analyse the use of drugs among young people. We propose the data collected with the caveat that, since this is a very sensitive subject, it may be underestimated.
Among the 'prohibited' substances, there is a greater prevalence of alcohol (26.1% consume it often and as many as 45.3% occasionally) and hard liquor (12.7% use it frequently and 30.5% occasionally). There is also a fair tendency to consume hashish and marijuana, often in 6.5% of cases and more rarely in 11.3%.
Cocaine use, which is very frequent for 1.8% of the sample and occasional for 2.8%, follows it with smaller percentages. LSD also has a discrete use and, like most narcotics, is linked to particular occasions (2.2% answered 'occasionally' and 1.4% 'often').
The use of synthetic drugs tends to occur mainly in specific contexts, often related to nightlife, and there are similar percentages among occasional users and regulars: ketamine, crystal, and ecstasy are used in similar proportions and at similar intervals.
One of the characteristics of users of the new drugs is poly-drug use, i.e., the tendency to take several substances in one evening. Probably for this reason, the data collected is almost standardised. Heroin is the substance with the lowest level of penetration among young people: 1.4% use it often, 0.8% occasionally, and 93.6% never.
With the Fini Law, drug use is always considered punishable. In fact, the concept of personal use no longer exists; therefore, not only dealing but also consumption is punished; the penalties will be identical.
Let us see how Italians fit into the favour-against continuum through the data from a sample survey conducted by Eurispes.
The main element that emerges in all the questions put to the interviewees is a greater awareness of the subject matter (2004-2003 comparison), which has probably matured in conjunction with the debate in recent months on the 'Fini Law proposal reported in the media, which is reflected in the decrease in the number of non-answers.
With regard to soft drugs, the majority of the interviewees (69.5%) take a punitive position, stating that it is right to prosecute those who use them; on the contrary, about one Italian in four is in favour of legalisation. The inter-temporal comparison shows a greater rigidity of the interviewed sample with regard to hashish and marijuana; in fact, the component in favour of the legalisation of soft drugs decreases (from 30.8% in 2003 to 26.6% in 2004) and the condemnation judgements increase (from 58.3% in 2003 to 69.5% in 2004).
The critical attitude of the Italians wanes when the use of soft drugs has a therapeutic purpose. Almost the entire sample, in fact, declares itself in favour in this case, with more energy than last year (84.7% in 2004 against 79.1% in 2003).

About one in two Italians think that controlled distribution by the State to drug addicts is useful as it removes them from the 'dependence' of drug dealers; the percentage (50.7%) sharing this position is higher than in 2003 (43.7%). A smaller proportion (29%), but a slight increase since last year, is of the opinion that it is an unnecessary measure that may pander to the addict's addiction.

The percentage of those who consider this to be harmful is decreasing (from 15.6% in 2003 to 13.9% in 2004), to the point of having counterproductive effects that bring other people into the world of drugs.

According to UN estimates in the 2003 annual report *Global Illicit Drug Trends, there are* about 200 million people in the world who use illicit drugs (in 2001, there were about 180 million).

The number of users varies according to the type of drug: 163 million consume cannabis, 34 million amphetamines, 15 million opiates (of which 10 are heroin), 14 million cocaine, and 8 million ecstasy. UN scholars point out that the numbers are not cumulative because of polydrug use. The report confirms the expansion of amphetamine stimulants, synthetic drugs that include amphetamines, methamphetamines, and ecstasy, particularly in Southeast Asia and Northern and Eastern Europe. In contrast, there has been a decline in Western Europe.

Furthermore, Coca plantations in Colombia decreased by 37% between 2000 and 2002, and in Peru by as much as 60% in the last eight years.

Worldwide, the use of areas for illicit opium cultivation is decreasing, but the situation is alarming in Afghanistan, where, after the fall of the Taliban regime, opium production has reached record levels of 3,400 metric tonnes, 250 times more than in 2001.

Moreover, the flow of heroin from Central Asia has led to an increase in heroin abuse in all countries along the trafficking route, from Afghanistan to the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe. A trend reversal is evident in the seizures of heroin and cocaine: whereas in 2001 the quantity of the latter was less than the former, in 2002 more than 3,861 kg of cocaine were seized (up 113% on the previous year) against 2,582 kg of heroin. The data as of October 31, 2003, seem to confirm the trend of the previous year, with a clear preponderance of cocaine over heroin; in relation to the percentage variations, a slight increase in the quantities of both drugs seized is noted. Hashish seizures rose sharply, from 17,579 kg in 2001 to 28,598 kg in 2002 (an increase of 11,000 kg in one year), an increase of over 20% between 2003 and the same period last year. The presence of marijuana on the market appears to have declined; in fact, the quantity seized in 2002 (16,436 kg) represents over 50% less than in 2001, a trend that seems to be continuing in 2003 (3.4%). Seizures of cannabis plants also decreased; in fact, the quantity seized in 2002 appears to be markedly lower than the previous year (297,627 kg and 3,219,431 kg, respectively), with the percentage variation between 2002 and 2003 being -44%.

Amphetamines (MDMA) show a significant increase between 2001 and 2002, with over 86,000 more tablets seized, while the rate of change as of October 31, 2003, marks a setback for these substances, a 36.1 percent decrease compared to the same period last year. This decrease could be due to lower consumption, a tighter fight by the police, or a high level of vigilance on the part of drug dealers. Through the following information, an attempt will be made to better understand the trend of the phenomenon. The following data show the trend in ascertained drug-related offences for the years 2002 and 2003. The overall variation shows a decrease in the number of crimes (-14.8%); specifically, as regards the establishment of criminal associations for the production and/or trafficking of drugs, there is a significant decrease when it comes to minor offences (-68.1%) and a smaller decrease in more serious cases (-10.4%). There is also a decrease in the same types of crime at the individual level: -15.4% for minor offences and -10.9% for the production and distribution of drugs. In contrast, the other offences under the legislation show an increase of 25%, from 8 people reported in 2002 to 10 in 2003.

Drug-related deaths are one of the basic indicators in the analysis of the phenomenon; 7,000–8,000 deaths are reported each year in EU countries, which are probably underestimated.

In Italy, according to data from the D.C.S.A. (Direzione Centrale Servizi Antidroga), the number of deaths in 2003 was significantly lower than in the previous year (322 as against 459 in 2002), which had already marked a steady decrease from the 822 cases that occurred in the whole of 2001.

In relation to nationality, it should be noted that, although there has been a clear decrease in drug-related deaths among Italians (-30.4%), these remain the largest component. In the last four years, the number of new users undergoing treatment for drug problems at territorial structures has shown slight fluctuations that make the phenomenon substantially stable (in 1999, there were 32,398 new Ser.T. users

and in 2002, 31,776). The territorial variable gives a homogeneous picture of the national situation in the North-East and the North-West, where the slight variations end in a favourable balance in 2002.
The data from the Islands indicate a significant decrease in the number of persons requesting treatment for the first time at a territorial structure; they went from 3,985 users in 1999 to 2,964 in 2002. On the contrary, new cases increase in the centre and the south, where they rise from 6,297 to 6,805 and from 7,843 to 8,201, respectively. While the new cases appear to be gradually decreasing, the old users (or prevalent cases, which refer to persons who prolong the detoxification treatment beyond 12 months or reactivate it following a relapse) show an upward trend: almost 13,000 more subjects in the four-year period considered, from 110,338 in 1999 to 123,320 in 2002.
The analysis stratified by macro-areas shows an unchanged situation for the North-West, where the number of prevalent cases varies very little; in the North-East and the Centre, there is an increase in the number of users of between 2,500 and 3,000 cases; the South shows a very alarming trend, with almost 6,000 more people turning to the Ser.T. The Islands also show the same trend as the other territories, although the increases are smaller, amounting to 1,716 units.
With regard to the specifics of the drugs consumed, the North-East is characterised by a greater presence of cannabis (11.8%) and ecstasy (1.5%) users and a lower percentage of heroin users (75.8%) than the other geographical areas. On the other hand, in the North-West, there is a higher percentage (9.1%) of cocaine users. The largest users of heroin reside on the Islands (84%), where the smallest percentage of cocaine users (5%) is recorded. The percentage of heroin abuse is also very high in Central Italy (82.9%). The South shows intermediate values on all drugs listed, with a high deviation of 5% in the other substances.
Heroin, investigated as the primary substance of abuse for access to treatment, showed a slight and steady increase over the four-year period under consideration (from 117,124 cases in 1999 to 123,154 in 2002); ecstasy abusers also increased slightly (4.1%), and cannabinoid abusers more substantially (27%). An exponential, and therefore alarming, increase is recorded in the abuse of cocaine and methadone (by 80% and 71.5%, respectively). In contrast, amphetamine users are decreasing (17.1%).
The racket invests in and profits from this youthful psychosis, as it makes staggering amounts of money: clandestine pharmaceutical laboratories process unthinkable quantities of drugs, sold at ever lower costs. The biggest profits come from soft drugs (for hashish and marijuana, increases of 268% and 456%, respectively) and synthetic drugs (323% for ecstasy, 213% for LSD, and 172% for amphetamines), which require a very simple and inexpensive chemical process. But cocaine and heroin also provide substantial revenues that make them an attractive business for criminal organisations; suffice it to say that the goods purchased are resold on the market for more than twice as much.

CHAPTER 5 ON COMPETITIVENESS

Essay | Competitiveness, development, and welfare and social cohesion in the global space

Many factors must be taken into account in order for a country's system to achieve the necessary capacity to improve competitiveness. In the last century, particularly in recent decades, it has become increasingly clear that there is a relationship between regulatory norms (better defined as institutions) and the behaviour associated with them that enables adequately successful economic performance. After all, in every phase of change, there are changes in regulations to make them more functional for the purposes they are intended to serve. This is what has happened and has been happening in many countries, starting with the developed ones, for at least two decades. In other words, good regulations in support of competitive goals are successful when they induce consistent behaviour on the part of economic operators.

It has to be said that competitiveness goals change over time, not only because there is competition in this respect between country systems but also because their internal balances are called upon to constantly adapt in the face of profound changes in the sphere of technology methods and knowledge. These circumstances, which have always occurred historically, are at present particularly exacerbated by the continuous evolution of technologies, knowledge, and organisational methods. As a result, competitiveness is linked to an evolutionary line that is never stable and always changes as a function of external changes.

Technologies and innovations, in particular, have affected the relationship between production and finance, shifting, sometimes wrongly, the emphasis on financial rather than production efficiency. International trade has acted as a locomotive and stimulus for all economies to participate. Closed systems of national economies have gradually opened up to the spaces offered by more or less global markets.

As can be guessed, institutional adjustments call into question political choices and power. Only political institutions can promote change and the re-adjustment of existing legal structures. This process is far from peaceful. As is easy to see in the experience of every country, changing norms means calling into question the interests that over time have found in those norms not only their legitimacy but also the expectation of enjoying the privilege of their defence over time.

In recent decades, the picture has also changed due to the deepening economic, financial, and social integration processes of various countries. The most relevant case is the strong integration of 15 countries into the European Union. Integration means the transfer of pieces of sovereignty, especially in economic and financial matters, from the Member States to the central EU institutions. With the Euro, the most important body is surely the European Central Bank, assisted by the presence of all the Governors of the National Central Banks. This change has postulated others: greater integration in defence, in common foreign policy, and in common economic policy. National economies are partly emptied of their powers.

In this context, how does Italy fit in? Not well, since the country's loss of competitiveness is attributable to three major causes: the set of institutional factors (which have the capacity to attract investment and development); the evolution of the indicator measuring competitiveness in foreign markets through the evolution of exports; and the country's structural evolution. The wealth produced by agriculture and industry is shrinking in favour of the expansion of service activities for the production of tangible and intangible goods.

According to statistics and on the practical side, in the first eight months of 2003, Italian exports to the United States fell by 13%, exports to China slowed down, and sales to Europe (the Euro area) fell by 3.1%. Due to the appreciation of the euro, exports to the dollar area fell more than those to the euro area. From 2000 to 2002, the loss in price competitiveness was estimated at 7.5%. It worsened further by 3%

in the first eight months of 2002. Our presence on world markets dropped from 4.5 percent to 3.6 percent. At the same time as our fall, Germany increased its share by 1%, while France's share remained stable. One explanation for our decline can be found in three causes: We continue to produce goods with little innovation and low technological content. Costs and productivity are more favourable in emerging countries that are moving along the same path as us. The industry's decline is associated with the slow growth rate in our country. Over the past seven years, industrial production in Italy has increased by 4.9%, compared to 16.5% in France and Germany. All other European countries produce at a rate of increase at least four times higher than ours. Only Great Britain registers a lower increase in industrial production than ours, but the service sector, which occupies a large place in terms of quality and price in exports to the world market, is booming.
Ultimately, in addition to the need to introduce strong innovations in industrial products, there is a need for rapid and efficient development in the production of both tangible and intangible services. At present, it can be said that the nature of services places us in further serious difficulties because we do not have sufficient experience and knowledge, as demonstrated by the fact that even with our neighbouring countries, France and Germany, we lag far behind in the quality and size of the services on offer. Commercial distribution, to give one example, is centred in European countries on department store chains. In France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 50% of consumers go to them. In ours, it does not go beyond 1718%.
In the retail sector, it is precisely because of these structural delays that the highest inflation rate is (largely) due. Small businesses are unable to lower their costs, which remain rigid or cause prices to rise. The fact that tens of thousands of small businesses across the nation have closed their doors demonstrates how serious this issue is. It is easy to understand that an alignment to the European structure will take years and some direct and indirect intervention to support the reconversion of small businesses, which can only survive thanks to strong specialisation and the ability to supply high-quality products.
In the tertiary sector, we must make a great effort to put public structures in a position to lower costs (by increasing productivity) and increase effectiveness (quality and diversification of services offered). The state must increasingly abandon the direct production and management of public goods and services. Alternatively, it must, as it is timidly beginning to do, enter into negotiated relations with agencies that meet the demand for public goods (this is the broad field of economic or social public entities that, however, need profound statutory adjustments and strong managerial and organisational innovations). In one way or another, all European countries, large or small, have taken steps to adapt their legal structures to a more or less satisfactory extent in the product market, the labour market, taxation, and competition in order to meet the challenges of competitiveness that constitute, even if not well accepted, the conditions for economic and social progress in the future. As far as Italy is concerned, the greatest difficulties concern the functionality of public administrations and public management. There have been legislative measures that are quite similar to those adopted in other countries. For example, the 'one-stop shop', 'territorial pacts, and 'area contracts'. There is a general awakening around the problems of operational governance and human resources management. This is a good sign, but the expected results are only in the medium term. Without dismantling the thicket of administrative measures (i.e., the concrete means by which the purpose of the law is to be realised), every effort will be in vain.
Italy has long struggled to adapt its product composition, especially in the manufacturing industry, to domestic and international market demand. We have long complained that our products are low-tech and therefore uncompetitive. The fall of our shares in international trade over the last decade is proof of the existence of this problem. This is why the focus on the problems of science, technology, innovation, and the knowledge complex are becoming increasingly central.
In terms of expenditure volume, we as a country account for 2.6% of the entire R&D expenditure of the OECD countries, while the US comes in at 47.7%, Japan at 17.8%, Germany at 8.3%, France at 5.4%, the UK at 4.5%, and South Korea at 3.3%.
Research expenditure per capita is $892 in the USA and around $750 in Japan, falling in the same order to $241 in Italy. However, smaller countries, such as Sweden, have a head of $875, Finland of $726, and Denmark of $541, while another set of European countries spend around $450 per head.

In relation to GDP, the USA spends 2.84% on research, Japan 3.06%, Germany 2.29%, and South Korea 2.52%, Finland 3.11%. We stand at a mediocre 1.05%.

These figures date back to 1999, but the situation has deteriorated further to our detriment as the resources allocated to Research and Development have been greatly reduced. In practise, only the private sector manages to maintain its expenditure levels. But they were no more than 0.60 percent of GDP in 2002.

If we go back to 1999 figures, we find that business R&D expenditure, relative to industry output, rose to 2.40% in the USA, 2.44% in Japan, 2.00% in France, 4.40% in Sweden, and 3.19% in Finland. In the same year, business expenditure did not exceed 0.73%, which fell further in the last year.

The fundamental cause of our inferiority lies in the extreme fragmentation and small size of companies on the one hand and, on the other, in the insufficient presence of production sectors that require high research and innovation intensity. We are very weak in the electronics and IT sectors. In the high-tech sector, we have a presence estimated at little more than a third of that of France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Consequently, a production structure that is poorly based on innovation postulates, if not profoundly corrected, a low commitment to research and development. In order to assess the importance of size, just two figures should be taken into account. Firstly, in the mid-1990s, only 23.5% of employees in manufacturing firms worked in companies with a size of 200 employees or more. Secondly, Italy's share of manufacturing output in firms with fewer than 500 employees rise to 67% of total output. In the US, the share of output attributable to firms with fewer than 500 employees are just 27%. European countries, from Belgium on down, fall from a share of 53% to 44%. These figures, which are certainly not comforting, especially with respect to the future, show how damaging the rhetoric of small is beautiful' and the role of small businesses have been, as has the overvaluation of the experience of industrial districts. Our weakness also shows in the technological balance of payments and, above all, in the low performance measured by the indicator 'number of patent applications per million inhabitants'. In the USA, the number of applications per million inhabitants is 144, in Germany 258, in Sweden 375, in Finland 298, in France 120, and in Italy 62. The technological balance of payments sees the USA in a hegemonic position, with a balance surplus of 25,500 million dollars. Substantial surpluses of the order of $2,500 million are recorded in the UK as well as in Japan. Germany, on the other hand, is in deficit by $2,041 million, as are many European countries, including us, in deficit by smaller amounts. But as the figures show, being in deficit in the balance of payments does not necessarily mean being weak or deficient in patent demand.

Fact Sheet 41 | The Italian industry: a system in decline

The current structure of Italian industry can be effectively schematised by identifying three different production systems in the four Italian macro-regions in the North-West, the presence of large enterprises is predominant, also for traditional reasons, which tend towards a process of re-centralisation in the large urban areas with the intention of targeting markets in Central Europe and outside Europe; in the North-East, the structure of industrial districts is maintained, which are surviving thanks also to the opening up of markets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, but whose prospects are now short-term; Central Italy is seeing the successful development of local development systems; the South and the Islands are seeing the emergence of the first industrial districts, which are beginning to develop thanks in part to state intervention rather than to a spontaneous evolutionary dynamic and which will soon be faced with the *phasing out of* EU funds.

The Italian industrial structure therefore has a threefold identity, and the economic dynamics currently underway denounce a generalised loss of competitiveness not only in high-value-added production (where Italy has lost many positions for too many years now), but especially in traditionally strong sectors such as textiles and manufacturing in general.

The return to a production structure in which large-scale industry plays a key role in the economy is no longer feasible, given the saturation of most of the markets for products typical of large-scale industry (cars, electrical appliances, etc.). The abandonment of an industrial structure based on large companies is also evident from the stock market indices, where in the MIB 30 there are very few industries compared to large companies producing services (banks, insurance companies, telecommunications, etc.).

The direction in which the three Italian industrial systems (large industry, industrial districts, and local development systems) seem to be heading is the obligatory one of creating local and international *networks* capable of improving their competitiveness and efficiency.

However, the creation of networks cannot disregard the territorial realities that support them, both in terms of cultural background and specificity and in terms of the potential for implementing the network itself.

For these reasons, the role of local institutions, which are the main interlocutor between industry and its territory, assumes great importance. It is no coincidence that the process of administrative decentralisation that Italy has experienced in recent years has developed hand in hand with industrial districts. Also of great importance is scientific and technological research, which should enable Italian industry to keep up with the most advanced countries. In this field, however, Italy is paying for a decades-long delay that is difficult to make up, especially in times of cooling demand. An examination of the main economic indicators relating to Italian industry (production, orders, and turnover) reveals the serious difficulties faced by most of the Italian production system. For the third year, the data show a sharp drop in production in all macro sectors.

More specifically, it is possible to observe that the industrial production index for capital goods goes from an indexed value of 100 in 2000 to an indexed value of 91.7 in 2003 (it should be noted that even for intermediate goods, there is a decrease of 7.3 points in the four-year period considered). The only sector growing is energy, the increase in which, however, can be attributed more to an increase in final consumption than to an intensification of the production process.

If we analyse the phenomenon in more detail, we can see that, except in sporadic cases, the drop in production is generalised and affects sectors with low added value as much as sectors with high added value. In particular, noticeable decreases can be seen in the period 2000–2003 in the following sectors: leather and leather products (-15.9 points), electrical machinery (-18.5), means of transport (-17.9), and textiles (-10 points compared to 2000). This phenomenon can be traced back to different causes: On the one hand, low-value-added production suffers from price competition from emerging markets (Asia and Eastern Europe); on the other hand, high-value-added sectors see a sharp increase in the competition from multinational companies and find themselves having to draw labour from a pool with a level of education below the European average.

In this sense, Italy's is an emblematic condition of backwardness, the effects of which can only be resolved in the long term if a different policy is launched in the fields of research, development, and education aimed at upgrading.
The trend in orders also shows a clear decrease compared to the last two years, and the tendency is to return to the values of 2000. The only two sectors in which an increase can be observed are wood and textiles and clothing. This figure appears to be against the trend with respect to production and turnover, but in reality, it is even more indicative of how strong the competition is in the new markets in Eastern Europe and Asia. As far as turnover is concerned, there is a strong upsurge in the mining industry, which contrasts very clearly with all other sectors that see a decline or at most a constant level of turnover.
GDP growth decelerated further in 2002, stopping at 0.4%, half the average rate recorded in the euro area. Available data for the first months of 2003 also show very weak economic activity. The value of net exports made a negative contribution to the GDP trend, and Italy's current account balance deteriorated slightly in 2002, reaching a deficit of EUR 7,300 million (0.5% of GDP). The widening of Italy's external deficit was mainly due to trade in services, where a deficit of almost 3,700 million euros opened up. By contrast, the trade balance remained almost unchanged, with a surplus close to EUR 17,300 million (in FOB-FOB terms). The strengthening of the euro led to an improvement in the terms of trade of almost 2% in 2002, despite the rise in dollar prices of oil and other commodities. This compensated for the unfavourable development in the quantities traded. In 2002, Italian goods exports fell by 2.8% in value and 0.9% in quantity, causing their share of world exports to fall again from 4% to 3.9% (at current prices). From the information available on the first months of 2003, it appears that the fall has not yet stopped: total exports fell by 0.7% in the January-April period, and the data for May, referring only to non-EU countries, show an even stronger drop (-13.7%). Italy's share of EU exports was 11.7% in 1996, its highest level, and fell to 10.3% in 2002.
One of the most significant indicators to grasp the evolutionary dynamics of Italian industry is the level of employment in the sector (number of employees), which in fact highlights different phenomena in regions characterised by specific economic dynamics. What is immediately apparent is the low incidence of industrial employment compared to total employment in the North-West (only 13,834 employees), where the dynamics of industrial decline and reconversion persist, especially in the industrial triangle. Another significant fact is the boost that the southern regions give to the industrial production system, with a considerable (84,040 employees) change in industrial employment comparable to that of the North (87,991 employees); it should be noted that employment growth is also present in the other sectors.
The same indicator, read in greater detail, reveals negative variations in industrial employment in Piedmont (-18,410 employees), Liguria (-21,819 employees), and Tuscany (-13,892 employees). The regions that record a greater increase in industrial employment than in other sectors are Veneto (49,427 employees), Umbria (12,221 employees), and Molise (4,012 employees).

Fact Sheet 42 | Protection and extreme exports: relations between Italy and China

The trend in international trade, which saw foreign demand driving domestic production growth, helped many Eurozone countries experience a modest economic recovery in 2002. As regards Italy, on the other hand, the volume of trade in goods, calculated as the sum of the value of exports and imports, recorded a contraction between 2001 and 2002, after the last five years had seen an increase of almost 26%, rising from 414,690 Meuros in 1998 to 521,117 Meuros in 2002. The reduction in Italy's trade with the rest of the world was about 2.7%, affecting, albeit to different degrees, the regions of the North-West (-4.1%), the Centre (-1.9%), and the South and Islands (-4.7%). The only exception, therefore, was the North-Eastern regions, which are characterised by strongly foreign-oriented economies, as is also shown by their growing presence in manufacturing internationalisation processes.
But 2003, often hailed as the year of recovery, has not yet provided any encouraging signs from this point of view. On the contrary, the trend has remained unchanged, at least if we consider trade exchanges with non-EU countries (which together absorb just under half of our exports). According to data from

Istat in July, Italian exports to non-EU markets fell by 5% from 2002 levels, and imports fell by an even greater 6.5%. The performance of exports was affected not only by the persistent weakness of world demand but above all by the progressive appreciation of the euro against the dollar (between July 2002 and July 2003, it was 20%), which reduced the competitiveness of Italian goods on non-EU markets. Many people have emphasised the worsening of the trade balance with China in particular: between 1998 and 2000, the balance went from -2,500 million euros to -4,289. These data, significant as they are, are only the 'tip of the iceberg' of what is now known as the 'China case', referring to a country whose economy is growing at a dizzying pace that is even more surprising in the light of the weak international economy (as the European Union, the United States, and Japan are well aware). Suffice it to say that in the last 10 years, China's GDP growth rate has never fallen below 7% (with a peak of 14.2% in 1992), reaching 8% in 2002. Also between 1992 and 2002, there was a record increase in foreign direct investment in China, which rose from $10 billion to about $50 billion. Foreign investment has also contributed to the boom in Chinese exports, which is probably one of the most characteristic features of the economic growth affecting the country. In fact, China was the only nation to increase its share of world trade between 1993 and 2001. In particular, between 1996 and 2002, China's share in world merchandise exports increased by 3.7% (from 2.8% to 6.5%), a value substantially equal to the decline recorded in the same interval by the US, Japan, and the EU combined. China, thanks to the country's development, was the world's sixth-largest economy, the top destination for foreign direct investment, and the world's fifth-largest exporter in 2002. Despite the Sars danger, the growth of the Chinese economy does not seem to have slowed down even in the first half of 2003, continuing to take the lion's share of international trade. In fact, between July 2002 and July 2003, Chinese exports increased again by 33%, resulting in a positive trade balance of almost $21 billion.

But wanting to delve further into the dynamics of China's international trade, at this point at least two questions arise. First question: what does China export?

In our country, the main items of Chinese exports are clothing, toys, household appliances, *hi-tech* products (e.g., computers, *hi-fi*, *DVD* players, mobile phones, etc.), footwear,
(especially sporting goods) and spectacles. These, in fact, together with furniture, precisely represent the specialised sectors of Chinese industrial production in which it is progressively becoming the world leader. It is important to emphasise that these are exclusively final goods intended for consumption, which China manages to produce by exploiting a series of competitive advantages. For the time being, mention can be made of the process of modernising production capacity, aimed at renewing the obsolete machinery and production processes that are still not very rational, in order to improve product quality and increase exports. Functional to this process is the purchase of capital goods, whose demand for Chinese companies continues to grow. Again, trade exchanges with Italy are very representative of the overall situation: the main items of our exports relate precisely to capital goods for production, such as machinery (for the textile industry, for the iron and steel industry, for special and general uses) and intermediate products (pumps, hydraulic systems, valves, electronic components, products for the iron and steel industry). In other words, Italy is contributing to and, to some extent, benefiting from China's industrial growth and the increase in its exports.

Second question: who suffers from competition from Chinese exports?

Although with all due caution and exceptions, it can be said that globalisation has made it possible to extend the application of the principle of communicating vessels to economic competition on a global scale: if the water level (i.e., market share) of one vessel (i.e., one country) increases, that of another is decreasing. In our case, therefore, the increase in Chinese exports in recent years has penalised the export capacity of other countries. We have already pointed out, in this regard, how the more advanced economies (the EU, the United States, and Japan) have been penalised by the invasion of *made-in-China* products, having seen their share of world exports decrease between 1993 and 2001 in the same proportion as the increase recorded by China.

But Italy in particular has been heavily penalised by the competition of Chinese goods on international markets, especially by those productions (fashion, footwear, furniture, and furnishings) that constitute the specialisations of our industrial districts, which in turn represent the driving force behind Italian exports. The excessive devaluation of the yuan, the national currency, also contributes to further lowering the prices of Chinese products on international markets. In fact, the Chinese government set a fixed exchange rate against the dollar of 8.28 yuan in 1994. This exchange rate, which has remained unchanged for the past 10 years, is considered by many to be deliberately undervalued, precisely in order to ensure even greater competitiveness for '*Made in China' products*, but from which, again, multinational companies located in China also benefit. The mode of unfair competition, based on counterfeit products, perhaps arouses even greater concern and reaction from the affected countries, starting with our own. The phenomenon of counterfeit products, which since the end of the 1990s have damaged *Made in Italy* products in particular, is warned about by the European Union itself, which states that counterfeiting accounts for between 5% and 7% of world trade (equal to about 250 billion euros per year) and has already caused the loss of 200,000 jobs in Europe. Again, according to data provided by the EU, China is one of the main countries responsible since, in the first half of 2003, out of the total number of counterfeit products intercepted and seized at EU customs, it was the first counterfeiting country for electrical appliances and equipment, for computer equipment, and for miscellaneous products such as spectacles and household goods (38%, 14%, and 37% of the products seized), and the second counterfeiting country (after Thailand) for clothing, jewellery, watches, and toys (respectively with 12%, 11%, and 27% of the products seized).

Fact Sheet 43 | Stock market trends: up but with difficulty

In eight months, from March to November 2003, the Milan Stock Exchange recovered €85,273 million. In fact, we went from a capitalization of 509,260 million euros (March 2003) to a capitalization of 594,533 million euros (November 2003). In practise, anyone who held a share capital of 100,000 euros in March 2003 now has 127,000 euros. Those who, on the other hand, had these 100,000 euros in July 2000 today find themselves with a capital of 72,000 euro, which is still higher than the capital value of March 2003: 45,000 euro. In reality, his capitalization has increased by 27%. This is what Eurispes calculated in its latest quarterly report on stock market trends. This is a positive sign, attributable to a clear recovery that has affected both Italy's stock exchange and all the main world stock exchanges after overcoming the combined effects of the global economic slowdown and the war. The trend, however, is not the same for the different business sectors of listed companies. The good increase over the last twelve months of the general index (+8.3) breaks down into an appreciable rise in financials (+16.6%), which improves on the figure recorded in July, the good performance of stocks of service companies (+7.3%, close to the general average), but also signals a sharp fall in the values of industrialists, which report a drop compared to November 2002 of 3.6%. In the last four months, however, all three sectors have shown a positive trend, with more positive performances for financials (+8.5%) and industrials (+7.1%) and more moderate ones for services (+3.2%). The figure seems extremely significant to us: the Stock Exchange, which on the whole is more confident than Minister Tremonti about a recovery in the economy as a whole, is also starting to bet on a revival of industrial activity, at least that of the large listed companies. First of all, the Milan Stock Exchange, as we have already seen, is still heavily discounting the losses accumulated in past years, but it also shows how it is precisely industrial stocks that have held up better in comparison with 2000. In fact, while financial stocks are still down 14% and services stocks are down 28% compared to their values three years ago, industrial stocks have left only 10% on the ground. The growth of the Milan Stock Exchange is confirmed by the trend in volumes traded, both in quantity and value. Compared to the previous period, trades in the last four months increased by over 50% and their countervalue by 21%. The capitalization values (calculated at the total quotation value) of securities on the Milan Stock Exchange show, at the same time, a contraction in three years, from November 1999 to date, averaging 28%. Even the Milan Stock Exchange, which, as we have seen, reached its minimum at the end of March 2003, had, however, recovered in the previous autumn. Both the number of securities traded and their countervalue in euros showed signs of improvement between October and December 2002. In particular, the countervalue of securities traded had risen from 2,099 million at the beginning of October 2002 to 3,236 million at the end of November, with activity close to that of the best times. The wait for war and then its outbreak drastically reduced operations, taking them back to the very mediocre levels of last spring and summer, as is also confirmed by an analysis of the number of securities traded and their countervalue. The growth that has taken place from March to today in trading, with reference both to their number and their countervalue, although finally significant, still does not appear to be entirely satisfactory, reflecting a disaffection among operators that is still struggling to dissipate. Finally, if we take a quick look at some of the leading companies on the Italian equity scene, we can see which stocks have grown over the last four years. Among those chosen by Eurispes, there are only four: Autostrade, Enel, Eni, and Saipem The most consistent increase was achieved by Eni with an increase of 156%, which, moreover, bucked the trend. In fact, the oil company has seen its share prices rise during the two and a half years of the generalised crisis on all stock exchanges, reaching a quotation above EUR 16, only to settle at just above EUR 14 in recent months, while all the general indices have shown signs of recovery. It is not difficult to relate the performance of this stock to the events of the war and their repercussions in the oil field. Some stocks, on the other hand, have followed the trend of the general index, giving up until this spring and regaining their composure in recent months, but still remaining well below their prices of three years ago. These include Bulgari, eBiscom, Generali, Mediaset, and Olivetti.

Fact Sheet 44 | Tourism: a strategic sector

In the first half of 2003, our country complained of a 2% drop in the number of foreign tourists arriving, a drop that could be even heavier in light of the data on the movement of guests in accommodation establishments in the first four months of the year: -4% in arrivals and -5.6% in presences, compared to the first four months of the previous year.

Foreign tourists in Italy are in the majority (93%) from Europe: 77/78% come from EU countries, 15/16% from other European countries, 3.5% from the Americas, and 3% from the Rest of the World.

At the same time, the number of Italians travelling abroad for holidays is growing: they were 11 million 126 thousand in 2000, became 11 million 279 thousand in 2001 (+ 1.4%), 12 million 38 thousand in 2002 (+ 6.7%), and continued to grow by 6.7% in the first half of 2003.

The most immediate economic reflection of the unhappy state of Italy's international tourism is found in the data on the tourist balance of payments. After the exploit of the year 2000 (29 million 920 thousand Euro in receipts and 12 million 893 thousand Euro in surplus), which, however, cannot be considered a reference point due to its extraordinary nature, the balance has subsequently depleted. In 2001, it closed with 28 million 977 thousand euros in revenue (-3.2%, compared to the previous year); in 2002, with 28 million 207 thousand euros (-2.7%, compared to 2001); and in the first half of 2003, it travelled with a further decrease of 1.6%. At the same time, tourist expenditure by Italians abroad, which was 17,260 million in 2000, first decreased to 16,550 million in 2001 (-2.8%), then increased again in 2002, reaching 17,811 million euros (+7.6%, compared to 2001), and again increased by 4.4% in the first half of this year. Consequently, the surplus on the tourism balance, which was 12,428 million euros in 2001, fell to 10,396 million euros (-16.4%) in 2002 and fell again by 12.7% in the first half of 2003, with the risk of not even reaching 9 million euros for the whole year.

The competitiveness of the sector depends on the quality of the offer and the price level. These elements constitute the two main compasses that guide the ever-increasing demand for international tourism supply.

The concept of quality is made up of two macrofactors: factors of attraction, linked to the pleasure of travelling and staying, and factors of attractiveness, linked to the comfort of travelling and staying. The former are identified with the material and immaterial resources, pre-existing or created ad hoc, that attract demand: landscape and natural attractions, artistic and cultural treasures, events, etc.

The main characteristics of these resources are that: a) they are qualitative resources, which are easier to assess than to measure; b) the public sector invests in them more than the private sector; and c) there is no direct and clearly identified economic consideration paid for them.

The second (accessibility factors) depend on the products (services and goods) that make tourist enjoyment possible and easy: accessibility to places, hospitality facilities, civil services in the places visited, etc. These are resources of a quantitative nature to be measured and evaluated, on which, in

tourist destinations, both the public and private enterprise sectors invest, for which the tourist generally pays an economic consideration, and therefore a pricing system exists.
The competitiveness of Italy's tourist offer has some national parameters, but the types of tourism and the regions on which they insist are frequently much more indicative of competitiveness. Tourism is in fact a factor of land use; it has maximum and specific validity and effects within a given territory; belonging to a specific territory rather than to another is fundamental for those who operate in it; exchange flows between supply and demand take place in it; the needs and consumption of the resident population and of the tourist population coexist and/or come together in the territory; movements of people and resources are determined between territories.
economy, through which the territory lives. Hence the entry into force of framework law 135 of 2001 (with the signing of the Prime Minister's decree on September 13, 2002, and subsequent publication in the Official Gazette on September 24, 2002), which introduces Local Tourist Systems into the national tourism organisation. The tourism sector, as a result of the new law, thus becomes a matter of regional competence, with limits derived from the Constitution, EU regulations, and international obligations.
The framework law emphasises the importance of integrated land management, overcoming the current fragmentation that characterises the tourism sector, to foster the socio-economic development of the territory. In addition, many regions have adopted public-private cooperation models with consultation and planning formulas stipulating mixed agreements, area contracts, or territorial pacts.
The role that artistic and cultural assets have always played as attractors of tourism in the Italian economy is decidedly significant: in 2001, 23.1% of total tourist presences in Italy were recorded in cities of art, which have a greater capacity to attract foreign tourists than seaside resorts. Yet, in spite of the appreciable economic results achieved by localities of historical and artistic interest, the management of cultural assets in our country still suffers from a spontaneous imprint that entrusts the innate qualities of centres of art with the function of attracting tourist flows.
In 2002, the feared crisis of the cities of art occurred, but with different characteristics and quantitative aspects, in the five largest centres of cultural tourism in Italy (8.8% of the national tourist movement).
Considering the five major cities of art as a whole, the total decrease in admissions reached 3.1% (3.7% foreign admissions and -1.6% Italian admissions). Rome experienced a particularly noticeable decline in the number of foreign visitors (-4.8%), which the increase in Italian visitors (+3.8%) could only partially offset. Moreover, the capital is the only case, among the five centres considered, in which the Italian presence increased compared to the previous year; in Palermo, the very slight increase in foreign presences (+0.8%) was accompanied by a substantial decrease in the Italian component (-8.4%), which to an even greater extent (-10.5%) deserted the city of Florence. The only slightly positive situation (+0.3%) was for the city of Naples, mainly due to the +1.7% of foreign tourists.
The disaggregation of data by nationality shows a significant reduction in intercontinental tourist flows (particularly from the United States) to the major centres of historical and cultural interest in our country; there is also a decrease in the presence of Germans, while there is a significant increase in the presence of Spaniards.
The difficulties recorded by the state museums in Tuscany, for which there was a drop in visits of -6.7% (Table 3), reflect the decline in tourist flows (foreigners and above all Italians) that affected the city of Florence. Campania and Latium also showed a negative variation, albeit smaller (-1.3%). Other regions, on the other hand, thanks to the opening of new museum offerings, stand out for a conspicuous increase in admissions; this is the case, for example, of Veneto and Venice in particular, where the activation of the Percorso Marciano (Doge's Palace, Correr Museum, Archaeological Museum, Sansovino Hall of the Marciana Library) attracted 970,109 visitors. Overall, however, the national figure shows a significant increase in admissions (+5%; +47.5% in the North-East alone).
Regarding rural tourism, statistics show that over the last decade the sector has experienced an increase in the number of companies operating in the country of 6–7% per year. As of 2001, the number of companies registered in the sector's official registers was 10,000, for a total of 125,000 beds. An average of almost 15 beds per company is calculated, a not inconsiderable company size compared to the peculiar nature of the activity. Altogether, these companies hosted 1,730,000 people during 2001, about one-fifth of whom were foreigners. Guests stay for an average of about one week (the total number of stays is thus 15 million days); thus, agritourism premises are economically active for about 100 days a year. The

turnover for 2001 was about 1,100 billion old lire, or more than 560 million euros. It can therefore be said that the agritourism business is increasingly succeeding in configuring itself as a place for holidays, where guests can immerse themselves in a natural environment while at the same time finding a varied and well-organised offer of leisure activities.

Fact Sheet 45 | Training as a strategic element for the regeneration of rural areas

In 2000, the distribution of income in the agricultural sector showed a concentration in the lowest income classes: 26.7% between 7,500 and 12,500 euros and 18.8% between 12,550 and 17,500 euros, while 9.3% of the households observed had an income of over 40,000 euros. The Bank of Italy data confirm that household income in agriculture is lower than in other sectors. In 2000, a farmer's household income amounted to 21,421 euros, about 8,000 euros less than that of a worker in industry.

10,000 less than those employed in services or public administration, and, finally, almost 12,000 less than those employed in other sectors. Moreover, again in 2000, only 1.4 percent of households employed in services had an income of less than EUR 7,500, compared to 8.4 percent of agricultural households; if, on the other hand, an income of more than EUR 40,000 is taken into account, 17.5 percent and 9.3 percent of households employed in services and agriculture, respectively, Taking the different indicators into account, we find that almost a quarter of individuals working in agriculture live in poverty.

In 2001, agriculture alone contributed 2.6% to the value added of the Italian economy. Compared to 1995, the added value of the primary sector, calculated at constant prices on a 1995 basis, grew in percentage terms by 6.5%, while the added value of the food industry grew by 3.6%. On the whole, in 2001, the agricultural sector recorded a drop compared to the previous year both in terms of production (-1.1%) and in terms of added value (-1%), unlike the other economic sectors, industry and services, which instead showed moderate growth (+1.8% GDP compared to 2000).

In terms of employment, there is a reversal of the trend (+0.8%) after a decade of more or less pronounced downturns. The recovery of dependent work units (+2.7%), if consolidated in the near future, could mean that the profound restructuring carried out in the sector is bearing its first fruits. The compensation of employees also confirmed the good trend, with a growth of 4.2% compared to 2000. This is a positive sign, unique in Europe, and is limited to salaried employment and non-EU labour, while self-employed labour units are down by 0.4% compared to the previous year.

The number of farms recorded in Italy on the date of the Census (October 22, 2000) was 2,593,090, about 14% less than in the 1990 Census. The intensity of the variations in the two censuses differed in the various territorial divisions. Overall, the decrease in companies was about 22% in the centre-North and 7.3% in the South.

Looking at the distribution of holdings over the territory, a strong concentration in the regions of the South, particularly in Campania, Apulia, and Sicily, can be seen. In fact, 56.9% of farms are concentrated in the South and the remaining 43.1% in the centre-North, confirming that agriculture is still an important component of the southern economy.

The distribution of farms and their surface areas by size classes shows that in the agricultural sector there is still a massive presence of micro-farms or farms in which the Sau (used agricultural surface area) covers a small part of the total farm surface area. 46.5% of these are micro-farms, i.e., farms with less than 1 hectare of Sau (a figure that has risen compared to the same class in 1990), while 35.6% are medium or small farms with less than 5 hectares of utilised area. On the other hand, medium and large holdings are less common, accounting for 16.6% but using 44% of the agricultural area. Large holdings, with more than 50 hectares of Sau, also use a large part of Sau, amounting to 36.3%.

On the other hand, with regard to the professional figures in the sector and their socio-cultural characteristics, overall, those employed in agriculture represent a small percentage (5%) compared to the percentage distributed among the other sectors. The primary sector is undergoing a profound transformation, which for some time now has resulted in a significant reduction in both the value of production and the number of employees. Between 1995 and 2002, the reduction in the number of employed people was significant for both sexes. In general, the number of employed people decreases

by about 18%, and in particular, the percentage of women employed in agriculture decreases by about 24%.
Concerning the first observation, it can be verified that although the self-employed and the labourer prevail in agriculture, at 37.1% and 36.8%, respectively, there was a significant increase in entrepreneurs between 1995 and 2000: 6.2%.
The new market challenges, however, impose the need for professional requalification, with the definition of the role of the agricultural entrepreneur but also of the worker, deriving from a specific training pathway, aimed at both qualification and updating, that allows to govern the processes of change and to introduce innovations from the point of view of production, market strategies, and work organisation, without losing sight of the integration with the rural environment and with the typicality of the territory in which one operates. Training, therefore, can play an absolutely important role in the qualification and redevelopment of rural municipalities, helping to bridge the persistent structural disadvantage of agriculture compared to other sectors of activity and the strong development disparities within it. This is, however, an uphill struggle given the limited financial resources made available by the EAGF. Further perplexity arises from the fact that the underestimation of training benefits does not seem to be on a downward trend: comparing the percentage distribution of investments in the 2000–2006 phase with that of the years 1994–1999 within the framework of the Por, there is a drop in the item 'Services and training' from 5.6 to 4.7%. Investment in modernization also fell from 66.8% to 52.3%. But these figures are largely offset by the considerable increase in resources for infrastructure, which rose from 9.4% in 1994–1999 to 23.1% in 2000–2006. There is, however, the possibility of interventions that, although they fall within the objectives of the European Community, are only activated with regional resources, through so-called 'pure' State aid. This aid therefore represents additional funds, which are not always used, compared with national and Community aid. In fact, the Objective 1 regions, engaged in adjusting the regional legislative framework to make it consistent with national and Community provisions, have used little or no additional resources available, so much so that it is difficult to analyse them.
The regions in the Centre-North, while taking advantage of this possibility, have not allocated a significant percentage of these resources for training. In fact, the priorities for intervention have been divided into six areas, ranging from the modernization of agricultural production structures to the environment, infrastructure, and training. Overall, most of the production resources have been allocated to the first three areas indicated, which alone absorb as much as 83% of the state aid foreseen in the PSR. The training sector made do with EUR 11.3 million out of a total of EUR 1,069 million available. The lack of a 'training culture', which associates concrete development with the increase in skill levels, is therefore linked to the limited funding available; these are the elements that constitute the main obstacles to the implementation of significant training activities for the development of the sector. This demonstrates how the need to establish synergies with organisations and structures already present in the area is dictated not only by issues of completeness and specificity of the training offer but also by economic issues and the effective implementation of plans.

Fact Sheet 46 | The Italian energy policy

Italian energy policy, like that of other European countries, seeks to reconcile three elements considered fundamental: security of energy supplies, market liberalisation, and mitigation of climate change.
Due to the low growth of the world economy, which stood at 2.2% in 2001 (below the average of the last twenty years), there was also low growth in world primary energy consumption. This was mainly due to US demand, where consumption fell sharply. As a study by Enea shows, energy demand increased substantially when considered net of US demand (Enea, 2002).
As far as the different energy sources are concerned, considering that the slowdown in demand growth affects them all, the situation appears rather differentiated. Oil shows a certain tendency towards stability, while natural gas and coal are growing. Electricity produced by nuclear power is growing at an above-average rate, while the share produced by hydroelectric power has largely decreased. In any

case, oil today continues to meet 38% of the world's energy needs, while coal, thanks to its use by some Asian countries such as China, remains the second largest energy source, followed by gas.
In this situation, many European countries, including Italy, continue to have the problem of certain continuity of supplies as more than 65% of oil and 36% of natural gas are in the Middle East, an area of the world subject to strong political and economic tensions. Added to this is the need for a policy that takes into account new environmental requirements that cannot be met with the use of the three sources mentioned, as they are all strong producers of greenhouse gases.
In Italy, little consideration is given to the regional differences that still exist in the country. In 2002, in fact, only six regions had actually adopted the Energy-Environmental Plans envisaged by the Conference of Presidents of the Regions and Autonomous Provinces, whose purpose was to adopt measures and policies aimed at implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the context of the transfer of the energy policy task to the regions, provinces, and municipalities. Of the remaining regions, 10 have drawn up the Plan but have not adopted it; in the other 4, it is in the process of being drawn up, as shown in the graph below.
On the other hand, energy demand in Italy during the years 2000 and 2001 was stagnant, again as a consequence of the world economic trend. Industry and the tertiary sector were the sectors that recorded the strongest growth (1.2% and 2.5%), while the primary sector declined by 1%. In terms of sources, the consumption of petroleum products decreased by 0.4%, while the consumption of natural gas increased by 0.5%, almost entirely in the civil sector. Overall, however, the demand for electricity increased by 2.3% in 2001 compared to the previous year.
On the supply side, Italy, among the countries with the highest external dependence in the energy field, has further reduced its domestic production of oil, gas, and solid fuels; suffice it to say that our country imports 99% of its coal requirements. Positive signs are coming from renewable energy sources; in this sector, the contribution to the national energy balance grew by 25% between 1995 and 2001. In spite of this, Italy's dependence on foreign energy is still very high. As far as oil is concerned, the world's dependence is 38%; in Italy, it is less than 50%. This does not mean that we have reduced our overall dependence; in fact, our dependence on natural gas for electricity generation has risen from 21% in the early 1990s to 45% today. Overall, it can be said that energy policies aimed at reducing external dependence have not been very successful, so much so that dependence has increased overall, even for the
delays in extracting oil from the Basilicata fields, which should have helped to reduce imports. In Italy, despite considerable potential, the share of primary energy in 2000 was only 5.4%, well below other industrialised countries.
If we compare the totals of primary energy produced in Italy with those of other countries, the strong dependence on fossil fuels (oil, coal, and gas) of our country compared to others is immediately apparent, even taking into account the absence of nuclear energy in Italy.
At the end of 2001, the Parliamentary Commission for Productive Activities dictated some guidelines for the government to improve the Italian energy system and strengthen the competitiveness of the national industry. The Commission's guidelines envisaged action on several fronts, including diversifying energy sources in order to reduce Italy's dependence on the Middle East. It also envisaged increasing domestic sources, such as gas and oil, through administrative simplification. It also advocated the use of clean coal through the development of technologies suitable for converting coal into gas and, in association, increased production from renewable sources. The last point, on the other hand, concerned a possible rethink for the future of nuclear energy; improving the efficiency of energy end-use also through the use of renewables to minimise the effect of greenhouse gases; and improving international relations in the sector through the creation of strategic alliances.
Starting from these considerations, the government presented to Parliament at the end of 2002 the law 'Reform and reorganisation of the energy sector', better known as the 'Marzano law' after the name of the current Minister. The Kyoto Protocol, indicating significant directions in Italy's energy policies, is considered by many to be the government's test case for achieving a virtuous circle between energy and the environment. The Kyoto Protocol dates back to 1997; it has been ratified by Italy since 2000, but it is not yet operational due to a clause that provides for its application only after at least 50% of the countries that emit greenhouse gases have in turn ratified it. In any case, in the EU, the energy

transformation sector was responsible for about 37% of CO_2 emissions in 1990, the base year for the Kyoto Protocol, and about 35% in 2000. In the same period, the manufacturing sector went from 21% to 19% of CO_2 emissions, the tertiary sector appears stable at 20%, and the transport sector went from 22% to 26%. Within this framework, Italy is responsible for 14% of emissions from the energy system. CO_2 emissions actually decreased only in Germany (despite the exit from nuclear power) and Great Britain, while they increased in all other countries. The fact remains that the Kyoto Protocol envisaged a 6.5 percent decrease in CO_2 emissions for Italy in 2010, whereas to date, Italy's emissions have increased by around 10 percent. This means that if Italy intends to comply with the agreements made, it will have to reduce emissions by about 16% by 2010, a target that seems frankly unattainable. On the other hand, it is reaffirmed that important reductions are possible in the transport sector and through the adoption of mechanisms such as reforestation and innovation in production processes. Nevertheless, it is believed that, due to the extreme dependence of the Italian energy system, a significant reduction in the use of fossil fuels for energy production is essential if the Kyoto targets are to be met.

Fact Sheet 47 | Renewable energy resources

The EU contributes only 6.4 percent of the world's renewable energy use. In spite of this low percentage, the EU is nevertheless considered the world leader in terms of renewable energy technologies. The situation varies significantly from country to country. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made in recent years.
The energy produced in the European Union in 1999 from renewable sources amounted to 87 Mtoe (or 87 million metric tonnes of oil equivalent). This means that 6.1% of the Union's energy consumption comes from renewable energy. If we consider this energy as a whole, we can see that biomass accounts for 62%, hydroelectric 30%, geothermal 2.3%, and wind 1.4%. In any case, 85% of hydropower is produced by large power stations, and only 15% is produced by power stations under 10 MW. From the point of view of environmental impact, therefore, this energy, which can be considered renewable, has considerable effects on the territory.
The countries making the most use of renewables are Sweden with 27%, Austria with 23% of domestic consumption (with use mostly from biomass and hydro), and Finland with 22% (with use mostly from biomass). Renewables also represent significant shares for Portugal with 13%, with use derived mainly from biomass; for Denmark with 8.6%, mainly from biomass; for Italy with 8.2%; for Spain with 5.8%; and for Greece with 5.7%. The use of renewables by other countries is considered residual in quantitative terms.
More than half of the energy produced in the EU in 1999, or 53%, was converted into electricity, while the remaining 47% was used as heat. Electricity production from renewable sources accounts for 11% of the total electricity produced in the EU. Austria and Sweden are the leaders in this sector.
Italy's heavy dependence on oil and gas imports and the decision to close nuclear power plants should have focused Italy's attention on developing renewable energy sources. This has only partly happened (see the Energy Policies' tab of this same Report), as Italian consumption of these energies (8.2%) is still very limited.
Overall, if one considers the contribution of non-traditional renewable sources (wind, solar, municipal solid waste, wood and its derivatives, and biogas) to electricity production for the years 1995–2001, it can be seen that, although there has been considerable growth, the contribution of these sources remains fairly modest.
More than half of the production from renewable sources in Italy comes from biomass, 30% from hydroelectric power plants, and about 20% from geothermal energy. The contribution of other sources is almost irrelevant.
Despite this, Italy is considered to be at the forefront of technologies and their potential, especially in areas such as wind and solar power, so much so that it is expected to double its energy production from renewable sources by 2010.

Regarding the possible fields of application for renewable energy, following the German, Danish, and generally northern European countries' example and as recommended by the Iea, the greatest potential for use can be found within domestic uses. In 2000, the European Union noted that the energy used in the residential and tertiary sectors, mostly buildings, accounts for more than 4% of the Community's final energy consumption. For this reason, Directive 2002/91/EC noted that buildings and their air-conditioning and ventilation systems must be designed and constructed in such a way as to require low energy consumption during operation, taking into account the climatic conditions of the location and respecting the occupants' well-being. Actions such as insulation and the use of renewable energy sources are considered by the Directive to be fundamental to achieving low energy consumption.
On the basis of recent national policies on the decentralisation of powers, Italy has given Local Authorities and Autonomous Provinces a leading role in the development of renewable energy sources through an instrument called PEAs (Environmental Energy Plans). In short, the EEPs had to contain within them: mapping of renewable energy resources; promotion of projects of particular energy-environmental interest; public awareness campaigns on renewable energy sources and the rational use of energy; recruitment of highly specialised technical personnel; and revision of municipal regulatory plans and utilisation plans, indispensable for the authorization process of new projects.
At the same time, a series of financial instruments and incentives were prepared for renewable energy sources, ranging from green certificates (i.e., the obligation for energy producing companies to reserve a share of production for renewable sources) to regional funds, mainly for housing, European structural funds, green tariffs, and incentive measures such as project financing and the introduction of social responsibility.
However, a fundamental role is widely acknowledged for research and development in the energy sector. In this sector, Italy ranks in the bottom ranks in Europe, with only 1 percent of GDP spent on research and development, well below competing countries such as France and Germany.
Consistent with this picture is the trend in government spending on research and development in the energy sector, which has fallen by 70% since 1990.
Beyond laws, therefore, a change of course by policymakers is necessary, especially in areas such as renewables, as research and development essentially depend on the policy strategies, in our case, energy policy, with which a nation endows itself.
The perception is that a new energy culture is still attempting to establish itself despite the political instability of the nations from which we import our oil and gas, the now-not-only hypothetical risks of blackouts, and the requirement to reduce CO_2 emissions as outlined in the International Convention on Climate Change, which Italy ratified. The new energy culture cannot do without the use of renewable energy.

Fact Sheet 48 | The public administration and the economic system

The fact that State aid can distort free market mechanisms and that there is a need to significantly reduce such practises has been reiterated on numerous international occasions, including, most recently, the Stockholm European Council (March 2001) or the Barcelona European Council (March 2002). Precisely because of these guidelines, there has been a non-negligible reduction in the overall volume of such interventions in recent years: overall, there has been a drop from an average annual contribution of 102 billion euros in the three-year period 1995–1997 to 93.4 in the period 1997–1999 to 85.7 in the three-year period 1999–2001. The renewed economic support policies undertaken by Germany and Italy contributed significantly to this decrease.
With regard to the 2001 figure, Italy ranks tenth in terms of total State aid as a proportion of GDP: the twelve billion euros disbursed, the third highest figure recorded in absolute terms, represent 1.01% of GDP, compared to 1.58% in Finland, 1.36% in Denmark, 1.14% in Germany, and 1.10% in France. Among the large European countries, only the United Kingdom (which is characterised by a different policy of state intervention in the economy) provides less aid to the national economy, standing at 0.66%.

The State does not only provide support for the country's productive realities. Very often, relations with the P.A., in terms of bureaucracy, litigation, or facilitating business start-ups, represent a crucial variable in economic experiences; in the case of Sistema-Italia, this relationship constitutes an inhibiting element of alarming proportions.
Overall, according to the recent survey by the World Economic Forum, which analyses the competitive performance of 80 countries, Italy has dropped from 26th to 39th place in terms of global competitive capacity. What is most worrying in this survey, apart from the figure itself, is that while in some respects the country shows clear signs of development and internationalisation capacity (Italy is in 8th place in terms of penetration capacity in international markets and 9th place in the application and use of innovations), there are conspicuous braking elements due precisely to the delays and inertia of the P. A. A.
According to the aforementioned international survey, Italian bureaucracy is a significant barrier to business activity; on a scale of 0 to 10, Italy received a mere 2.5. As exemplified by the graph, our country ranks 60th out of the eighty countries considered and last when considering the major industrialised countries of the West.
It is not just a matter of slow or inefficient bureaucracy. Very often, the very articulation of administrative procedures—especially in start-up situations—results in a waste of resources and a lengthening of time. Thus, with regard to the obstacles imposed on business activity by the P.A., our country is once again at the bottom of the international rankings. The score in this case is even lower than two (on a scale of 0 to ten), and among the industrialised countries of the West, only Portugal scores worse than ours.
In Italy, bureaucratic burdens weigh 0.7–0.8% of the gross domestic product, and this cost falls heaviest on small companies.
The labour costs that SMEs devote to dealing with bureaucratic matters are impressive: they are, relative to 2000, EUR 4,049.2 million in total, or 42% of the total burdens incurred by companies for administrative tasks.
The proportionally highest cost is borne by businesses in the North-West, where an average of EUR 1,661 is spent per employee on dealing with red tape; considering that the average number of employees in SMEs in this geographical area is 11, there are an average of 8.2 fulfilments per employee and almost six and a half days per year dedicated to such activities per employee. Less overburdened by this workload are the regions of the Mezzogiorno, where the average cost
for such work is EUR 1,051 per year, and each employee spends on average 4.4 days per year on such activities.
The advanced tertiary sector, where public bureaucracy costs an average of more than EUR 1,500 per employee, is where this workload is particularly high. Manufacturing and the construction sectors are next, where this cost exceeds EUR 1,400 on average.
From the point of view of the size of SMEs, it should be noted that it is precisely the smaller companies that suffer the greatest cost: companies with up to nine employees report an average monthly expenditure on red tape of EUR 1,444, compared to EUR 942 for companies with 20–49 employees and just EUR 655 for those with an even larger size (50–499).
From the point of view of the cost of the various bureaucratic tasks companies have to cope with, according to some studies, taxation and accounting are the costliest items, i.e., EUR 827 per employee per year.
The cost of the PA for the business system is EUR 5.7 billion, not counting the excessive waste of paper and the slowness of the judicial system. In particular, the costs incurred by Italian SMEs are highest for industry, at 1.53% of the GDP produced by the sector, and 0.23% for services. Activities related to bureaucratic fulfilment are carried out by companies using mainly internal resources, while in 41% of cases, external consultancies are used. On average, each enterprise with more than 10 employees employs about two full-time employees for the overall handling of administrative tasks.
On average, each company with 10 to 49 employees spends more than EUR 32,000 per year on the management of the main administrative tasks (related to personnel, tax, health, safety, and the environment), or EUR 1,539 per employee. This figure becomes EUR 1,134 for companies with 50 to

99 employees and decreases further in larger companies, to EUR 734 for companies with 100 to 499 employees and EUR 160 for larger companies.
In any case, about 60 percent of the enterprises are fairly satisfied with the quality of the services provided.
A further important aspect concerning the relationship between businesses and the public administration calls into question the justice system. In this regard, according to ad hoc studies, 54% of companies say they are dissatisfied with the functioning of the justice system, while 61% claim to have incurred legal costs in 2001 for legal disputes. 52% of companies resort to legal action to collect debts, while 23% have ongoing labour disputes and/or bankruptcy proceedings. Obviously, much of the criticism levelled by entrepreneurs at the Italian judicial system relates to the time taken to complete disputes: for 40% of companies, it takes between two and four years to collect a debt through legal channels, and for 22%, between five and eight years. This slowness meant that in 2001, 38% of companies gave up collecting debts through legal channels, while 54% suffered real losses on credit.
A further recent study on the business world states that more than 60% of the sample is satisfied with its relationship with the P.A., and the perception of a positive development is expressed by more than a third of those interviewed. In particular, certain innovations are appreciated, including self-certification, the computerization of public offices, and the introduction of *call centres* and toll-free numbers. The best perceived quality is found among those active in the North-West regions.
The bodies with which the companies surveyed had the most dealings were the municipality, the Chamber of Commerce, social security agencies, and labour offices. Among the most critical elements was the problem of the complexity of the bureaucratic process and the waiting time for the completion of the required paperwork and access to documentation. It is also noted in the study how entrepreneurs have a widespread fear of making mistakes in their dealings with the P.A.; for this reason, they frequently resort to external professionals (lawyers, accountants, consultants). Regarding the evolution of
P.A., one finds, against the above-mentioned elements of satisfaction, the persistence of a widespread bureaucratic culture among civil servants (49.3% of those interviewed), as well as the existence of laws that hinder the streamlining of procedures (22.6%) and the lack of real training on the part of employees (21.2%).

Fact Sheet 49 | The welfare state in Italy: the experimentation of the minimum wage

In Italy, according to the most recent surveys, there are 2,456,000 poor households, totalling 7,140,000 individuals; in 2001, there were 2,663,000 poor households and 7,828,000 poor individuals.
Which, translated in terms, would mean that, in spite of economic stagnation, increased cost of living, and lack of employment growth, the number of poor households decreased between 2001 and 2003. It is useful to point out that the poverty line is affected by changes in the economic cycle; this implies a shift in the poverty line caused, on the one hand, by changes in consumer prices and, on the other hand, by changes in real terms in household consumption expenditure.
The South, with 66.4% (1 million 630 thousand) of poor households, is the area in Italy most affected by poverty, followed by the North with 21.9% (537 thousand) and the Centre with 11.8 (289 thousand). The presentation of these first values allows us to grasp only an overall view of the phenomenon; in order to better interpret the dynamics and structure of relative poverty, it is necessary to observe its incidence in the cases of both households and individuals. In Italy, the incidence of poor households on the total number of resident households is 11% (12% in 2001). The area with the highest value was the Mezzogiorno, 22.4% (24.3% in 2001), followed by the Centre, 6.7% (8.4% in 2001), and finally the North, 5% (5% in 2001).
The same dynamics can also be observed for individuals: against a national incidence of 12.4% (13.6% in 2001), the geographical breakdown that is most affected is the South with 23.6% (26.2% in 2001), followed by the Centre with 7.8% (9.6% in 2001) and the North with 5.4% (5.2% in 2001). The data thus show how relative poverty affects both individuals and households in the Mezzogiorno, with very

high values compared to those in the centre and the North. The same data show an improvement between 2001 and 2002, while recalling the considerations made about the economic situation.
The 1998 Financial Law launched the two-year experimentation of the Minimum Insertion Income as an integrated income support measure to start responding to the territorial differences characterising poverty phenomena. The purpose of the experimentation was to assess the financial and organisational feasibility of this measure, already present in all European countries except Greece, in order to generalise it, at a later stage, to the whole national territory.
The reasons that led to the establishment of the RMI (Minimum Income for Integration) are to be found in the need to provide Italy with a general income support measure for all those in poverty situations. According to European Union guidelines, the measure must also be a part of a more comprehensive strategy to combat poverty and exclusion.
Experimentation with the Minimum Integration Income started at the end of 1998 in 39 municipalities. With the 2001 Financial Act, Parliament, without waiting for the results of the experimentation, extended the number of municipalities for the two-year period 2000–2002. In total, in addition to the initial 39 municipalities, a further 268 were subsequently identified as belonging to territorial pacts that already included the initial 39.
The distribution of the first 39 municipalities was made taking into account the hardship indicators provided by ISTAT: five municipalities in the North, ten municipalities in the centre, and twenty-four municipalities in the South were selected. The measure's implementation modalities identified the following as recipients: Italian citizens, EU citizens residing for at least one year in one of the municipalities admitted to the experiment, and non-EU citizens legally residing for at least three years in the municipalities in question.
The amount of RMI given monthly was not a fixed amount but represented a supplement between the present household income and a certain threshold. The guaranteed amount for a one-member household amounted to about EUR 268 (£520,000). The measure also provided for a 25 percent deductible to be applied to earned income in order to discourage non-participation in paid work, i.e., to prevent any 'poverty trap' effects.
As of December 31, 2000, 55,522 applications were submitted and 34,730 (62.6%) were accepted; the total number of individuals involved was 85,818, i.e., 1.5% of the population of the 39 municipalities. The measure involved 25,591 households; in about three-quarters of these, one or more members actually participated in reintegration programmes, for a total of about 37,000 individuals.
The households most affected were 60.5 percent couples with children, mainly located in the South; 14.6 percent were single-parent families; and 13.6 percent were single persons, mainly concentrated in the North (31 percent).
In terms of occupational status, 68% of RMI check holders were unemployed or seeking their first job, 19% were not in the labour force, and the remaining 12% were employed.
It was noted that RMI beneficiaries, where the conditions were met, were obliged to take part in social integration programmes; as of December 2000, 37,087 people were included, i.e., 43.2% of the total number of people in the Institute's charge.
The most widespread programme, with 8,783 individuals (24% of the total number of individuals included in the programmes), was the socio-relational integration programme, which aimed to promote social inclusion and a sense of community belonging while at the same time allowing the individuals involved to take advantage of a number of resources in the area. Many individuals were therefore placed in voluntary associations, social cooperatives, and parishes with the task of carrying out support activities in the various contexts in which they operated.
Another recurring typology was intra-family care and support (of a child or a dependent elderly person), with a total of 7,351 individuals (20.5 percent of the total number of entries).
Not very comforting, especially in the South, was the share of employment-type programmes (14.9 percent), in which job orientation, job placement accompaniment, and job matching activities were also included.
Another objective of the RMI deserves a separate note, namely the fight against school evasion, a phenomenon that is more concentrated in certain areas of southern Italy and in disadvantaged social groups.

As of December 31, 2000, 30 of the 39 municipalities still had portions of the state transfers at their disposal, while the remaining 9 municipalities had spent more than they had originally been allocated.
The National Fund for Social Policies provided 97 percent of the total resources distributed to households, with individual municipalities bearing the remaining 3 percent depending on the various municipal budgets that were available. Municipal funds are responsible for 2.6 percent of expenses on average.
Also borne by the individual administrations, for a total estimate of around EUR 6 million, are the costs: for personnel, for the purchase of equipment, for the modernization of technical equipment, for postal and printing costs, and for the insurance coverage of employees and users engaged in socially useful activities.
The 39 municipalities spent a total of about EUR 12 million, which includes the disbursements for the Rmisharing and other expenses.
Finally, the institutes in charge of evaluating the experiment have calculated an estimated annual expenditure for the generalisation of the MRI of between 2,300 and 3,000 million.

Fact Sheet 50 | Migrants: problem or resource?

In the space of a few decades, after having been a country of emigration, internal migration, and transit immigration, Italy has become a country of stable immigration.
The foreign presence, in global figures, is still contained, although growing, but there is no doubt that Italy has experienced and is experiencing a process of great transformation, which elsewhere has been assimilated over a much longer time span. Re-reading the immigration issue today, in light of the changes that have marked the last decade, seems like a duty. Economic globalisation and the regionalization of conflicts determine the irreversible nature of immigration and impose on states the need to adopt strategic actions that adapt to local needs.
A phase of change has begun in Italy, in which immigration has moved from a borderline position to place itself at the heart of socio-economic processes. Suffice it to recall the number of immigrants working in Italy, the numbers of contributions paid to the INPS, the 180,000 plus children of immigrants attending Italian schools, and the productive sectors that now depend on the presence of immigrant workers, including domestic and care work.
At the same time, the issue of citizens' security is increasingly automatically linked to the immigration phenomenon; Italian civil society is beginning to show concrete signs of intolerance; and on a political level, the immigration issue is taking on a decisive electoral significance.
This set of facts clearly highlights the centrality of the immigration issue, which must now be considered a phenomenon that requires strategic action capable of providing concrete answers on the basis of correct interpretations as well as curbing the evils that result from it.
Nevertheless, according to the numbers, as of December 31, 2002, the number of foreigners legally residing in Italy, including those who will presumably be granted regularisation, was estimated at approximately
2,500,000 people.
Thanks to the 'Bossi-Fini' law (Art. 33, Law 189/02) and the subsequent law to legalise irregular work (Law 222/02), regularisation was initiated in Italy, which proved to be much higher than expected and far greater than previous regularisations: in fact, 705,138 applications were submitted (in 1995, 244,000 non EU citizens were regularised and in 1998, 251,000), of which 343,616 concerned domestic helpers and carers and 361,522 other subordinate workers. Leaving out workers from the EU or other advanced development countries (about 100,000), immigrant workers arriving from countries with strong migration pressure doubled following regularisation: 705,138 regularisation applications were added to the 706,329 registered at the end of 2002, which involved the different areas of the country in an unequal manner.
The ratio between regularisation applications and resident workers is a very concrete index of migratory pressure. The data show that 51.8% of regularisation applications were concentrated in the North, 30.5%

in the centre, and 17.7% in the South. The regions where the most applications for regularisation were submitted were Lombardy (159,144), Lazio (124,344), Campania (68,4879), Veneto (61,500), Piedmont (57,528), Emilia Romagna (57,171), and Tuscany (50,849); those where the fewest applications were submitted were: Molise (1,114), Basilicata (2,467), Sardinia (3,206), and Trentino Alto Adige (5,556).
In the regions with the lowest rate of irregularity, the requests for emersion, in relation to the number of workers staying, range from 1/3 in Trentino Alto Adige (also because this region benefits to a greater and more organised extent from seasonal workers), to half in Friuli Venezia Giulia and Valle d'Aosta, to 2/3 in Sardinia, Sicily, Marche, and Emilia Romagna, which confirms itself as the region with the lowest rate of irregularity in relation to the number of workers staying. Overall, the number of legally resident foreigners in Italy is approximately 2.6 million, with an incidence on the resident population of just over 4%, a value at the lower end of the scale. Which is actually well below the European average of 5.2%. In fact, in the last five years, the foreign population legally present in the European Union seems to have stabilised at around 20 million individuals, i.e., 5.2% of the total population, with an incidence of 37.3% in Germany (7,300,000 immigrants), 16.7% in France, and 12.5% in the United Kingdom. The overall figure, concerning the regular foreign population in Italy, should, however, be integrated with the quota of undocumented immigrants present in our country and who totally escape the official accounting of the Ministry of the Interior. According to Eurispes, in fact, there are 800,000 illegal non-EU immigrants currently present on the national territory, a figure that brings the overall total of the foreign presence to over 3.4 million immigrants, or 6% of the Italian population. The vast majority of the 800,000 irregular workers who prefer or are forced to remain in illegality are people engaged in agriculture (especially in the South), services (restaurants and bars), construction (labourers), and a not insignificant quota of people who consider their presence in Italy transitory. The latter, in fact, consider our country a bridge of passage either because they have decided to move to other places such as Canada, the USA, and other Northern European countries or because they consider it economically unprofitable to be subject to Italian labour and tax regulations. From an analysis of foreigners regularly residing in Italy on December 31, 2002, subdivided by reason, it is evident that the majority of immigrants held a residence permit for work reasons; in fact, there were 682 residence permits for subordinate work. 747 (45% of the total) and residence permits for self-employment 108,615 (7.2%); therefore, 52.2% of foreigners stay in Italy for work reasons and a good 472,240 (31.2%) for family reasons, that is, they are family members of foreign workers and are therefore part of the social fabric and are therefore able to provide for their own subsistence. If we add to these the 650,000 workers who, at the end of 2003, will presumably have obtained a residence permit following regularisation, the percentage of residence permits for work rises to 54.6%, more than enough to make us consider immigrants as a resource.
According to the 2003 survey, there was a significant increase in the maximum number of non-EU workers that businesses could employ, reaching about 224,000. From a sectoral point of view, about 60% of the recruitment of non-EU personnel took place in the services sector (about 130,000); within this sector, the majority of requests were concentrated in operating services to companies, hotels, restaurants, tourist services, and commerce. Among industrial activities, the largest applications were in construction (around 30,000). As was to be expected, the area most inclined to hire non-EU personnel is the North-East (37% of the total), followed by the North-West with 35.4%, the Centre with 32.5%, and the South with 27.5%.
There are not only employees, among whom there is also an increase in trade union membership (99,000 in the CGIL, 110,000 in the CISL, and 29,000 in the UIL); in fact, it has been calculated that there were 116,123 individual firms registered in the names of non-EU citizens in Italy on June 30, 2002. Lombardy is still in the lead with 21,000 businesses; in second place comes Tuscany with 13,000 businesses; and in third place is Emilia Romagna with 10,000 businesses. On the same date, moreover, 69,776 companies had a non-EU citizen as a director; if we then count all the companies where non-EU citizens were partners or held other positions, we arrive at 242,776 companies.

CHAPTER 6 ON COSTUME

Essay | Promises and bets

What we observe on a daily basis is the image of a waiting, waiting Italy.
What? No one knows; perhaps the unpredictable, the unexpected event...
It is the age of uncertainty, of precariousness, of latent and manifest insecurity, which is evident in political apathy, in the decline of the authority of institutions, in the eager search for 'community', but as long as it does not contaminate our 'particular', in the exaggerated cult of the body, and in the disappearance of the search for social ties.
Uncertain Italy is Italy wrapped up, spinning in circles, like a cyclist pedalling without completing more than a few metres. An Italy that struggles without, apparently, producing results. This is the Italy that one would prefer not to describe but that appears before everyone's eyes.
It is a fake immobility; it produces insecurity because the results of the efforts made are not visible. What can be seen is the image of an indecisive Italy, an Italy that seems to have lost the security acquired through years of history. And precariousness can be seen in people's eyes—in the eyes of young people who fight to gain a space within the world of work, and what they sometimes manage to obtain, when they do, is a temporary space. A job that may not be there tomorrow. Coordinated and Continuous Collaborators, the so-called atypical, have now become the norm. Those who only have more rights than other workers because the time they dedicate to their employer is increasingly full According to some data, co.co.s represent a quarter of the total workforce; 50% are graduates who earn less than EUR 10,000 a year and are without any social security assistance. They live in the present and drive the Italian economy forward, but they have no right to assume a future. Two million, four hundred thousand people are not represented by anyone. How do these people dream of their future? How will they live tomorrow? Do they have a family and/or can they afford one? Do they have a party or a trade union that can defend them? These are the real bets! Postindustrial subordinate workers—this is how Crunch defines 'flexible workers' in the essay *Post Democracy*—have no one to represent them because they are too busy defending the old representations.
And those in power assure people that this is the only course of action, that it is healthy to change jobs, and that they should abandon the idea of having a set job because one only gains experience by expanding their horizons, which means they must constantly try new jobs.
The current insecurity is inevitably caused by the world situation, by a generalised and invisible global conflict where there is no precise enemy. The enemy is indeterminate, has no visible troops, and has no weapons in sight. It strikes when we least expect it, in favour of a sometimes barely perceptible cause. Italy is in danger of becoming a war zone; we live insecurely even within our own cities; the underground instills fear in us; even places of worship cause unrest. We are defenceless because we know neither how nor when we might be hit. A sense of disorientation pervades our lives, and the risk is to use fear as a system for interpreting the world. The Nassyrian massacre is an example of the terror that can be generated. 19 people were killed, and the Italian population, which did not perceive the causes, put up a compact wall.
The thirty-something age group, which the family frequently pampers, shields, and muffles, is the one that exhibits the most indecision. A generation that fails to grow up because it sees a horizon too confused to set sail and leave. Too much uncertainty and consequently too much indecision in work, in affections, in money, and in investments Indecision pushes one to postpone the most important choices because it does not make one feel ready; it pushes one to delegate and to hope that someone else will make the decision. Work or study. Getting married or continuing to see each other occasionally Change cities or stay. Have a child, or wait. all the crossroads that we encounter during our existence and which we push away in the hope of having another chance. Deciding sometimes means taking a position and assuming responsibility for a choice that defines our identity precisely on the outside.
We live in a society that tends to reward laziness and those who, out of laziness and a lack of Pilates, prefer not to displease anyone. While indecision causes anxiety and emotional discomfort, it also drives

one to reason one's way out of complexity. Doubt is a spring that serves to fuel reflection, the analysis of the situation, the definition of the problem before acting, and the investigation of possible solutions. Indecision as a temporary state prodrome of an unexpected result Indecision runs the risk of being a virus that touches the most sensitive chords of our actions, transforming every act in daily life into existential doubt.

It comes as no surprise when specialist journals indicate that the most frequent psychopathologies are anxiety, headaches, tachycardia, and colitis, illnesses caused by the excessive stress we are subjected to on a daily basis. Signs of difficulty that our organism manifests as alarm bells for an unclear situation

The disease of our times is anxiety, which can lead to eating disorders and panic attacks. On the one hand, anxiety can be a useful indicator of how focused we are on our objectives, but on the other hand, if it is unchecked or excessive, it runs the risk of submerging the person in an endless crime movie, a suspenseful thriller where every action the person takes has a survivalist meaning.

One of the vices of today's society is the attempt to make any content accessible to anyone. This, all too often, leads to an emptying out of the main meaning and a levelling down of the content.

People look for the easy way to emerge. We are inundated with appearances, which are ends in themselves.

Profession: host. Yes, by profession, on any television network. To say what is not known.

Appearances have replaced reality. These characters, then, become so familiar to our eyes because they are fed to us in a state of intellectual acquiescence. Shortcuts have replaced effort, commitment, and fatigue. This too is a simplification. All the fault of television, a true weapon of mass distraction, barker of consciences, a pastime in the real meaning of the term, as it consumes it without leaving the individual with an element, a plus to justify the time spent.

TV, as in a real competition, takes advantage of the crisis of the primary institutions, family and school, to compete with them. Television is one of the causes of the process of simplification, which is ever closer to meaning the trivialization of learning processes in modern society. It simplifies because it flattens; it produces a treacle of contradictory elements that are not functional to understanding and man's natural procedure, which is that of reflection. It produces symbionts, simulacra, and stars that the same logic of consumption, which drives much of the modern world's actions, makes perishable in a short time.

The culture of the body is increasingly unscrupulous. Appearing before being: We would like to be what we show on the outside. Image first. And in this huge social arena, we try to chase time, to disguise our age with everything that nature, medicine, and chemistry allow us. The prevalence of the 'I' shifts the perspective with which one faces life: a continuous battle with other 'I's', in the conquest of one's own space. Individual freedom seems to be the only criterion for action, a freedom conditioned exclusively by personal pleasure. Each person sees himself as an autonomous subject in the real sense of the term; he is a law unto himself, but the law can and does change at any time.

Everyone is a stranger to everyone else; it is the death of the sense of community. We all become strangers, and so the sense of mistrust increases. Polls constantly monitor trust in certain politicians and institutions, and the picture that emerges is bleak; society seems to have lost trust in the generalised other. We do not trust politicians, the judiciary, doctors, police, banks, schools, insurance companies, or television. We see the rot everywhere and behave accordingly. We consider others untrustworthy because we ourselves are the first to reward cleverness. An increasingly complex society drives us to constant doubt because we struggle to understand its mechanisms and forces us to live in a state of perpetual defence. We have passwords on our money, on our personal mail, and on our mobile phones. Dozens of combinations intersect in our minds and serve to defend us from another stranger. We are in a state of constant alert, a clear signal of our existence.

precarious, producing a defensive individualism. The final cause of continuous *non-partisanship* is a manifest desire to remain *super-partisan*. We are for *political correctness*, which means never displeasing anyone. We are against the stress of modern life, but in the end, we spend a good part of our savings on things that complicate it for us. We take to the streets against globalisation but take refuge in ethnic bars on Saturdays. Schizophrenic behaviour that pushes us, on the one hand, to bind our mobile phone calls to an access code and, on the other hand, to a daily acceptance that our data can be processed by specialised companies that put our names into typologies and consumer profiles Technology, on the

one hand, allows us to know everything about ourselves; on the other hand, it offers itself as a screen for our privacy.
We are immersed in a society that mythologizes speed: faster and faster Internet connections, cars launched at high speed, advertised deserted roads that do not actually exist in Italy. We tend to live fast because we are afraid of not being able to savour all that the present offers us. It is a typical trait of postmodernism that drives us to follow the utopia of having to realise *everything* possible. It is the fear of missed opportunities and the illusion of *carpe diem* about everything that is thrown at us. It is our insecurity that drives us to seek frequent communication in every sphere, identifying availability as the criterion for existence. If we analyse an ordinary day, we realise that the mobile phone makes us always reachable, in every space and at every moment of the day; the Internet puts us in communication with the world with news updated by the second; and e-mail has replaced the old letter and stamp because it reaches the addressee immediately. While this need for up-to-date communication—to be constantly connected with the outside world—gives us the security of being in constant communication with an undefined other, it also causes us the anxiety of constant availability. We are active 24 hours a day. We are the *bystander* generation. With the click of a mouse or the press of a button on our mobile phone, we are ready to communicate. The unreachability of the person we are looking for causes us upset and anxiety, i.e., we immediately associate the inability to communicate with imminent danger. This was unimaginable a few years ago, when individuals could be reached either at home or, in some cases, at their place of work, and the time spent passing from one place to another was intended for healthy reflection. Not any more. Being in constant contact with the media outside leaves us on perpetual standby, preventing us from unplugging lest we feel left out. News is flashy; mail arrives in seconds; machines get faster and faster; software is almost instantaneous. This hyper-fast society tends to replace personal relationships with those mediated by constant advances in technology. Time has become the unit of measurement for our existence. We act as if it were our last days of life, despite the widespread perception that we are saving time. And with the time we save, how do we spend it? We lose it immersed in traffic, in finding parking spaces for our fastest cars, or in efficiently operating the very tools that are supposed to make us live better. E-mail has become the primary form of communication in the workplace. We spend a large part of our time downloading avalanches of emails, only a fraction of which are useful for the work we do. The remainder is either personal mail, spam, or junk mail. Spamming is like those marketplaces where, at every step, you can find someone willing to sell us something or refer us to things of little interest. E-mails are flooded with messages from those who want to sell us software, palmtops, sexual services, and natural medicines. A souk inside our computer.
Is this the effect of globalisation?
Faced with the promise of a better life given by speed, the gamble can be to gather up anxieties and transform them into attitudes of responsibility, because time is a gift to be made to bear fruit; it is a resource that should not be dispersed, so fruitful is it. It is precisely this that can prompt us to carefully dose our days, avoiding filling up every space and taking care to use time as a resource for reflection on the actions we are going to perform.
The interdependence of thought and action must effectively define the meaning of living. No longer are gestures isolated from their meaning but embedded in a perspective vision; this distinguishes man from other living beings. When this rationality wanes, it is because the context in which we live shows its unpredictability, and
Then some gestures that seemed to go well before had to be modified and adapted to the new context.
The meaning of life depends on man; it is the direction we give to our actions.
The means are not the end. The discourse of new technologies opens up infinite spaces for social analysis. Technologies change our lives, although it becomes pointless to ask whether they improve or worsen them. Technology is like a glove that fits the purpose for which we use it.
Some research suggests that adults suffer from technology while young people rule it. Thus, adults also suffer the stress that comes with it, while young people navigate it naturally. According to some statistics, 94% of young people between the ages of 14 and 30 own a mobile phone, compared to 70% of adults. Only 20% of adults use the internet, compared to 60% of young people.
The Internet has invaded our present and will totally occupy our future. The future of the Internet is already written. Entertainment and information: these will be the contents of the Net, the same as TV.

And indeed, Web TV is already ready, combining these two interests. The Web will become a source of home entertainment; we will be able to watch a film, surf the Internet, listen to a song, write to our friends, and read a newspaper. From the comfort of our armchair at home.
The Internet is the realm of freedom, and to hell with those who judge it to be merely an instrument of personal control.
The evolution of the web cannot be stopped. We wear electronics like a second skin, and we realise it more and more every day. In Europe, 23 million people are registered on portals or sites that allow virtual encounters. No longer the old *chat room* where it was possible to hide behind a written text, today it is possible to see the person with whom one is meeting on the net, their biographical profile, and their religious beliefs. On the Internet highway, petrol stations are multiplying, as are sites that allow entertainment, friendships, and acquaintanceships between members. They explicitly meet individuals' need for social relations, which clashes with the lack of time in a complex and stressed society such as ours.

Fact Sheet 51 | The 'male question' in media stories about men

The contemporary male individual needs to exercise himself in two relational spheres that are equally emotionally involving and equally necessary for the identification of his social role and his own evolution: relationships with women and children and exclusive male-male relationships. But today men have neither the woman-with-child that soothes their private existence nor the male group, positively oriented towards common goals that enhance the quality of public life. In this trajectory, the man of the third millennium aspires to re-feel himself as a man and to re-construct the evil bonding. But in order to rename his sexual identity, he does not know whether to call himself a man or a male, as he seeks the most disparate and contradictory ways to affirm the dignity of being a man-male. After females have become women.
Eurispes has verified the state of representation of the 'men's question' using the archive of the Institute's Documentation Centre (soon to be available online), created by reading and analysing 20 of the most important national daily newspapers and sorted according to 420 topics, from 1986 to the present day. Each topic contains the article chosen to be the richest and most representative among those published on the same day on the same subject. Since 1989, the Eurispes Documentation Centre has also included the topic 'man', consisting of 691 articles. Compared to those catalogued under 'women' (3,614) since the same year, there are almost 20% fewer.
The following thematic strand groups the 691 articles:
'Men with sex problems' is the title of 161 articles dedicated to his sexual health: one defiance after another, in copulation and reproduction.
More corpulent (212) is the group of articles portraying 'men under attack': as 'attacked', in 164 articles that corroborate the oppressed and humiliated (by women, of course) face of the so-called post-feminist male, and as 'accused', in 48 articles that, relying on a kind of sociological neutrality, re-propose the denigrating bogeyman (from the male point of view, of course) of the oppressor and predator.
''Object men', (subdivided into 'vain' and 'naked') is the expression itself: make-up, scalpels, and striptease; in other words, masculinity that conquers the 'right' to an image as the mirror image of the better known femininity of the 'object woman': 93 articles speak of his propensity for cosmetic products and beauty treatments (even surgical ones), and 32 celebrate them in the new professions of cover boy, gigolo, and stripper.
The thematic strand 'New Men' (subdivided into 'fragile' and 'homely fathers') classifies 130 items that positively represent his feminization: his having become fragile and thus more human; his drive towards homemaking and looking after his offspring. His assumption of paternal responsibilities is described in terms of tender dedication rather than sullen solicitude. But when the Daddy with all the cuddles and caresses separates from the mother and, in 90% of cases, does not get custody of the children, and as a 'non-custodial parent' (so in legal parlance) suffers all sorts of things, he turns from a wuss into a lion.

Finally, the men in' the 'struggle': 44 articles, few in number but significant, speak of intellectuals and scholars of the male condition who come out into the open without fear of being accused of machismo and declare: it is the man who is the real oppressed by women and the cultural, political, and judicial systems influenced by feminism. Thus conceived, the analysis constitutes the 'Ariadne's thread' that guides the reconnaissance journey around the Italian man-male, a man not at all different from his Western brethren. " Sons of
mamma', 'latin lover', chauvinist,lazy, and a bit debauched according to the old stereotypes of Italianness, our men no longer sleep on their old, comfortable laurels.
There is a cause-and-effect link between articles about men under attack' and those describing their sex problems: since men are targeted by sexual demands, psychological aggression, blunt competitiveness, and even female violence, their sexual and reproductive apparatus is in tatters. Impotence and decreased desire are the disorders that follow the crisis of virility. But while impotence has always been there, caused by physiological as well as mental reasons, the decline in desire is presented as entirely new and all in the head because it originates from a kind of indifference to her difference, which has become unreliable and undesirable in his eyes.
But the defeat of male sexual potency dominating the news pages of newspapers (and their health inserts) turned into redemption thanks to the invention of the 'blue pill'. In 1999 and 2000, the discourse on the rediscovered (thanks to the drug) copulatory capacity of the man-male increased the number of articles from 12 in 1998 to 24 in 2000.
Later disappearing from newspapers and the media in general, Viagra is still part of the male anti-crisis paraphernalia. The annual growth in consumption of the pill, with 27 million pills sold over six years, has placed Italy in third place in the world after the USA and Germany. Purchases of the new products in 2002 and the first eight months of 2003 were around 2 million pills. But in addition to the official market, there is a vast online market that offers blue pills free of prescription and at competitive prices, from 4.50 to a maximum of 6 euros per pill, including shipping costs. Between one and a half and two million pills per year are purchased on the online market. Using a certain degree of caution, we can reasonably estimate that in the first eight months of 2003, 5 million anti-defaill pills were bought on the official market and more than 1.3 million on the Internet market, the former at an average unit price of EUR 10, the latter at an average unit price of EUR 5. By crossing the data, we obtain the total expenditure of Italians on the purchase of this type of drug (56.5 million euros). These are only male consumers because our statistics do not include female consumers. According to a study by a US health portal, female participation in Viagra consumption is around 2.5%. 56 million euros in eight months invested in sexual happiness pills is not a small amount. Nor are the 6.3 million Italians who use them, spread over a very wide age range of 35 to 80 years old, a small number.
In more recent years (from 2001 onwards), there has also been a conspicuous number of articles about a disease, naturally new, for which a name has been coined, in English of course: sex-addiction. Sex addiction has become popular since Hollywood actors and actresses have confessed to being affected and unhappy enough to have to resort to psychiatric treatment. According to the newspapers, in Italy, the syndrome of Michael Douglas and Sharon Stone affects 6% of males between 20 and 45 years of age and 4% of females, an almost bisexual figure.
From men ruined in health, we move on to those ruined by loss of authority and reputation*: 'men under attack'*.
Among the articles lumped together under the heading 'assaulted' (164 out of 212) are many editorials, with titles that lament the lost male or incite him to raise his head: 'Males without power', 'Poor apathetic male', 'Come forward male', 'Males, rebel'.
'On her side', albeit indirectly, are the articles (48 out of 212) under the heading 'accused men'.
Under the subject heading *'Object Men',* 125 articles are classified: 93 talk about his make-up and make-up, and 32 about his nudity.
Every year in the newspapers, information on the state of the cosmetics industry never fails to inspire articles with various vague anthropological considerations. Many articles in 2003 report that in 2002, Italians spent just over 8 million euros on cosmetics. Men's consumption accounts for 30 percent of the total, but this cannot be measured because it is spread over a myriad of products. The only share of

expenditure that can be ascertained is that on traditional male products: shaving foams, aftershaves, deodorants, and perfumes 'for him'.

What is really new in today's male scenario is the transversality of liking and pleasure. After the striving for beauty and the unveiling of it, Men strip themselves naked on calendars until they arrive in strip tease clubs and fill the Palasport in Bologna on the occasion of 'Women's Day' that same year.

The phenomenon of 'buying a man' has not become (and is far from becoming) mass, but has settled down into a niche phenomenon. In the research on the prices of sexual services 'Open for Holidays: An Investigation into the Sex Market (Eurispes 2003), the extent of the male offer was identified based on 150 advertisements in local newspapers and gazettes, specialised magazines, and on the Internet, which were monitored to derive price standards. On this statistical basis, it emerged that male advertisements made up 3% of the female ones.

The clientele, according to the prostitutes themselves, is petty-middle-class, mainly between the ages of 25 and 45, and made up of two types of women: the manager and the housewife, where the manager is any employed or self-employed woman, and the housewife is any unemployed or intermittently employed woman who skimps on groceries to pay for entertainment.

The articles classified under the heading 'Object Men' signal the advent of men's monthlies with a certain sass. What do readers demand from their monthly magazines? That they deal with health (62%), sexuality (53%), and nutrition (32%). No culture, no society, and gossip less so.

There are 130 articles classified under the heading 'New Men'. We have divided them into two headings: those

(35) who insist on the figure of the man 'as fragile as glass' and those (95) on fathers capable of taking on the traditional maternal function: looking after their children with love, affection, and understanding, abdicating the role of *pater familias*. The new fathers encroach upon the household men, in love with hoovers and kitchen rags. The men-at-home are of three types: those who consider domestic work and childcare their main activity, if it is the wife who brings home the income; those who declare themselves collaborative partners; and those who proclaim themselves single and/or happy father-boys.

The 44 articles, classified under the thematic strand 'Men in Struggle', give an account of men organised as men when they make curious or striking news. Three are the common goals of the men's movement: abolish paternity by compulsion as a counterbalance to the fact that women are allowed the right to abortion. Abolish 'equal opportunity' laws. Abolish the legal culture, laws, and jurisprudential practise that favour women in separation and divorce cases, including the allocation of the common home, the receipt of alimony, and child custody. Fatherhood, say the masculinists, has been reduced to a mere economic item.

The claim of the men's movement not to be deprived of their children after separations is the one that has the greatest social and popular resonance in all Western countries. In Italy, 80,000 separations and 40,000 divorces per year, with more than 1,400 children and adolescents involved (not per year, of course, but over the course of their lives as minor children of separated and divorced men) constitute a nerve centre, the most neuralgic node of the men's issue.

Fact Sheet 52 | The European fight against 'child pornography': internet under scrutiny

Law No. 269 of 1998, entitled 'Rules against the Exploitation of Prostitution, Pornography, and Sex Tourism to the Detriment of Minors as New Forms of Enslavement, introduced two important innovations. The first concerns the criminalization not only of the producers and disseminators of child pornography but also of the consumers; the second concerns the possibility of carrying out police investigations (obviously by order of the judicial authority) into child pornography using undercover agents. Their function accompanies the 24-hour monitoring of pornographic sites carried out by the Department of the Postal and Communications Police with the aim of identifying child pornography sites. Specialised agents acting undercover can either set up 'covert sites' to attract consumers of illegal material or pretend to be consumers themselves in order to frame those who put illegal material online. Their initiatives, of course, must be communicated to the Judicial Authority, which may, with a reasoned

decree, even allow investigative activities to continue until the conclusion of the investigation without hindering it with the necessary seizures of the materials found and reported.
The judiciary and the police thus have a very broad mandate, which has enabled a number of wide-ranging operations to be carried out in recent years. In 2003, there were two main operations. The first, called 'Sisko's Club, was directed by the Venice Public Prosecutor's Office and involved the whole of Northern Italy in a series of searches that led to the seizure of computers as well as 78 charges for possession of material pertaining to the sexual exploitation of minors. The 'Clean Web' operation coordinated by the Caltagirone Public Prosecutor's Office led to 63 people being reported and two being arrested.
Albeit with caution, an analysis of some data suggests that the punishment of sexual offences against minors under Law No. 269 (including those of dealing in and possession of child pornography via the Internet) is difficult. In fact, criminal statistics tell us that in 2001, as many as 577 people were investigated, of whom 61 were convicted and 14 were imprisoned.
In order to provide investigative insights and scientific data on websites providing child pornographic material, the international P.W.S.A. project was set up. The UACI (Computer Crime Analysis Unit) periodically disseminates the (non-confidential) information of the State Police on the State Police website and in various scientific periodicals because it converges on this project.
A special Uaci team thus carries out, after the investigative monitoring phase, further and more in-depth surveys on the structure of these sites, their geographical location, and the material they contain. The research results disclosed for the first time in a sheet of the 4th National Report on the Condition of Childhood and Adolescence produced by Eurispes were processed on a sample of 1,000 sites.
The data show that the 'host' countries are the US (76%), followed by Canada (5%) and the Netherlands (3%). The reason for this choice may be linked to three factors: First, the United States and Canada have a huge number of sites, which makes it more difficult for providers to monitor them. Secondly, the habit of complete management of the site by the owner, who freely uses the purchased web space without the service provider having any control over the material placed on the server, is widespread in these countries. Thirdly, the US legal culture, as we shall see, offers a highly protective attitude with respect to content placed online.
The data also show that 85 percent of child pornography sites are at least partly pay-per-view; in particular, while 28 percent are only pay-per-view, 57 percent contain
a free section designed primarily to entice customers to download paid material. The predominantly paid nature of the sites greatly reduces the possibility of downloading material by mistake. However, the high cost of paedophile material leads some users to organise parallel exchanges through free sites, where material purchased on paid sites often converges.
In the sample of sites analysed, the prevalence of children photographed or filmed is female (87%); 11% propose subjects of both sexes.
The age group of 4 to 10 years (apparently) alone accounts for half of the children photographed, while the group technically defined as 'lolitism' (14 to 16 years) accounts for 13% of the admissions; 11 to 13-year-olds account for 6% of the cases, and children up to 3 years old account for 1%. According to the Pwsa researchers, this information therefore suggests the prevalent interest of child pornography users in young children, and this factor represents, from a psychopathological point of view, an unequivocal presence of paedophilic paraphilia in a severe form. Interest in adolescent children (with developed secondary sexual characteristics) tends to be the prerogative of paedophiles with a less severe clinical picture. On the other hand, many sites (around 30%) offer children of various ages, presumably to meet the tastes of the majority of consumers who frequent such sites.
The majority of photographed children (75%) appear to have European or US somatic features. A very small proportion of the analysed sites (2%) contain predominantly Asian children, while there are a fair number of pages (around 23%) containing photos of children of various races.
The origin of children with European somatic features is, in fact, uncertain. In theoretical connection with studies on sex tourism, a certain provenance from Eastern European countries and South America can be assumed. 75% of the photos analysed depict children engaged in explicit sexual activities; 19% show minors naked even if not engaged in such activities.

The type of material present in 98% of the analysed sites concerns photographs, normally of good resolution if professionally produced (in a studio) and of mediocre quality if amateur. Photographs represent the most agile medium, being quick to download. But also videos (63%), as well as live webcams (34%), are often present on child pornography sites (it is precisely on webcams that a specific Uaci study is under way).
Finally, the presence of comic strips in 7% of the cases is a matter of particular criminological and investigative interest (a specific Uaci study is under way on this). Only in 1% of the analysed sites are the contents of child pornography images made explicit through the narration of a story.
The prevalence of the analysed sites is 69%, aimed at users who are purely interested in child pornography. The operators of most of the sites, therefore, presumably tend to target a specific market segment.
The presence of child pornography within an adult site effectively makes such a site illegal and requires special precautions. There are, however, 31% of pornographic sites that contain a small section devoted to child pornography, although these are often 'tricks' achieved through various stratagems (e.g., making up a very young and small woman as a child).

Fact Sheet 53 | Sexual violence against women

The 'real' dimensions of sexual violence against women are mainly found in the underground: sexual violence is, in fact, a crime that invades the intimate, private sphere of the person, with physical, but above all psychological, consequences of a profound nature.
The reference points for examining crimes that do not enter the official path of justice are the research carried out by the various anti-violence centres operating in Italy.
A survey conducted between September 1997 and January 1998 included the section 'Harassment and sexual violence' and represents, to date, the only nationwide 'official' survey of sexual violence that does not result in a complaint. The survey was carried out by means of telephone interviews with women between 14 and 59 years of age, with two time references: violence suffered in the last three years and violence suffered in the course of a lifetime.
The number of women who have experienced rape or attempted rape in their lifetime is very high: 'There are 714,000. There are 185,000 who have experienced it in the last three years'. Only a small percentage of these crimes, however, are reported.
The propensity to denounce is higher in the case of actual rapes, presumably due to the greater seriousness of the crime, while it decreases significantly for attempted rapes. "It is interesting to note the higher incidence of reports of sexual violence in the last three years, which, in accordance with the current trend in judicial statistics, could show important signs of female awareness and greater determination to deal with the situation".
It must be remembered, however, that this trend was detected almost six years ago, and no research has been repeated in this regard.
The survey also denounces another important aspect that characterises sexual violence, especially from the point of view of the undeclared: only 21.7% of rapes and attempted rapes occurred at the hands of strangers. The vast majority of rapes, therefore, occurred at the hands of known persons: friends, relatives, spouses, boyfriends, colleagues, or employers; furthermore, only 14.9% were committed in the street. The places most at risk proved to be precisely those generally considered less dangerous: one's own home, the home of friends, the offender's home, or the workplace.
Multivariate analysis, specifically *cluster analysis*, *made* it possible to highlight the fundamental dimensions of the phenomenon: Six types of sexual violence were identified, of which '*unexpected violence: friends, boyfriends, and acquaintances*' was the most widespread. This category accounts for more than half of the sexual violence detected (54.2 percent). 'These are mainly unreported attempted rapes (98.7 percent). Such a low reporting rate is explained by the type of relationship that existed between the victim and the offender: acquaintances in 30% of cases, friends in 39.4%, and boyfriends

in 10.7%. The most frequent places of violence are, in order, the home of friends (25.3%), the car (17%), and one's own home (11.1%); thus, people known in unexpected places

Only in second place is '*street rape*', which accounts for 22.5% of rapes or attempted rapes, carried out mainly by strangers (85.8%), especially in the street (64.6%). The propensity to denounce in this case increases considerably, reaching 22.4 percent of all rapes detected; however, the amount of undeclared violence remains very high.

From 1993 to 2001, the number of reports of sexual violence tripled, from 866 to 2,447; from 1993 to 1996, in particular, the increase was less substantial, at 32.9%, while it became more conspicuous after 1996: from 1996 to 2001, the increase was 112.6%. However, it is impossible to detect a constant trend in this phenomenon; there is a fluctuating growth that only comes to a halt in 1995. It would be wrong, however, to associate this trend solely with the effects of the new law (from 1995 to 1996, the increase was 21.7%).

Sexual violence perpetrated against children under the age of 14 also seems to have greater visibility, accounting for more than 25% of the total number of reports since 1996. We should not forget, then, the enormous media interest that has invested in the phenomenon of paedophilia in recent years, providing strong resonance and public visibility to acts of sexual violence against minors; so much so that sexual abuse is now almost always associated with the figure of minors, reproducing the same interest and the same indignation that years ago, just before the promulgation of the new law, had characterised sexual violence against women.

It is striking, however, that in both cases, for women and children, only a small percentage of the complaints made are against unknown persons, a percentage that never goes beyond 20 percent, the highest peak recorded in 2000. This means that in more than 80% of the cases, the victim knew the perpetrator of the violence.

Lombardy holds the record for the number of reports of sexual violence, averaging one-sixth of those filed nationwide for all five years considered. In Lombardy, in fact, the number of reports increased, not only in absolute terms (from 161 to 400), but also as a percentage of the total number of reports filed in Italy, rising from 14% to 16.4%. Veneto and Lazio also witnessed the growth of the phenomenon in absolute and percentage terms. Veneto gained two percentage points over the five-year period under consideration, from 5.8% to 8%; Lazio gained more than four, rising from 8% in 1996 to 12.4% in 2001 and establishing itself as the region with the largest increase in complaints in the years examined.

Exactly the opposite is true for Campania, which saw its relative weight of complaints halve from 1996 to 2001, going from 10% in 1996 (when it was second only to Lombardy) to 5.6% in 2001.

The other regions, while following the trend of quantitative growth in complaints, maintain their percentage almost unchanged compared to the general Italian situation.

With regard to criminal proceedings actually commenced during the years under consideration, of interest are the data collected concerning reported persons against whom the judicial authorities took criminal action and those concerning convicted persons, the latter broken down by gender and age group.

From 1996 to 2001, the number of persons reported for whom criminal proceedings were initiated increased; the percentage increase is 33.8%; however, this growth does not follow a constant trend and comes to a halt in 1999, when 169 fewer persons were reported than in 1998. The decline continued in the following year, when approximately 1,000 fewer criminal proceedings were registered than in 1999. In 2001, however, there was again an increase, which was 44.2% compared to the previous year.

The survey also includes reported women for whom criminal proceedings have been initiated; in the years under consideration, the incidence of women is small but not insignificant. In 1996, in particular, it reaches the highest proportion recorded in the five-year period under review (6.3%) and then settles at around 4%. The only exception is 2000, when the female presence drops to 0.2 percent of the total; in that year, only four women were reported in criminal proceedings. Data on the sex of the victims, the modalities of the crime, and whether it was harassment, rape, or gang violence are not available; for this reason, it is difficult to establish whether the modalities of the crime differ according to the sex of the persons reported.

One more element is available in the case of those convicted of sexual violence offences. In this case, in fact, the breakdown by age group is also present.

Those convicted between 1996 and 2001 were predominantly aged between 18 and 44, with a peak of convictions for sexual violence among 25-34-year-olds. In second place are those aged between 35 and 44, with the exception of 1996, when convictions were highest among 18- to 24-year-olds. On the other hand, few minors (14 years of age and older) are convicted of this offence. The male-female comparison, on the other hand, shows the clear supremacy of men, who account for at least 98% of those convicted for all the years examined. There have therefore been very few convictions against women in the last five years.
According to data for 2002, 19.4% of people aged 14 years and over are very worried about being subjected to sexual violence, 16.9% are quite worried, 25.4% are not very worried, and 38.3% are not worried at all. Overall, therefore, more than one third (36.3%) of people aged 14 and over are worried about the risk of sexual violence.
As might be expected, the gender of the subjects is a determining variable for the perception of the risk of sexual violence and the importance attached to it. As many as 45% of women are, in fact, fairly or very concerned about being subjected to sexual violence, compared to a smaller 26.9% of men. Women have fewer possibilities to defend themselves and are traditionally the most common victims of violence, including sexual violence.
Taking the age of the subjects into consideration, it can be observed that it is above all the youngest, i.e., the most vulnerable and most exposed to the risk of sexual violence, who are the most frightened: 46.8% of 14- to 24-year-olds. This trend is particularly noticeable for females: 63.2 percent of women between 14 and 24 years of age and about 55 percent of those between 25 and 44 years of age declare themselves concerned; the percentages gradually decrease as age increases.
At least for young women, the fear and concern of falling victim to sexual violence are therefore extremely widespread.
Men, on the other hand, show more concern between the ages of 35 and 54 and, with slightly less frequency, between the ages of 14 and 24.
The geographical areas of the country where the percentage of people worried about being subjected to violence of a sexual nature is highest are the South (38.2%), the Islands (37.2%), and the North-West (37%); the lowest percentage is in the North-East (33.3%). The regions where fear is highest are those in which crime is most widespread and those in which the large metropolises are concentrated: Apulia (41.2%), Campania (40.3%), Lazio (39.7%), and Lombardy (39%); the opposite is true in Valle d'Aosta (24.6%) and Trentino Alto Adige (26.7%). It is above all the inhabitants of the suburbs of metropolitan areas (41.2%) and the inner cities of metropolitan areas (40.8%) who feel exposed to the risk of sexual abuse.
Concern about this kind of danger is therefore related to the perception of the probability of the danger itself; those who live in centres where crime is more widespread are therefore more anxious. Sexual violence is a very complex phenomenon, the study of which must inevitably cover multiple dimensions; in Italy, however, there are still no surveys that provide a complete overview of the phenomenon.

Fact Sheet 54 | The agencies of hope, the search for a soul mate

Looking for a soul mate has become more difficult today. According to a recent survey, 56% of Italians do not have time to cope effectively with their daily commitments, while, according to another survey, 79% of those who turn to a matrimonial agency do so mainly for lack of time. In other words, despite the fact that there have been more opportunities for human contact, the deterioration of ideals and the accelerated pace of life have resulted in relationships between men that are distrustful, suspicious, or even temporary, superficial, or marginal. Men then found themselves faced with completely new situations in that the economic independence and greater life experiences that work allows have put women on an equal, or almost equal, footing with them, as a result of which they have necessarily had to give up their former authority and established position of dominance.
Since 1996, the number of marriages celebrated in Italy has not decreased except in 2001 (-7%), and even in 2002, their number increased significantly.

Unfortunately, litigiousness between spouses is also on the rise: from 1995 to 2000, couple instability caused separations to increase by 37.5% and divorces by 38.9%.
Meeting a soul mate can take place in many ways: there is the casual one (at school, at parties, meetings, presentations, etc.), the one that stems from a friendship begun in clubs, institutes, or associations, and the one planned perhaps through a matrimonial agency. But how many Italians turn to an agency?
A recent survey found that the number of regularly registered agencies in Italy increased by 77% over the previous three years, from 246 in 2000 to 436 in 2003. This impressive increase gives an idea of the potential that this particular economic sector offers.
The data analysis shows that as many as two-thirds of the companies operating in the lonely hearts market operate in the North of Italy, with the rest equally distributed between the centre and the South. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that 5% of the southern and 6% of the central Italian provinces are, so to speak, 'deprived' of this particular service.
Data on the major Italian cities confirm that most marriage agencies are located in the North: in the first seven positions, with the exception of Rome, all the others are northern cities.
More unbalanced appears the situation in the centre, where in fact Florence and Rome host as many as 36 of the 78 matrimonial agencies surveyed in this macro area.
With the exception of Abruzzo, only the northern Italian regions have more than one agency for every 100,000 inhabitants over the age of 18, a figure that certifies the indisputable greater development in the north of this particular economic sector.
But who today, at the dawn of the third millennium, in an era when telecommunications are developing at an unprecedented pace, turns to a matrimonial agency?
36%, i.e., more than one third of the agencies surveyed, stated that they have a predominantly male clientele, while only 12% of the agencies claim to have predominantly female clients. As for the age of those who use a matrimonial agency, the majority of the agencies stated that they have clients who are now in their early forties, while only 4% of the agencies stated that they have mainly clients over 60.
One third of Italian agencies have mainly freelancers and entrepreneurs as their predominant clients, people who are therefore fulfilled in their professional lives but clearly not in their sentimental ones.
It can also be deduced that the weight of the divorced is considerable within the clientele of the agencies of the heart; in fact, only 12% of them state that single clients outnumber divorced ones, while the remaining 88% of the agencies state that those who have already had a matrimonial experience are about the same number as the single ones, if not even prevalent.
In short, from the examined data, we can attempt to elaborate on the real identity of the typical client of a matrimonial agency: he is male, with a good social position, divorced, and from the North. The majority of agencies are mainly concentrated in the North, but it is not enough to rely on a matrimonial agency to solve one's romantic problems; 61% of Italian agencies state that
Only 20–30% of their customers can say they have found someone they can fall in love with.
In this connection, however, it is worth mentioning a recently released figure of 20% separations and divorces out of the total number of marriages celebrated through a matrimonial agency. It is a sad figure that must nevertheless be evaluated positively if we consider that the percentage of separations and divorces in traditional unions is much higher (almost double: 39%).
But how long does it take to find a soul mate? Obviously, it depends on the situation, and this is what most agencies say; however, we can see that for almost one in three agencies (30.5%), most clients manage to find their soul mate in less than three months, so the lightning strike is also permissible in marriage agencies.
What should the ideal partner be like, then? For women, the criterion of practicality applies; they want a mature person with an established job position; men, on the other hand, who are more romantic, would almost all prefer to simply fall in love with a beautiful girl; on the other hand, why criticise them for this choice if the young and beautiful woman has ended up filling three quarters of the entire literary production with her presence, and if we think that famous poets and writers ranging from Catullus to Dante, from Petrarch to Foscolo, and from Leopardi to D'Annunzio all fell in love with the dazzling beauty of young maidens?
Those who want to find their soul mate cannot get by, in most cases, for less than EUR 500; however, it must be emphasised that 'the service of a matrimonial agency is always personalised...

Comparing the prices charged by traditional agencies with those of Internet-based matrimonial agencies, as many as 27% of online agencies offer prices of less than EUR 300. Without a doubt, using the Internet can save a lot of money, but one must also exercise extreme caution to avoid falling victim to the thousands of traps that are present online (60%).
Although a recent survey states that 11% of Italians prefer to marry a foreign woman, and despite the fact that the number of marriages with a spouse from across the border has almost doubled in just four years, one in four agencies in Italy still does not include the possibility of meeting foreigners among its services.
In the United States, looking for a soul mate is becoming a real business; in fact, the Wall Street Journal estimated the annual turnover of matrimonial agencies at around USD 600 million. But in Italy, how much does one earn from a matrimonial agency?
Based on this investment plan, it can be deduced that a matrimonial agency with two employees and a minimum of 30 new registrations per month can achieve an average monthly gross profit of at least 9,000 euros. It should be noted that this study also clearly shows that it is mainly in the North that prospective agencies can find a greater economic return.

Fact Sheet 55 | The new old age: Viagra, Velone, and their many ambitions

It is wrong to think that the elderly put sexuality in the scrapbook, uncritically accepting the advancing years with resignation and sometimes with a premature renunciation of the joys of the thalamus. One study estimated that complete sexual acts continue to be performed by 95 percent of 50-year-olds but also by 28 percent of those over 70. Even in the 80- to 102-year-old age group, some 75 percent of men and two-thirds of women are still reported to be sexually active, perhaps through the mutual exchange of caresses and affection.
Women, as we have seen, do not disdain sex until late in life, with their urges and desires hitherto considered unmentionable. Forty percent of women in the 75–79 age group claim to have a fulfilling and regular sexual life.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the belief that sex can harm the elderly must be dispelled.
Sex, therefore, is among the ingredients that help one live longer and better. With the arrival of grey hair, males are no longer willing to pull the oars in the boat, instead often launching themselves into daring and risky conquests, sometimes outside the stable relationship and perhaps with the useful stimulus of the latest generation of drugs.
The spread of Viagra and similar products is living testimony to this. Within five years of the market launch of this new stimulant product, designed to combat erectile dysfunction, there has been an exponential growth in Viagra consumption.
Last year, in the 115 countries around the world where Viagra is distributed, 875 million pills were consumed, according to data provided by the manufacturer, based on 120 million prescriptions made by over 600,000 doctors. In Europe, consumption was estimated to be on the order of 148 million, while in our country, over 20 million pills were sold. Italy would rank third among consumer countries, after England and Germany, followed by France and Germany.
Average consumption in Italy is said to be one pill per week, with users with an average age of 54 years who would preferably use a dosage of 50 mg. In terms of the spread of knowledge about Viagra, it is worth mentioning that an average of 8 medical publications per week and as many as 275 articles dedicated to erectile dysfunction appear on the subject out of 1,300 total publications.
The pharmaceutical companies, sensitive to the changing demand, continue their targeted research, bringing more products onto the market. Thus Cialis was born, which ensured a longer duration of action than Viagra, so much so that it was jokingly referred to as the 'weekend pill'.
The recovery of a fervour to live and play more efficient roles is not only limited to the medical-sexual sphere. Problems with appearance and aesthetics are just as present in older people. Anti-ageing creams, exfoliating and depilatory creams, and dermatological products to lighten sun spots and other skin imperfections are now widely consumed, so the cosmetic industries are broadening their market

horizons, targeting the 'over 60s'. The latter are those who spend the most, responding to the identity of affluent people and eager to care for their physical appearance without worrying excessively about spending.
Recent data show that in 2002, Italians spent a total of 8,000 million euros on cosmetic products, a volume confirmed for 2003 with a slight increase. The trend is strongly positive in the case of male adults, with an increase of 2.5 percent compared to 0.5 percent for women, who, however, account for 70 percent of total consumption. In addition, nourishing, moisturising, and exfoliating creams increased by 8.4% and anti-ageing creams by 4%.
Over the five-year period 1995–2000, the percentages of males and females devoting leisure time to body care increased significantly, with the slight exception of males in the 60–64 age group.
which, in practise, maintains the same percentage levels. In all other segments, increases ranging from two to over seven points can be noted in the percentage of body care users.
The 'V.V. Age' announces itself, therefore, as the age of the senile Renaissance, which is progressively erasing all rigid boundaries between different age groups.
Even the new technology of computers and mobile phones arouses curiosity, and even grandparents like it.
Conquered by the wave of consumerism of these products, perhaps because they are more aware of their usefulness, the 'over-60s' are abandoning the stereotyped role of the physically weak, defenceless elderly person who is impervious to innovation. The findings of the most recent studies carried out in the United States, which for 2003 indicate that about 27% of Americans over 55 use the web, confirm this. In 2005, it is estimated that as many as 3.2 million British pensioners will be using the Internet.
The elderly, having become sufficiently familiar with computers, start using them frequently; i.e., they become paradoxically computer-addicted, spending on average more than 8 hours a week in front of the desktop, more than teenagers and university students.
In Italy, pensioners who regularly connect to the Internet already exceed 2%. Learning the proper use of computers is no longer the responsibility of children or grandchildren, eager to initiate their loved ones into the use of a useful and modern tool, but also through computer courses for the elderly organised in some Italian cities. The figures are much higher than one might think.
Already in 2000, the respondents pointed out that spending on communication was ranked among the 'must-haves', with health (91%) and food (85%) coming next. The results of the survey revealed that as many as 39.4% of the 'over 60s' have a mobile phone and 17.2% own a computer.
Microsoft, having taken note of this huge pool of users, in collaboration with Telecom Italia, opened the first Internet-Saloon in Milan as part of the 'Internet, grandparents, and grandchildren' project, which in two years has issued 12,000 diplomas of proficiency in the use of computers. The Net, moreover, is not stingy with sites dedicated to the elderly, from playful ones to those concerning domestic and health problems.
The face of the elderly at the beginning of this millennium is therefore changing: 76% of them enjoy good health and say they are happy; 26% say they are ready to adapt to change; 39% want to follow innovations; and 44% want to travel.
Increasingly young, increasingly active, and with a great desire to travel—this is the identity of the modern elderly.
The sector relating to this age group is expanding so strongly that it is attracting the attention of tour operators. Attention that is almost obligatory given that today Italy has over 14 million people over the age of 60, and the number of citizens in this age group is set to grow by 20% in the next 20 years.
Demand for this sector continues to grow: spas and sanctuaries now attract only 5.7% and 4.3% of travellers, respectively, while the most popular destinations are the seaside, cruises (45%), and trips abroad (13%). According to the Italian Foreign Exchange Office, our compatriots over 65 who took a holiday abroad in 2001 totaled 1.9 million, or 3.94% of the total. They spent 289 million euros for a total of 5.08 million overnight stays (2.28% of the total).
Italians 'over 65' travel predominantly in Europe, with 18% of overnight stays in France, Switzerland (17.8%), Austria (7.2%), Croatia (7%), and Germany (6%).

In Switzerland, they spent 57 million euros in 2001; in France, 39; in Austria, 24; and in Germany, 23. The figures, updated to October 2002, show a total of 332 million euros spent abroad by the over-65s, an increase of 30.7%, with overnights amounting to 6.1 million compared to 4.7 million in 2001.
According to the survey of February 17, 2003, on tourism in 2002 and expectations for 2003, the 'over 60' population is increasingly on the move.
According to data from another survey, 'The Third Age in Tourism', more than 32 million trips were made by people aged 60 and over. In 63% of cases, it was a long holiday with four or more overnight stays. A predilection for group travel persists, with one notable variant from the past, namely that groups of travellers no longer prefer small pensions but opt for three- and four-star hotels. Elderly Italians use 38% of the organised departures; they are very good consumers and also rather demanding. 72.2% would like to know their food preferences in advance, and 71.9% would like to know who their travelling companions are.
The assertion then that 'grandparents', if they did not exist, would have to be 'invented, seems to find valid arguments in the statistical data.
In general, 70.8% of the 'over 60s' enjoy the status of grandparents, have on average about 4 grandchildren, and enjoy good health. Although only 10% of grandparents and grandchildren live together, relationships between the two generations are still frequent. Every week, grandparents over 40 see their grandchildren a few times (71.1%) and talk to each other on the phone (52.7%). In most cases, grandparents and grandchildren live relatively close to each other, and, in the case of the over-65s, 1 in 6 shares the same urban block with one or more grandchildren, and 1 in 4 lives within a kilometre radius.
With regard to the care of grandchildren, grandmothers excel. Only 13% never take care of them, compared to 18.8% of grandparents.
19% of the 'over 60s' take up sport, 11% volunteer, and 6% go back to school or university.
Grandmothers also play a variety of roles within the family system, which they ultimately influence. In fact, there are grandmothers who pursue their own independent life projects, still investing a lot in both work activities and in the direction of leisure, travel, cultural projects, and social life.
According to the latest census, out of a population of around 57 million, the 'over-65s' weigh in at 6,250,878 compared to 4,311,057 for men. As many as 25.7% of women in this age group continue to work or manage to find new employment.
Today's elderly person ultimately continues to be a supportive element for the next generation while not giving up future plans for himself.
As many as 53% of the 'over 60s' in 2002 claimed to have created new interests, and as many as 43% of them admitted to having plans for the future.
In fact, managers with silver tongues run six out of every hundred pink companies. An army of almost 130,000 women, with Milan in the lead (11,000), followed by Turin (over 6,000), Naples (5,120), and Rome (4,550), but the highest incidences of their presence in entrepreneurship are recorded in the South. Caltanissetta leads the ranking with almost 10% of companies administered by Fair Sex, followed by Brindisi with 9.2% and Foggia with 9%. All data that definitively clears the 'new grandmothers' of the obsolete model of the crochet and soap opera
Populations are ageing, an effect of declining fertility and increasing longevity.
By 2150, one third of the world's population as a whole will be over 60 years old. But the bet is by no means lost.

Fact Sheet 56 | Psychotropic drugs: the happy pills?...whose?

A survey carried out by Farmindustria notes that the total (public and private) per capita pharmaceutical expenditure in Italy in 2002 was EUR 304.19, a value of

- higher than in the Netherlands (€ 272.53), Greece (€ 273.74), Spain (€ 274.66), and Portugal (€ 280.15);
- lower than in the United Kingdom (EUR 364.67), Belgium (EUR 390.87), Germany (EUR 408.58), and France (EUR 456.44);

- extremely lower than the pharmaceutical expenditure per capita in Japan (euro 567.57) and the United States (euro 1,301.95).

Public health expenditure rose by 5.1% compared to 2001, from 74,957 to 78,796 million euros, broken down as follows:

- 9% for hospital services
- 3% for other health benefits and services
- 9% for the purchase of medicines by the SSN
- 4% allocated to contracted general medicine
- 9% for administrative services
- 6% for financial charges and contributions
-

Against this increase, there was a moderate increase in public pharmaceutical expenditure (+0.5%), amounting to EUR 11,723 million, which grew less than in other major European countries (Germany +5%, UK +10%, France +13.6%).

Private pharmaceutical expenditure in 2002, on the other hand, increased over the previous year by 6.1%, from €5,559 million to €5,896 million, with an average per capita expenditure of €101.74, but with noteworthy regional differences. The regions of southern and insular Italy settle at an average per capita expenditure of €81.57, 10% lower than the previous year; those of central Italy at an average expenditure of €107.57 (-2.3% compared to 2001); and the regions of northern Italy spend an average of €115.42 (a decrease of 4.6% compared to the previous year). The highest private expenditure is in Liguria: € 152.79 (part of the amount is made up of the ticket); the lowest, € 59.93, is in Basilicata.

Compared to the main OECD countries, Italy records:

- the lowest number of packages on the market (after France): 8,903 compared to 90,000 in the US, 30,000 in Japan, 19,302 in Germany, 14,756 in Switzerland, 12,633 in Austria, 10,184 in the Netherlands, and 10,000 in the UK;
- the lowest number of 'packs per inhabitant' (after France): 154 compared to 2,166 in Switzerland, 1,967 in Ireland, 1,552 in Austria, 1,208 in Denmark, 1,012 in Norway, 866 in Sweden, 846 in Finland, 655 in Belgium, 629 in the Netherlands, 326 in the US, 235 in Japan, 234 in Germany, 208 in Spain, and 170 in the UK.

Pharmaceutical consumption decreased in Italy (-0.4%) and France (-1.5%) while it increased in the other main industrialised countries: Greece (+15%), the UK (+3.7), the US (+3.6%), Portugal (+3.3%), Japan (+2.8%), Germany (+2.4%), Spain (+1.5%), and Belgium (+0.4%) (IMS data).

Nevertheless, Italy is the sixth-largest country in the world in terms of total pharmaceutical sales (sales through pharmacies and to hospitals), after the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

Investment in research by the pharmaceutical industry amounted to € 914 million in 2002, while employment in the pharmaceutical sector increased by 6.2% to 83,670.

of which 5,080 (4,658 in 2001) were used in research. The new Osmed report on the use of pharmaceuticals in Italy for the first nine months of 2003 reveals that national territorial pharmaceutical expenditure (public and private) increased by about 2%; net expenditure by the National Health Service fell by 7.1% compared to the same period in 2002, settling at about €8,241 million; gross expenditure fell for the first time since 1995 (-3.5%); and private expenditure rose by 15.9%.

On the whole, the decrease does not seem to be due to a change in the pharmaceutical quantities prescribed (which remain stable) but rather to a strong decrease in prices (-6.4%), obtained both through the direct manoeuvre of a 2% reduction in the price of pharmaceuticals as of January 2003 (which is added to the 5% reduction already introduced in April 2002) and to the application of the cut-off criterion to the homogeneous categories of pharmaceuticals of the new National Pharmaceutical Catalogue (NFP). At the regional level, the trend in pharmaceutical expenditure is by no means uniform due to the different expenditure control policies adopted in the regions. Net per capita expenditure ranges from €115.31 (Piedmont) to €177.59 (Lazio) and, like gross expenditure, decreases for all regions except Sardinia and Lazio. The strongest decrease is recorded in Lombardy (-14.4%) and can be partly explained by the introduction of co-payments, which only took place in December 2002, as well as in

Piedmont, Trentino Alto Adige, Liguria, Latium, Abruzzi, Molise, Apulia, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia.
A recent study takes a snapshot of the relationship between Italian households and the management of medicines. Responses from around 300 households showed that 92% keep medicines at home: 9% have more than 20 packs in stock, 65% have at least 10 packs, and 26% have between 10 and 20 packs.
According to Farmindustria, the consumption of medicines in 2001 was awarded the golden palm for the leap forward made in twelve months to antacids and anti-ulcer drugs (+15.8%), anti-asthmatic drugs (+13.7%), and antidepressants (+11.5%), and for the 33.3% increase in the value consumption of the same drugs. An analysis of the consumption of antidepressants by the Verona Local Health Authority pharmaceuticals service found that in four years, from 1998 to 2001, the sale of psychotropic drugs increased by 60%. The use of the new antidepressants in particular has risen (+150%), 25% of which are also prescribed for anxiety disorders, panic attacks, eating disorders, and obsessions. Seventy percent of patients taking antidepressant pills are women, but consumption among 15- to 44-year-olds is also on the rise, accounting for almost 30% of consumption (up from 16% in 1998), once a monopoly of the elderly. In 2003, the drugs for which the largest decreases were recorded (mainly attributable to the Pfn revision) were those for the respiratory system (-32.1%) and dermatological drugs (-73.5%), while they increased both in terms of expenditure per capita and in terms of consumption: drugs of the cardiovascular system (+6.9%) and the prescription of drugs of the central nervous system (+6.6%), in particular SSRI antidepressants (+14.2%), and among these citalopram and paroxetine (tables 5 and 6). By contrast, the consumption of tricyclic antidepressants fell by 7%.
In October 2003, 4,831,161 pharmaceutical packages were sold for the central nervous system, which was in percentage terms the most sold (7.6%), after those for the cardiovascular system, the gastrointestinal system, and general antimicrobials for systemic use.
Within the category, after antiepileptics, it is psychoanaleptics that record the highest number of detached packages: 903,770, or 39.4% of the packages. It should be recalled that psycho-analeptics include mood stimulants or antidepressants and vigilance stimulants, also known as nootropics (amphetamines and caffeine). The following data also makes us reflect on the incidence of psychic distress in children. With regard to Adhd, for example, the Emilia Romagna region estimates that 4% of children between 0 and 13 years of age are affected (16,384 estimated cases that, projected on a national scale, become 350,000), while the Italian Society of Paediatrics estimates that there are no more than 250 cases in Italy.
The analysis of psychotropic drug prescriptions in a paediatric population of 614,452 children and adolescents between the ages of 0 and 18 monitored since 1997 is not comforting. Using the data bank built and managed by Cineca, in which 27 Local Health Authorities participate, the researchers found that in 2000 alone, according to data referring to the prescriptions of four regions (Veneto, Liguria, Tuscany, and Piedmont), those treated with antidepressants, more numerous in the 14–18 age group, were 1.7 per thousand, or 1,064. On a national scale, this comes to 20,000.

Fact Sheet 57 | Obesity and the eating styles of the Italian population

In Western countries, obesity is the second-most common cause of death after smoking. In fact, it represents a risk factor for a number of chronic and degenerative diseases that are collectively responsible for about 75% of deaths.
Obesity is responsible for 57% of cases of type 2 diabetes, 33% of cases of gallstones, and 19% of cases of cardiovascular disease. It is an established risk factor for a number of respiratory problems (including sleep apnea), arthrosis, and certain forms of cancer (cancer of the uterus, prostate, colon, and rectum). Excessive eating is in fact the cause of 30% of male cancers and 40% of female cancers, and a positive correlation between fat consumption and these diseases has been established. Obesity is also often at the origin of the multimetabolic syndrome: 14.8% of obese people over 18 suffer from at least two of the following diseases: heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension; 2% suffer from all three. Obesity is on the rise in all Western countries, to the point of being called an epidemic. About 1 billion people in the

world are overweight, and 300 million are obese. In the industrialised world, about half of the population is overweight.
The population is therefore also growing exponentially in our country: in Italy, there are about 4 million obese adults and 16 million overweight adults, an increase of about 25 percent since 1994 (an increase in line with that recorded in other European countries).
The problem is more widespread among men than among women: 9.2% of males are obese and 42.4% are overweight, compared to 8.8% and 26% of females, respectively. Among women, being underweight is more common, especially among the very young.
It is conceivable that women pay more attention to maintaining their weight under control, which may also contribute to this significant difference between the sexes.
The proportion of obese people increases with age: only 1.6 percent among 18–24-year-olds, 12.4 percent among 45–54-year-olds, peaking at 14.4 percent among 55–64-year-olds, and 14.2 percent among 65–74-year-olds. Immediately after the age of 18 to 24, the percentage of overweight individuals among men rises considerably. The age most at risk for women is between 65 and 74 years; for men, it is between 55 and 64 years.
The territorial analysis reveals rather significant differences in the incidence of the phenomenon. Overweight people are more numerous in the South (37.1%) and the Islands (34.7%) and less so in the North-West (30.6%), the Centre (32.5%), and the North-East (33%).
The regions where overweight is particularly widespread are Campania (39%), Calabria (37.8%), Molise, and Basilicata, with the same percentage share (37%); the shares are lower in Valle d'Aosta (28.9%) and Trentino Alto Adige (29.7%).
Obesity also shows a higher prevalence in the South. In the North West, 7.8 percent of the population is obese; in the Centre, 7.9 percent; in the North East, 8.9 percent; in the Islands, 9.5 percent; and in the South, 10.8 percent.
The highest percentage of obesity is found in Molise (12.8%) and Campania (11.2%), the lowest in Trentino Alto Adige (6.9%). Even more significant than among adults was the increase in the incidence of obesity and overweight among children.
An overweight child can therefore be defined as a child whose weight exceeds the ideal weight in relation to height by 10–20%, and an obese child whose weight exceeds the ideal weight by 20%.
In this respect, Italian children are the fattest in Europe: 36% are overweight, compared to 27% in Spain, 24% in Switzerland, 20% in England, 19% in France, and 14% in Germany. Much lower is the rate in poorer countries such as Russia and Poland (9%).
On the other hand, 10–12% of children are obese (according to 2003 data), with percentages below 10% before the age of 9 and higher percentages between 9 and 13; as for adults, the incidence is higher among boys than among girls and in the South.
One in three obese children is already developing other related diseases such as hypertension, increased blood triglycerides, low 'good' cholesterol values, insulin resistance, and diabetes.
Obesity-related healthcare costs amount to EUR 22.8 billion in our country, or 6–7% of total healthcare expenditure (in the USA, 12%). Hospital costs account for 65% of this figure.
The social costs are also high: 75.5% of Italians suffering from obesity give up work, 7.2 percent decrease it, and 12.5% are forced to change their type of activity.
A survey conducted in 2003 by Eurispes on a sample of more than 5,000 children between the ages of 7 and 11 gives some indications of the main eating habits of Italian minors. The data show that although the majority of those interviewed eat fruit every day (51%), there is no shortage of those who eat it rarely or never. More discouraging is the situation regarding vegetable consumption: only 25.7% of the sample eats it every day, while 15.7% never eat it.
38.6% of the young respondents eat sweets once or twice a week, 31.5% often, and 13.9% every day. The majority of the children eat pasta or rice often or every day, according to the tradition of Mediterranean cuisine; however, 27.1% say they eat it only once or twice a week and 4.4% never. 54.9 percent of the sample often eat meat, or 14.8% every day. It should be remembered that meat provides important proteins for growth, but as it also contains animal fat, its consumption should be limited. Cheese is also an important food during childhood as it is a good source of calcium and phosphorus, but its consumption, again, should not be excessive as it contains a good amount of animal fat; 32.3% of the

children eat it often and 20% every day. The habit of eating outside meals is also widespread among children (only 7% say they do not do so), favouring, according to the results of the survey, products that are appetising and satisfying from the point of view of taste but of reduced nutritional value or excessively rich in calories, sugar, and cholesterol. The favourite foods outside meals are pizza (22.5%), yoghurt and ice cream (16.2%), sandwiches (14.1%), but also crisps (11.8%), snacks (7.9%), and chocolate or sweets (6%). Fortunately, 12% of children eat a piece of fruit outside of meals, but this is a minority compared to the very young, who are tempted by tastier, less healthy snacks.
Another factor of great importance for an individual's weight and general physical condition is physical activity. Data from 2001 shows that only in the age group of 6 to 17 years do most people engage in sports or other physical activities. The percentages drop rapidly to 35.4% already between the ages of 25 and 34, dropping to well below one third of the total from the age of 35 onwards. Overall, only 33.6 percent of the population over the age of three practises sports, a figure that marks a slight drop compared to 1997 (34.4 percent). As far as diets are concerned, almost one in five overweight people unfortunately resort to 'do-it-yourself' to start a diet; many turn to centres or people lacking the necessary professionalism (door-to-door sales, Internet), but only about 60% turn to a specialist or family doctor (more than a quarter of overweight people, on the other hand, have never undergone a diet).
Confirming this dangerous trend, the Italian market for food supplements and slimming products reached a figure of 1,585 million euros in 2002, with an average annual expenditure of 500 euros per person. There are about 3 million consumers, mainly women between the ages of 25 and 34.

Fact Sheet 58 | The writing phenomenon: comparing narratives

Writing as a new form of vandalism, advertising, or political expression. Writing can be both an expression of deviance for the shopkeeper who sees the shop shutter covered in tags, perhaps freshly repainted, and a vehicle of enrichment for the advertiser who sees in writing a perfect writing style for his planned 'underground' advertising. Differentiation also affects the writing population within it; in this sense, talking about 'writers' is an oversimplification. We are now dealing with heterogeneous identity systems that are irreducible to each other, elements of a centrifugal universe.
In the novelty of the code, in the content of the text, in the choice of using walls and trains as canvases, lie probably the greatest 'impertinences' of writing. But what do young people think of it?
An Eurispes survey carried out in 2003 on a sample of 5,710 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 19 showed that most of them considered them to be an artistic expression (44.1%) or a way to express their opinions (24.1%), and that 7.8% preferred them to advertising posters.
We can therefore say that 76% of adolescents express a favourable opinion of painting on noncanonical 'canvases, such as walls and trains. 21.7% condemn them, believing, in 14.4% of cases, that they are acts of vandalism and in 7.3% that, regardless of intentions, they beautify the city. Only 0.8% of the sample recognises them as a political expression, recovering the connotation that characterised the phenomenon when it was born.
The various forms and contexts in which writing appears appear to partially explain the diversity of representations. When asked where they consider it permissible to paint graffiti (a train, a wall, a monument, a building), 60.1% of the young people stated that it is quite permissible to paint on a wall, recognising the graffiti's function of embellishing otherwise anonymous or abandoned parts of the city. They consider it less permissible to paint on the side of a train (36%), probably because they experience firsthand the discomfort caused by the darkening of the windows but also the different quality of the graffiti, which is as 'fast' as the medium on which it is painted. Only 20.3% consider it lawful to paint a building, and only 7% consider it a monument. In these cases, the contrast between freedom of expression and the protection of private and public property probably becomes more evident. In short, the meaning of writing is problematized and anchored to criteria that seem to trace the possibility of coexistence in a civic sense.
However, the boundaries between licit and non-licit are not identical across age groups. Splitting the data reveals that the phenomenon is more tolerated by young people (15–19 years old) than by the very

young (12–14 years old). Both are more in favour of graffiti on a wall than graffiti on a train, a building, or a historical monument, but with notable differences. 65.2% of 15–19-year-olds consider it permissible to paint on a wall, 41.1% also on a train, and 20.3% on a building; the percentages drop to 54.7%, 29.7%, and 19.6% for 12–14-year-olds, respectively.

We can hypothesise that the rules and representations of adults carry more weight with the youngest children, that being older favours a more multifaceted interpretation of the phenomenon, and/or that the reasons for a gesture that also refers to the search for an identity, the culture of risk, and the protest against what is established are clearer to those who, due to their life cycle phase, are more likely to share the crises and transformations. Not without limits, however: graffiti on a monument is condemned by 92.8% of 15–19-year-olds and 87.9% of 12–14-year-olds. In short, older children are more tolerant of those who 'break the rules', but only as long as what is presented now as art, now as a need, now as freedom of expression, does not claim to erase and deface other expressions, other historically and collectively recognised arts.

The breakdown of the data by gender reveals that although 44.5% of boys and 43.3% of girls agree that graffiti is an artistic expression, boys express negative opinions more than girls of the same age. In fact, they are more inclined to consider graffiti acts of vandalism (16.3% compared to 12.6% of teenage girls) and to say that it makes the city ugly (7.8% compared to 6.8% for girls). On the other hand, the percentage of those who consider graffiti a means of expressing their opinions is particularly high among girls (28%, against a male figure of 20.7%).

In relation to the medium used, it emerges that boys and girls agree that graffiti on walls is more permissible than graffiti drawn on trains, although with less tolerance on the part of males (39.3% consider it to be illegal, compared to 35.2% of female respondents). Girls are more severe with regard to graffiti on a building (illicit for 79.8% of female respondents and 72.1% of male respondents) or on a historical monument (91.4% against a male figure of 88.4%).

In all cases, the nature of the medium seems to be the discriminating criterion for labelling the event. Artists or vandals? The dichotomy seems to be a narrow one for teenagers, who see different motivations in the different choices of media.

Can we assume that the variety of connotations attributable to writing at least partly reflects the variety of cultures gravitating towards it? Is the writers' representation of writing univocal, the expression of a youth subculture that relates on the basis of shared meanings, or, rather, are there divergent representations, reflecting different cultures under the single name of 'writers'?

After observing how paradoxically there are more articles, discussions, public debates, and legislative measures than there are attempts to understand writing from the inside, a field study tried to provide an answer. To date, the research, which involved 70 writers meeting in the provinces of Syracuse, Naples, Rome, and Milan, is one of the few sources for an analysis of the cultural characteristics of the phenomenon.

From the multiple correspondence analyses carried out on the content categories, four different cultural repertoires emerged. The first stand at the extremes of an axis interpreted as a continuum of degrees of reference to the group (the crew) and account for the variety of relationships between the writers. The other two, contrasted on an axis interpreted in terms of absent or present rules, clarify the variety of relationships that may exist between the writers and the wider context. The lack of reference to the group characterises the first two clusters, the most numerous of which are the "regulated experiential" writers and the "artists without a group" writers, in which a total of almost three-quarters (74.3%) of the interviewees are gathered. For the regulated experiential writers (42.9%), writing is a new form of personal expression, a performance through which they can express their emotions and feel fulfilled, but which does not require the presence of other writers in order to express themselves, as they are not adopted in order to be recognised.

Artist writers without a group (31.4%) reject conflict; they would not like problems, neither with people in general nor with other writers, and it is the latter who are mostly blamed for the lack of integration with the wider context.

By contrast, the absence of rules characterises the third and fourth clusters, in which a total of 1/4 (25.7%) of the interviewed writers are gathered.

The relationship with the group characterises more than other cultural organisers the relationship of militant writers with a group (11.4%), in which we find writers who categorically exclude the wall as a possible support for their piece and choose trains and subways, which are considered suitable for carrying their name around.
For the unruly writers (14.3%), writing is a socio-cultural fact that emerges from and denounces a lack of understanding of the rules and culture of the context in which one lives.
There is therefore no aspiration to reduce the 'noise'; if anything, it is intended to amplify it. The dominant logic is challenged through a gesture that violates the codes and things of others in order to question, along with them, the cultural models of which they are reflections. These, in short, are the codes with which the writers make sense of reality, codes that then guide their behaviour. Finally, the analysis revealed that three-quarters of the writers interviewed propose an integration between writing and the wider context and do so by 'offering' rules relating to the way of relating to the Other, understood as the social and cultural environment.

Fact Sheet 59 | Violent typhus

But what do the fans, the ultras, think of the violence in the stadiums? Do they recognise themselves in these representations? Certainly today they express their opinions much more often, even outside the stadium: they have found new forms of aggregation that are not based exclusively on support for their own team but are based on an awareness of their own role within the entire football system; not only that, they express their point of view using communication channels other than banners, which nevertheless remain the most visible and incisive means of expression. Data provided by the Centre for Public Safety Studies, in fact, show that 175 banners were displayed during the last championship (in the 2001/2002 championship, there were 169). While sporting themes prevailed (77% of banners), political, racist, and anti-racist banners also found space in the corners.
In 20 percent of cases, the ultras also speak out on political issues, while significantly less space is devoted to racism (2 percent) and anti-racism (1 percent).
Alongside the 'traditional' communication channel, numerous Internet sites dedicated to cheering have also flourished; the ultras also publish gazettes, or fanzines, to advance their ideas on football, on the police, and on society as a whole.
Let us now turn to the 'numbers' of violent supporters, which can be found in the report 'Analysis of the phenomenon of violence in stadiums' of the Department of Public Security, and refer to last year's football championship. There were 250 incidents of intemperance in the 2002/2003 championship, 28% more than the previous year (195). As can be seen from the data, the number of incidents in the last championship increased compared to the previous year, but almost exclusively those of low or very low severity. The average percentage increase in the latter is, in fact, 68 percent; in contrast, grade 3 accidents remained unchanged, while grade 1 accidents fell by 4 percent.
The incidents are also disaggregated by the place where they occur: they can occur inside the stadium, outside, or away.
During the last championship, only one-fifth (21.1 percent) of violent incidents occurred inside the stadium, while almost 70 percent occurred outside it. The latter type of incident underwent an average percentage increase of 33% compared to the previous championship. In contrast, accidents during away matches decreased by almost 50 percent. Accidents inside the stadium suffered an average percentage reduction of 13.1%. As far as incidents outside the stadium are concerned, most of them occurred in the area in front of the stadium, either before the match (36.9%) or after it (42.3%). According to the report, In analyses *of the phenomenon of violence in stadiums, the* former can be attributed to attempts to enter the stadium without a ticket, rivalry between the opposing fans, and hostility towards the police, while the latter, those occurring at the end of the match, are almost entirely attributable to rivalry between the fans and the result of the match. In the area in front of the stadium, therefore, the incidents that most characterise the intemperance and aggressiveness of the ultras occur: First, the phase of the influx of spectators inside the sports complexes has always been considered one of the most 'delicate. The last

championship was then characterised by numerous 'controversies', also within the curves, on the increase in the cost of tickets, which, together with the raging of pay-TV, were two of the 'hottest' issues debated by the ultras. As far as the rivalry between the opposing fans and the Police Force is concerned, it has already been said that it is, in some way, the glue of the Ultrà groups, the means through which they build and strengthen their own identities.

On the other hand, as the figures show, incidents on the way from the station to the stadium, or vice versa, both before and after the football match, are of little significance. This is probably due to the encouragement, also implemented through the abolition of the 'special trains' service for fans,

arranged in 1999 by the government in cooperation with the State Railways for the use of alternative means of transport to trains.

The incidents of intemperance that occurred inside the stadium in the 2002/2003 championship can be exemplified as follows:

In more than half of the cases (62.7%), violent incidents can be attributed to the throwing of blunt objects or pyrotechnic devices, incidents that underwent an average percentage increase of 59.5% compared to the previous championship. On the other hand, there was a clear decrease in pitch invasions, which represented the second most frequently recorded type of incident, albeit to a lesser extent than the previous one; in fact, they characterised only 13.8% of the incidents of intemperance, also registering an average percentage decrease of 27.8%. Simple encroachment attempts, on the other hand, increased by 28.6%, reaching a share of 9.6% of the total number of incidents recorded. These data, together with those of actual invasions (which, on the other hand, are clearly decreasing), could suggest a greater incisiveness of the control by the police, who more frequently succeed in preventing attempts from turning into successes. They reveal, furthermore, a net weakening of the 'classic' phenomena of intemperance carried out by the ultras, i.e., those that have most characterised the ultras movement since its birth.

Compared to 2001/2002, clashes between opposing supporters also decreased significantly, accounting for 4.3% of the violent incidents recorded in 2002/2003. They are, however, at a lower level than clashes with the police (6.4%), which recorded a net decrease of 62.5% compared to the previous year. This could suggest a 'softening' of relations between the ultras and the police, although in the report drawn up by the Centre for the Study of Public Security, the level of guard against the congenital rancour of the organised supporters towards the Police Force remains very high. In fact, looking at the causes of the incidents recorded in the 2002/2003 championship (which cannot be compared with those of the previous year due to a different classification of causes), animosity towards the police 'explains' 21.3% of them. In this case, we refer to all possible incidents encountered, both inside and outside the stadium, as well as during the away match.

However, the element that most triggers phenomena of violence remains the 'historical' rivalry between fans, which was the cause of 45.4% of the episodes of intemperance. Therefore, the need to have an enemy to fight against and against whom to build and consolidate one's identity does not seem to lose strength.

But beyond this type of violence, which is more traditional and consolidated in the ultra world, it is interesting to note that almost one third of the incidents (28.1%) are due to pure fan vandalism, whose motives are difficult to trace and whose consequences are impossible to predict from time to time. Despite the capillary controls, the division of antagonistic supporters, and the militarization of stadiums so much opposed by the ultra, vandalism has not yet found suitable tools to combat it.

The incidence of causes more strictly related to the game of football was derisory: 2.4 percent of the incidents occurred to challenge the team or the club; only 0.9 percent of the violent incidents, on the other hand, were instigated by refereeing decisions deemed to be incorrect.

Fact Sheet 60 | An ambiguous society: between Catholicism and pragmatism

Some data confirm that the majority of Italians who claim to be believers no longer consider their religion to be their only true belief.

68% are convinced that 'important truths' can be found in other religious doctrines. Even 25% believe that those same truths are present in "all religions". Only 27.6% remain firmly convinced that Catholicism is the only possible truth.

62.7% of respondents believe that religion should in no way influence politics. Only 4.5% believe the opposite.

- 4% believe in a God with whom they can establish a personal relationship, and 35.9% are convinced that God "is within us and in nature". Only 4.6% do not believe "in any kind of God."
- 58% barely believe that Jesus "is God and man". As many as 12.4% affirm that he was neither one nor the other. Those uncertain about the Christ figure come to 22%;
- Only 25.3% are certain that the Bible is the "true word of God," while 40.2% believe that "men inspired by God" wrote it.
- 40%, in their approach to the afterlife, answered that they believe in 'something, but I don't know what' after death. Only 16.8% asserted that death is the end of everything, while a similar figure, 16.9%, canonically expects to 'go to heaven or hell'.

So what is happening in Catholic Italy?

In short, Third Millennium Catholics seem inclined to profess a 'do-it-yourself' religion.

Analysing the area of values and behaviour pertaining to morality, it can be seen that the greatest distances are observed between the most committed young Catholics and non-religious young people, particularly on issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and relations with married people. One third of Catholics consider them permissible, compared to two thirds of the others.

Distances narrow significantly on other topics such as divorce, cohabitation, and sexual relations without marriage. On these topics, young Catholics come closer to the orientations of their peers while distancing themselves from the absolutely opposite types of behaviour recommended by the Church. Furthermore, one third of Catholics and 70% of atheists admit euthanasia; two thirds and 84%, respectively, of the two groups are in favour of assisted procreation techniques, while a very large majority of both groups are in favour of organ donation.

In summary, the influence of religion appears relevant only for the most committed young Catholics, while it is weak and discontinuous among the large proportion of young people belonging to the so-called majority religion. In a recent survey, 120 Romans, 16–18-year-olds and 24-26-year-olds, spoke freely about their faith. Those belonging to 'church groups' of respondents accounted for only 10% of the sample, but even in this restricted area, Christian doctrine and practise seem to waver. Among the adolescents in the various church groups, 12% even doubt the existence of God. And even among those who believe in His existence, almost one in four doubts that He is the creator of heaven and earth. As for assiduity and attendance at church services, in general, girls feel much closer to the Church than their male peers. Among the latter, only those who belong to church groups go to Mass on Sundays, and not even all of them, whereas among females, the proportion is higher and also includes those who do not belong to groups.

Another problem is the low willingness to change, which could be attributable to the rather high average age of the clergy. In 2000, as many as 56% of Italian clergy were over 60 years old. Disaggregating the data, 13% are over 80 years old, 22% are between 70 and 79, and 21% are between 60 and 69. Even when analysing the segment of seminarians, the true driving force of the Church as the guarantor of clerical staff coverage as well as of generational turnover, the data do not appear comforting. The total number of seminarians would amount to 3,231, out of a total number of diocesan priests of 36,117, with a ratio of seminarians to diocesan priests of 11.1%.

Taking into account a number of parameters, such as the time required for seminary study, the age at which one enters the seminary, the average age of priests, and the year of retirement of priests (set at 75), the value above which the ratio of seminarians to priests guarantees a turnover should be 12.5%. In this scenario, the role of the family also changes.

Continuous changes and redefinitions shape the family universe, not only on a relational level but also from a structural point of view.

Such an articulated definition is in contrast with that of the Church, which places the family in the more circumscribed sphere of the sacred bond of marriage, although the general trend of nuptiality shows a tendency to attribute less and less value to the formalisation of unions. Between 1997 and 2001, the

percentage of religious marriages appeared to be decreasing, with a significant increase in those with a civil ceremony (+6.1%). In the last fifty years, the number of registered families has almost doubled, going from 11,800,000 in 1951 to over 22 million in 2001. Over the same period, the increase in population was only 21%.
According to a survey conducted in 2000, changes in family forms are linked to a decrease in the number of household members, from an average of 4.0 to the current average of 2.6. A process of simplification of family structures has also been triggered, with families of one or two members increasing from 43% to 48% and families of four members or more decreasing from 34% to 29% of the total. Significant in this regard has been the increase in singles and childless couples, as well as the reduction in the number of couples with children.
Changes in family structures should be read in the light of the social and cultural transformations brought about by the individualization and secularisation processes of recent decades.
Two out of every 100 births in our country already take place through reproductive technology, with more than
12,000 children were born in the last five years and conceived in test tubes.
With regard to the use of contraceptives, the results of the Eurispes survey, conducted in January 2003 on a sample of 2,000 interviewees representative of the adult Italian population, stratified by sex, age, and regional macro-area of belonging, show how widespread and unanimously approved their use is. Catholic Italy now seems to be marked by rather desecrating traditional customs and beliefs.
And even on the subject of abortion, the results of the Eurispes survey send back the image of a strongly secular country, resolutely in defence of the rights to free choice and conscious motherhood.
When asked to analyse Italians' opinions on Law 194/78, which legalised abortion in our country, 63.8% of the sample replied that the law sanctioned the right to bring children into the world consciously and responsibly and that it therefore represented a civil conquest for Italy. On the other hand, 28.2% of the population believes that Law 194 denies the right to life, while 8% of the sample could not express a clear opinion on the matter.
On the subject of homosexuality, then, in order to investigate whether the opinions of those interviewed were in line with Catholic morality, Eurispes conducted a survey on a sample of 2,000 people.
For 55.2% of women, homosexuality is as much a form of love as heterosexuality, but it is also so for more than 43% of men, although 37.3% of them declare themselves tolerant as long as it is not practised.
The age group of the sample proves to be a significant variable. The percentage of those who consider homosexuality to be a form of love is inversely proportional to the age of the respondents. In fact, it amounts to 59.2% in the 18–24 age group, while it drops to 36.9% in the over-65 age group.
On the other hand, the percentage share of those who consider homosexuality immoral is directly proportional to age, rising from 6.3% in the lowest bracket to 10.3% in the highest, a direct consequence of the fact that homosexuality today, unlike what happened a few decades ago, is no longer lived in hiding, and the new generations naturally relate to what was considered diversity by previous generations.
Civil marriage between same-sex couples is considered by more than 50% of the sample to be an individual choice, which involves those concerned and offers them, in addition to social recognition, important guarantees. This trend stands in clear contradiction to the Church's attitude.
The Catholic Church has long since intervened decisively on the issues of euthanasia, organ donation, and genetic manipulation.
On euthanasia, the moral condemnation is clear, severe, and without exception, in line with the entire Christian tradition, solemnly reconfirmed by the Second Vatican Council.
But what do Italians think about euthanasia?
Compared to the past, Italians are much more favourably disposed towards euthanasia. The numerous borderline cases commented on by the media have evidently conditioned public opinion to the point that the absolute defence of the value of life is beginning to give way to a more careful assessment of its quality. As early as 1987, in a survey conducted by Eurispes, over 40% of Italians declared themselves against euthanasia. In 2002, the percentage in favour was close to 60%, but with a considerable percentage difference between the opinions expressed by women (55.2%) and men (63.9%). Women, guarantors of the survival of the human race and, for years, traditionally the only ones responsible for

childcare, seem inclined to accept euthanasia only in cases of extreme gravity. Data for 2002 on human organ donation and transplantation show that in organ donation, Italy is second only to Spain among European countries, with 18.1 donors per million inhabitants. Data updated to October 2003 by the National Transplant Centre show that 1,473 kidney, 864 liver, 318 heart, 62 lung, and 94 pancreas transplants were carried out during the year. Italy ranks first in Europe for tissue donation, with 98 corneal donors per million inhabitants, followed by France with 75 and Spain with 60.
As is well known, organ donation presents the issue of determining death, which may lead to the removal of crucial organs. The Church's position is identical in the case of therapeutic cloning, i.e., the use, for research purposes, of stem cells obtained from frozen embryos obtained in supernumerary quantities for reproductive purposes and no longer implantable.
A large majority of Italians, however, are not of the same opinion, as 60.9% of respondents are in favour of the possibility of cloning for scientific research purposes, while almost 30% of respondents say they are against it, and one Italian in ten has no clear position on the matter or prefers not to answer (Eurispes data 2003).